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PART ONE: MINIMALISM AS DYNAMIC MOVEMENT 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
a) Principal thesis and structural overview 
 
The thesis of the present work is that minimalism exemplifies the facticity and persistence of the Real. 
Grounding this assertion is the fundamental distinction between Being
1
 or pure multiplicity, and 
existence, which involves the subtraction of contingent unities from such multiplicity without reducing 
the latter.
2
 Accepting this distinction, it becomes possible to recognize that, from both an ontological and 
an existential perspective, minimalism discovers distinctive articulations. From the perspective of 
ontology, minimalism expresses its poietic in the terms of quantity – a quantity from which are drawn its 
existential qualities. From an existential perspective, minimalism emerges by a logic of transumption – “a 
poetics involving transference from one part or place to another, and marking that transference in a 
material way.”3  
 
In the case of minimalism, this transumption is from the material place of the work to its poietic taking-
place.
4
 If this taking-place manifests in terms of a radical reconsideration of the spatial and temporal 
aspects of objecthood, its principal predication is atopian – the manifestation of a poietic non-space upon 
which the rehearsal of generativity itself is maximally visible. Such minimalist transumption manifests in 
three principal ways: in terms of containment or convergence, in which the restriction or unification of 
properties defines the parameters of the work; distension, which results from the redefinition of 
minimalist materialism in terms of process; and distribution, which is marked by the transformation of the 
                                                          
1
 Here the upper-case Being is used to designate the ontological field as a whole – that which Badiou refers to as 
being qua being – whereas the lower-case being is more or less co-extensive with existents – those things which are 
subtracted from pure Being and which Badiou refers to in terms of being qua existence. The preference of specific 
writers has been followed for the most part – Badiou‟s being qua being and being qua existence, and Agamben‟s 
whatever being foremost amongst these. 
2
 Alain Badiou, “The Question of Being Today,” Theoretical Writings, ed. and trans. Ray Brassier and Alberto 
Toscano (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 46-8. Collection hereafter TW. 
3
 Stephen Bann, “A Poetics of Transumption,” Cosmopoetics, St. John‟s College, Durham University, 8 September 
2010. 
4
 The significance of the term taking-place is explained below. 
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constituent medium of the work or its exposition qua medium. In this context, the Real reaches across the 
ontological and the existential in order to clarify the relation between these two.  
 
The discussion investigates these claims in three parts. The first part, including the present introductory 
section, offers a brief overview of the argument and its structure by presenting the primary thesis upon 
which the argument hinges (stated above), then laying out a number of sub-theses required to confirm and 
demonstrate the validity of the thesis. The opening section includes concise accounts of the two terms at 
the heart of this thesis: minimalism and the Real. 
 
Regarding minimalism, a brief examination is offered of that which is delimited by this term. Minimalism 
offers a dynamic field upon which to reappraise the notion of an aesthetic
5
 movement. Rapidly tracing its 
origins, development and criticism from several distinct perspectives, the introductory account argues that 
minimalism identifies itself by a peculiar reflexivity, at once concerned with the formal – indeed formalist 
– aspects of its emergence, and the ontological and existential material from which its objects take their 
shape. These ontological and existential modalities by which minimalism is recognized – quantity and 
transumption – are inextricable from a type of realism, neither naive nor dogmatic, which is marked by 
the actual taking-place
6
 of entities. Briefly, such taking-place recognizes that “the pure transcendent is the 
taking-place of every thing...[B]eing irreparably in the world is what transcends and exposes every 
worldly entity.”7 In its taking-place the facticity of minimalism is also defined. The Real, in turn, names 
the quantitative ontological ground to which minimalism attests: that which is Real conjoins the 
contingency of every entity in any existential situation and the irreversible temporal passage within which 
such entities manifest; what is Real is a contingent entity taking-place in time.  
 
The second section explores the quantitative ontology by which minimalism expresses itself in relation to 
the Real. Challenging the predominantly qualitative understanding of phenomena, the argument takes its 
initial direction from the manner in which minimalist aesthetic objects reflect the quantitative basis of 
Being, exemplifying the ateleological immanence of their own taking-place. Illustrated by diverse 
examples, minimalist art renders maximally visible this quantitative dimension of Being and its relation to 
                                                          
5
 The terms art and aesthetic are employed in their broadest sense in the following work. Art is used to encompass 
all creative disciplines – their objects, properties and processes – irrespective of the medium or media through which 
they are expressed. Similarly, the term aesthetic is used in relation to art, and so, unless otherwise specified, is 
applied in its broadest sense.  
6
 Taking-place – a central term in the following study – is developed from the commentary of Giorgio Agamben on 
the philosophy of Amalric of Bena, and is discussed in some detail subsequently (Giorgio Agamben, The Coming 
Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis and London: U of Minnesota P, 1993), 13-5. Hereafter CC.  
7
 CC, 15. 
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ontological realism. To claim that minimalism is primarily concerned with an exposition of quantity is not 
to deny that its objects have qualities, or that these qualities lack significance or meaning. Rather, the 
possibility of the latter is predicated on the coherence of the former. Returning to the Parmenidean axiom 
of the One and the Multiple as the point of departure for any ontology, the present work favours the view, 
elaborated by Alain Badiou, that Being is multiple. Upon this understanding, every existential situation in 
which a Real entity is subtracted from pure multiplicity, involves a process by which multiplicity is 
counted-as-One.
8
 Minimalism clarifies in its objects both the Count and the Real – the contingent stability 
and the contingent taking-place of entities. The tension between contingency and stability is reflected in 
the manner in which minimalism embraces simultaneously an aesthetic of eschewal and negation, and one 
of production or poiesis. Regarding the former, minimalism offers a potent account of the sublation – a 
lessness which, pressed further towards the Void, touches the very heart of the questions of death, 
disappearance and nothingness.  
 
Closely tracing the negative aspect of minimalism paradoxically returns us to the positivity of process: a 
poietic – that is, productive – impasse between the minimalist object on the one hand as absolutely 
independent and on the other as the product of perception. To examine this problem, the discussion traces 
the several intersection of the trajectories of nihilism, existentialism and the minimalist aesthetic. In 
particular, it sets about re-examining Levinas‟ proposition of the il y a – an important ontological precept 
which is habitually misinterpreted or oversimplified – as the negative approximation of the Real. 
Negation and the philosophical discourse on nothingness finally point back to the sheer facticity of the 
Real to which minimalism attests.  
 
Having established that the ontological modality of minimalism is quantitative, and briefly evaluated the 
claims of pure quantity against those of a qualitative phenomenology, the third section turns with greater 
vigour to the manner in which minimalism manifests in existential terms by a logic of transumption – the 
subtraction of poietic force from pure quantity, so that it might be predicated in aesthetic terms. That such 
transumption is exemplified with particular clarity by minimalism and its objects is a central tenet of the 
argument. Minimalism, in fact, constitutes an aesthetic field occupied by theoretical objects – objects in 
search of a theory, one might say, which by their very taking-place obviate any simple distinction of 
theory from praxis by posing at their heart a question of considerable significance to the present study: 
can a theory of minimalism confirm the sheer facticity of its taking-place solely by the instantiation of its 
                                                          
8
 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London and New York: Continuum, 2005), 23. Hereafter 
BE. When One is presented in the upper-case it is to identify the function of ontological unicity from the 
commonplace numerical use. 
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objects? In fact, minimalism effects a curious tension between its objects, their theoretical constitution, 
and a meta-theoretical understanding of the force of poietic instantiation itself. The present study suggests 
that this tension is explicable in terms of the aesthetic of concretism.  
 
Concretism is examined as a transhistorical
9
 and transmediary phenomenon – at many points parallel in 
emphasis yet distinct from minimalism; at others, furnishing minimalism with of its most significant 
examples. From its theurgical origins in the visual and sonic genres and forms of classical antiquity, 
through to its extensive presence in the historical avant-gardes of the twentieth century – Futurism, 
Dadaism, Concrete poetry, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, and various experiments in new and hypermedia – 
concretism constitutes a significant position against which many of minimalism‟s most significant 
characteristics might be measured. A patient examination of the concrete aesthetic is undertaken, 
exposing the points of contact between concretism and minimalism, and illustrating the conditions under 
which poietic atopia becomes evident – a non-space between matter and concept in which we glimpse 
poiesis itself. Here the distinction of art from non-art is crucial, a distinction which minimalists, echoing 
the Dadaists, habitually question, and occasionally refine.  
 
Visually, sonically, conceptually and linguistically navigated forms of concretism open significant 
avenues to minimalist objecthood – respectively in terms of the image, the pursuit of an ursound, the 
concept and the interplay of text and language. In all cases, the questions of medium and mediation reflect 
the difficulties which attend the subtraction of existence from Being. Is any medium sufficient ground for 
distinguishing existential from superficial consonances; is it plausible to reconsider the concreteness of 
minimalism in this seemingly abstract manner? Attending to these questions exposes with greater 
precision the considerable stakes of concretism – the intensity with which poietic material coheres in a 
maximally self-reflexive manner while presenting a minimal distance between form and content – which 
significantly reshapes our understanding of minimalism and its reach. The argument is made that the 
overarching concern of concretism is with the force of the example itself. Exemplarity is investigated as a 
measure of the intensity with which an entity renders itself knowable. Such knowability does not manifest 
in simple material terms, however, but, rather, constitutes an ontological field adjacent to the exemplary 
entity – a para-ontology.  
 
                                                          
9
 Except for the sake of consistency between sources in the cases of trans-ontology and trans-Being, non-hyphenated 
form have been preferred when using the prefix trans. 
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Our attention is turned to the recognition that the exemplary force which establishes a minimalist para-
ontology is, finally, nothing other than an approximation of the force of production itself, or the means by 
which poietic effort is tied to, and exemplifies, the Real. The provocative situation arises in which the 
minimalist example is not only a meta-example – an example of exemplarity – but a presentation of the 
manner in which structural homology or isomorphism constitutes the basis of exemplary knowability, and 
possesses a genuine poietic or productive capacity. Having examined the terms of its principal thesis – 
that minimalism exemplifies the facticity and persistence of the Real – the work concludes by confirming 
the manner in which transumption is minimalism‟s proper existential logic. Throughout, three principal 
modalities have been emphasized: containment, distension and distribution. These are now offered as a 
typology of minimalism – one which encompasses well the principal concerns of the work as a whole, 
while drawing attention to the increasing significance which the minimalist aesthetic harbours in light of 
its progressive delineation.  
 
 
b) Sub-theses in support of the principal thesis 
 
It is now possible to offer in support of the primary thesis – that minimalism exemplifies the facticity and 
persistence of the Real – a number of sub-theses:   
 
i) Being and existence are nonidentical – the latter is subtracted from, but without reducing, the 
former. 
ii) Being is essentially quantitative.  
iii) From this quantity is drawn all that can be considered Real.  
iv) The Real, in turn, is what guarantees the persistence of entities – a persistence defined by the 
capacity of entities to continue in some existential situation over a period of time; persistent 
entities, conversely, guarantee the facticity of the Real.   
v) Such entities – which simultaneously exemplify existential persistence, the Real, and 
ontological quantity – can be most reliably discovered in the situations in which they are 
produced. 
vi) Such production is apprehended most clearly when it is an end in itself – in other words, in 
terms of poiesis, which habitually generates as its products entities which belong to the 
various fields of art. 
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vii) Within art, the persistent quantity of the Real is exemplified with great force in works which 
admit minimal impediments to apprehending the facticity of the taking-place of the Real. 
viii) The existential modality within which such poietic activity takes place might be defined by 
various types of minimalism, affirming which requires us to revisit and extend the theoretical, 
historical and aesthetic definition of minimalism.   
ix) The existential modality of minimalism is transumptive, exemplifying poietic activity in 
terms of a displacement which manifests by three principal types of minimalism: 
containment, distension, and distribution. 
 
In summary, we might say that minimalism, by the poietic production of aesthetic entities which persist 
within the Real, exemplifies the fact that the Real exists. Existing as it does, minimalism revivifies realist 
ontological concerns alongside its radical re-examination of the media, forms and structure through which 
aesthetic expression, perception and exemplarity take place.  
 
 
 
 
2. MINIMALISM AS A DYNAMIC AESTHETIC MOVEMENT 
 
a) Minimalism as an existential modality 
 
The present work is not an historical study. The genealogy it offers is incomplete, with no final 
delineation of a period to which its claims apply. Nor is it a critical catalogue of minimalist works, 
although woven into its propositions is a range of examples drawn from every minimalist genre and style. 
Its principal claims are for the most part not causal, and contextual information is at no point mistaken or 
substituted for the emergence and persistence of entities themselves. Instead, it attempts to grasp 
minimalism as a dynamic aesthetic movement, directed by a theoretical reflexivity capable of recognizing 
that what minimalism is and how it is are inextricable: its content and modes of Being and existing are 
thoroughly interwoven. In the present work, existential modality is employed to describe the manner in 
which an entity exists. Having already drawn attention to the distinction of Being and existence, the 
present investigation of minimalism‟s ontological and existential modalities marks in its works a manner 
of Being capable of penetrating many different situations of existing; a manner of Being that marks in 
certain entities their intrinsic processes of existing and of becoming. To claim that minimalism is revealed 
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in existence by the transformative logic of transumption, is to recognize the manner in which numerous 
distinct minimalist phenomena, models and theories can be articulated simultaneously. Thus, 
minimalism‟s historical poignancy arrives precisely inasmuch as it exemplifies a distributed history, 
which proceeds obliquely through, and by its relation to, essentially transhistorical processes.  
 
Minimalism names an existential orientation towards fundamental ontological quantity: minimum is, after 
all, a quantitative marker – the least possible; the superlative form of that which is small or essential and, 
by extension, uncomplicated, direct or immanent, either in conception, as process, or as the product of 
such conception or process. Minimalism is used to designate forms, structures, systems and actual 
entities. Indeed, it has been and continues to be investigated in fields as diverse as computer 
programming, systems design, linguistics, sociology, theology, philosophy, law and art (including 
architecture and various types of design) as an orientation towards discovering and constructing the most 
essential, direct, simple and unambiguous access to the contents of these fields. As contemporary 
existence in a complex, network society increasingly migrates from an abstract theoretical frame to 
everyday praxis, is it not possible that minimalism will increasingly be offered not only as a utopian 
rhetorical counter to this situation, but, moreover, as a disciplined and systematic means of rendering such 
complexity intelligible?
10
  
 
 
b) The tension between stasis and dynamis in the concept of an aesthetic movement 
 
If minimalism marks simultaneously a quantitative logic of Being and the transumptive existential 
modality of its objects, there is compelling reason to suppose that it should be restricted neither to a single 
epoch nor to any particular medium, genre, style or type of expression. To retain the dynamic potential of 
minimalism compels us to challenge the idea that it might be understood in any simple sense as an 
aesthetic movement. Establishing the parameters of an aesthetic movement involves the construction of a 
unified field upon which is demonstrated, projected, or forced a relation of similarity between a number 
of entities, physical or conceptual. 
 
                                                          
10
 In this sense, minimalism would offer an alternative explanatory strategy to those configurations which attempt to 
model themselves in a manner not dissimilar to the phenomenon they seek to describe – autopoietic systems theory 
for example, as opposed to the minimalist account of multiplicity and complexity developed by set theory and 
translated into contemporary philosophical terms by Alain Badiou. 
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The advantages of classifying art in terms of distinct movements are several. The movement offers 
epistemological stability to entities often as diverse as they are similar. Thus comparison is rendered 
simpler: aesthetic works reveal their similarities and differences with greater transparency; processes of 
change – whether the gradual formation of trends or sudden shifts in aesthetic attitudes, means of 
production and theoretical understanding – are rendered more comprehensible, lending credence to the 
proposition of the causes and effects of such transformations. In this light, movements also appear to 
serve a weak predictive function regarding that which is likely to be produced, classified or reclassified 
with reference to a specific movement. Indeed, every movement has an ideological component which is 
deployed to foster certain attitudes, allegiances and opposition to a particular set of artworks.
11
  
  
Convenient as it may be, the paradox at the heart of the concept movement is a significant one: the point 
which promises to apprehend the relational dynamism of a situation prescribes not only stability, but 
often also imposes a type of stasis. Movements become problematic when boundaries which were 
intended to elucidate the manner in which entities belong to one another become confines encouraging 
oversimplification in order retrospectively to impose unity of purpose, or projectively to prevent dissent. 
In the case of minimalism, disproportionate critical energy has been expended on debating which 
chronological limits are most appropriate, which minimalist canon is least objectionable, and how to 
manoeuvre past aesthetic practitioners of every discipline who, for the most part, eschew the minimalist 
label.
12
 The cost has been the possibility of interpreting minimalism as a dynamic existential modality 
with radical ontological significance. In this light, the present discussion adopts the term canonical 
minimalism to describe the works most closely associable with a consciously minimalist aesthetic – works 
produced principally from the mid-1950s onward – while insisting that this very loosely defined canon in 
no sense constitutes the horizon of a minimalist movement per se.    
 
Giorgio Agamben insightfully encapsulates this problem by suggesting that “when the movement is there 
pretend it is not there and when it‟s not there pretend it is.”13 Yet, if this captures the dynamic by which a 
                                                          
11
 Following Danto, the non-hyphenated artwork has been preferred to art-work and art work except where it would 
alter quotations. 
12
 David Batchelor, Minimalism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), 6-7. Strickland reports that sculptors Robert 
Morris and Donald Judd, as well as composers Steve Reich and Philip Glass in music, objected vigorously to the 
term (Edward Strickland, Minimalism: Origins (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1993), 23), which is 
similarly rejected by writers Raymond Carver and Amy Hempel (Cynthia Whitney Hallett, Minimalism and the 
Short Story: Raymond Carver, Amy Hempel, and Mary Robison (Lewiston, Queenston and Lampeter: Edwin 
Mellen, 1999), 8-9). Admittedly, this position derives as much from significant conceptual and aesthetic differences 
as it does from the negative journalistic attention the term initially garnered (ibid.). 
13
 Giorgio Agamben, “Movement,” Uni.Nomade. Seminar War and Democracy, trans. Arianna Bove. 20 September 
2011 <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/giorgio-agamben/articles/movement/>. 
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movement applies, it fails to apprehend precisely what a movement means, “a word everyone seems to 
understand but no one defines,” at the risk of “compromising our choices and strategies.”14 If, as 
Agamben suggests, “terminology is the poetic, hence productive moment of thought,” then to name a 
movement – for “evidently in certain historical moments, certain codewords irresistibly impose 
themselves and become adopted by antagonistic positions”15 – is an act of considerable significance 
which permeates philosophy, science and politics as well as the aesthetic field.
16
 Agamben‟s central 
observation
17
 is that every movement claims for itself an exceptional status in relation to that which it 
organizes – a particular autonomy which necessitates that “the excluded elements from the movement 
come[...] back as what must be decided upon,”18 and hence that objects of a movement become subject to 
a certain stasis imposed by the movement itself.
19
 Thus we might understand the quasi-prophetic tone 
which in Danto‟s writing asserts “the end of the movement in the movement‟s beginning, the end of a 
period inscribed in its beginning.”20 The style of a particular movement is at once immanent and essential 
to that movement – exempt from the ordinary flow from cause to telos – yet, when interpreted 
diachronically, it gives the very shape that we conventionally term a linear history.
21
 In such a history, 
“art is killed by art”22 as we find “movements stopping but not ending, ending but not stopping, ending 
and stopping, and neither ending nor stopping.”23 The depth of consciousness of this situation as 
exemplified by minimalism
24
 places it in the singular position both of suspending the progressive vision 
of aesthetic movement and of reinvesting a dynamism within the notion of movement which is of 
considerable importance to the present work.
25
  
 
                                                          
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 It should be noted cursorily that Agamben‟s discussion centres on political questions which arise from the work of 
Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt who distinguishes between state, movement and people – the last depoliticized so that the 
movement is compelled to divide (repoliticize) and thus direct them according to the valences required to maintain 
or impose the state as sovereign entity (ibid.) – exposed, in turn, to an Aristotelian reconceptualization of movement 
(ibid).  
18
 Ibid. 
19
 “[T]he movement can only find its own being political by assigning to the unpolitical body of the people [an] 
internal caesura that allows for its politicization” (ibid.). 
20
 Arthur C. Danto, “Style and Narrative,” Beyond the Brillo Box: The Visual Arts in Post-Historical Perspective 
(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1992), 243. 
21
 Ibid., 246. 
22
 Ibid., 247. 
23
 Ibid.  
24
 Here I focus on Danto‟s argument in a manner with which he would doubtless be uncomfortable. To begin with, 
Pop Art and minimalism are for him symmetrical expressions of the same Hegelian consciousness of art historical 
termination. 
25
 See Gregory Battcock, Introduction, Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, ed. Gregory Battcock (New York: E.P. 
Dutton, 1968), 26. Collection hereafter MA. 
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For Agamben, preserving the dynamic potential of a movement resides in a return to a radical reappraisal 
of the Aristotelian understanding of dynamis and kinesis as charged by their relation to potentiality: “the 
act of a potenza as potenza [potentiality as potentiality], rather than the passage to act…[and as] an 
imperfect act, without an end.”26 This ateleological understanding of the movement returns us to a sense 
of immanent force in the present, oriented towards futurity, but which does not foreclose on the changing 
valences which entities may demonstrate in belonging to a particular movement. The present formulation 
– that an aesthetic movement unifies within a field of immanence the dynamic force of collectivity or 
belonging and a progression from the finitude of the past towards an indefinite futurity, a progression 
which renders identification possible without imposing any final identity – recalls that which Alain 
Badiou understands in terms of truth procedure. Like a movement, a truth “makes it possible to group the 
elements of a situation so that they all count in the same way.”27 “[T]ruths, and truths, alone, unify 
worlds,” Badiou claims. “They transfix the disparate composites of bodies and language in such a way 
that…these are, as it were, welded together…Only a truth opens…the world-to-come.”28  
 
 
c) Naming minimalism 
 
The name of a movement is of considerable significance to the force it signifies or exercises in its relation 
of, and to, a truth procedure, operating as a type of ontological paradigm within which the understanding 
of the entity which it denominates unfolds. In Caputo‟s estimation, “[n]ames belong to natural languages 
and are historically constituted or constructed.”29 Accepting this argument, it is no surprise to discover the 
significance of a nominal logic operating in all regions of philosophical history, from the pre-Socratic 
naming of substance in terms of elements, through the Platonic eidos – indicated ideal, independent form 
which is subsequently interpreted by Aristotle in terms of abstract universals. These pass through the 
theological significance of the name of God into the high nominalism of medieval scholasticism and into 
the Kantian a priori – perhaps the most powerful mark of that which the name lacks. One need look no 
further than Husserlian nominal acts, through which the intentional content of consciousness is 
confirmed, to witness the significance of names to phenomenologists. Indeed, the name is also placed at 
the centre of analytical theoretical counterpoints, expressed in Russell‟s idea of definite definitions or 
                                                          
26
 Agamben, Movement.   
27
 Peter Hallward, Introduction, Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, ed. Peter Hallward 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 9.  
28
 Alain Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity, 2011), 24. Hereafter SMP. 
29
 John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 2006), 2. 
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Kripke‟s rigid designators – a hermeneutically informed recapitulation of medieval nominalism30 in 
which the rigid designator “designates the same object in all possible worlds.”31 Contemporary 
continental philosophy frequently pauses on the significance of the name: it is central in Derrida‟s work, 
to Agamben‟s analysis of Aristotle, and, for Badiou, is a point of access between pure Being and 
existence.  
 
The present concern lies not with determining precisely how a name functions as it does, nor precisely 
what these functions are, but instead with recognizing that wherever a name is given, is applied, or applies 
itself, it reflects a frequently unarticulated ontological and existential commitment. This is precisely what 
is asserted in affirming that a name and entity coincide, that the name exceeds the possibility of its 
accurate application, or that reality cannot be equated with any act or process of nomination. In the case 
of minimalism, the pull between dynamic and static categorization is mirrored with surprising precision in 
the distinction of common from proper name, and in the designation of the movement by the lower-case 
minimalism or the upper-case Minimalism.  
 
The question of capitalization proves of considerable significance. Examining the manner in which each 
is deployed by minimalist critics, it becomes evident that the proper sphere of identity – specific location, 
stability, fixity – from which historical judgments and stylistic generalizations might be offered is 
indicated by the use of the upper-case Minimalism. By contrast, the lower-case minimalism indicates 
fluctuation, contingency, inclusiveness, but also a degree of vagueness.
32
 We might say that Minimalism 
is primarily concerned with asserting the stable being of an artefact-driven poetics, empowering the 
identification of a minimalist canon, while minimalism is concerned with an artefact-driven becoming – 
an immersion of concept and praxis within dynamic poietic modalities. In this light, we do well to 
recognize how readily the capitalized Minimalism converts poietic product into cultural capital. Studies of 
Minimalism tend to take relative chronological or historical stability as their point of departure. This is 
especially true of accounts contemporary with the widespread inception of the term,
33
 first applied to the 
aesthetic context in 1937 by John Graham,
34
 but more famously used in 1965 in the slight variation, 
                                                          
30
 John P. Burgess, “Why I am not a Nominalist,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 24:1 (1983), 96-7, 100.  
31
 Joseph LaPorte, “Rigid Designator,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 20 September 2011 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rigid-designators/#NamOrdDesIdeSta>.  
32
 See Robert Fink, Repeating Ourselves: American Minimal Music as Cultural Practice (Berkeley: U of California 
P, 2005), 19-21. 
33
 Edward Strickland offers an excellent overview of the development of minimalism as a critical and journalistic 
term, and the chronologies which discover their limits in relation to the several canonical understandings of 
minimalism which prevail in the majority of criticism (Strickland, Minimalism, 17-20). 
34
 Kenneth Baker, Minimalism: Art of Circumstance (New York: Abbeville, 1988), 17. 
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Minimal Art, by philosopher Richard Wollheim.
35
 Minimalism is similarly recognized as the appropriate 
and proper denomination
36
 for the abstract, direct and austere work of certain artists from the late 1950s 
into the 1960s by Gregory Battcock,
37
 Clement Greenberg,
38
 Barbara Rose
39
 and, perhaps most 
memorably, by John Perreault, who asserts that “[w]hat is minimal about Minimal Art...is the means, not 
the end.”40 Kenneth Baker‟s injunction to “[t]hink of „Minimalism‟ as the name not of an artistic style but 
of a historical moment, a brief outbreak of critical thought and invention in the cavalcade of postwar 
American art,”41 is emblematic of the symmetry between clear historical delimitation and the proper 
name, reflected also in the criticism of Marzona,
42
 Gablik,
43
 Batchelor
44
 and McDermott.
45
  
 
The converse trend – the use of the lower-case minimalism – is observable in criticism which identifies its 
objects primarily in terms of a conceptual orientation, an aesthetic sensibility, or existential modality. 
Several of these studies are transhistorical and transdisciplinary – Edward Strickland‟s Minimalism: 
Origins
46
 most notable amongst them,
47
 a model followed by Cheviakoff 
48
 and Bonet,
49
 and, more 
narrowly, in Schwartz‟s account of musical minimalism.50 More focused are the enquiries of Colpitt51 and 
Potter,
52
 both shaped by formalist analytical concerns, yet which retain dynamism in their approaches. 
While Colpitt stresses of her study that “Minimalism is not used here with a lowercase m...[but] restricted 
to those artists who shared a philosophical commitment to the abstract, anticompositional, material 
                                                          
35
 Richard Wollheim, “Minimal Art,” MA, 388.  
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40
 John Perreault, “Minimal Abstracts,” MA, 260. 
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43
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114. 
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Cologne, 2006), 24-33. 
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 K. Robert Schwartz, Minimalists (London: Phaedon, 1996).  
51
 Colpitt, Minimal Art.  
52
 Keith Potter, Four Musical Minimalist: La Monte Young, Terry Riley, Steve Reich, Philip Glass (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2000). 
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object,”53 her notion of movement remains dynamic inasmuch as it is informed by the properties of the 
entities in question rather than by the means through which they are stabilized. Similar on account of its 
subtlety regarding formal question, is Potter‟s study, drawing specific attention to his preference for the 
lower-case minimalism on account of what he perceives as the rather more liberal application of the term 
in music.
54
  
 
The analyses of minimalism offered by Hal Foster,
55
 Walter Benn Michaels
56
 and Christopher Lasch
57
 are 
directed by broader theoretical questions so that minimalism is itself understood as part of a conceptual 
complex with an expansive shape. Similarly, Mertens,
58
 Meyer
59
 and Fink
60
 all place an emphasis on 
minimalism as a dynamic system in which art interacts, often polemically, with a nexus of ideological, 
economic and socio-political markers. It is no coincidence that the critically sanctioned Minimalism of the 
visual arts and music should be capitalized more frequently than the somewhat ambiguous and tentative 
identification of minimalism in literary criticism. Motte,
61
 Hallett,
62
 Herzinger,
63
 Verhoeven,
64
 
Stevenson,
65
 Bellamy
66
 and, perhaps most acutely, John Barth,
67
 all prefer minimalism – albeit for 
different reasons, and admitting that several of these expend significant energy bemoaning its 
nomenclatural inadequacy.
68
 If, however, the minimalist sensibility is extended indefinitely it loses its 
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currency, a situation which applies equally to its historical over-generalization as to the Postminimalist 
situation indicated by Robert Pincus-Witten‟s eponymous publication.69 
 
Between an astringent historicism and the paradoxical stasis imposed by an absolute unboundedness, the 
present work avoids such extremes by asserting that the modalities within which minimalism emerges are 
fundamentally non-categorical
70
 and essentially indifferent to the poietic or aesthetic situations they 
ground. Thus, minimalism is able at once to be thoroughly historical – the “coherent”71 Minimalism 
which, to Fink, is “a belated journalistic construction”72 against which Strickland also warns73 – and 
dynamic, insofar as minimalism by its self-referential eschewal of reference presents the active poietic 
means by which art, in clarifying itself, sympathetically clarifies what might be understood in terms of the 
unfolding of reality.  
 
In this light we grasp the continuity between Meyer‟s understanding of minimalism “not as a coherent 
movement but as practical field”74 – “a dynamic field of specific practices”75 upon which is conducted a 
“critical debate”76 as to minimalism‟s nature – and Redfield‟s claim regarding the “violent gestures with 
which aesthetic systems seek to exorcise their inability to ground their claims.”77 The aesthetic movement 
always harbours the danger of self-determined totalitarianism which, in systemic terms, we approach by 
the recognition that its “identity is specified by a network of dynamic processes whose effects do not 
leave that network.”78 This is why it is important to keep in mind Hal Foster‟s suggestion that every 
avant-garde movement be understood as “a continual process of protension and retension, a complex 
relay of anticipated futures and reconstructed pasts...that throw over any simple scheme of before or after, 
                                                          
69
 “Postminimalism could be seen to stand in…relationship to Minimalism, as so naturally continuous with it that it 
may be regarded as part of the same impulse. Similarly, Postminimalism also strikes me as continuous with 
Maximalism; Minimalism into Postminimalism and on into Maximalism, all part of the same continuum, especially 
if we consider in the immense role played by a growing historicist impulse during this same period” (Robert Pincus-
Witten, Postminimalism into Maximalism: American Art, 1966-86 (Ann Arbor: UMI Research, 1987), 2). Pincus-
Witten seems for the most part unaware of undermining his own argument. See Strickland, Minimalism, 6; Stephen 
Melville, “What Was Postminimalism?,” Art and Thought, ed. Dana Arnold and Margaret Iversen (Oxford and 
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 156-73. 
70
 Although Aristotle and Kant recognize quantity in categorical terms, the present work regards it as genuinely 
radical, hence prior to categories which remain predominantly epistemological accounts of metaphysics. 
71
 Fink, Repeating, 19. 
72
 Ibid.    
73
 Strickland, Minimalism, 22.  
74
 MAP, 3. 
75
 Ibid., 4. 
76
 Ibid., 3.  
77
 Marc Redfield, Phantom Formations: Aesthetic Ideology and the Bildungsroman (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1996), x.  
78
 Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human 
Understanding (Boston and London: New Science Library, 1987), 89. 
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cause and effect, origin and repetition.”79 In this light, following Badiou, the present work decides in 
favour of an ontological multiplicity which cannot readily be contained as such.
80
 Here we encounter the 
fundamental axiom of ontology: that Being either is One or is not-One;
81
 either is unified and systemic or 
is multiple. However, even accepting that Being is pure multiplicity, it is clear that for Being to be 
presented or to appear at all, there must exist situations in which multiplicity is contingently counted-as-
One without sacrificing its essentially multiple character. In short, multiplicity becomes structured. 
However, according to Badiou, what escapes the structuring is the force of structuration itself; the Count 
escapes being counted-as-One,
82
 necessitating a metastructure.
83
 Were this not the case, the contingency 
at the heart of the Count would be eliminated, and the multiplicity of Being would be reasserted as unity 
or One. If belonging to an aesthetic movement in the first instance is deduced from the properties of 
particular objects and the associations which such properties prompt, then one might suggest that the 
notion of a dynamic movement presents a metastructuration of such properties and relations.  
 
In short, this notion of movement refocuses the ontological conditions of what previously was held to be a 
predominantly epistemological exercise of recognizing resemblance – albeit such resemblances prompt 
recognition as much by the senses as by the intellect. In this light, minimalism might further be 
characterized as that which, both proper to entities and to the metastructural processes by which these 
come to be grouped together, reveals the quantitative ontological dimension of artworks in as transparent 
a manner as possible. 
 
 
 
   
3. THE EMERGENCE OF MINIMALISM 
 
a) A path of austerity towards clarity 
  
Minimalism discovers a venerable if problematic lineage in the austerities – chosen or imposed; 
environmental, material, psychological or spiritual – which play out in the deeply divergent existential 
                                                          
79
 Foster, Return, 29.  
80
 BE, 28.  
81
 Ibid., 23-4. 
82
 Ibid., 93.  
83
 Ibid., 93-4.  
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courses and aims of the eremitic or cloistered religious life,
84
 the melancholic sense of the isolation of the 
artist,
85
 and supposedly corrective system of incarceration. These share the conviction that extreme 
simplicity, deprivation (whether imposed or by self-denial), withdrawal, solitude and discipline are to 
some extent confluent and, moreover, transformatory. Thus, “the epiphany of the unattainable,”86 which 
inspires the melancholic artist, and the solitude and silence that “enkindles and nurtures in our hearts the 
fire of divine love, which is the bond of perfection,”87 to which the solitary monk aspires, express a logic 
which is at once antagonistic and complementary – the suspension of the one enables the commencement 
of the other. In the severe ideals of the Rule of Saint Benedict, the monk sleeps (“clothed, girded with 
belts or cords”88) in order to rise to Opus Dei or the Work of God: an austere minimalism promises 
transcendence. Conventionally art is less optimistic. Where moderate sleep deprivation is a means of 
sanctification for the monk,
89
 it is a reminder of the painful irremissibility of existence for the melancholic 
poet. The attractive despair of Emily Brontë‟s “Sleep brings no joy to me”90 lies precisely in that sleep 
promises no opportunity for sanctification or transcendence, prompting only the desire for release from 
“[d]eepen[ing] the gloom”91 of memory, absolvable only by the amnesia of death. Similarly, we might 
argue that the drive towards a sacred simplicity
92
 which prompts Saint Francis‟ kataphatic embrace of 
“Sister Bodily Death”93 in the early thirteenth century “Canticle of Brother Sun,”, is embodied 
aesthetically not only in such austere reflections on the skull as symbol of death, as in El Greco‟s Saint 
Francis Praying (Figure 1)
94
 and its subtle subversion of the tradition of the vanitas painting
95
 – but also 
                                                          
84
 Although specific reference is made only to forms of west European religious life here, it should be noted in 
passing that these in fact derive from the extremely austere practices of the third century (unless otherwise indicated, 
all references to centuries AD or CE) desert fathers, hermits and stylites of near eastern Christianity. These find 
notable parallels in the cultures and religions of the near and far east, but are largely parenthetic to the present 
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 El Greco, Saint Francis Praying, 1580-85. Joclyn Art Museum, Omaha. 
   30 
 
in its apophatic existential manifestation. In this respect we need only look to the opening of Beckett‟s 
“For to end yet again” to discover a formulation which conforms to the best tradition of the contemporary 
minimalist in the stark presentness of its constituent fragments and incremental repetitions: “For to end 
yet again skull alone in a dark place pent bowed on a board to begin. Long thus to begin till the place 
fades followed by the board long after. For to end yet again skull alone in the dark the void no neck no 
face just the box last place of all in the dark void.”96   
 
 
 
Figure 1:El Greco, Saint Francis Praying, 1580-85. 
 
From an anthropocentric perspective, the skull is a marker of minimal existential intensity, making it a 
poignant symbol of the aesthetic logic identified in the present work in terms of containment. It encases 
the primary sensory organs
97
 as well as the brain, thus grounding the consciousness
98
 which is capable of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
95
 Vanitas paintings, which typically juxtapose images of human vitality and creativity with those of death, most 
notably the skull, invariably seek to draw attention to the contingency of human life and the vanity of presuming to 
deny or overcome this corporeal finitude.  
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 Samuel Beckett, “Fizzle 8: For to end yet again,” The Complete Short Prose: 1929-1989, ed. S.E. Gontarski (New 
York: Grove, 1995), 243. Collection hereafter CSP.  
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 Although touch is distributed, it goes without saying that the skin of the face is extremely sensitive. 
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constituting a coherent reality, a reality which reflects in the poietic enterprise something other than a 
fatal inertia. It follows, thus, that the skull should function as a peculiar type of minimalist icon, both in 
the hermit‟s cave in which we contemplate it from an external perspective, and in Beckett‟s prose, in 
which it is almost always a symbol of the liminal point at which consciousness fails to extinguish itself. 
The skull intimates both the bareness of the hermit‟s cave from which is drawn a transcendental freedom, 
as well as the cell which incarcerates, rendering excedence as such implausible.    
 
In this sense it is possible profitably to juxtapose the minimalist aesthetic of the monastic cell (Figure 2) 
with the prison cell. The effect of both depends on a lean, sparse intensity. In Discipline and Punish 
Michel Foucault famously elaborates the manner in which the legislative, political and social exercise of 
power comes to be harboured in the prison as biopolitical apparatus. In a remarkable passage he 
characterizes its operation in terms of the  
 
distribut[ion of] individuals, fixing them in space, classifying them, extracting from them the 
maximum in time and forces, training their bodies, coding their continuous behaviour, 
maintaining them in perfect visibility, forming around them an apparatus of observation, 
registration and recording, constituting on them a body of knowledge [regarding the 
transformation of the individual and the group] that is accumulated and centralized.
99
 
 
Where the monastic cell
100
 claims to contain the potential locus of spiritual transformation, the prison cell 
is concerned with the “technical transformation of individuals”101 under the guise of reformation.102 Both 
the monastic and prison cells are “complete and austere institutions”103 – the former is occupied by 
voluntary penitents;
104
 in the latter, the occupants of the penitentiary are bound to the place by a legally 
defined crime and juridically determined sentence.
105
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 Neuroscience continues to discern precisely where the brain ends and the mind begins, and where precisely the 
strategic processing of sensation gives way to the consciousness of a world. 
99
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1977), 231. 
100
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Perhaps the modern paradigm of the most stark of prison cells is that of Nelson Mandela on Robben 
Island (Figure 3). It is difficult to substantiate any stable causal pattern between the harsh, radically 
austere conditions which Mandela and his fellow prisoners faced and the personal and political patience, 
solidarity and perseverance they exhibited. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suppose that there exists some 
connection in this regard, and that its manifestation in terms of this haunting and uncanny species of 
minimalism almost certain shapes the directness of its impact.   
 
 
 
Figure 2: The cell of St. Theresa of Avilla,          Figure 3: Nelson Mandela's Prison Cell on Robben Island. 
Convento de la Encarnacion, Avilla, Spain. 
 
 
The continuity between the interior architectural aesthetic of the cell, the functionalist aesthetic of the 
modern city, and a more conventional minimalism is clearly in evidence in Martin Boyce‟s installation, 
Our Love is like the Earth, the Sun, the Trees and the Birth (Figure 4).
106
 The work presents an urban 
dystopianism in which domestic and public space – the spaces of the bedroom, the gallery and the public 
park – are increasingly inseparable and subject to rigorous restriction. Park-bench and bed, cage and 
home, tree and lamp – indeed gallery and domicile – are practically interchangeable. The influence of 
minimalism is clear: fluorescent fixtures, made famous by Dan Flavin as sculptural material (Figure 5),
107 
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 Martin Boyce, Our Love is like the Earth, the Sun, the Trees and the Birth, 2003/2008. Gallery of Modern Art, 
Glasgow. 
107
 Dan Flavin, Monument 1 for V. Tatlin, 1964. Dia Art Foundation, New York. 
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form trees; the mesh from which beds, benches and bins are constructed recalls material used both by 
Robert Morris (Figure 6)
108
 and Donald Judd (Figure 7).
109
  
 
 
Figure 4: Martin Boyce, Our Love is like the Earth, the Sun, the Trees and the Birth, 2003/2008. 
                                                          
108
Robert Morris, Untitled (Quarter-Round Mesh), 1967. Guggenheim Museum, New York. Mesh is also a favourite 
material of Antony Caro‟s sculpture. 
109
 Donald Judd, Untitled, 1965. Private collection. 
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Figure 5: Dan Flavin, Monument 1 for           Figure 6: Robert Morris, Untitled (Quarter-Round Mesh), 1967. 
V. Tatlin, 1964. 
                                                                             
 
Figure 7: Donald Judd, Untitled, 1965. 
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Boyce‟s installation dislocates: the prepositions displayed on the faux ventilation shafts which are part of 
the installation undermine their actual placement – behind is in front of the viewer, between is actually 
beside, below is high on a wall (Figure 8). It is on account of its skeletal sparseness that the installation is 
able to present the elision of intimacy and extimacy. The cell is literally located on the outside, in a public 
exhibitionary space, by which an uncanny inversion of the monastic vision of seclusion is realized, 
manifesting from a minimalism of interior severity an external but austere anarchism (Figure 9).   
 
     
Figure 8: Martin Boyce, Our Love is like the Earth,     Figure 9: Martin Boyce, Our Love is like the Earth, the Sun 
 the Sun, the Trees and the Birth, 2003/2008.       the Trees and the Birth, 2003/2008. Installation view. 
Installation view.  
 
 
The central point to be taken for the present argument is that the minimalist aesthetic – simultaneously 
concrete and conceptual, Real and symbolic – traverses the historic systems of religion, politics and law. 
It does this by a depoliticization, or the subtraction of its constituent elements from the patently political 
configurations to which they belong. The implicit, if naive, principle is that reinstating the tabula rasa of 
an unformed polis rekindles the potentiality from which a pure politics might arise. The content or 
orientation of this politics is itself undetermined. The architectural austerity of the cell, with its 
transhistorical appeal to the silence and featurelessness which purportedly fuel contemplation, is merely a 
concrete marker of the ideal of simplicity, transparency and immanence which informs not only precepts 
such as the parsimony of scholasticism – briefly stated, the avoidance of the unnecessary multiplication 
and complexification of entities – but also the puritan and quietist110 religious ethic. These, in turn, 
develop into various species of pragmatism which manifest aesthetically in terms of a highly reductive 
and functionalist aesthetic. This is nowhere clearer than in the case of the Quakers and Shakers.  
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The Religious Society of Friends, or Quakers, arose in seventeenth century England as part of the 
protestant revival that gave rise to the various and geographically dispersed traditions which include 
several German Evangelical groups, Methodists and Baptists. In a significant sense, Quakerism 
democratizes
111
 the aesthetic ideals of western monasticism, situating a reverence for silence and 
simplicity at the heart of its practice. Such ritualized silence is intended to enhance divine and 
interpersonal communion by eliminating that which impedes a patient attentiveness.
112
 In the sense that it 
aims for progressive access to the Real by means of conceptual and experiential clarification, Quakerism 
legitimately describes a species of minimalism which marks itself as the container of potential 
universality by means of disciplined exclusion of excess. Thus it also promotes both internal and external 
temperance – simplicity of dress, speech and general life.  
 
The charismatic and pentecostal revivals of the succeeding eighteenth century manifested in Quakerism a 
tendency to more extroverted practices.
113
 Known first as Shaking Quakers, and subsequently simply as 
Shakers, these individuals adopted a radical form of communitarian monasticism.
114
 Remarkable for its 
promotion of equality of the sexes without demanding their absolute segregation
115
 (despite its advocacy 
of celibacy) established productive, self-sufficient
116
 towns and communities in early nineteenth century 
America as an alternative to absolute retreat from the world and society as such.
117
 While Shaker rituals 
were markedly improvisational and elaborate, their aesthetic practice is notable for its distinct 
minimalism. While contemporary minimalist composer, John Adams, attempts to reconcile these to some 
extent in his 1978 Shaker Loops,
118
 of particular renown with regard to a minimalist sensibility is Shaker 
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furniture which in its simplicity and symmetry is noteworthy for its functionality
119
 and the manner in 
which it is integrated with Shaker architecture (Figure 10).
120
 
 
 
Figure 10: Great Stone Dwelling House, Enfield Village, New Hampshire, 1837-41. 
 
Visually pleasing in its austerity, yet seldom decorative in the conventional sense (Figures 11 and 12), 
Shaker furniture seems to generate rather than to occupy space, and is readily portable, convertible and 
storable (principally, chairs were hung on walls) in a manner which anticipates the functionalist thrust of 
Russian Constructivism (Figure 13)
121
 and Bauhaus architecture and design
122
 (Figure 14).
123
 Towards the 
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 Most contemporary minimalism is functionless in an objective sense. However, it does not merely reverse 
functionalism, but in many cases instigates a critique of consumerism by offering itself as a parody of its own 
functionlessness (Lasch, Minimal Self, 31).   
120
 “Their rejection of ornament for an elegance born of optimum economy and practicality of design has an 
unmistakable resonance with aspects of some Minimal art” (Baker, Minimalism, 14). 
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 Ivan Zvesdin, School 518, 1935. Moscow, Russia. 
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revered Bauhaus dictum – less is more124 – also flows the symmetrical current of classicism, from its 
Hellenic origins to its eighteenth century revival. In turn, the Bauhaus and constructivist case extends 
almost seamlessly to the work of De Stijl with its minimalist grids, chromatic limitation
125
 and Gestalt 
forms, is a central principle of much subsequent minimalist art and design.
126
 It takes no deductive skill to 
recognize a related stylistic sensibility in Rietveld‟s Zig-Zag Chair of 1934 (Figure 15)127 and the 1991 
Chair 84/85
128
 of Donald Judd – one of minimalism‟s canonical sculptors and critics (Figure 16).129  
 
 
           
Figure 11: Shaker kitchen and furniture, Pleasant Hill,                 Figure 12: Shaker wall with built-in cupboards, 
Kentucky, undated.                                                                             Pleasant Hill, Kentucky, undated. 
 
                                                          
124
 This phrase was adopted by Mies van der Rohe as the principal of minimalist design, and is exemplified in the 
works of other Bauhaus architects such as Walter Gropius and László Moholy-Nagy, as well as in De Stijl of Theo 
van Doesburg, Piet Mondrian and Gerrit Rietveld amongst others. See Cheviakoff, Minimal Art, 74-5.  
125
 For the most part, De Stijl uses only primary colours, black and white.  
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Figure 13: Ivan Zvesdin, School 518, 1935. 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Walter Gropius, Bauhaus Dessau, 1924-5. 
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 Figure 15:Gerrit Rietveld, Zig-zag Chair, 1934.                    Figure 16: Donald Judd, Chair 84/85, 1991. 
 
Tracing a reductive line from the “rudimentary, utilitarian elements introduced by the early settlers,”130 
through the austerity of Shaker design, to more contemporary expressions of this minimalist imbrication 
of locus and Geist, several critics draw attention to minimalism as a socio-cultural path of austerity 
towards the clarification of the Real.
131
 Kenneth Baker considers minimalism a “distinctly American 
tradition of respect for plain facts and plain speaking, manifested in Shaker furniture and the pragmatist 
philosophy of Charles Sanders Pierce.”132 Indeed, it should be clear that the pragmatic functionalism133 of 
such austere design is no small part of minimalism‟s origin or legacy. However, if the case is most 
persuasively made with reference to the American context,
134
 I remain convinced that the logic of 
containment which moves through minimalism cannot contain minimalism itself. From the perspective of 
style, the reverse may readily be asserted: that “minimal artists and their work are indebted to the 
European modern tradition in the areas of neoplasticism, suprematism and constructivism.”135   
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Minimalism may well draw a significant part of itself from the same point of transcendence to which 
mystical experience alludes. Barbara Rose makes this connection explicit in terms of “the state of 
blankness and stagnation preceding illumination.”136 The minimalist dimension of aesthetics and of 
spiritual interrogation share an attempt to approximate in minimally positive terms that which escapes 
positive presentation altogether. Few critics, however, recognize the numerous points of confluence 
between minimalism and religious asceticism. There can be little doubt that the sociological analysis of 
religion rests on an understanding of its ideological dimension; nor that the more adventurous studies of 
minimalism
137
 attend to its ideological implications over its aesthetic concerns. However, few recognize 
that the latter expresses in relation to the former what is itself quite patently an ideology of sacred or holy 
minimalism:
138
 that an encounter with material minimalism is transformed by a sacred transcendence. 
That here exists a force of transformation – one which is clearly in force, but without clear parameters – 
offers what we legitimately recognize as the empty paradigm of ideological operation.
139
  
 
This is evident in the work of leading minimalists, regardless of how we choose to define this term. The 
compositional techniques of La Monte Young and Terry Riley – the respective progenitors of minimalist 
soundscapes of extreme duration, and the use of modular repetition – considered their music 
fundamentally spiritual.
140
 Glass‟ early composition reflects the influence of Indian classical music 
(which often has an explicitly religious dimension)
141
 and he is a practising Tibetan Vasjaryana 
Buddhist,
142
 which has and continues to fuel both the subjects and substance of much of his music.
143
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Funeral of Amenhotep III,” Akhnaten. CBS, 1987). 
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Steve Reich‟s Different Trains144 and Tehillim (Track 1)145 expose the composer‟s interest in and study of 
Jewish history and music (especially cantillation) and their confluence in his brand of minimalism.
146
 A 
generation later, several of minimalism‟s most imposing and creative figures composed what has, not 
inappropriately, been called holy minimalism. Arvo Pärt (Track 2)
147
 and John Tavener (Track 3)
148
 are 
principal amongst these, their work reaching back not only to the musical modes of medieval Catholic 
Europe and the Orthodox East, but to the minimalist existential modalities which accompany the search 
for spiritual clarity. We might make similar, although more varied and occasional, comments regarding 
both the theurgical and contemplative in the music of Meredith Monk,
149
 Henryk Gorecki, Gavin Bryars 
and Nico Muhly.
150
 Neither should we disregard the remarkable creative synergy which existed between 
the writer and Trappist monk, Thomas Merton, the painter Ad Reinhardt – who, for his relentless 
exploration of black monochromatic painting, is often styled the “heretical black monk of Abstract 
Expressionism”151 – and the concrete poet or “conceptual Minimalist,”152 Robert Lax.153  
 
Likewise, the work of Mark Rothko and Barnett Newman manifest two opposing, but equally minimalist, 
aesthetic responses to an overwhelmingly religious sense of awe. Attempting to “purge[...] their work of 
extraneous elements in order to develop an art of transcendental immediacy,”154 Rothko seeks to draw the 
religious into the aesthetic realm by means of its sheer chromatic density, while Newman, bisecting 
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massive fields of heavy colour with bright zips, attempts to generate a sense of the sublime encounter.
155
 
Dan Flavin – for his intermediary success perhaps minimalism‟s most significant innovator – was at one 
point a Roman Catholic seminarian, and numerous of his installations aim to draw out the relationship 
between luminescence and illumination. Likewise, in claiming to “paint with her back to the world,”156 
Agnes Martin embraces in the subtle girds and extremely fine chromatic rhythms of her minimalist 
paintings and drawings (Figures 17 and 18)
157
 an overtly ascetic, even eremitic ideal. 
 
         
Figure 17: Agnes Martin, Untitled #12, (1997.                        Figure 18: Agnes Martin, Untitled #9, 1990. 
  
In writing, however, most minimalists – Raymond Carver, Joan Didion and Frederick Barthelme, for 
instance – reflecting a heightened concern with realism, appear either indifferent to or disillusioned with 
religion and spirituality. Notable exceptions, although not strictly speaking minimalists, are the polymath 
John Cage, who made extensive use of the I Ching and various techniques of Zen to produce his work, 
and Samuel Beckett who enjoys a productively ironic relationship with organized religion – at once 
scathing and deeply comical.  
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In One Word Poems
158
 – the twenty-fifth issue of Ian Hamilton Finlay‟s journal of poetry, Poor Old Tired 
Horse – we discover what should be recognized as amongst the most radical expressions of aesthetic 
minimalism, yet which remains virtually unknown. In a letter to Stephen Bann, Finlay suggests that “a 
one-word poem consists of one word and a title of any length.”159 Almost twenty-years later, in a letter to 
Jessie Sheeler, his aesthetic resolve remains firm: “I feel more and more that the purest poetry exists in 
single words or seemingly minute effects. These are what lodge in one.”160 Indeed, it is by this logic that 
Finlay attempts to uncover in a one-word poem nothing less than the very currency of Arcadia – the 
means by which poietic generation can be exchanged for a utopian vision; the alphabet in its infinite 
permutations for an experience of the infinite itself:   
 
Arcady 
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
161
 
 
By presenting itself in terms of the most fundamental constituents of every expressive medium, 
minimalism exhibits its determination to uncover the fundamental stuff of poiesis. In this sense, its 
ambition is to outflank any act of classification.  
 
  
b) The minimalist transection of modern and postmodern 
 
There is clearly more to minimalism than meets the senses. Reserved in the transparency, simplicity, 
austerity and immediacy of its objects is a remarkable capacity for transformation. This capacity has been 
harnessed in numerous ways by the institutions and practices of religion, but permeates other more 
contemporary fields of ideological disputation as well. In particular, minimalism opens into a polemical 
field
162
 upon which the reification of value through the commodification of art is able to take place. This 
is perhaps clearest, though not restricted to, the works produced between 1950 and 1970 which are most 
regularly discussed as components of canonical Minimalism. If minimalism presents the apotheosis of 
abstraction, this presentation is offered upon the field of ruination which follows the Second World War. 
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As Adorno
163
 and Lyotard
164
 recognize, the history of mimesis is decisively disrupted by the horrors of 
this war, and of the extermination of the Jews in particular. Of Lyotard‟s understanding of this failure of 
representation, Rancière notes the following:  
 
[t]he absence of any common measurement [between art and life] is here called catastrophe...If 
modern art must preserve the purity of its separations, it is so as to inscribe the mark of this 
sublime catastrophe whose inscription also bears witness against the totalitarian catastrophe – that 
of the genocides, but also that of aestheticized (i.e., in fact anaesthetized) existence.
165
  
 
In this situation, extreme forms of abstraction appear to take on different intensities of reflexivity which 
distinguish the modern from the postmodern.
166
 This general field of special reflexivity Lyotard identifies 
with the regime of the sublime – the negative pleasure which arrives when, in the face of an aesthetic 
stimulus which initially overwhelms us, we are able to affirm our mastery and the final ascendency of 
mind over phenomena.
167
 “[M]odern art...devotes [itself] to present[ing] the fact that the unpresentable 
exists,”168 whereas “postmodern [art is]...that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in 
presentation itself.”169 Modern art habitually points to a transcendental aperture, attempting to extract 
itself from the ordinary forms of mimetic economy by a process of careful and progressive abstraction. 
The art of postmodernism seals this aperture: that which in modernism is recognized in terms of 
abstraction appears now paradoxically immanent – incapable of transcendence, but neither associable 
with a formal prototype. If modernist abstraction encourages the tracing of formal processes of reduction 
evident in its works, postmodernism tends to present its objects in their immanence. Thus, recalling Fried, 
while the modernist work searches for an “instantaneousness”170 in which “[p]resentness171 is grace,”172 
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the same concept in postmodernism rests on a sense of immediacy or presence.
173
 Accordingly, where 
modernism aims to “compel conviction...[and] to seek the essential,” postmodernism tends to “cast 
doubt...and to reveal the conditional.”174  
 
Critics tend to emphasize a decisive shift: from a spatially dominated modernist vision in which the 
epiphanic experience of time presents the possibility of transcendence – almost an existential escape-
clause within the legislation of aesthetic experience – to a stress on time as the concrete and sequential 
passage of moments (albeit with indeterminate content) within which an artwork is perceived.
175
 
However, as Patricia Waugh argues, any vigorous distinction of modern from postmodern is more likely 
to rest on a critical overdetermination than on the actual properties of actual artefacts. The result is a 
failure to recognize the “radical situatedness”176 which has marked the aesthetic field at least since early 
romanticism.
177
 Canonical minimalism occupies a singularly ambiguous position in this respect. Its works 
in every medium are as frequently concerned with autonomy (of a particular formalist species) and 
indifference to context and meaning
178
 as they are with their status as relational objects. It is this same 
disposition which articulates numerous mid-twentieth century attempts to radicalize objectivity in the 
form of objecthood, exemplified by Robbe-Grillet in his search for an aesthetic to present a “world 
[which] is neither meaningful nor absurd. It quite simply is. And that…is what is most remarkable about 
it.”179  
 
Modernist in its formalism, postmodern for the sheer facticity of its objecthood, minimalism exists upon 
the cusp between these two great contemporary epistemes. Perhaps “the last „classic‟ period before the 
flood of artistic flotsam and jetsam termed „post-Modernist,‟”180 minimalism presents itself “as a 
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historical crux in which the formalist autonomy of art is at once achieved and broken up,”181 and is thus 
identifiable with the sense of dynamic aesthetic movement offered above. Through its pursuit of 
objecthood over objectivity,
182
 minimalism at once “completed and broke with [modernist aesthetic 
practice].”183 Less benign in her assessment is Anna C. Chave, who claims that “Minimalism forms the 
terse, but veracious last word in a narrowly framed argument about what modern art is or should be.”184 
However, Chave‟s reading is as selective as it is polemical, and we do well to turn to the less biased 
understanding of Rosalind Krauss which seeks to clarify the singular position minimalism occupies upon 
the cusp between modernity and postmodernity. By its formal austerity, minimalist art effects a scission 
with “the styles that immediately precede it,”185 yet on “another level186 can be seen as renewing and 
continuing the thinking”187 of high modernism. Minimalism draws into a single, charged poietic sphere 
both constancy and variability
188
 in which “space and time cannot be separated for the purpose of 
analysis,”189 gesturing towards the reconciliation of these most distinct markers of the modern from the 
postmodern. Krauss “projects a minimalist recognition back onto modernism so that she can then read 
minimalism as a modernist epitome [in which case] minimalism is an apogee of modernism, but it is no 
less a break with it.”190  
 
In this light aesthetic modernism harbours the final figure of its transfiguration by abstraction – a self-
reflexive present at once sublime and unambiguously Real. Affirming in minimalism the literalism
191
 
which Fried sees as its most salient feature, painter Frank Stella claims of his work that “only what can be 
seen there is there...What you see is what you see.”192 Neither intrinsically meaningful nor nihilistic, 
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minimalism aims to provoke directness of affect
193
 and aesthetic effect such that it is still possible, with 
Lyotard, that the “task of art remains that of the immanent sublime, that of alluding to an 
unpresentable...which is inscribed in the infinity of the transformation of „realities.‟”194  
 
The aesthetic economy of minimalism must be understood as the persistent attempt to clarify the Real,
195
 
and, inasmuch as the Real underpins every possible reality, minimalism offers the objectal
196
 pivot upon 
which existential situations are potentially transformed. Such transformation touches the heart of the 
multiple institutions which negotiate and finally prescribe value; and in its capacity for generating 
maximum effect from minimal means,
197
minimalism transects, at the most radical level, the relation of 
art, economy and power.   
 
 
c) Institution and economy 
 
If the minimalist aesthetic is directed by a self-conscious radicalism – the desire to reveal the essential 
quantity of Being itself – its appearance in terms of a movement, whether canonical or a brief spasm 
towards simplicity and clarity, centres a revolutionary impulse to “disrupt[...] the formal categories of 
institutional art.”198 Like Foster, Danto recognizes that in minimalism art comes to an historical 
reflexivity, but also a suspension of its historicity
199
 – a “self-conscious position on art”200 which emerges 
“in the early 1960s [in the manner in which]...the institutionality not only of art but also of the avant-
garde [is] first appreciated and then exploited.”201 Recognizing that the limits of any definition of art are 
contingent rather than absolute,
202
 Danto‟s thought prompts a number of theories of art – not all congruent 
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with his own
203
 – which emphasize the institutional nature of defining art qua art. Danto does not, 
however, accede to the vulgar reduction of art simply to objects designated as such by an “institutionally 
enfranchised group.”204 Finally he affirms that art is knowable as such by its ontological properties, but 
that these take shape within institutional configurations in which relative value is decided by contingent 
yet normative social, political and economic significance.  
 
The canonical minimalist aesthetic took firm root in an American society
205
 which, despite the “slow, 
almost reluctant shaking off of the obedient conformity the war effort had demanded”206 at a domestic 
level, had rapidly risen to a position of unrivalled economic and political dominance in the west.
207
 In the 
1950s and early 1960s prosperity was the prevailing condition. That America was “[n]o longer a 
province, but the center of the new capitalist empire”208 resulted not only in the increased material 
prosperity of the 1950s, but also in a burgeoning sense of cultural confidence. “For all its apparent 
restrictions, minimalism opened up a new field of art,”209 a sense of novelty to match the utopian 
domestic vision of the 1960s and 1970s, while “[f]or all its apparent freedoms, neo-expressionism 
participated in the cultural regression of the Reagan-Bush era”210 and its chastening of American identity. 
In this climate, competition and excellence
211
 were rapidly assimilated into a social vision which makes 
the force of identity and the act of identification central both to the individual and corporation, rendering 
these increasingly indistinguishable.
212
  
  
The resultant “epidemic of popular narcissism”213 complicates the distinction of subjectivity and 
individuality.
214
 The individual is trained to objectify his or her own subjectivity
215
 in terms of a 
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“boundless appetite for change,”216 with the consequence that the markers of individuality are 
commodified, and the individual becomes a consumer of his or her own identity. Individuality is 
subsumed within a self-limiting dialectic: a constant exchange of dominant, popular and countercultural 
expression – progressive inasmuch as it generates the necessary difference to guarantee that every 
individual might still associate the right to individuality with a fundamental expression of freedom; 
regressive in that culture is then in a position to prescribe and distribute the amount and type of difference 
an individual apparently requires in order to be sufficiently substantial and free. When freedom is thus 
guaranteed, the individual is in fact at its most compliant with a corporate model of society which 
ingeniously consumes difference by reifying actual differences – both as particular values but, moreover, 
as specific objects which must be produced and consumed as paradoxically necessary commodities.  
 
In this situation, a commodity such as art which, at first, appears to be entirely generative, finally proves 
intricate in the production of the very needs it claims to satisfy. As Lasch correctly observes, 
“[c]ommodities are produced for immediate consumption. Their value lies not in their usefulness or 
permanence but in their marketability. They wear out even if they are not used, since they are designed to 
be superseded by „new and improved‟ products.”217 Art is by no means exempted from this logic. That the 
minimalist object “mimes the degraded world of capitalist modernity in order not to embrace but to mock 
it,”218 does not bar these works from being substituted for the absence of subjective identity in the 
“unremitting consumption of sensation”219 which characterizes the contemporary. “Minimalism marks the 
transition of twentieth-century art from its waning as an autonomous and implicit critique of mass culture 
to its demystification and acceptance as but another commodity,”220 Strickland suggests.  
 
In short “the social attitude of minimalism...is ambivalent,”221 emerging at once in opposition to the 
reduction of art to product, yet unable, finally, to resist its own commodification.
222
 In the visual arts, a 
number of seminal exhibitions took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s at the Guggenheim, Whitney 
and Jewish Museums in New York, the Dwan Gallery in Los Angeles, the Hague Gemeentemuseum, and 
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the Tate Gallery in London amongst many others.
223
 James Meyer does well to recognize the considerable 
polemical significance these exhibitions played in the development of a minimalist canon.
224
 The epochal 
Primary Structures exhibition curated by Kynaston McShine at the Jewish Museum in 1966,
225
 confirmed 
not only the significance and status of canonical minimalism, but set in motion the critical machinery 
which would distinguish minimalism from its predecessors.
226
   
 
“Minimalism…[is a] creation[…] not only of artists, but of ancillary art-world professionals,”227 and is 
intensified by the concurrency with which artefacts and the critical literature assessing and theorizing 
these arose. As Colpitt notes, “a great number of [minimalist] artists took on the critical responsibility for 
explaining their work.”228 “[T]heories of Minimal art, whether relevant to artistic production…or the 
spectator/critic‟s apprehension of the object…are central to an understanding of that object,”229 and in 
minimalism the reflexivity between theory appears so inextricable that it is often difficult to give one or 
the other priority.
230
 In minimalism we encounter the incipient paradigm of that which Mieke Bal names 
the theoretical object – an artwork capable of stimulating, simultaneously, several contradictory responses 
in relation to a spectrum of theoretically grounded situations.
231
  
 
Indeed, what minimalism reveals of the interdependence of the generative and reflexive aspects of poiesis 
is significant, and offers a dynamic and aptly minimal model for the operation of an aesthetic movement: 
the process by which the occurrence of criticism and artefact imply a progressive clarity in one another. 
There can be little doubt that the emergence of a significant and concurrent ancillary, para-aesthetic 
complex in relation to minimalism, facilitated its rapid canonization. A network of galleries, institutes, 
collectors, journalists, critics and academics quickly set the agenda for an ongoing polemic regarding, in 
particular, its status as art,
232
 its transgressive relation to medium and genre, and its significance in 
formalist terms. The leading minimalists were themselves erudite, philosophically astute and articulate 
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regarding the theoretical implications of their work.
233
 Minimalist music – cultivated between the 
university classroom,
234
 the informal but hip spaces of the New York loft scene,
235
 and performance art 
groups such as Fluxus 
236
 – soon migrated to these gallery settings,237 and, finally, to concert halls.  
 
Here is an epochal moment in the development of American cultural economy: only an art of the most 
radical simplicity and immanence seemed equal to the self-sacrificial task of responding to the apparently 
constitutive instabilities of postmodernity,
238
 and this took shape in a public which was increasingly 
“persuaded that it was both chic and financially savvy to buy contemporary American art, until the traffic 
in art becomes a high-roller‟s game.”239 Those in the arts were unafraid to challenge professional 
orthodoxies: Finlay‟s Poor Old Tired Horse offered a ground-breaking platform for concrete poetry; 
working with revolutionary stage directors such as Robert Wilson, Glass‟ heavily amplified ensemble has 
never bound itself to the traditional concert stage;
240
 minimalist painters and sculptors dispensed with 
both the frame and the plinth, undermining perhaps the principal means of partitioning art from the 
commonplace.
241
 What is reshaped is not only how art is encountered, but its substance – inasmuch as the 
latter is distributed between the temporality of perception, locus, the effects of sensation and the essence 
or substance of the work. As Danto understands it, “the pedestal upon which art gets put...[which] is a 
political translocation as savage as that which turned women into ladies,”242 is thus undone. In other 
words, the ideological undercurrent of art‟s physical transformation and distribution amongst formal 
institutions is significant. Baker grasps this problem with considerable insight:  
 
An activist impulse to change people‟s attitudes underlies much so-called Minimalist work. This activism  
foundered on a contradiction built into the art world: the institutional forces which make art known and 
meaningful to the public tacitly assert a hierarchy of values in which power and money predominate, as 
does the coercive authority their consolidation requires. Minimalism is a compelling and important episode 
in American art because it clarified the fact that artists, despite their ambitions, can only play at superseding 
the values by which society‟s ruling groups legitimize their power. At its best, Minimalist art was and is a 
plea for commitment to values – such as clear, contemplative vision, the recognition of illusions for what 
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they are, and a love of physical reality for its own sake – that are not, and probably cannot be, widely 
shared in a highly technologized, economically volatile mass society, irrespective of its form of 
government.
243
 
 
Indeed, upon close analysis, canonical minimalism is at least as readily deployed in service of mass 
communication as it is in the indifferent realism the present work regards as it truest vocation. Its 
aesthetic is rapidly and effectively assimilated into the visual language and soundtrack of advertising and 
product design;
244
 minimalism becomes synonymous with restrained style in architecture, (Figures 19 and 
20)
245
 interior design (Figure 21)
246
 and fashion (Figure 22);
247
 its influence on the course of popular 
music is significant, from the hypnotic riffs of much 1970s rock to Marnie Stern‟s recent This Is It and I 
Am It and You Are It and So Is That and He Is It and She Is It and It Is It and That Is That (Track 4),
248
 
and from the disco of the late 1970s
249
 to the minimal electronica of IDM (Intelligent Dance Music), 
exemplified in the work of composers such as Plastikman (Track 5).
250
 
 
    
Figure 19: Dirk Jan Postel, Glass House in Almelo.                    Figure 20: Morger & Degelo, House in Dornach. 
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Figure 21: Gluckman Mayner, Helmut Lang Flagship   Figure 22: Francisco Costa (for Calvin Klein),  
Parfumerie, New York, 1997.    Pre-fall, 2011/12. 
           
 
Inasmuch as there is manifested a minimal look
251
 – a stylistic, aesthetic immediacy, as well as the marker 
for an existential containment and austerity which promises the most by way of the least – we ought 
immediately, and more cynically, also to recognize in its operation a “characteristic repetitive experience 
of self in mass-media consumer society...[T]he rationalized techno-world that began to take final shape in 
industrialized societies during the long post-war boom of the 1950s and 1960s created for the first time 
the theoretical possibility of a strange feedback loop”252 to which minimalism in a sense attests. 
Minimalism is all too easily recuperated in support of hegemonic social structures. This point is at the 
heart of Anna C. Chave‟s vehement criticism of minimalism, directed at what she interprets as its 
“domineering, sometimes brutal rhetoric.”253 Where Greenberg disapproves of the conceptualism of 
minimalism, and Fried criticizes it for its theatricality, Chave attacks it for the sheer physicality of its 
taking-place. In her view, “the authority implicit in the identity of the materials and shapes the artists 
used, as well as in the scale and often the weight of their objects,”254 “effectually perpetrat[ing] violence 
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through their work – violence against the conventions of art and against the viewer – rather than using 
their visual language to articulate a more pointed critique of particular kinds or instances of violence.”255 
Chave‟s real target, however, is the ostensible neutrality of minimalism towards questions of political256 
and especially gendered power. She believes that it imports covertly all the trappings of patriarchal, 
masculinist discourse, both formally and in the terms it deploys in relation to its work.
257
 That the 
majority of minimalist critics are women is of little interest to her,
258
 and, more significantly, she seems 
unaware that her reading of gender is itself deeply heterosexist. In this respect, we might look to Fink‟s 
study which exhibits a more subtle understanding of the implicit relation in minimalism not merely of 
gender to power, but also of power and aesthetic telos to sexuality.  
 
 
 
 
4. THE AESTHETICS AND OBJECTS OF MINIMALISM 
 
a) Formalism and objecthood 
 
The admirable clarity and detail of Frances Colpitt‟s 1990 study, Minimal Art: The Critical Perspective, 
stems principally from her insight that a flexible, analytical formalism best exposes the qualities of 
minimalist objects which, by their quantitative presence, habitually render their elaboration in terms of 
meaning extremely difficult. Colpitt thus limits her study to the “abstract, geometric painting and 
sculpture executed in the United States in the 1960s.”259 Form makes itself known through the actual 
existential intensity of an artwork – the objecthood of an object, in which case appearance is reality. 
Minimalist sculptural forms constitute such intensities by their radicalization of ordinary sculptural space. 
Carl Andre‟s floor-pieces (Figure 23)260 “succeed[...] in squeezing out sculptural space to the point of two 
dimensionality,” Colpitt suggests, while Sol LeWitt‟s open cubic structures at once extrapolate and 
contain space by virtue of form (Figure 24).
261
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Figure 23: Carl Andre, Fall, 1968. 
 
Figure 24: Sol LeWitt, Incomplete Open Cubes, 1974. 
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It is to a similar formal intensity that painter Frank Stella refers, as it is mentioned above, in claiming of 
his painting that “only what can be seen there is there…What you see is what you see.”262 Examining 
Tomlinson Court Park (Figure 25),
263
 one of the Black Paintings produced by Frank Stella between 1958 
and 1959, it becomes evident how minimalism is poised between the formalist tradition of Bauhaus, De 
Stijl and constructivism on the one hand, and the colour field monochromatic tradition of abstract 
expressionism
264
 on the other – the latter exemplified best in the work of Newman, Rothko, Klein and 
Reinhardt (Figures 26-29).
265
 In Stella‟s work, place266 is abstracted to shape – the work containing itself 
in its most essential geometric and, moreover, chromatic qualities. The central formal concern of the work 
is “the relationship of [its]...internal structure and its bounding shape,” which in this case is the canvas. 
However, as Meyer notes,
267
 this relationship is itself tense. “Forc[ing] the picture (or depicted shape) into 
near coincidence with the picture support (or literal shape),”268 Stella‟s work undertakes an uneasy 
negotiation of literalism – expressed in the artist‟s desire to “to keep the paint as good as it was in the 
can”269 – and illusionism – for, when we regard the work carefully, there is considerable dynamism 
depending upon which area, line or space our focus falls. In the movement it exhibits from the edge of the 
canvas towards the elongated central rectangle, the formal properties of the painting demonstrate what 
Fried describes as a “deductive structure:” the shape of the canvas determines the movement of the 
shrinking rectangular shapes towards the centre. Equally, these rectangles race outward, pointing toward 
the corners of the canvas and beyond, thus perpetuating the disjunction between the pictorial plane and 
that of the wall, despite the absence of a frame. From certain perspectives the expansion and contraction 
of these rectangles also acquires depth: the central rectangle at once draws the viewer towards an 
unspecified depth – an objectal instantiation of infinite regress, perhaps – and also presents the apex of a 
pyramidal structure as viewed from above.  
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Figure 25: Frank Stella, Tomlinson Court Park, 1959. 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Barnett Newman, cathedra, 1971. 
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Figure 27: Yves Klein, IKB 82, 1959.           Figure 28: Mark Rothko, Black on Maroon,          Figure 29: Ad                                             
             1958.                 Reinhardt, Abstract   
                                     Painting Black (A), 1954-9.  
 
That we “understand the object better on its – the object‟s – own terms,”270 is central to the minimalist 
vision. It is the aesthetic commitment to objecthood which encompasses considerations of form and 
abstraction in minimalism. “The rejection of mimesis and reference, and concomitant emphasis on 
materiality, led artists and critics to the notion of objecthood,”271 observes Colpitt. “To refer to the work 
of art as an object…meant that it was a nonrepresentational, concrete, and real thing existing in the world, 
without illusion or formal prototype.”272 My contention is that the emergence of minimalist objects qua 
their objecthood can finally only be apprehended in an existential self-relation which emerges by the 
immanent, transformatory logic of transumption. Nonetheless, it is profitable to examine the most notable 
of the numerous and imperfect techniques employed in the pursuit of objecthood.  
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b) Minimal forms and internal relation 
 
For visual artists, principal amongst the techniques by which objecthood is pursued is the reduction of 
external and internal relations within the artwork in question. The internal relational elements
273
 of art 
“specify the ordering of pictorial or sculptural parts”274 within the work itself. In minimalism, the 
emphasis on nonrelational internal composition stipulates that “individual parts and elements275 play a 
subordinate role to the overall form of the work. It is not that elements are necessarily eliminated, but 
rather that the idiosyncratic or dynamic relationships between them are expended.”276 In visual terms, the 
clearest instantiation of this principle arrives in monochromatic canvases, exemplified most obviously in 
the invariant colour fields of painters such as Brice Marden (Figure 30),
277
 Robert Mangold, Robert 
Ryman and Jo Baer, or, indeed, the earlier generation of Yves Klein, Ad Reinhardt or Barnett Newman. 
Such fields of colour contain no parts as such,
278
 and demonstrate the capacity for unified fields of colour 
to reinforce the sense of objecthood for which the minimalist work strives. Yet, we might also consider a 
far busier minimalism with respect to nonrelational composition, exhibited in paintings such as Stella‟s 
Delaware Crossing (Figure 31).
279
 The work is composed of a chevron design which, because it is 
deployed in perfect symmetry and pointing inwards, serves not to complicate the painting, but to focus the 
perceiver‟s attention onto the centre of the canvas, reinforcing, indeed containing, the work in its 
singularity.    
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Figure 30: Brice Marden, Grove Group I, 1972-3.                                      
 
 
Donald Judd explicitly claimed that in his sculpture “the parts are unrelational…[W]hen you start relating 
parts…you‟re assuming you have a vague whole…and definite parts, which is all screwed up, because 
you should have a definite whole and maybe no parts, or very few” 280 (Figure 32).281 That with which 
canonical minimalist sculptors concerned themselves, then, was the creation of autonomous, self-
contained objects.
282
 In work consisting of more than one part – here we might consider Judd‟s serial 
sculptures (Figure 33)
283
 which consist of identical forms, mostly uniform in colour and material, but 
occasionally with variations – the object remains nonrelational in the sense that the relation of unit to unit 
is one of a duplication emphasizing quantity rather than any particular qualitative dynamism.  
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Figure 31: Frank Stella, Delaware Crossing, 1961.     Figure 32: Donald Judd, Untitled, 1970. 
 
Figure 33: Donald Judd, Untitled, 1990; first type 1965. 
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Equivalent techniques are observable in minimalist music. La Monte Young‟s Trio284 – a wonderful 
exemplar of minimalist containment – is structured by a miniature arch-form285 which is conceived in 
such a way as to assure the minimum differentiation between its parts, using the smallest possible number 
of notes for its particular structure, thus evidencing the strictest musical symmetry imaginable. A similar 
observation can be made of Steve Reich‟s phasing technique (first-used by Terry Riley): two (or more) 
instruments/channels begin an identical melody in unison, then gradually shift out of phase at specific 
intervals, creating a series of unexpected and gripping melodic and pulse variations. Phasing operates by a 
logic of distension rather than containment. Internal parts move against each other, exposing the active, 
processual dimension of the work – a cyclical, internal torsion – but finally affirm rather than undermine 
the integrity of the composition.  
 
The question of literary nonrelation might be approached from the two rather traditional formal channels 
of poetry and of prose. The case for relational containment or convergence is well-made by much 
concrete poetry. Aram Saroyan‟s untitled poster-poem (Figure 34),286 which consists solely of an 
experimental poietic grapheme, offers a paradigm for a generative act of writing which is significant 
without being meaningful. Hansjörg Gappmayr‟s “ver” (Figure 35)287 offers a negative but equally 
compelling alternative to this poietic position: that in the top left corner we encounter the prefix ver, “an 
inseparable prefix added to German verbs, and nouns and adjectives derived from them, with the idea of 
removal, loss, untoward action, using up, change, reversal, etc.”288 suggests that the black block 
simultaneously limits and conceals the potentiality of the poem. Behind its impassive bulk it conceals 
text, the faintest outlines of which are visible upon close inspection, while itself constituting a rather 
intimidating poietic body in response to the injunction of the negative prefix.  
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Figure 34: Aram Saroyan, Untitled poster-poem, 1965-6. 
 
 
Figure 35: Heinz Gappmayr, ver, 1966. 
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Regarding prose, Hallett suggest that minimalist writing for the most part employs a “blunt, 
uncomplicated prose…[and] lack of editorial commentary.”289 The writers to which this might apply are 
numerous and diverse: amongst the earliest we might count the realism of Chekhov and, subsequently, 
that of Hemingway, but equally we could look to the radical work of the nouveaux romanciers – the plait 
of objectivist, generative and self-conscious fictions which mark much of the work of Alain Robbe-
Grillet, Jean Ricardou, Georges Perec and, in a different sense, that of Maurice Blanchot and Samuel 
Beckett, both of whom resist easy categorization. In the Anglo-American context, this aesthetic 
parsimony is expressed variously in the work of the Beat writers Jack Kerouac, Hunter S. Thomson and 
Charles Bukowski, and in the combinations of blue collar realism, neo-naturalism, blank fiction and 
compulsive bourgeois self-consciousness which constitute a minimalist engagement of recent fiction with 
the Real. The latter, although eclectic and certainly not a group, might include many works of writers as 
diverse as Raymond Carver, Joan Didion, Frederick Barthelme, Gabriel Josipovici, Paul Auster, Amy 
Hempel, Mary Robison, Bobby Ann Mason, Richard Kostelanetz, Richard Brautigan, Jay McInerney, 
Tobias Wolf, Jerzy Kozinsky, Anne Beattie, Brett Easton Ellis, Dave Eggers, David Markson and Tao 
Lin.
290
 
 
Prose at its sparest undoubtedly suggests a definite reduction in the elaborate structures which govern 
earlier fiction. As Foster emphasizes, minimalist reduction should not carelessly be conflated with “the 
quotidian, the utilitarian, and the non-artistic”291 as has been the tendency of many over-zealous critics. 
Rather, it marks a “reorientation”292 and a “mission of recovery,”293 in the terms of Karen Alexander. By 
the manner in which the properties of the everyday manifest in a transformative relation to the internal, 
quantitative elements most proper to the medium within which the work is constituted, minimalist prose 
habitually functions by a distributive logic. 
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The preference in minimalist narrative for “discontinuous devices, arbitrary and open endings, interplay 
of surface details,
294
 narrative omissions, and anti-linear plots”295 at once permits and complicates the 
pursuit of minimalism. The prose tradition is one of considerable formal and generic complexity, and 
although minimalism renders its structural intricacies clear on one level, the opacity it retains on another 
is necessary if it is to accomplish its mimetic vocation – a maximal realism pursued by minimal means.296 
Thus, there appears to be a limit to the degree of minimalism which one might accomplish by stylistic 
austerity for a work still to be recognizable as functioning in relation to the conventions of narrative 
fiction. Given the situation in which stylistic markers are pushed to their minimal extremes, minimalist 
prose accedes to a quantitative logic. Simply put, the conviction with which we assert that a work is 
minimalist is intimately related to its scale. Carver is more readily recognizable as a minimalist than is 
Alain Robbe-Grillet not primarily for reasons of style,
297
 but because the prose of the former writing is 
characterized by a parsimony unmatched by the latter. Such condensation marks the scale of Carver‟s 
work as minimalist – a scale not dependent solely on its brevity, although such brevity certainly assists in 
our perception of these as unified works, and in this unity, in turn, resides the capacity of these works to 
compel our attention qua their minimalism. An extreme of this quantitative logic is apparent in Richard 
Kostelanetz‟s Microstories,298 which, far briefer than Carver‟s work and usually consisting of single 
sentences, exceed what is ordinarily comprehensible in terms of narrative prose. This transgression is the 
precise consequence of their aphoristic concision: their syntax is proper neither to prose nor to poetry; 
radical in that they resemble narrative but, by virtue of their claim to universality, attach to none of the 
represented events which are its ordinary consequences.    
 
Examining Carver‟s short fiction, it becomes evident how the case for objecthood in narrative prose is 
habitually complicated by the manner in which the internal relation of formal elements (no matter how 
limited) and external referentiality appear inseparable.
299
 Precisely on this mimetic count, critics 
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periodically attempt to classify Carver as a realist rather than a minimalist – Verhoeven offers numerous 
alternatives, and Hilfer emphasises in Carver‟s work a “reflex to lower-class exigency”300 above a 
particular aesthetic vision. As do Hallett
301
 and Alexander,
302
 we ought to recall that minimalism has 
always concerned itself with intensifying the Real, which justifies Schechner‟s claim that Carver‟s work 
is a catalyst for the realist revival in 1980s fiction,
303
 expressing “a capacity for seeing clearly and the 
power to create, in prose, the illusion of a sharply visualised world.”304 Fluck characterizes realist 
literature as writing “intent on arresting semantic play by insisting on the need of life-likeness and 
verisimilitude in representation.”305 In the best of Carver‟s minimalism, writing presents “an effective 
illusion of reality,”306 generated – as in the case of Stella‟s painting – within the tension which persists 
between illusionism and factical materiality.    
 
In “The bath”, for example, Carver‟s terse, dispassionate and fractured narrative captures with 
considerable subtlety the emotional complex and communicative disjuncture which might accompany 
traumatic experience. Recounting an accident in which a boy is run down by a car on the eve of his eighth 
birthday, and the vigil of his parents at his hospital bed, Carver reflects the full distress of the incident in 
the devastating obliqueness of the mothers‟ fractured monologue which she recites upon encountering 
complete strangers in a hospital waiting room:   
  
My son was hit by a car...But he‟s going to be all right. He‟s in shock now, but it might be some kind of a 
coma too. That‟s what worries us, the coma part. I‟m going out for a little while. Maybe I‟ll take a bath. 
But my husband is with him. He‟s watching. There‟s a chance everything will change when I‟m gone. My 
name is Ann Weiss.
307
  
 
Although the aesthetic of minimalist prose manifests principally in terms of a radical reduction of “form, 
style, vocabulary, syntax, imagery, structure, plot, and characterisation,”308 analysis reveals that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
at which the functional and actional levels are integrated and the narrative is opened to the world for interpretation 
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condensation of its internal relations is only contingent, and that the minimalist work exposes a particular 
set of external relations. 
 
 
c) Poietic immanence – impassive presence, repetition, and the demands minimalism makes of its 
perceiver 
 
Much as minimalism moves across the conventions of modern and postmodern aesthetics, so, too, does its 
concern with absolute autonomy and an increasingly active mode of aesthetic perception which such 
autonomy paradoxically demands. While the limited internal relations by which the minimalist artwork is 
most unambiguously confirmed habitually appeal to an existential logic of containment, it is not 
uncommon that this internality turns upon itself – revealing a dynamism unanticipated in the object in 
question, which the present work recognizes in terms of distension – or turns outward – a process of 
transumption, in which the dislocation of an object‟s most essential quantity is at once a relocation of the 
same.  
 
Treating such externality in formalist terms, numerous critics recognize that a radicalization of the 
constructive nature of perception is minimalism‟s most consistent feature. Colpitt suggests that in 
minimalism we discover “a new focus on relationships struck across and within the space between the 
spectator and the object of perception.”309 The consequences of this relationship are by no means 
unambiguous, however. In Art and Objecthood Michael Fried holds that intrinsic to minimalism is its 
theatricality – fundamentally detrimental to the fortunes of art310 – which derives directly from his 
understanding that literalist
311
 objects deprive the perceiver of the capacity not to respond to them:
312
 
“inasmuch as the literalist work depends on the beholder, is incomplete without him, it has been waiting 
for him.”313 As Michael‟s notes, “in Fried‟s account of Minimalism, the object exists on its own all right; 
what depends on the beholder is only the experience. But of course, the experience is everything – it is the 
experience instead of the object that Minimalism values.”314 Yet to the extent that the general minimalist 
programme asserts that the aesthetic object is equal, rather than superior, to the perceiver, Fried‟s 
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argument tends towards overstatement. Indeed, as Foster emphasizes, “minimalism considers perception 
in phenomenological terms, as somehow before or outside history, language, sexuality, and power.”315  
  
The external relations of minimalist artwork encompass the manner in which such an artwork exists in a 
particular spatial and temporal complex and, moreover, in relation to the perceiver. A chief concern of 
minimalism is presence – the immanence of an object, intrinsically and in relation to its environment. The 
significant force of such presence arises from the concurrency of affect and effect in minimalism‟s most 
significant works. Colpitt contends that “there are no exhibited, formal clues to signal the existence of 
presence, since it is felt, responded to, rather than recognised.”316 Presence, in this light, offers itself as an 
oblique aesthetic contract between object and perceiver, at once a testimony to the radical, impassive, 
quantitative dimension of Being – the Real – and the manner in which the Real renders itself intelligible 
through minimal aesthetic objects which reach out into the experiential world.   
 
In Fried‟s estimation,317 minimalists “want[…] to achieve presence through objecthood, which requires a 
certain largeness of scale, rather than through size alone.”318 In minimalism, however, acknowledging the 
spatial and temporal particularities of perception draws us towards, rather than away from, the objecthood 
of the work. In musical minimalism, presence is conveyed principally by the immediacy achieved in 
works which use sustained drones – the work of La Monte Young, Pauline Oliveros, Brian Eno, Harold 
Budd and Richard Maxfield typify this approach – or various types of intense repetition – Philip Glass, 
Steve Reich, Terry Riley, and John Adams for whom this technique offers an active means of structuring 
the music.
319
 By these techniques, composers reduce to a minimum the interval between the production, 
reception and consequent perception and processing of, and reflection upon, the music in question. 
Variation takes on a far more subtle and ateleological role in this context, ensuring between the 
composition as sonic object, and the immanence with which the perceiver experiences the composition, a 
remarkable continuity.  
 
The minimalist concern with presence relates closely to what in traditional aesthetics is marked in terms 
of the sublime: an immediacy of experience which commands attention precisely by threatening to 
overwhelm the integrity of the senses.
320
 Thus, common to Robert Wilson‟s remarkable design for Glass‟ 
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opera Einstein on the Beach
321
 (Figure 36), Dan Flavin‟s installation at the Dan Flavin Art Institute 
(Figure 37),
322
 Olafur Eliasson‟s The Weather Project (Figure 38)323 and Walter de Maria‟s Lightning 
Field (Figure 39)
324
 is not only a minimalist understanding of light, natural or manufactured, as sculptural 
medium, but of minimalist light art as evoking an experience of sublime presence.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Robert Wilson, Part of stage design for Einstein on the Beach, 1976. 
  
                                                          
321
 Philip Glass, Einstein on the Beach, 1975.  
322
 Dan Flavin, untitled (to Robert, Joe and Michael), 1975-81. Dan Flavin Art Institute, Bridgehampton. 
323
 Olafur Eliasson, The Weather Project, 2003. Tate Modern, London. 
324
 Walter de Maria, The Lightning Field, 1971-7. Dia Art Foundation, Quemado, New Mexico. 
   71 
 
       
Figure 37: Dan Flavin, untitled (to Robert, Joe and Michael),     Figure 38: Olafur Eliasson, The Weather Project, 
1975-81.                              2003.     
 
 
Figure 39: Walter de Maria, The Lighting Field, 1971-7. 
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Intimately related in minimalism to the notion of presence is that of scale, or the relative quantitative 
relation of an artwork to the perceiver and its environment.
325
 “Like presence, the ingredients of scale 
cannot be prescribed.”326 In minimalism, the appropriate scale for a work is the one which maximises the 
immanence of its objecthood. In all four works of light art above, the scale is, as it were, maximally 
minimal. This is the case despite the fact that the scale of De Maria‟s work is enormous – four hundred 
steel poles, each over twenty feet tall, act as lightning conductors arranged over a mile-by-kilometre area 
in New Mexico, harnessing and distributing massive amounts of electrical energy
327
 – whereas the scale 
of Flavin‟s work is comparably moderate, although no less aesthetically forceful, measured as it is by the 
room in which the fixtures are situated, and transmuting modest amounts of energy into a quite 
overwhelming yellow and violet luminescence. 
 
Minimalist music generates through sustained pitches, relentless repetition or considerable duration a 
“sublime excess of teleology,”328 which not only neutralizes any conventional telos but abandons the 
anthropocentric scale by which classical music is traditionally structured according to the “timescale of 
individual (or cumulative) arcs of tension and release.”329 Evidence of this new approach to musical scale 
is offered in the indefinite duration of La Monte Young‟s The Well-Tuned Piano (Track 6),330 the five 
hours of Philip Glass‟ opera Einstein on the Beach, or the three and a half hours of his Music in Twelve 
Parts.
331
 Yet even apparently smaller works exhibit a similarly impactful distensive logic: in Steve 
Reich‟s Four Organs (Track 7)332 “four electronic organs repeat the pitches of a single chord, gradually 
extending them so that, while the pulse remains intact, the music gives the impression of slowing 
down.”333 The scale of the work is distinct not so much for its pure duration, but for the manner in which 
it transforms the human experience of duration.  
 
Proposing a parallel poetics between minimalism and the short story on the basis of scale, Hallett suggests 
that “both minimalism and the short story privilege the singular, focus on surface images, and speak 
sparingly…[B]oth have been subjected to the worst sort of literary bias: accused of lacking capacity and 
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substance.”334 Hallett claims for minimalist literature a particular clarity in its capacity for presenting 
“concrete details which reflect complex states of being and which correlate with elements of the universal 
human condition.”335 Indeed, in the attempt to grasp the quantitative dimension by which the perceiving 
subject belongs to a potentially universal configuration, we glimpse the considerable significance of the 
minimalist concern with scale.  
 
 
d) Minimalism between index and indifference – nonreferentiality, nonmediation, 
nonanthropomorphism   
 
Supporting the minimalist concern with presence is its preference for producing nonreferential objects. In 
the case of minimalist transumption, the centrality of displacement and transformation invariably results 
in a struggle for dominance between hetero- and self-reference. Thus, considering several of the 
manifestations of the sun-god Apollo in the environments of Ian Hamilton Finlay‟s concrete poetry, we 
discover that the god has “migrated far from his native Greece; he is the pale „Hyperborean Apollo‟ 
visiting the northern regions, of whom Heine and Pater write. His modern avatar is the French 
revolutionary, Saint-Just.”336 Encountering upon a wooded path at Little Sparta337 the imposing golden 
head of the sun-God – glowing, as it might be expected to, but upon its forehead inscribed the title 
Apollon Terroriste (Figure 40)
338
 – we are subject to a remarkable experience of theoretical and historical 
convergence; the “disjunction of disorder and coherence,”339 as Alec Finlay has suggested, which is yet a 
“model of order.”340 For here is not only Apollo, but also an architect of the French Revolution, Saint-
Just, who makes frequent appearances in Finlay‟s work:341 the classical and neo-classical, bucolic and 
political, generative and destructive, are held in a stimulating proximity.
342
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Figure 40: Ian Hamilton Finlay with Alexander Stoddart, Apollon Terroriste, 1988. 
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Their harmony is a paradoxical one: Apollo is associated not only with light, truth, revelation, learning 
and creative endeavour, but also with the manner in which these dialectically contain their own antitheses. 
Thus also with Saint-Just: the revolutionary is at once the instrument of enlightenment and terror.
343
 
Revelation and revolution, intimately linked, are easily consumed by an instrumental application of terror; 
truth slips back into dogma, and art only scarcely contains the savage, sublime
344
 forces and violence by 
which it is generated. It is not by chance that Saint-Just‟s golden head should be disembodied, as the 
promise of the revolution succumbs all too rapidly to the extremities of its own logic, and its progenitors 
meet the same fate at the foot of the guillotine which they expedited for so many others. Thus it is stylistic 
and historical discontinuity, rather than thematic disunity, which strikes us in the statuette of 
Apollo/Saint-Just (Figure 41)
345
 carrying a machine-gun,
346
 as well as in the inscription which appears on 
the facade of Finlay‟s Garden Temple (Figure 42):347 “TO APOLLO, HIS MUSIC, HIS MISSILES, HIS 
MUSES.”348 Finlay‟s concrete poetry offers minimal, yet potent, markers of historical, spatial and cultural 
transposition,
349
 indeed, transumption. In the singularity of their location, these objects act as indices: 
minimalist poietic markers which render deeply problematic the understanding that intense self-
reflexivity passes most readily into non-referentiality.   
 
Nonetheless, it is still accurate that in much minimalism, self-reflexivity is of so intense an order that, 
contra the processes observable in much of Finlay‟s concrete poetry, the aesthetic object does in fact 
eschew all external and mimetic reference. “[R]eleased from representation, they further remove 
themselves from allusion by their being new and unique objects, referring to nothing (except, some might 
argue, to the theories upon which they are based).”350 Despite numerous superficial resemblances, 
minimalists habitually reject the principles of traditional abstraction – of an “art whose forms have a basis 
in the real world.”351 Identifying in its objects the persistence and indifference of the Real, minimalism 
pursues its unmediated realness by a vigorous eschewal of mimesis.
352
 Shape and form are means of 
conceptual and formal deduction rather than the imitation of something pre-existent. Similarly, 
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anthropomorphism – the comprehension of parts, properties and the relation between these with reference 
to that which is manifestly human – is “displaced in this art (Minimalism) by the nonanthropomorphic 
quality of „presence,‟”353 discussed above.    
 
            
Figure 41: Ian Hamilton Finlay, Apollo/Saint-Just        Figure 42: Ian Hamilton Finlay, The Garden Temple 
(after Bernini), 1986.               (To Apollo, His Music, His Missiles, His Muses), 1982.  
 
The condition implied by an ideal and dynamic combination of appropriate scale, presence and 
nonanthropomorphism is nonreferentiality – the artwork is free to exist in relation to its own objecthood 
or, otherwise, in terms of its essential quantity. Critics and artists disagree on the extent and desirability of 
minimalism‟s nonreferentiality, yet habitually acknowledge its significance: Fried proposes a deductive 
logic in minimalism according to which “the shape is the object;”354 Wollheim asserts that “the identity of 
a work…resides in the actual stuff in which it consists;”355 Robert Morris‟ unitary forms and Donald 
Judd‟s specific objects offer integral visions of nonreferentiality from the perspective of the object 
itself.
356
 The unity and wholeness of such objects is pursued by various techniques of construction. In 
music, for example, both drones and repetitive modules draw attention to limitation in order to render the 
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work more perceivable and thus effective in terms of its integrity and structural unity (Track 8).
357
  
Analogical techniques of repetition are observable in the serial (Figure 43)
358
 and modular sculpture 
(Figure 44)
359
 of such artists as Donald Judd, Carl Andre and Mel Bochner, and in the hard edge painting 
of Ellsworth Kelly (Figure 45)
360
 or series of Brice Marden and Paul Mogensen (Figure 46).
361
 Kelly‟s 
work consists of repeated (usually) vertical bands or panels of highly contrasted colour, to which Judd 
ascribes “some…earlier purity, idealism, and oblique but directly descriptive reference to nature.”362 
Strickland highlights the unifying function of Kelly‟s repetition, which he associates with the immediacy 
evoked by the formal and chromatic interruption between these panels,
363
 and their significance in 
exploiting the effectiveness of replication within modular patterns of structural uniformity.
364
 
 
 
Figure 43: Sol LeWitt, Serial Project No. 1 (ABCD), 1966. 
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Figure 44: Donald Judd, Untitled series (North Artillery Shed,      Figure 45:Ellsworth Kelly, Spectrum IV, 1967.             
Marfa), 1982-6. 
 
 
Figure 46: Paul Mogensen, Copperopolis, 1966. 
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Repetition is similarly pivotal to the pursuit of a minimalist literary aesthetic. It finds of its most intense 
expressions in Gertrude Stein‟s circuitous and cyclical writing with its emphasis on wordness – the 
“satisfaction in language made present, contemporary; the pleasure/plenitude in the immersion in 
language, where language is not understood as a code for something else or a representation of 
somewhere else.”365 Equally we might look to the example of Beckett whose “work, with its asymptotic 
approaches to zero, enacts this complex play between reduction and addition, in which to repeat oneself, 
and therefore to say progressively less, seems, uncannily always to involve saying more.”366 Modular 
repetition – often replete with incremental additions and subtractions, and constructed from phrases 
making use of various techniques of contraction, elaboration, reversal, inversion or displacement – is 
central to the writing of Beckett and such other writers as Robbe-Grillet and Josipovici. The “voice...in 
the dark”367 provides a central module in Beckett‟s “Company,” the permutations of which allow one to 
trace a vigorous play of existential limits within the work – between internality and externality; active and 
passive voice; first, second and third person narrative
368
 – as well as the recollection of largely traumatic 
childhood memories. In Josipovici‟s The Inventory entire passages are repeated,369 reflecting on the 
manner in which conceptual chunking and repetitive narrative units often implicate one another. Similar 
use of repetition is recognizable in Didion‟s prose,370 and in the writing of that “stylistic genitor of 
contemporary minimalist prose,”371 Ernest Hemingway.  
 
Repetition is more clearly integral to the structure and coherence of much traditional as well as avant-
garde poetry. Nonetheless, a particularly minimalist conception of repetition is most convincingly 
exhibited in some of the finest Concrete and L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poetry. By its repetition, Eugen 
Gomringer‟s “silence” evokes the symmetry which exists between textual, semantic and material 
presence and absence:  
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silence   silence   silence 
silence   silence   silence 
silence                   silence 
silence   silence   silence 
silence   silence   silence
372
 
 
 
If the word silence were not repeated as relentlessly as it is in Gomringer‟s poem – admitting that every 
iteration effectively negates the immanence of the word‟s meaning – then it is unlikely that its absence at 
the poem‟s physical centre could match the absence which is its semantic heart, that is, silence.  
 
Fluctuating between the genres of prose poem and artist‟s book,373 the work of Steve McCaffery is 
equally significant with respect to repetition. At the close of the third part of Panopticon
374 we encounter 
the phrase “and on” repeated no less than four hundred and forty times (Figure 47). The visual effect is as 
startling as the manner in which this repetition elicits from us a recognition of the materiality of text. 
Whether reading these lines, which for their sheer quantity dissolve the semantic element which precedes 
them, or apprehending them in purely visual terms, we encounter text in increasingly preconceptual, 
independent and objectal terms.  
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Figure 47: Steve McCaffery, from Panopticon, 1984. 
 
The writing of Robert Lax is also notably innovative for the manner in which, by repetition, it aims to 
return to the poietic constituents of a given work a sense of radical immanence:  
  
is 
 is 
is 
is 
is 
is 
is 
  
is  
is 
is 
  
is 
is 
is 
  
 
is 
is 
is 
is 
is 
is 
is
375
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Lax‟s poem exemplifies the manner in which repetition and presence are often confluent in minimalism, 
emphasizing a poietic taking-place as the very heart of the work – that transcendental immanence is most 
proper to every entity by virtue simply of its occurrence. Such is the “innermost exteriority”376 by which 
aesthetic objects reflect the minimal displacement from themselves by which they acquire a poietic 
existential valence:    
  
things 
into  
words 
  
words  
into 
things 
  
things 
into  
words 
  
words  
into 
things 
  
words  
into  
things 
  
words 
into  
things 
  
things 
into  
words 
  
words  
into  
things
377
 
 
 
e) The problem of reduction and the questions of facture and process 
 
As noted, critical models attempting to conflate minimalism and reductivism remain problematic 
inasmuch as they fail to distinguish with suitable clarity radical simplicity from one arrived at as the telos 
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of a reductive process. In recognizing minimalisms of unit, form, scale, style and material,
378
 John Barth 
offers a sufficiently open typology of minimalism, but one which rests heavily upon this conflation. This 
is also true of the nine principal characteristics of minimalist literature
379
 which Hallett identifies, 
concluding that minimalism offers “containers of condensed meaning”380 in which we are obliged to 
“infer from the part exposed exactly what has been omitted, what lies beneath.”381 Where the part is 
metonymic in minimalist literature, in the visual arts it is independent. Colpitt contends that “while 
simplicity implies an intentionally reductive process…it does not demand it. For many artists there is a 
difference between the conception of a work of art as simple and the process of reducing from complexity 
to arrive at that simplicity.”382 In light of this important recognition, the extremity of reduction which 
seems evident in minimalism sui generis is as much the product of hermeneutic expectations and 
analytical processes traceable to the perceiver, as to the preference for “using materials as they...[are], 
without adulteration.”383 According to Colpitt, “simplification or reduction are conceptual…[I]f elements 
were to be eliminated, they were done so in the artist‟s mind.”384 Tracing minimalism qua reduction is 
thus a manner of regenerating in the aesthetic work an act of and active perception – constructively 
paying attention, in the spirit noted by Merleau-Ponty.
385
  
  
The questions of where, of what and how an artwork is constituted – in short, questions of facture – are of 
considerable significance to the development of canonical minimalism. By abandoning the fetishization 
of the generative ritual, minimalism also forgoes numerous of the outward signs of artistic facture – its 
technical irregularities, expressiveness and gestures. Minimalists seek maximally stable and impersonal  
techniques through which to produce their works. This is particularly evident in minimalist sculpture 
which, along with the mechanical, anonymous reproduction of Pop art, “rejected personal facture.”386 
Donald Judd, Robert Morris and Anne Truitt all used media unconventional for their art – sheet metal and 
plywood for example – which benefited from the expertise of industrial fabrication, providing works with 
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an increased “sharpness and clarity of edge and surface.”387 Thus at least some minimalism appears to 
move towards an aesthetic situation which “evince[s] a „minimum‟ of artistic labour…purging...authorial 
feeling and demonstratable intention.”388 The reasons for abandoning the physical labour of sculptural 
construction, preferring industrial fabrication and assemblage, thus seem quite as practical as they are 
aesthetic.
389
  
 
For many minimalist sculptors, the sheer scale of work (Figure 48),
390
 the incredible heaviness of 
material,
391
 and the use of premanufactured objects
392
 required an unprecedented cooperation between 
artists, manufacturers and various specialists in industrial construction and installation. That “the artist 
functioned as conceptualizer; the factory as the actualizer”393 provoked some dissent amongst critics.394 
Fried and Greenberg were less than hospitable to the idea, although as Colpitt emphasizes, it was 
principally New York Times critic, Hilton Kramer, who, in deeply Romantic rather than anti-minimalist 
terms, lamented the sacrifice of “the energy and genius of [the artist‟s] own hand”395 to various 
technologies of reproduction, a position immediately and effectively countered by Dore Ashton.
396
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Figure 48: Ronald Bladen, The X, 1967. 
 
It is simply naive to imagine any form of artistic expression as entirely disconnected from technology, be 
it in terms of the means or the medium of production.
397
 Minimalism‟s reliance on fabrication over artistic 
facture might, by some, be interpreted cynically as the point at which the utopianism of modernity tips 
into the dystopianism of postmodernity: creative force appears to be displaced, first from genius to 
technique, then from technique to technology, generating a rupture in which the potential for true novelty 
collapses into a void of simulacra. Yet, perhaps unexpectedly, minimalism in fact resists this collapse: its 
simultaneously radical and materialist approach offers clarity on the manner in which various techniques 
of fabrication cross into art. The manner of its complication of simulacra, and its accompanying 
problematization of the Real, extends well beyond the concerns exposed above in terms of sculpture, and 
into other aesthetic pursuits. In minimalist painting, a similar interest in the withdrawal of facture is 
                                                          
397
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discernible.
398
 Brush strokes, suggestive of human action, give way to instruments and techniques which 
ensure the even application of paint. Rauschenberg used a roller and housepaint
399
 for his 
“prototypical…series of six works composed of from one to seven panels of rolled white enamel 
paint,”400 while Robert Mangold famously used a spray gun to maximize the evenness of application 
(Figure 49).
401
 Even though these works remain dependent on the effort of artists, “the „look‟ of 
fabrication was evident in most paintings.”402 Neutrality, impersonality and anonymity quickly became 
one of the understated yet striking hallmarks of minimalist painting.  
 
   
Figure 49: Robert Mangold, Red Wall, 1965. 
 
Minimalist composers were similarly concerned with investigating the manner in which technology might 
intensify their aesthetic aims. Steve Reich‟s Pendulum Music, for example, is a process work which 
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derives its content from “allowing four microphones to swing above four upturned speakers” (Track 9).403 
Like many of the conceptual compositions of John Cage, La Monte Young, and various of the latter‟s 
Fluxus contemporaries, the musical process is notated entirely in regular language:  
 
2, 3, 4 or more microphones are suspended from the ceiling by their cables, that they all hang the same 
distance from floor and are all free to swing with a pendular motion. Each microphone‟s cable is plugged 
into an amplifier which is connected to a speaker. Each microphone hangs a few inches directly above or 
next to it‟s [sic] speaker…The performance begins with the performers taking each mike, pulling it back 
like a swing, and then in unison releasing all of them together. Performers then carefully turn up each 
amplifier just to the point where feedback occurs when a mike swings directly over or next to it‟s [sic] 
speaker. Thus, a series of feedback pulses are heard which will either be all in unison or not depending on 
the gradually changing phase relations of the different mike pendulums. Performers then sit down to watch 
and listen to the process along with the audience…The piece is ended sometime after all mikes have come 
to rest and are feeding back a continuous tone.
404
 
 
 
Unique in Reich‟s compositional output for its conceptual focus, the composition incorporates in a 
technologically progressive manner, a distinctly Dadaist transgression of artistic convention and medium 
with an aleatory processual element which clearly recalls the endeavours of John Cage.
405
 
Simultaneously, the work has an austerity which is characteristically minimalist. It incorporates drone and 
repeated sound in a singular manner: the latter gives way to the former; the telos of the composition 
proves distinctly ateleological – the work loses momentum, moves away from a sense of its own finitude 
even as it progresses, and gives way to a continuum rather than a consummation of poietic effort. Here, 
repetition simultaneously dissolves, transforms, and reforms the work. As the energy of the swinging 
microphones dissipates, pulsing sound is transformed into stable drone. The potential relationship of 
minimalism to the logic of transumption is once again reinforced. As the swaying microphone comes to 
rest, we witness a process through which force, work and movement reconstitute themselves, through 
their dissipation, as sound. Technology, originally designed to mediate (amplify) sound for aesthetic 
effect, becomes the source of sound qua aesthetic work.  
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The displacement of poiesis from individual genius to the impersonal processes of Pendulum Music 
accentuates minimalism‟s concern with the conjunction of the singularity of personal facture and the 
generic, impersonal techniques and technologies and processes of fabrication. It also clarifies how the 
minimalist proclivity for impersonal, physical or perceptual process
406
 facilitates the objectal appeals of 
minimalism both to aesthetic distension and transumption. “[O]f all my pieces [Pendulum Music] was the 
most impersonal, and was the most emblematic and the most didactic in terms of the process idea [that 
process is impersonal and independent of its objects
407] and also most sculptural,”408 claims Reich. “In 
many ways, you could describe Pendulum Music as audible sculpture, with the objects being the swinging 
microphones and the loudspeakers. I always set them up quite clearly as sculpture.”409 
 
Here is exhibited the manner in which, by attempting to expose the radix of its medium, the minimalist 
work habitually transgresses generic limits, is transmediated, or even produces the radix of something 
entirely new. Minimalism expresses a singular responsibility with regard to poiesis and the new, 
rendering maximally visible the processes by which novelty asserts itself – not merely differentially, but 
positively, by the instantiation of a rarity entirely unanticipated. It offers minimal impediment both to an 
accurate sensory and conceptual retracing of the art-object itself, since the generation or exposition of 
such an objecthood is, perhaps, minimalism‟s most universal aim. Minimalism allows us to delineate, 
with a singular closeness, the processes through which such novel objects emerge within and sustain their 
status as art. Because its objects habitually eschew reference to meaning or contexts outside of 
themselves, minimalism also affords a great clarification of the minimal displacement required for an 
object – apparently neutral, objective, and indifferent – to become incorporated into the subjective 
processes of individual or group agents. Such displacement might best be understood by considering the 
manner in which explanatory analysis easily becomes causal in itself; how various ideological valences 
regarding the importance and place of objects in the contemporary world come to be exercised, and how 
the significance of context comes to be principally of causal rather than explanatory significance. Objects, 
exposed through minimalism in their blunt, objectal facticity, might easily become agents to validate and 
often ossify certain cultural sequences which require objects as their principal capital. In short, it is in 
minimalism that we discover the tools which allow us to understand how objects speak: speak themselves 
in their absolute independence; speak in relation to other objects and subjects, conceptual and existential 
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sequences; speak as examples of specific cultural situations; speak as examples of the force of generation 
itself, or poiesis. Sometimes such speech might be clearly located in the objectal status of the object qua 
object, while at other times it emerges in the temporal and interactive complexity of processes of 
production, reception, and interpretation. I contend that both ultimately depend on the recognition that 
what persists in the object – what conditions the persistence of minimalism in whatever manifestation – is 
something akin to a poietic space. However, the difficulty of demarcating this evasive space increasingly 
leads us to the position that we urgently require not an aesthetic space, as such, but an aesthetic non-space 
or atopos – a poietic atopia. This atopia is nothing other than the proper place of exemplarity, which 
Agamben perspicuously defines in terms of a para-ontology.  
  
It is such an atopian poetics – not unique to minimalism, but uniquely decipherable through minimalism, 
on account of the latter‟s proclivity for an objecthood unhampered by self-conscious complexity – that 
accounts for the persistence of minimalism. The persistence of minimalism, in turn, is what renders it a 
potent vehicle in understanding the difficult but vital field of exemplarity, of how things come to be 
known through something intrinsic to their constitution, and how this radiation of intrinsic knowability 
comes to be effective in the world. I argue that this knowability of objects must ultimately be tied to their 
Being, rather than any epistemological rendering of their being. More subtly still, minimalism clarifies 
what might be termed quite precisely the minimal distance between an object in-itself and its self-
reflexive capacity, which is required for it to be knowable as such without external reference. In this light, 
what minimalism affords is a particularly potent mechanism for understanding the way in which objects 
render themselves exemplary in the first place, how such exemplarity has an agency of its own prior to 
any so-called subjective intervention, and how such objects promise a better understanding of the way in 
which objects and subjects become intricated in the first place, a consideration with implications as far-
reaching for the contemporary understanding of law, ethics, politics and economics, as for art, aesthetics 
or cultural production.  
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5. A MINIMALIST TOPOLOGY OF THE REAL 
 
a) The pursuit of the Real as a transection of Being and existence 
 
Numerous conceptions of realism fail to grasp with cogency the distinction between Being and existence, 
and thus between ontology and existentialism.
410
 The present work differs sharply in this respect. 
Following Badiou‟s understanding, at its heart is the assertion that being qua being – generally rendered 
as Being
411
 – must be regarded in terms of pure multiplicity. Such pure multiplicity412 can be 
mathematically demonstrated by the proofs of axiomatic set theory.
413
 While existence occurs within such 
Being, it in no senses reduces,
414
 nor can it be understood properly as identical with, this Being. Pure 
Being is necessarily indifferent to existence, but existence is not indifferent to pure Being. Existence is 
subtracted from, and hence in a significant sense dependent upon, Being.
415
 In light of the insistence that 
Being and existence ought at all times to be distinguished most carefully from one another, the following 
is offered: the Real is that which traverses both Being and existence, as the potentiality of an entity which 
persists within the subtraction of an existential field from pure multiplicity; which has consistency in 
existing simultaneously in terms of multiplicity and unity – multiplicity which is counted-as-one by “a 
system of conditions through which the multiple can be recognized as multiple”416 
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b) Species of realism 
 
Derived from the Latin res – thing, in both its abstract and concrete dimensions – the real leads to an 
understanding of reality as “the totality of all real things,”417 and realism as “a philosophical doctrine 
about the reality [of real things].”418 All realisms share a radical, if minimal, positivity: for an entity to be 
real it must, first, exist, and, second, exist independently.
419
 Thus, for a realist, “at least part of reality is 
ontologically independent of human minds.”420 The rejection of realism must first of all replace this 
autonomy with an understanding that reality is limited by some form of access to the real.
421
 The 
misapprehension upon which this activity coheres is its insistence that some sort of symmetry pertains 
between the real, the unreal, the non-real and the irreal
422
 – the various degrees of accepting or subverting 
realism, in other words. Hence the circularity of Lawson‟s argument is far from convincing: “realism 
even as a hypothetical goal, of whatever form or however limited, is not an option, for the destructive 
self-reference that has been identified in non-realism, and which typifies the contemporary predicament, 
has its roots in the project of uncovering a true picture of an independent reality.”423  
 
From the perspective of the present argument, Lawson‟s errors are several. The extreme model of self-
reference which he develops too gratuitously conflates cause and telos, suggesting that apparent stability 
is always subject to epistemological circularity. Thus Lawson justifies inserting into his argument a 
conceptual, stabilizing mechanism,
424
 closure: “the means by which our experience is constructed;”425 the 
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imposition of “fixity on openness,”426 “hold[ing] that which is different as the same...realiz[ing] material 
which is in addition to that which preceded it.”427 By a convenient conjunction of self-reference and 
necessity, Lawson contends that closures produce the effect of contingent reality in the absence of real 
reality: “[i]t is through the provision of a reality which is relatively stable that we are able to maintain our 
system of closures even though that system is constantly changing.”428 In this manner, and by failing 
sufficiently to distinguish semantic, epistemological and ontological realism,
429
 Lawson‟s anti-realism is 
blunted; dispersed into a quasi-pragmatic field. The implicit maxim here – whatever does the job of the 
real, is sure not to be real
430
 – seems to be more dogmatically than it is logically derived, resting on 
rhetorical refutation of realism, but addressing only obliquely even its most minimal claim regarding the 
existence of ontologically autonomous and mind-independent entities (entity realism).
431
 Lawson is 
perhaps correct in many of the details of his argument. Indeed, his identification of an ontological plenum 
– fundamentally multiple and unpredictable, unmarked rather than marked – from which must be 
subtracted contingent stability, is close to what Badiou argues in terms of subtraction, and which is central 
to the present work.  
 
In brief, Lawson‟s anti-realism moves in a complex but essentially epistemological orbit which fails, from 
the perspective of the present argument, either to account for or to counter the radical ontological claim 
which realism makes when it asserts that at least some part of Being is autonomous, independent and 
coherent. A similar case can be made against any anti-realism
432
 which fails to address convincingly 
either this minimal criterion of the Real, or the particularities of the species of realism against which it 
                                                          
426
 Ibid., 4. 
427
 Ibid., 10. “It is because the material is „in addition‟ to that which preceded it, and not merely a manipulation of 
the which preceded it, that closure does not eradicate or exhaust openness, but instead provides a means of holding 
openness as something” (ibid.). 
428
 Ibid., 99. See ibid., 93, 98-9. 
429
 See Jerold L. Aronson, Rom Harré and Eileen Cornell Way, Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress is 
Possible (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1995), 1-2; Niiniluoto, Critical, 2-4. 
430
 Here we might recall Goodman‟s view that it is “[s]urely not...any sort of resemblance to reality” (Nelson 
Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis: Bobs-Merill, 1968), 34) that 
“constitutes a realism of representation” (ibid.), but an adherence to a similar means of presentation (ibid., 39).  
431
 See Niiniluoto, Critical , 2-3, 12; John Losee, A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford UP, 2001), 254-6.  
432
 Christopher Norris is justifiably critical of several species of anti-realism: “trivial semantic variety” (that an 
intrinsic instability in signification is sufficient decisively to undermine reality); “ „strong‟ sociological or cultural-
relativist approaches” (which have a “large investment in the idea of scientific „truth‟ or „reality‟ as relative 
to…some culture-specific discourse” (Christopher Norris, New idols of the cave: On the limits of anti-realism 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester UP, 1997), 117)), and formal arguments which assert that the loss of 
“recognition-transcendent truths” amounts to the loss of the Real (Christopher Norris, “Reply to Jeff Malpas: On 
Truth, Realism, Changing one's Mind about Davidson (not Heidegger), and Related Topics,” International Journal 
of Philosophical Studies Vol. 12.3 (2004): 358-9. Also see Norris, New idols, 117-20. 
   93 
 
sets itself.
433
 Thus, metaphysical realism – variously the crux of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy 
which echoes into medieval scholasticism – must be countered not only by a destruction of metaphysics, 
to paraphrase Heidegger,
434
 but by a process by which the Real is decisively uncoupled from metaphysics. 
Likewise, once it has been recognized that various routes travelled by the Enlightenment tradition rest on 
the imbrication of the Real – either as radix or telos – with such methodological concerns as deduction or 
induction, rationalism or empiricism, it is impossible to ignore, or negate by a weak anti-realism 
(relativism or pragmatism), the minimal yet immanent positivity to which they attest. The Kantian 
position – which is contested and adapted by various types of phenomenology, perhaps most notably that 
of Husserl – does not dismiss the Real so much as suspend it between mind and perception. Indeed, a 
dialectic of presence and absence to a significant extent informs the Hegelian, Marxist, Freudian, 
Lacanian and Derridean understanding of reality and the Real.   
 
It is true that the venerable metaphysical lineage of realism is in fact not as easily separable from its 
scientific manifestation as one might suppose. Russell argues that the early classical forms of philosophy 
and science were practically indistinguishable,
435
 and we do not overstate the case to recognize amongst 
the earliest realists the Presocratic atomists. It is therefore not surprising that anti-realism is a “prevailing 
trend”436 which in a significant sense is as alien to common sense437 as it is to positivist science. The 
broadest distinction with regard to the Real is between a metaphysical and a non-metaphysical realism. 
Modern (post-Enlightenment) philosophy has tended to view the latter as more susceptible to analysis 
than the former, although the present argument regards the Real as a radical term with a trajectory of its 
own.
438
 Hilary Putnam follows the distinction of scientific from pre-scientific, or common sense, 
realism.
439
 The decisive shift from an intuitively derived metaphysics to scientific realism occurs in the 
Galilean claim that the world operates by a mathematical physics and can be translated by mathematical 
                                                          
433
 Norris reports on several of the extremes at which realist and anti-realist arguments unwittingly support one 
another (Norris, “Reply to Jeff Malpas,” 362, 370).  
434
 See pages 207-9 of the present work. In Norris‟ estimation an “authentic truth” from which the coordinates of 
reality might be taken, is, for Heidegger, “vouchsafed in certain fragments of the Presocratics but thereafter 
progressively obscured by the accretions of „Western metaphysics‟ and latter-day technoscience” (Norris, New idols, 
119). See Norris, “Reply to Jeff Malpas,” 369.   
435
 Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 15. 
436
 Norris, New Idols, 117. 
437
 Niiniluoto, Critical, 8. 
438
 There has been a notable, if sometimes hyperbolic, resurgence in realist thought in these early years of the 
twenty-first century, most notably under the banner of speculative realism, closely associated with the journal 
Collapse, and a recent collection of essays, The Speculative Turn (Eds. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham 
Harman, The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: re.press, 2011)).  
439
 Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism: The Paul Carus Lectures (La Salle: Open Court, 1987), 3-4. 
   94 
 
formulae.
440
 For Putnam,
441
 “[t]he kind of scientific realism we have inherited from the seventeenth 
century has not lost all its prestige even yet, but it has saddled us with a disastrous picture of the world”442 
“that denies precisely the common man‟s kind of realism, his realism about tables and chairs.”443 The 
world as it is, is thus reduced to a world as it is given – one in which truth is sovereign marker, but only 
insofar as it marks a transcendental alethic
444
 point, or, alternately, a strong correspondence or 
convergence
445
 between cause and effect.
446
 While transcendental models of truth originate from 
metaphysics, convergent models – which (following Tarski) can be either deflationary or minimal,447 or 
inflationary,
448
 in which case they seek “some extra correspondence, or coherentist, or pragmatist 
condition”449 – ground themselves in immanent correspondences. Such correspondences may themselves 
be conceptualized in numerous ways: most significantly, for the present purpose, in terms of 
verisimilitude – that one proposition can be more true than others, without approaching absolute truth450 – 
and veridicality – that propositions can be absolutely true given the hypothetical completeness of a 
situation, but, that since the completeness of a situation is itself only contingent, truth, in fact, is always in 
the process of being completed.
451
 The central proposition here, however, is simply that the majority of 
realist models are “charted in terms of their attitudes towards truth.”452  
 
Niiniluoto usefully distinguishes six realist species: ontological realism, which addresses the possibility 
of a mind-independent world; semantical realism, which attempts to establish reality in terms of an 
objective correlation between language or thought and world; epistemological realism, which formulates 
such correlation in terms of knowledge; axiological realism, which stipulates that at the heart of real 
being or knowledge is an axiom binding these to truth or non-truth; methodological realism which 
determines the most reliable means of arriving at knowledge regarding reality; and ethical realism which 
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sets as its task the exposition of moral values.
453
 Accepting that arguments regarding realism almost 
invariably return to evidentiary cases for the existence of reality, science or quasi-science retain a 
considerable significance, in which light Niiniluoto‟s typology454 is particularly stimulating. Beginning 
with the question of truth, a triple distinction is made – between anarchists, who altogether reject truth as 
a basis of reality; those who substitute a suitable equivalent concept to that of truth; and those who favour 
some sort of model in which reality, fact and truth correspond. Amongst truth equivalents we might 
consider the offerings of pragmatists and neopragmatists, from Dewey and James to Rorty;
455
 “semantic 
anti-realists”456 such as Dummett, who seek systematically to decouple reality from truth; internal realists 
such as Putnam, who resists the slide into relativism by promoting a limited degree of internal 
consistency;
457
 and sociological relativists and constructivists such as Stengers or Latour.
458
 For 
Niniiluoto, however, the most scientifically and philosophically convincing realist models accept truth as 
a point of convergence for the Real, in which case it is possible to proceed either descriptively or 
theoretically.  
 
The inductive tradition in the sciences endorses a broadly descriptive model of truth while embracing a 
type of methodological realism. Amongst these are empiricists such as Bacon, Berkeley, Locke and 
Hume, positivists from Comte to the more radical logical positivism of the Vienna circle (Neurath, 
Schlick and Carnap) and logical atomist precursors, Russell and Wittgenstein, and, more latterly, 
instrumentalists such as Nagel, Stegmüller
459
 and van Fraasen.
460
 However, since descriptive language can 
only approximate reality, every programme of transcendental realism which attempts to “give an adequate 
account of...the sciences, in all their differences and specificities as well as their unity”461 is at best 
contingent – “merely that of the best account currently available.”462 The result is progressive doubt as to 
the completeness of any theoretical account of reality, in which sphere we encounter numerous “half-
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realism[s],”463 most notably the entity realism of Cartwright, Hacking, Harré and Giere which recognizes 
that “theoretical entities...play a role in causal explanation, but denies realism about theoretical laws.”464  
 
Half-realism emphasizes the dispute as to whether the realist vocation lies in the faithful transcription 
through theory of existing relationships between entities, or whether it resides in the production of new 
entities themselves.
465
 In this sense, as well as by the manner in which either proposition finally is 
compelled to deal with its axiological basis – its acceptance of reality as a predicate of truth at the 
expense of an apophatic realism – we are enjoined to recognize that “truth, realism and verisimilitude are 
all part of a single [and, ultimately, metaphysical] picture.”466 Thus it is that such an axiology draws 
realism back to its most fundamental ground – that upon which the conflict between realism and anti-
realism plays out, as well as upon which is posited the distinction of pre-scientific or so-called naive 
realism
467
 from scientific realism. Sceptics such as Feyerabend and irrealists such as Goodman maintain 
their positions on methodological rather than rhetorical grounds,
468
 as opposed to common sense realism 
which, though probably correct, does not habitually represent itself in the most convincing light. 
Mediating extreme scepticism and naivety is critical realism. If critical realism is perhaps a term too 
general to be applied with consistency, it nonetheless includes various robust contestations of absolute 
reality or lack of reality (some axiomatic and entity realists amongst them) and extends even to the 
political programme of Bhaskar‟s meta-theory: “[c]ritical realism embraces a coherent account of the 
nature of nature, society, science, human agency and philosophy (including itself). Its intent is to 
underlabour for science, conceived as a necessary but insufficient agency of human emancipation.”469 
 
The aims of the present work are far humbler, tentatively returning to the most minimal claim of 
ontological realism from the perspective of aesthetic objects – that there are autonomous entities which 
persist within the existential field called reality. The claim is that minimalism attempts to clarify – in 
minimal, objectal terms – the very generative acts and transformative processes broadly describable in 
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terms of poiesis. In this it does not produce reality so much as gain access to that which is real as 
transparently as possible. Thus it is possible to return with greater confidence to our principal thesis: 
minimalism exemplifies the facticity and persistence of the Real.  
 
The objects of minimalism, and the field within which these objects emerge, appeal to a quite different 
type of realism. Perhaps we conceptualise minimalist objects best in terms of an agnostic,
470
 common 
sense realism – objects which testify to their own indifferent facticity, to that which simply is as it is – 
which nonetheless submit to the strong descriptivism of empirical confirmation. Minimalism, as a 
contingent field of aesthetic practices, exhibits itself through a strongly self-reflexive form of entity 
realism: the existential intensity of minimalism is greatest on neither a conceptual nor an objectal ground, 
but with regard to its taking-place as the connection between the object and the Real as an abstract, 
minimal entity. Regarding the factical ground or implications of this position, we echo Meillassoux‟s 
assertion that “facticity is the lack of reason for any reality”471 – or, in other words, that facticity indicates 
the coherence of a reality as it is despite the fact that it could have been otherwise. Thus minimalism does 
not constitute reality as such – it remains indifferent in this regard precisely to exhibit the generic manner 
of belonging to the Real – but most certainly posits the question with unprecedented emphasis as to 
whether or not aesthetic objects have the capacity to clarify the relation between fact and reality. 
 
 
c) Clarifying the Real 
 
The realism to which minimalism attests is homologous but adjacent to those models offered in terms of 
scientific realism. Traditionally, aesthetics has concerned itself principally with mimetic realism.
472
 To the 
extent that it claims a correspondential relation between a descriptive language and the world, mimesis is 
certainly a species of realism. The precise extent to which its reach is limited ontologically, 
epistemologically, semantically, or axiologically remains an area of contention, however.
473
 Historically, 
                                                          
470
 See Psillos, Scientific Realism, 179-84. 
471
 SRM, 428. 
472
 Considering the reduction of realist aesthetic to a reproduction of reality, it is important to keep in mind 
Raymond Tallis‟ hesitation regarding the “tendency to assimilate the iconic truth of a representational mode of 
signification to the referential truth of an expressive mode of signification” (Raymond Tallis, In Defence of Realism 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1988), 195. Danto similarly identifies possible disputes as to whether representation is 
properly intensional, extensional or relational (Danto, Transfiguration, 68-70). Also see Goodman, Languages, 34-9. 
473
 Although in terms often quite different to those of the present discussion, René Girard‟s Deceit, Desire and the 
Novel (René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure, trans. Yvonne Frecerro 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1965)) and Violence and the Sacred (René Girard, Violence and the 
Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1975)), as well as Philippe Lacoue-
   98 
 
the question of aesthetic verisimilitude is organized by a mimetic rather than an artistic economy – the set 
of techniques by which existent entities are imitated,
474
 rather than those theoretical correspondences 
between world and work, including the question of beauty, which arguably has been the dominant one for 
aestheticians since the eighteenth century.
475
 Periodic revivals of realism are less revolutionary than they 
are radical – at once gestures of conservation and renovation, aesthetic immanence and metaphysical 
transcendence – and succeed to the extent that they expose the minimal but requisite distance between the 
world and the mimemata.
476
  
 
Here Danto‟s views are instructive regarding the intensification of the relation between thought and 
reality which art effects: first, that “philosophy begins to arise only when the society within which it 
arises achieves a concept of reality...that can happen only when a contrast is available between reality and 
something else – appearances, illusion, representation, art;”477and second, its corollaries, that “one could 
not imagine, any more than one could a world made up just of shadows, a world made up solely of 
artworks. One could imagine a world without artworks...for such a world would be exactly that in which 
the concept of reality had not yet arisen.”478  
 
The difficult relation between thought and reality is precisely that which is intuited by the techniques of 
mimesis which define realist art. Historically, the representational goals of aesthetic realism correspond 
considerably to the directives of non-scientific realism.
479
 If, in both spheres, realism fails to coincide 
with reality, this occurs not because the latter is resistant to translation, but because our mechanisms for 
perceiving and reproducing reality are limited and, as has been suggested, necessarily so if the coherence 
of particular entities is to be maintained. Realism is in this sense the foil to an idealist transcendentalism, 
motivated, as Nochlin notes, by the desire of art to express its own contemporaneity.
480
 The thrust of 
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Lukács‟ celebrated position is not dissimilar. Although the efforts of modernism may be directed towards 
expressions of formalist autonomy,
481
 desocialized existentialism,
482
 and denaturalized thought,
483
 the 
principal exigency of contemporary art remains its capacity for exemplifying a “concrete potentiality 
[which] is concerned with the dialectic between the individual‟s subjectivity and objective reality.”484 
From such concrete potentiality is actualized the force of a contemporary realism – one which 
“deliberately introduces elements of disintegration...to portray the contemporary world more exactly,”485 
but which nonetheless returns art to social and political actuality and its participation in history.
486
  
 
It would simply be inaccurate – regardless of how convincing one finds Lukács‟ case for realism at the 
expense of modernism – to deny that several strands of the modernist aesthetic approach realism through 
their acute awareness that the abandonment of mimesis offers a plausible culmination not only for the 
trend towards autonomy, but also the search for abstract purity.
487
 Critical misprision in this regard is 
fuelled by a view of reality which is not elegant for its simplicity, but rather simply dogmatic. For such a 
realist, who maintains “that truth to observed facts – facts about the outer world, or facts about his own 
feelings – is important,”488and who is “intent on arresting semantic play by insisting on the need of life-
likeness and verisimilitude in representation,”489 the sensus communis retains a naivety which resists 
theoretical substantiation. To this dogmatic view minimalism offers a genuinely radical counterpoint, 
circumventing the associated problems by substituting the object itself for the entire mimetic system.  
 
Yet, as has already been noted, the radical reorientation towards the world of objects is in a significant 
sense a fulfilment of the realist vocation to intensify rather than replicate reality, and is a solution not 
entirely without precedent. Modernist avant-gardes frequently emphasize that objects potentially function 
metonymically with respect to reality, from the Dadaist readymade,
490
 to a growing significance of 
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indifferent things in the experimental novel. Stein and Joyce are both deeply concerned with “the 
objectivity and apartness of things,”491 and the Bloomsbury group, particularly Woolf, adopted aspects of 
G.E. Moore‟s brand of atomism by way of a psychologico-phenomenal realism which regards as central 
the constructive importance of sensation in its relation to externality.
492
  
 
In a proposition reminiscent of Stein,
493
 Alain Robbe-Grillet considers literature subject to a mimetic 
exhaustion in which the writer “has nothing to say, [retaining] merely a manner of speaking.”494 The 
vocation of words becomes once again poietic – not the reflection, but rather the generation, of reality 
itself, “creat[ing] a world...out of dust.”495 Attending to infinitesimal detail, Robbe-Grillet‟s prose 
constitutes a literary phenomenology of particular severity, it is true, but also of poietic promise. The 
reality of objects is carefully distributed between sensation and perception and the literary means of 
negotiating and relating these, but, moreover, is intensified by the peculiarly self-reflexive, and arguably 
self-productive, character of this radical realism. It is difficult to accept the hyperbolic claims that the 
problems of formal realism “completely lose[…] their meaning the moment we realise that not only does 
everyone see his own version of reality in the world, but that it is precisely the novel that creates this 
reality.”496 Here the suggestion is not simply that a realism which knows itself as such escapes the 
“[o]bjectivity [which], in the current meaning of the term – a completely impersonal way of looking at 
things – is only too obviously a chimera.”497 Rather, by integrating aesthetic self-reflexivity with a precise 
mimesis – keeping in mind here Danto‟s argument that representation does not of necessity require a 
formal prototype
498
 – Robbe-Grillet believes that artificiality and reality become indistinguishable through 
a work‟s objectal presence. The reality of the work is “no longer...permanently situated elsewhere, but 
here and now, without ambiguity...[and] no longer find[s] its justification in a hidden meaning…Beyond 
what we see…there would henceforth be nothing.”499  
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This is fairly conventional of the canonical minimalist aesthetic which Robbe-Grillet was to influence 
significantly.
500
 Turning to the short prose work, In the Corridors of the Underground, we discover 
exemplified with some clarity the strategies which distinguish Robbe-Grillet‟s phenomenological 
literature from its realist predecessors. The first part of the work, “The Escalator,” presents a meticulous 
description of a group of people on an escalator in a Parisian underground station. To grasp accurately 
what simply is, Robbe-Grillet intimates that the initial definitions and anticipated objects of existing 
knowledge must be suspended. Here is not the commonplace escalator, but its moving parts – “a long, 
iron-grey staircase, whose steps become level, one after the other, as they get to the top, and disappear, 
one by one…with a heavy, and yet at the same time abrupt, regularity.”501 By a curious inverse 
nominalism, the escalator is kept at an ontological distance from its passengers: its name is withheld, and 
its haecceity or thisness
502
 is divorced from its functionality.  
 
Such phenomenality is heightened by a careful exposition of the “inexpressive”503 character which 
pervades perception, even in its constructiveness. It is the dystopian vision of “a universe in which 
...most things are unsayable”504 which excites from the minimalist text a perceptible realness. Impassive 
realness is reinforced by the redundancy or circularity of motion. Movement is “almost imperceptible”505 
or gives way to “motionless[ness]”506 itself, of a group “petrified for the duration of the mechanical 
journey.”507 Furthermore, what minimal movement exists is repeated,508 uniform in speed,509 and 
preserves an indifferent equidistance between objects,
510
 negating a dynamic sense of temporal passage. 
We might associate such instances of inertia with a deconditioning which Cela claims is implicit in the 
position language adopts in relation to itself in Robbe-Grillet‟s writing.511 Admitting such self-reflexive 
deconditioning, it is possible to clarify the manner in which Robbe-Grillet‟s phenomenology expands 
upon the basic generative units – initial ideas, signs, objects, or situations – from which it is constructed.  
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Of this creative procedure, Leach notes “a strong inclination to allow the work to develop from a source 
outside of [it].”512 Refining this proposition, Morissette identifies three principal types of literary 
generator: situational generators – occurrences, or sequence of occurrences, which produce a specific 
narrative course;
513
 formal or linguistic generators – those parts of a text which operate at the level of plot 
and structure;
514
 and serial generation, a “deliberate serial patterning”515 which involves the purposeful 
juxtaposition of generators which are not specifically related to narrative content. The work presently 
under discussion exemplifies the latter – motion, as it relates to physical and represented movement on the 
one hand, and poietic process on the other: in the first part the reader encounters “a motionless group”516 
on an “interrupted journey,”517 which, by the second, gains the uniform momentum of a “thinly scattered 
crowd of hurrying people, all moving at the same speed,”518 only to be “brought to a halt,”519 and when 
these people attempt to board the train, “they remain more or less stationary.”520  
  
The implication of generative phenomenology is particularly significant to minimalism for the way in 
which it refocuses traditional aesthetic consideration to the problems and promises of poiesis ex nihilo. 
The affinities between this and the minimalist aesthetic are noteworthy. Both reject any straightforward 
notion of mimesis and representation in favour of immediacy, presence and nonrelation. The minimalist 
enterprise proposes a further radicalization, however: it substitutes actual objects for representations of 
objects; and in place of the intuition of natural processes, it offers direct access to aesthetic processes in 
their very taking-place. Its province is thus explicitly an intensification of the Real.  
 
 
d) Returning to the principles of ontological realism 
 
The species of ontological realism are numerous, and incorporate the realist logic of the pre-scientific 
commonplace, quasi-scientific metaphysical realism, and even realist phenomenology. A paradigm of the 
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latter is offered in the metaphysical thought of Roman Ingarden, which is habitually and unjustly 
subordinated to his consideration of literature which, for the most part, is merely a field of exemplarity for 
his ontological position.
521
 For Ingarden, “our apprehension of a real object is based on our recognition 
that all the properties of which it is a carrier are appropriate to its nature in that they qualify the object as a 
concrete unity.”522 Regardless of whether an object is presented in formal or material terms, or with 
regard to its existential mode of being,
523
 there exists no final disjunction between the object and the 
manner of its presentation or apprehension. Hence, “the real world is essentially connected with that of 
the nature of the real individual object, since it occurs on the basis of their intertwinings as the possible 
form binding together their totality.”524  
 
Although still figured in terms of facticity, realism by this view pertains primarily to ontological, and 
secondarily to epistemological correspondences.
525
 In this sense it differs from the prevailing perspectives 
of scientific realism which centre upon the epistemological legislation of facts and phenomena. The 
present work aims to return to a realism which recognizes the primacy of its ontological dimension, while 
demonstrating that a radical, minimalist aesthetic facilitates our apprehension of the manner in which the 
Real transects the ontological and existential planes. In brief, the axiological aspect of aesthetic realism – 
the questions of correlation and coordination, of presentation and representation – dominate its 
appearance, while a quantitative, ontological minimalism constitutes the radix of its possibility.  
 
In this claim we seek to oppose the elision of the ontological proposition of an entity into the realm of its 
qualities or the pattern of causal situations to which it belongs. For instance, that which is Real in a stone 
is that it is – the coextensiveness of the activity and facticity of its Being. This position is too readily 
confused with the claim that its realism arises because it is a stone, or, in other words, that its realistic 
status is the predicate of certain qualities which define its substance. Resisting such a reduction of Being 
to qualitative substance and causality, is at the heart of Duns Scotus‟ proposition of haecceity, and is 
pursued in the present work, albeit with somewhat different emphasis, in terms of quantitative ontology.   
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Claiming that it is minimalism which best exemplifies such a quantitative ontology, we face the heart of 
Being in terms of pure multiplicity, a position which is subsequently defended with reference to the work 
of Alain Badiou. Where extreme forms of representational abstraction – either of entities or processes – 
tend to view multiplicity as the aggregate of the qualities they have sought to radicalize,
526
 minimalism 
intensifies access to, rather than instantiates, such multiplicity. The objects of minimalism, by virtue of 
their minimal status – their simplicity, transparency, processual clarity – generate the conditions in which 
multiplicity, or the ontological substance of the Real, becomes increasingly visible. Here the distinction of 
Being from existence is once again instructive. With respect to Being, minimalism partakes fully of 
multiplicity. At the level of existence, however, it makes no claim to instantiate multiplicity. Its works 
render maximally perceptible the manner in which art subtracts itself from multiplicity, without reducing 
the multiple, and thus attest obliquely to the claim of multiplicity to an ontological absolute: that 
multiplicity constitutes every possible horizon of Being.  
 
Here a brief excursus regarding the present use of the term Real is necessary. To this point, real has 
mostly been used only to describe competing formulations of realism or reality. Where it has been used in 
the upper-case Real it suggests a substantive force. Hence, if the Real is to be regarded as a metaphysical 
construct, it must be stressed that its metaphysics would remain deeply rooted in the irremissibility of a 
material world marked by the taking-place of objects. Meillassoux captures the dynamic of this situation 
well, albeit in general terms, by noting that “[a]gainst dogmatism, it is important that we uphold the 
refusal of every metaphysical absolute, but against the reasoned violence of various fanaticisms, it is 
important the we re-discover in thought a modicum of absoluteness.”527  
 
The considerable significance of the polemic which persists between realists and anti-realists begins to 
emerge in this light. Although anti-realism takes a number of forms, none has proven more influential 
than the aesthetic diagnosis offered by Jean Baudrillard, which is effective precisely to the extent that it 
mistakes the existential intensity of a particular object for the sum of its qualities. “In fact, [the real] is no 
longer really the real,”528 Baudrillard contends. “Never again will the real have the chance to produce 
itself.”529 This argument is contingent on accepting not only the ruination of the naturalist first of order of 
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simulacra – the mimetic processes which, in aiming to reproduce the world as it is, commits it to a naive 
realism – but also that the burden of compensating for the loss of a sense of immanence, which 
presentation formerly had fallen to realism, now rests increasingly upon second and third order simulacra. 
The second order simulates, through the construction of fictions, that which the first order fails accurately 
to represent, encouraging speculation regarding possible futures. The third order, to which the second 
gives way, involves the “simulacra of simulation,”530which effect a stifling distance between the real and 
the represented. “Founded on information”531 they install “the model…[as] an anticipation of the real, and 
this leaves no room for any sort of fictional anticipation…or imaginary transcendence.”532 Baudrillard 
offers a nostalgic threnody for a time when “[r]eality could go beyond fiction: that was the surest sign of 
the possibility of an ever-increasing imaginary. But the real cannot surpass the model…And, 
paradoxically, it is the real that has become our true utopia – but a utopia that is no longer in the realm of 
the possible, that can only be dreamt of as one would dream of a lost object.”533  
 
It is not unreasonable to wonder whether this state of affairs might not also characterize the relationship 
proposed between minimalism and the Real. It has been suggested that minimalism witnesses the Real, 
yet does not itself constitute reality per se; it exemplifies the Real, but remains incapable of generating the 
Real ex nihilo. The apprehension of that which enters existence while participating in, but not 
constituting, the Real, are points indispensable to the present argument. Finally, that which is Real 
remains radically indifferent and fundamentally independent of any of its possible manifestations. In this 
sense, the Real cannot be predicated in any final sense: it cannot be revealed as such, or contained by any 
possible configuration. However, this is not simply to admit to the melancholic insistence of Baudrillard – 
of the Real as spectre, a “lost object” to which contemporaneity can no longer lay claim except as an 
absence. That the Real is not finally predicable does not condemn us to a disappointed lament for an 
impossible utopianism or dystopianism. Instead, it calls us to imagine an atopia: a positive non-space; 
positive and, indeed, posited by the exemplary entities which bear witness to the Real – such objects as 
those which minimalism seeks to present.  
 
Displaced from the fields of metaphysics,
534
 the Real might easily be mistaken for a matter of perspective, 
giving rise to the misapprehension that what might be judged as reality from a particular perspective, is 
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identical to that which is Real. Equally, it might be inaccurately judged the product of, rather than the 
indifferent precondition for, the nexus of relations we habitually call reality. Quentin Meillassoux warns 
against such a situation in which facts are incorrectly conflated with facticity,
535
 contingent conditions 
with necessary conditions.
536
 A realism dependent on perspective and relation cannot tolerate the 
independence and integrity of entities – their being such as they are537 – and presses potentiality itself into 
that narrowest and most restrictive of existential containers: human consciousness. The preponderance for 
this distinctly anthropocentric understanding of existence – one which systematically suppresses both pre-
cognitive and pre-reflective existence – exemplifies a tendency towards self-limitation by virtue of an 
understanding of thought as bound to human rather than pure being. Such concerns are not merely 
theoretical, however. Turning to minimalism, a considerable amount of the controversy prompted by its 
canonical movement arises from the fact that its objects at once claim autonomy and contingency upon 
perception, significantly problematizing the relationship between subject and object.  
 
 
e) A topology of the Real  
 
In the spirit of reconnecting realism and universality, it is necessary to suspend the view of reality as a 
correspondence between cause and effect. The Real concerns itself with the non-predicative aspect of 
every entity, drawn from the inexhaustible fabric of Being. The realism endorsed here is neither naive, 
nor the assertion of some primary quality that is pervasive in certain entities and absent in others. In fact, 
“we must uncover an absolute necessity that does not reinstate any form of absolutely necessary 
entity.”538 An entity or object is Real not because it is itself absolute, but because there is an Absolute. 
The Real accounts for the proximity of the object to the Absolute, without dissolving the one into the 
other. Stated in terms of the realism adopted here, there simply can be nothing in existence that is 
genuinely beyond the Real; that could not be real in some possible world.  
 
The minimalist aesthetic addresses the doubts which art nowadays habitually raises regarding this type of 
ontological realism, despite the fact that, thus defined, there is simply nothing with which to be at odds in 
the Real – the Real simply is, without its being attached to any particular predicate. Thus the Real 
designates a peculiar type of ontological naturalism which at once grounds and is approximated by the 
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aesthetic realm. This is a bold claim, but crucial if we are to comprehend the manner in which 
minimalism defines an aperture through which the recuperation of the Real might be pursued.   
 
At this point it is possible to offer a schematic outline of the relationship between Being, existence and 
the Real which underpins the present work (Figure 50):
539
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 50: Topology of the Real with Respect to Being, event and occurrence of entities.  
 
Being does not begin. What we call beginning takes place within the pervasiveness of Being. Being is 
pure multiplicity
540
 and, as such, has no conditions to which it is tied. Being without any condition is 
Absolute. It has neither nature nor natural limits. Its temporality is non-specific but linear and 
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irreversible.
541
 Fluctuations occur in Being
542
 – events, occurrences, entities – but these are not 
fluctuations in Being itself.
543
 The being of Being, or the multiplicity of multiplicity,
544
 is Absolutely Real 
to the extent that the Real is the mark of that which is beyond any act of positing, point of access, or telos 
of interpretation. The Real thus transects Being as a condition for the existence of entities which, 
contingently persistent over a period of time, constitute reality. As will subsequently be demonstrated by 
reproducing the argumentation of Meillassoux, the only necessity inherent to the Real is that of 
contingency: for the Real to persist, contingent entities must emerge or desist, appear or disappear;
545
 that 
is, must take-place in time. The corollary to this contention is that any beginning – that is, emergence or 
appearance of an entity – takes place within the existential field denominated by the Real. Such entities 
take place between Being and the Real, in an existential field punctuated by occurrences or points upon 
which entities begin to exist, or begin to inexist or disappear. Henceforth, the Real implies the 
pervasiveness in Being of the necessity of contingency and the irreversibility of time.  
 
Since it is recognizable principally by its instantiation through entities, it is plausible to suggest that the 
Real, in its relation to Being, constitutes an existential field. Once again a corollary applies: every entity 
begins by the force of an appearance within the Real; a contingent but irreversible occurrence in the 
Real.
546
 This does not imply that an entity cannot desist, nor that it could not have occurred differently, 
but that this occurrence itself, once it has taken-place, cannot be reversed. Such an occurrence may be of 
something absolutely new,
547
 in which case, following Badiou, it might be tied to an event. In its shortest 
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version, Alain Badiou defines the event as the inauguration of something totally new and rare, a new 
subject in Being, “a point of rupture with respect to being [that] does not exonerate us from thinking the 
being of the event itself.”548 In this case an event is trans-ontological – something “which is not being qua 
being…which subtracts itself from ontological subtraction.”549 To clarify the topology of an event‟s trans-
being – its being both proper to and also subtracted from Being – Badiou claims that, “[i]n effect, an 
event is composed of the elements of a site, but also by the event itself, which belongs to itself.”550  
 
According to the Axiom of Foundation, a multiple – the set which indicates contingent coherence across 
the ontological and existential fields – cannot be founded on its own elements.551 In every multiple there 
is a founding element which is not part of the multiple in question.
552
 According to Badiou, the sole 
exception to this rule is the event which is founded on an element which is also its essential constituent – 
an occurrence on the edge of the void.
553
 While an event itself is an unfounded multiple, for it to be even 
momentarily present in Being, it requires some sort of topos to support its upsurge – its “originary 
disappearance, supplementing the situation for the duration of a lightning flash.”554 Such an evental site 
acts as a foundation for that which cannot be founded.
555
 Thus the event is unpredictable with respect to 
Being, yet undeniably arises in relation to Being. This, Badiou terms, an event‟s trans-being.556 From an 
event emerges what Badiou envisages in terms of a subject or truth which has the capacity to organize 
and to valorize information in a field of existence.
557
 Importantly, Badiou limits the definition of truth or 
subject to the direct consequences of an event, but stresses that the pure eventality of the event is 
irretrievable as such.
558
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Much more common than events are occurrences – those changes within a given situation of existence 
derived from rearranging its elements. Through occurrences, entities come into existence as well as desist 
or inexist. These nascent entities, which we might hesitantly denominate ordinary subjects and objects, 
are not absolutely new in the strictest sense, but often take on the appearance of novel objects.
559
 We 
might say that the point at which such an entity, in defining its relation to the Real, intersects with the 
progress of a truth, is the point at which the entity expresses its fidelity to a truth – to an event having 
taken place. To paraphrase, the occurrence of entities in a situation presents the basic existential material 
which an event (as distinct from an occurrence) potentially reorganizes. Such occurrences also define the 
poietic substance of art. Where events transect Being, occurrences transect existence. Again we are 
reminded that entities confirm the distinction of existence from Being, and that this confirmation is 
subtracted from Being without reducing its essential multiplicity.  
 
While both event and occurrence concern the Real, only the former is strictly aleatory,
560
 and retains a 
degree of indifference to human existence. To be clear, Badiou maintains that an event can only be known 
retroactively through the relation of an historical situation.
561
 However, if it is not the event itself which is 
known historically, but rather the site and consequences of its taking-place, it does not follow that such an 
event would necessarily be bound to anthropocentrism, nor that it would be impossible for events to occur 
in nature.
562
 To this extent the present work expresses some doubt regarding Badiou‟s procedural vision. 
This said, since an event is transitory and can finally be attested to only retrospectively, it must be 
approached from within a given existential situation.
563
 Thus the comprehension of novelty is 
inconceivable without the point which separates existence from inexistence, appearance from 
disappearance, and entities from non-entities.  
 
Most significant for the present is that existence is coincidental with the emergence of Real entities. If it is 
possible to assert that something exists, then it is an entity. The Real, admitted in this sense and contra 
Baudrillard‟s assertion, opposes the inertia which anaesthetizes everyday reality rather than succumbing 
to it. It reveals the operations by which Real objects are often subjugated to forces such as history and 
context, which seldom recognize their ontological autonomy. As Bruno Latour recognizes, history and 
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context become truly “visible only by the traces [they] leave[…] when a new association is being 
produced between elements”564 not intrinsically related. We are thus warned against the inertia565 of fixing 
the Real in terms of a set of historical predicates. Existence enjoins us to accommodate simultaneously 
the irreversible temporality of the Real, and the multiple and often contradictory temporal trajectories of 
entities. The Real entity extends itself across contingent and contradictory multiples – the innumerable 
fluctuating metabolic times of organisms, as well as those of aesthetic entities.  
 
To grasp that the Real discovers no final predicate, yet still is instantiated in every entity – and with 
particular clarity in entities which self-reflexively uncover the minimal conditions of their own poietic 
emergence and persistence – is to recognize that every entity participates in, but only approximates, the 
Real. I submit that this point of recognition characterizes the moment at which an entity is subtracted, or 
subtracts itself, from Being – the point at which a work appears or disappears, exists or inexists. Here, 
upon this minimal distinction, poietic Being takes on its full force, and the relation of art to the Real is at 
its most intense. This speculative proposition might be stated as follows: when self-reflexive interrogation 
is simultaneously a reflection on the nature of the Real, then we might say that thought thinks itself as the 
minimal subtraction of existence from Being, or, in other words, the most minimal entity possible.  
 
 
f) The persistence of the Real 
 
The Real persists. This is its most abiding feature. Entities may or may not come into existence – such is 
the universal condition of their contingency – and so partake, or not partake, of the Real. In either case, 
the contingency of their existential status does not affect the Real as such. It is true that the contingent 
part of any entity might reside in its material, conceptual or perceptual composition, and that it is these 
contingencies which charge the potential of every entity. Such contingencies would be impossible, 
however, if there were not some principle to which they appeal which is itself not contingent, but which is 
the persistent ground upon which basis entities are capable of persisting. For Meillassoux, this persistent 
ground is the force of contingency itself.
566
 In this light, persistence is understood to indicate the most 
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intrinsic part of any entity
567
 which exists as a contingent quantity across a period of time. That which 
persists in an entity, does so insofar as it implies the Real, accepting which, the Real and contingency are 
in fact inextricable.  
 
Returning to the central thesis – that minimalism exemplifies the facticity and persistence of the Real – it 
is clearer what is intended by the term persistence and its connection to the Real. At this point it is 
possible to suggest that minimalism persists precisely to the extent that it is complicit with the Real. 
Regardless of the analytical and theoretical vocabulary within which minimalism is investigated, it gives 
up the same secret, which is no secret at all. The minimalist object exposes objecthood in itself as both the 
source and the target of its aesthetic. Minimalism clarifies the Real precisely to the extent that its objects 
adhere to and also exemplify the existential mould of the austere brand of realism currently under 
consideration.  
 
The incapacity of minimalist objects to be other than they are is the pivot upon which their aesthetic 
turns.
568
 Minimalism is focused through its objects – not in the sense that a particular object maintains a 
particular referential relation to a universe of significance, association, or meaning, but in the fact that it is 
an object. The pervasive condition, exhibited in every minimalist object, is its capacity to “allow…a 
contingency to be.”569 It is this sole realization – that things could have been different, yet that they are 
not – that renders contingent entities factical, and every fact contingent except the fact of contingency 
itself. Contingency is absolute and cannot itself be reduced to a contingent situation.
570
 This is merely an 
approximation of Meillassoux‟s argument, discussed below, which inaugurates a route between the 
Absolute and the Real. My contention is that for a minimalist object not to be as it is, it must not be at all. 
In other words, minimalism testifies to contingency at a radical, ontological level, rather than at the level 
of the correspondences which culminate in the proposition of its identity. 
 
Minimalism exists in such a way as to intensify the Real by exposing through its most singular property – 
being such as it is – the various forces of poietic generation: of creation and decreation, of emergence and 
recession, of appearance and disappearance. Yet, if this is its overwhelming sense, an immediate problem 
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arises as to where, precisely, such a force might be located. Of course, one such location is the minimalist 
object itself. Yet, to the extent that minimalism habitually eschews all external reference, its locus is 
finally atopian – neither properly material nor conceptual, but contained within a self-reflexive non-space 
beyond that which is given in the ordinary topology of objects.  
 
The manner in which such minimalist atopoi intensify our recognition of the Real is of considerable 
significance. Several postulations might be offered in this regard: first, that since the Real is the 
continuous part of every entity, neither arising nor receding with respect to this entity, it (the Real) 
necessarily coincides with what is intended by persistence; secondly, accepting that the Real here defines 
a field within which every entity arises, that it (the Real) can evidently not be contained in an entity, as in 
this case it would only be knowable to itself, and would be limited to the manifestation of the entity; third, 
that if the Real is not contained within an entity, yet is still continuous with that entity, that it must in 
some sense manifest beside this entity – at once indissociable from the entity, yet apart from its 
apprehension, interpretation, or explanation. A mode of being which operates beside an entity, while 
remaining proper to the same entity, might be called a para-ontology. It is through a para-ontology that an 
entity exhibits the minimal conditions of its autonomy qua objecthood – its paradigmicity, “show[ing] 
„beside itself‟...both its own intelligibility and that of the class it constitutes.”571 
 
Understanding minimalism in para-ontological terms allows us to approach the object from two 
perspectives at once: the first strives to guarantee the Real qua Being – the very pervasiveness of 
multiplicity from which an entity is subtracted; the other testifies to the Real qua existence – the manner 
in which entities are presented. In describing the subtraction of existential entities from Being, such a 
para-ontology approaches the very heart of poiesis itself. Minimalism seeks something more Real than 
any mimetic logic can admit: the persistent ground of that which makes something knowable as an entity 
in the first instance, and the para-ontological or exemplary conditions which define the entity by its 
taking-place such as it is.  
 
 
g) The facticity of the Real 
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For the Real as it is posited here to gain credibility, it is necessary to overcome the paradox that the 
“realist always has to posit some more concepts to prove he has accessed pre-conceptual reality.”572 The 
realization that absolute necessity exists because of and not despite the fact that there is no entity that is 
absolutely necessary – either in itself, or as it is related within a set of determinate laws – is what 
reinvigorates such a realism. In other words an entity is Real precisely because it is entirely contingent; its 
existence is only imperfectly accounted for by any determinate structure. To construct a compelling case 
for the revivification of realism, Quentin Meillassoux explains his fundamental objection to what he terms 
correlationism – an idea in modern thought573 which insists that “we only ever have access574 to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other.”575  
 
Although Meillassoux distinguishes several manifestations of this correlation, the one most significant to 
the present argument is that which maintains that it is finally impossible to conceptualize objects 
independently of subjects, in which case it is impossible to formulate a convincing account of an entity 
which exists entirely autonomously, or in-itself.
576
 The manner in which access is granted to objects is of 
prime significance in this regard. In brief, correlationism suppresses the possibility of an entity existing 
in-itself and affirms that all entities exist in terms of the access which is granted to them, and thus only 
inasmuch as they exist for-us.
577
 Meillassoux‟s refutation of correlationism is advanced through a formal 
proof that the correlationist rejection of realism rests on an inaccurate dismissal of the absolute. His 
recuperation of the absolute requires that we hold to two principal points. The first asserts ancestrality – 
“reality anterior to the emergence of the human species”578 – which is indicated by the existence of arche-
fossils or objects expressing the “givenness of a being anterior to its givenness.”579 Arche-fossils can be 
proven to exist independently, both by logic
580
 and with respect to the laws of physics.
581
 The second 
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point involves the systematic reversal of the traditional opposition of necessity and contingency, arguing 
that the sole necessity in Being is contingency itself.
582
  
 
From this position Meillassoux applies himself systematically to the task of demonstrating that a minimal 
presupposition of absolute autonomy resides in every claim of inter-dependence: thus, the manner in 
which for-us, access-oriented correlationism exists includes some element of the in-itself. This 
demonstration requires the clarification of two further terms fundamental to Meillassoux‟s thought: 
contingency and fact. In Brassier‟s summation,  
 
[c]ontingency is empirical and pertains to phenomena: a phenomenon is contingent if it can come into or 
out of existence without violating the principles of cognition that govern phenomena. Facticity is 
transcendental and pertains to our cognitive relation to phenomena, and hence to the principles of 
knowledge themselves, concerning which it makes no sense to say either that they are necessary or 
contingent, since we have no other principle to compare them to.
583
 
 
Meillassoux insists that there is no way of asserting the transcendentality of the factial
584
 relation except 
through an ultimate self-contradiction, by falling back on an absolutization of facticity, of its being 
neither necessary nor contingent. Asserting an absolute, however, has the contradictory implication of 
deciding as to the necessity of contingency. In this case, what was meant to remain undecidable – that 
facticity could not decide between contingency and necessity – effectively asserts that “the contingency or 
groundlessness of the for-us (the correlation)…becomes in-itself or necessary precisely insofar as its 
contingency is not something which is merely for-us.”585 In other words, fact absolutized as the condition 
of indecision, decides as to the necessity only of contingency. In the most direct terms possible, this 
compels the acknowledgement that there is a Real outside of the claim that reality cannot distinguish 
between subject and object.  
 
It is necessary to retrace the most essential points of Meillassoux‟s argument. His first claim is 
ontological, derived from what he might recognise in terms of Heideggerian strong correlationism – the 
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“necessity for everything that is [that exists in being] to be a fact.”586 If something is, it is a fact in relation 
to some determinate principle or law which confirms that it is: it exists, and it is factual with regard to this 
existence. Facticity refers “not [to] an objective reality, but rather [to] the unsurpassable limits of 
objectivity confronted with the fact that there is a world; a world that is describable and perceptible, and 
structured by determinate invariants.”587  
 
This is a properly ontological contention, and, as has been suggested, facticity should not be confused 
with knowledge as such. Thus, Meillassoux is able to maintain that the “facticity of every thing cannot be 
thought of as a fact,”588 since this would introduce an insurmountable logical and ontological 
contradiction; it would precisely reduce facticity (non-contingency) to the realm of knowledge, which 
itself is, according to the correlationist argument, contingent. In such a case, the contingency of 
contingency itself would be affirmed, the insistence upon which would be disastrous for ontology, as 
Meillassoux notes,
589
 since it implies that infinite regress is the acceptable fate of every analytical 
endeavour. If this were the case, then determination of what counts as knowledge could potentially rest 
solely upon dogmatic decisions as to the reality or unreality of one thing over another and, terrifyingly, 
even the conservation or destruction of such real or unreal things.  
 
Meillassoux provides significant opposition to the idea that infinite regress or circularity are unfortunate 
but inevitable consequences of accurate analysis. Such resistance – the persistence of the Real against its 
possible reduction to any particular reality or nexus of realities – is confirmed by Meillassoux‟s 
affirmation of the “non-factual essence of the fact.”590 According to this claim, at the centre of any fact, of 
anything that is or is knowable as existence in Being, there resides something radically unstable. Such 
instability is not the result of any failure to articulate some spectral essence or errant identitarian core, but 
is the very basis of ontology, the Real, as well as any expression of these last terms in any possible reality. 
One of his primary conclusions is thus that “only facticity is not factual – viz., only the contingency of 
what is, is not itself contingent,”591 and he proceeds to clarify that this “does not claim that contingency is 
necessary; its precise claim is that contingency alone is necessary – and only this prevents it from being 
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metaphysical. For the statement, „contingency is necessary‟ is in fact entirely compatible with 
metaphysics.”592  
 
The significance of this argument for the present work is that it expresses the urgency of determining the 
theoretical parameters of the Real – the means of its communication, exemplification and effectiveness – 
through objects in the world. Where the majority of contemporary philosophical discourses “forbid[...] 
any possibility of a conceptual discourse about the Real in itself,”593 Meillassoux advocates the 
reconnection of the Real to various forms of realism.
594
  
 
Minimalism, I claim, offers a legitimate exemplar of such a speculative realism – exemplifying, without 
subduing, the Real. The pursuit of realism should not, however, distract us from the recognition, 
increasingly felt across quite different spheres of knowledge production and testing, that there exists “a 
lack of reason of any reality; that is, the impossibility of giving an ultimate ground to the existence of any 
being. We can reach conditional necessity, but never absolute necessity.”595 In the place of the absolute 
necessity of any entity, Meillassoux absolutizes facticity itself. He proposes a Principle of Factiality,
596
 
asserting through this principle “the speculative essence of facticity.”597 Meillassoux contends that 
everything that is, is a fact. In terms more familiar, being qua existence is factual; it can be reflected with 
relative accuracy by facts which present the “structural invariants” of existence.598 Facts, however, are not 
necessary to being qua being. While facticity prompts us “to grasp the „possibility‟ of that which is 
wholly other to the world, but which resides in the midst of the world as such”599 – Being, or pure 
multiplicity – it does so by revealing the impossibility of exchanging any set of facts for Being itself.600 
Facts are finally products of conditional necessity, conditioned by determinate laws rather than absolute 
necessity. To paraphrase: the relationship between rule or law and its predicate in terms of fact is, 
therefore, one of conditional necessity rather than absolute necessity. For example, that gravity is a law to 
which all matter bends appears only as absolute necessity once one has accepted that relative stability is 
the mark of existence. Of course, in such a case the consequences of asserting contingency where 
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presently stability persists, are existentially catastrophic. However, the configurations which tie 
potentiality to obligation are ethical rather than ontological, and finally there may be no absolutely 
compelling reason to suppose that no world could exist at all outside of the contingencies which currently 
reign. 
  
Assumptions in this regard are doubtless conditioned by the reign of correlationism, a consequence of 
which might be formulated in the claim that it is impossible to conceive of a world convincingly outside 
of the relation between thought and that which it thinks; outside of the correlation of thought and being. 
To break with this dogma is to recognize that all which is fact for us is contingent, but that this 
contingency itself, the facticity of the fact, is both absolute and necessary.
601
 Accordingly, there exist no 
necessary, universal laws, with the sole exception of the law which affirms that there is no necessary 
universality to any law. “[C]ontingency and only contingency, is absolutely necessary. Facticity, and only 
facticity, is not factual, but eternal. Facticity is not a fact, it is not „one more‟ fact in the world…[T]o be is 
to be factual – and this is not a fact.”602 Regarding determinate entities as they relate to determinate laws, 
we are enjoined either to trace painstakingly the conditions which define the emergence of facts
603
 – the 
potential passages between entity and knowledge – or to affirm the unity and independence of the entity 
as such. In this light, it is of considerable significance that the Real exhibits the compossibility of decision 
and the undecidable, the axiomatic and non-axiomatic, the contingent and the absolute.
604
 In either case, 
our relation to contingency is drawn beyond passive withdrawal to the contingent but positive taking-
place of Real entities in irreversible time. 
 
 
h) A minimalist realism 
 
The Real, as it is formulated above, makes clear claims as to its affinities with both pre-scientific realism 
– it conforms to the commonplace regarding the separateness of entities – as well as scientific realism, in 
a sense merely paraphrasing what science demonstrates experimentally regarding the interaction of origin, 
time and object. As it is offered here, the Real is explicitly minimal, and it is the shared desire for clarity 
and presence which binds it convincingly to the minimalist aesthetic. Minimalism presents a 
radicalization of that to which Badiou alludes in terms of a “[d]istancing – conceived as the way that 
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semblance works out its proper distance from the real – [which] can be taken as an axiom of [recent] 
art...a reflexive art, an art that wants to exhibit its own process, an art that wants visibly to idealize its own 
materiality.”605 For minimalists, the minimal displacement between the fundamental quantity of an entity 
and its existential vocation qua art – that is, its marking the transumptive mediation of the very force of 
poiesis – instantiates at once the passion for the Real and the concern with proper distance which Badiou 
recognizes as central traits of contemporaneity. Minimalism offers arguably the most direct of the many 
aesthetic “attempt[s] to devise transparent, self-regulating forms of thought whose only occasion, in the 
absence of any object that they might represent or interpret, is an encounter with the generic nudity of the 
real.”606 That the parameters of reality are as often set ideologically as by any force of metaphysics, 
reinforces the distinctive indifference of the Real. Thus we approach Norris‟ claim regarding “Badiou‟s 
realist ontology...[that] a situation is in no way dependent on what we may perceive, recognize, believe or 
take ourselves to know concerning it.”607 
 
The present formulation of the Real – although more reductive in its presentation – shares a great deal 
with the propositions of Meillassoux, Badiou and Norris on this subject. Norris is particularly concerned 
to reconcile scientific realism with those accounts which discern the Real from within the realm of 
cultural production. Too often are the latter dismissed arbitrarily as anti-realists on the assumption that all 
subscribe to a paradoxically dogmatic relativism – one which “assume[s] the priority of language over 
thought and of thought in its diverse, linguistically articulated modes over anything pertaining to the 
nature or structure of mind-independent reality.”608 Accepting this, relativists are able to justify that 
“„reality‟ just is coextensive with or restricted to the domain of known, verifiable, reliably vouchsafed, 
well-documented, adequately sourced, or at any rate sufficiently agreed-upon historical facts.”609 That a 
suspicion regarding the absolute – such as that entertained by deconstruction – should so often be 
mistaken for an absolute refusal of the fact that such practices habitually remain “anchored firmly in 
certain properties of the physical or natural world and in certain likewise robust phenomenological 
truths,”610 owes finally to the acceleration of anti-realism from a logical to a dogmatic position.611  
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The present recuperation of the absolute – derived in equal part from the work of Meillassoux and the 
taking-place of minimalist objects – is similarly opposed to such dogmatism. To recall: that which is 
Real, is; and that which is, is absolutely contingent. However, if we understand properly what is intended 
by absolute contingency, it becomes clear that what could have been otherwise is not otherwise – it is as it 
is in a particular situation. For this reason, it does not follow that if what is, is absolutely contingent, that 
the Real is also absolutely contingent. Rather, the Real is what is necessary to an entity‟s existence in 
order for it to be such as it is. Since it is understood that Being is also necessary to existence, there exists 
a modal argument for considering the Real as transecting Being and existence. Briefly phrased, the Real is 
the manner in which Being makes itself known within the immanence of existence. 
 
In short, Being qua being supervenes upon any expression or situation of being (for example, a situation, 
an object, an identity, and so on), but any expression or situation of being does not supervene upon Being 
itself. Similarly, the Real supervenes upon any possible expression of a reality, but reality does not 
supervene upon the Real. In other words, just as specific beings or existents participate in Being in 
general, but cannot themselves constitute or reconstitute Being in general, so subjects, objects, things and 
processes, which together constitute descriptions of reality, participate in the Real, but cannot themselves 
constitute or reconstitute the Real. Indeed, we might paraphrase this by a conceptually difficult, but 
crucial, paradox: that which in any entity is genuinely transcendental is in fact immanent to the same 
entity. That, in practice, the transcendental is always subject to the conditions of objectal immanence, 
explains how the most frequent, if spurious, attacks on realism tend to reject the notion of ontological 
presence altogether. Once its factical conditions are divorced from the immanence of its objects, the Real 
is unable to resist the reduction of its ontological concerns to various sets of epistemic conditions.  
 
Thus it remains paramount that the Real be distinguished from its instantiation in objectal terms – 
discerned in the material terms of the exemplary field upon which existential contingency unfolds within 
an irreversible temporal continuum. It is this field which I claim, at least in part, for the minimalist 
enterprise. As has been argued, the numerous configurations of reality define existence in the orbit of the 
Real, to which extent they remain contingent upon the Real. Such reality is always subject to the laws of 
contingency, however, and does not itself produce the force of contingency as such. Thus we are returned 
to Meillassoux‟s thesis: that everything is contingent except contingency itself, which solely is necessary 
and hence absolute. The Real, defined as the necessity of contingency apprehended within the persistence 
of time, attempts to comprehend the absolute in motion. It is to this possibility which the minimalist 
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aesthetic attends in terms of transumption: poiesis apprehended at its most radical location in the very 
midst of its instantiation as quantity.   
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PART TWO: MINIMALISM AS QUANTITATIVE ONTOLOGY 
 
 
 
6. MINIMALISM AS QUANTITATIVE BEING 
 
a) Counting and the experience of existence 
 
One of the clearest memories of my early years involves a seven-hour return journey with my parents and 
sister from a seaside holiday. Such journeys so often seem marked by an intense combination of 
excitement and regret, anticipation and melancholy. It was Good Friday. I know this because interrupting 
another of my failed attempts to prove that if one stares at the sun without blinking or looking away for 
more than ten seconds it would cease to be bright, was the closing reminder of a religious radio broadcast: 
that the Crucifixion had taken place from twelve to three. This was followed by the midday news. I 
assume that general mindfulness was what the broadcaster was after. However, for one of those reasons 
which are senseless to all but children in such arbitrary situations, I decided to attempt to count to a 
million in those three hours, convinced, of course, that this was perfectly achievable.  
 
As my imagination surged towards this huge target, the torrential count became increasingly incoherent. 
The mental sounding and visualization of numbers merged until I was no longer sure whether or not I was 
making any progress. I began again, slowly, then a little faster, then was lost again. Despite the ferocious 
determination of the count, I never got to a thousand. I abandoned the attempt after half an hour. 
Whatever association had temporarily flared between religion as achievable infinity subsided abruptly.  
  
If the emotional complexity of that day has rendered its memories unusually clear, this lucidity has also 
allowed me to reflect on this precise moment as one of some significance. Mathematical possibility had, 
to this point, been easily predicable – imminent additions and subtraction of apples and so forth; concrete 
things. Suddenly it had become abstract. I understood and accepted that a million was possible, but I 
could only conceive it stratospherically, in some unreachable possibility – possible somewhere else and 
for someone else also. Henceforth, mathematics would be predicated in the ether, away from this concrete 
world or its systems of knowledge production – their unremitting emphasis on solution and equation, 
predication and proof – within which such abstraction was unwittingly affirmed. For what keeps this 
massive count grounded is that we accept that it simply is. Accepting this facticity of numerical 
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accumulation uncritically is not, however, a question of acceding to the base quantity of being, but 
precisely rebranding this quantity as an ultimately desirable quality. “That number must rule, that the 
imperative must be: „count!‟ – who doubts this today?” asks Badiou. “For, under the current empire of 
number, it is not a question of thought, but of realities.”612 
 
I think back to that day, that specific hour, and it is hard not to discern the Platonic echo of the situation 
and its consequences.
613
 A boy stares into the sun. He is young enough still to possess that intrepid, 
experimental naivety that does not apprehend an imminent limitation to knowledge and knowability. He 
stares and believes he can fully grasp its generative power: more than grasp – objectify, unify, even 
domesticate. He dreams of some sort of control in a world that always seems to realize itself too 
haphazardly, too slowly. The force of his gaze is frustrated, but not thwarted. The desire behind this force 
migrates. The singular quantity, totality, the One, is sought now through a process of quantification. The 
count of a massive number, one million, is the only approximation in the undermarked memory of the boy 
that might approach the infinite dimension of the sun in its productive capacity – both the beginning and 
end of form and formation; the very possibility of Form itself. This number proves unattainable. The 
failed apprehension of an immanent, original quantity, the One, the correlate of an absolute Form, is 
compounded by a second failure to approach the One through quantification or approximation. Thus I 
became unwittingly an appellant to the essential axiom of ontology, according to Badiou: “the One is 
not.”614 
 
I am tempted to say that at an early age I was subject to a Platonic disappointment of sorts, since which 
the force purported to underpin the One has always seemed disappointingly fragmentary. However, 
disenchantment on one level – the loss of accessibility to the relation between number, mathematical 
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operation and world – spelled re-enchantment on another. Over the course of my education, my 
mathematical skills were subject to the average fluctuations. There were concepts and operations which 
struck a chord, and others that were profoundly bewildering. If that day inaugurated a numerical 
disappointment, it is one that ultimately may be universal as much as it is mine. Perhaps such numerical 
disappointment is a condition not only characteristic of western culture, but even of being in general and 
of the knowledge of such being, reflective of an unavoidable tension between the boundedness of entities 
and the infinity of number.   
 
It requires no great skill of observation to affirm that the importance of numericity, as well as its potential 
divisiveness, is marked repeatedly in western education – in the quantitative pull of the mathematical and 
hard sciences from the qualitative magnetism of the cultural field. It is possible here to endorse, if only 
broadly and in passing, Aristotle‟s distinction: that quantity is that which “is divisible into intrinsic parts 
each of which has by constitution a sort of unity or thisness,”615 whereas quality is essentially the positive 
or negative attributes of quantity.
616
 We habitually take sides in a manner which allows quantity to 
indicate the amount and magnitude inherent in being, claiming this as prerequisite for the emergence and 
determination of quality, or specific properties which orient an entity within being. Within the processes 
which we conventionally associate with the cultivation of the mind, the results seem dismayingly 
predictable: those interested in the sciences tend to quantify the cultural sphere, and those interested in the 
cultural tend to qualify the scientific. The sufficiency of either quantity or quality is doubtful, and neither 
can be defined functionally within an existential context in the absence of the other. If it remains an 
urgent task to criticize the reign which quantity exercises, most obviously through the various techniques 
of capitalism, the solution is surely not simply to elevate quality in its place.  
 
All of this threatens to miss one crucial aspect, a point that is intimately tied to a contemporary reassertion 
of realism. The ontological predominance of quantity holds precisely to the extent that the absolute is the 
product of neither a naive realism, nor an absolute idealism. This recalls the recent work of Meillassoux 
discussed above, which argues that that it is only contingency itself that is not contingent, and hence 
absolute. “[O]nly facticity is not factual – viz., only the contingency of what is, is not itself 
contingent…[which] does not claim that contingency is necessary; its precise claim is that contingency 
alone is necessary – and only this prevents it from being metaphysical.”617 Within such a realist ontology, 
objects are once again free to be objects – Real quantities – without simply disregarding their qualitative 
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dimension. What is Real simply is, and is indifferent to its own affirmation or negation, or any particular 
sense in which it might be known. That this proposition might be challenged by denying the possibility of 
the Real as a basis for any categorical thought, is only compounded when we consider that even 
competing arguments in favour of privileging ontology have habitually veered away from quantity: from 
the emphasis on substance in various orthodox materialisms and naïve realisms, through the qualitative 
bias of much phenomenology, to the Heideggerian or Deleuzian endorsement of becoming.  
 
If few are unaware of the brutal aspect of quantity and its potential consequences, recognizing its 
ontological pre-eminence seems to have been largely subverted by the understanding that being is simply 
unthinkable without the qualification that “a world-in-itself, subsisting independently of our relation to it, 
is an absurdity.”618 Whether this is the Cartesian connectedness of thought and being, or the vitalist or 
existentialist understanding of being-in-the-world,
619
 what remains essentially unchallenged is the 
submission of ontology to epistemology; of the conditions of being to the conditions of knowledge 
regarding being. The proclivity for scientific and methodological advancement, and the various attendant 
fields of knowledge which have accompanied the rise of epistemology, bring their own range of 
inconsistencies and problems. This modern disposition, which Simon Critchley characterizes as beginning 
in disappointment,
620
 is one that is pervaded by ontologico-political nihilism. We are enveloped by a 
growing sense of “the meaninglessness of reality, or rather its essential unreality, which inspires either 
passive withdrawal or violent destruction.”621  
 
Opposing this nihilism becomes paramount, and if we no longer can affirm a simple transcendental 
solution, this does not render Critchley‟s assertion – that we must “face up to the hard reality of the 
world”622 – simply naive. In attempting to forward suitable consolation, it seems to me that too few 
recognize that the key to undoing this pervasive pessimism lies in an ontological proposition most often 
dismissed as the province of naïve realism: that the ground of being is prior to affirmation or negation; 
prior and indifferent to the complication of qualification. This priority I here identify with the persistence 
of quantity within the Real. What persists in the Real is also antecedent to any specific qualities or 
significance that any real object might possess, and this is its absolute quantity; atopian, without location, 
and affirmed principally through the mirage of self-reflexivity. It is in the field of minimalist aesthetics 
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that I identify the objects most capable of attesting to these conditions with consistency and force. In this 
light, I suggest that much minimalism mirrors what we might call the conditions of a quantitative 
ontology.  
 
 
b) The loss of quantity and the ascendency of quality in the understanding of ontology 
 
When I recall my disappointment that Good Friday and the failure of my count – the failed unification or 
quantification of being – I return also to an exemplary rehearsal of the surrender of quantity to quality. 
The awful cost of such situations resides not in this acquiescence itself, but in that a refusal of the 
quantitative basis of ontology allows quantity to return as a destructive protocol – as the sole logic of both 
being and existence. In failing to recognize precisely when our lives have been reduced to mere being as a 
number, we effectively reinstate our being-as-quantity as the primary quality of existence. Badiou 
identifies five pervasive examples through which numerical being dominates: the political, the 
institutionalization of knowledge acquisition, cultural representation, economy, and the existential notion 
of being human.
623
 The recognition of a quantitative ontology – that being is predicated on magnitude, 
quantity, and number – in no sense advocates a world in which quality is suppressed. Badiou‟s lament, 
that “we don‟t know what a number is, so we don‟t know what we are,”624 must be understood thus in 
terms of affirming quantification against its wholesale betrayal to qualification. In failing to grasp number 
in itself, we expose the danger of glossing over the quantitative aspect of ontology, of reducing being to 
just another number, a reduction which can subsequently be applied to endorse, indeed to qualify, 
particular qualities, ideologies, or situations. The turn away from number spells the ruthless return of 
number, and quantity comes insidiously to dominate existence, to predicate our disappointment, not as an 
ontological principle, but as the tragic marker of our inability to harness the quantitative force of ontology 
itself against the absolute quantification of existence.  
 
It is an error to assume, on the basis of the existential threat posed by actual infinity (which finds its 
mathematical proof in set theory
625
) and the vastness of quantity, that being might simply be recalculated 
in qualitative terms. Quality, it is true, dominates the moment we orient our engagement with an external 
world based on the dogmatic acceptance of this externality. “Only as phenomenology is ontology 
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possible,”626 Heidegger famously assures us; but if it is possible to agree with the many and profound 
consequences which stem from his painstaking analysis of covered-up-ness as antithesis to Being, it is 
more difficult, in the light of the realist commitment of this work, to accept interpretation as the pivot 
upon which the relation between phenomena, human being, and Being depends.
627
 Affirming the 
externality of the phenomenon to Being, and that Being must henceforth discover some sort of 
qualification, serves to coordinate the suppression of a quantitative ontology. It is in returning to 
ontological quantity – with caution and without naivety – that the persistence of minimalism proves 
indispensable.   
 
 
c) Sustenance and silence 
 
Given that the work of its most celebrated exponents is intimately concerned with testifying to 
quantitative being, it is unsurprising that I claim for minimalism a peculiar exemplarity in this regard. 
Edward Strickland draws attention to the problems associated with any attempt at an uncomplicated 
definition of minimalism in terms of chronology, the affiliation of artists, or even the primacy of certain 
aesthetic characteristics.
628
 In music, for example, we might describe, at best, two very broad lineages – 
drone music and motoric repetition – which have very different implications for how minimum is 
conceived.  
 
The first lineage emphasizes sustained tone and silence, often of indeterminate duration. Monotonal and 
drone works are of particular aesthetic interest for the manner in which they expose duration as essential 
musical matter. In so doing, they further problematize the relation between sound and silence and the 
phenomenological status each enjoys. Does sound arise from silence or from a chaotic background of 
noise,
629
 and what might either solution imply for the manner in which sensory information coheres to 
complement or complete various forms of sonic and temporal objecthood?
630
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Numerous philosophers – amongst them, Wittgenstein, Derrida and Kant – have affirmed silence as the 
unsayable “limits to thought, rationality, even to the human imagination,” as Stuart Sim reminds us.631 
Others, such as Dauenhauer, affirm a more positive phenomenological dimension to silence, “an active 
human performance…[which] involves a yielding following upon an awareness of finitude and awe.”632 
Accordingly, if ordinary speech and its attendant activity maintain their momentum through an after-
silence
633
 by which we recollect the activity just past and anticipate that to follow, then there is also a 
more profound silence of the to-be-said,
634
 which necessarily pre-exists any affirmatory articulation of 
existence. The eclectic philosopher, Michel Serres – in concert with the aesthetic John Cage pursues 
through his silent composition, 4’33”635 – asserts the opposite, that being is inextricable from noise:  
 
 [t]he background noise never ceases; it is limitless, continuous unending, unchanging…Noise  cannot 
 be a phenomenon; every phenomenon is separated from it. As soon as a phenomenon  appears, it leaves 
 the noise; as soon as a form looms up or pokes through, it reveals itself by veiling noise. So noise is 
 not a matter of phenomenology, so it is a matter of being itself.
636
 
 
Undifferentiated noise, sustained pitch, and silence persist in a complex relationship. Many theorists of 
perception endorse views of selective auditory attention, the “process by which the perception of certain 
stimuli in the environment is enhanced relative to other concurrent stimuli of lesser immediate 
priority.”637 Theoretical constructs such as the auditory filter638 provide models through which it is 
possible simultaneously to situate empirical research regarding the selectivity of frequency attention and 
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perception
639
 as well as primary sensory experience. In terms of the latter, prolonged exposure to 
sustained sound or to the genuine absence of sound produces a curious and sometimes uncomfortable type 
of sensory amnesia: an inner sensory limitation of the world. John Cage describes how even in an 
anechoic chamber in which every external noise is eliminated, the internal sounds produced by the 
functioning of the body affirm an internal soundscape.
640
 In his characteristically modular prose, Samuel 
Beckett, similarly problematizes the tension between the phenomenality of sound itself, and our 
incorporation and dulling of the phenomenon by our sensory experience: in “this stillest night,” we persist 
by “listening trying listening...for no such thing as a sound.”641 Conversely, drone music frequently 
dominates our perception to the extent that extraneous information is either missed or masked.
642
 The 
inward world which is affirmed is that of the sonic object, of the tone itself in its persistent indifference to 
an environment which on another level appears to contain it.  
 
That this difficult relationship of drone music to silence finds diverse expressions is not surprising. 
Composition drawing extensively on either might be epic or miniature, of indeterminate duration or 
rigorously controlled. Yves Klein‟s Monotone Symphony – Silence (Track 10),643 which was regularly 
used by Klein to accompany his performance and action painting, and which is arguably the first 
minimalist drone work,
644
 consists of a single chord
645
 held for an indefinite period, followed by an 
extended period of silence.
646
 By returning to the fundamental possibilities of music itself, this “two-part 
continuum of sound and silence”647 demonstrates through the confluence of duration and tonal presence 
or absence, the very quantitative basis of a musical ontology.  
 
The inextricability of noise and silence is only problematically reduced to a type of binarism, however.
648
 
If proto-minimalists such as Klein, John Cage or Morton Feldman pay equal attention to sustained tone as 
                                                          
639
 Ibid., 48. 
640
 John Cage, Conversing with Cage, ed. Richard Kostelanetz (New York: Limelight, 1989), 228-9. Hereafter CG. 
641
 Beckett, “Still 3,” CSP, 270.  
642
 The phenomenon of masking is discussed by Richards and Kidd, “Audition,” 48.   
643
 Yves Klein, Monotone Symphony, 1949,  20 November 2011 <http://www.artep.net/kam/symphony.html>. 
644
 Strickland, Minimalism, 124. 
645
As Strickland suggests, the work is more accurately described as monochordal than monotonal (ibid., 35).  
646
 For example, the performance which accompanied the first of Klein‟s celebrated Anthropométries of the Blue 
Epoch (Yves Klein, Anthropométries of the Blue Epoch, 1960) – action painting where naked models, painted in 
Klein‟s signature colour, International Klein Blue (IKB), would imprint their bodies on canvases mounted on gallery 
walls – consisted of a sustained chord of twenty minutes, followed by twenty minutes of silence (Hannah 
Weitemeier, Yves Klein (Köln: Taschen, 2001), 55).  
647
 Ibid., 11.  
648
 Another problem might be the connection between drone and repetition, and the former as an exponential case of 
the latter, although Strickland correctly criticizes the tenuous basis of this argument (Strickland, Minimalism, 145).   
   130 
 
to its alternation with silence, the music of La Monte Young and those that follow in his path, exposes the 
possibility that sustained tone can itself be interpreted as silent. Exemplary among such works is Young‟s 
first epic drone composition, The Tortoise, His Dreams and Journeys,
649
 a composition which, in 
principle, is still ongoing.
650
 In its many incarnations by Young‟s Theatre of Eternal Music,651 various 
sustained tones are held above an amplified drone which was initially produced by the motor of his pet 
turtle‟s aquarium, but subsequently replaced by synthesized sound. Young set up these drones to sound 
for some time prior and subsequent to any performance of the work, intensifying their representational 
element as a “primordial sonic vibration,”652 an ethereal continuum from which sonic being arises. In 
several ways, The Tortoise maintains Young‟s link to aesthetic indeterminacy:653 the precise duration of 
Young‟s drone environment is unspecified, running from a few hours to several days;654 with the 
exception of the drone, instrumentation and accompanying pitch are not set out by the composition itself, 
determined only in relation to each performance.  
 
Yet, for all this, the dominant characteristic of this music is the persistence
655
 of its invariance, a distinctly 
difficult, but nonetheless necessary determinacy.
656
 It is precisely to the extent that the work seems static 
that it reveals within its constituent, sustained pitches a sonic world in considerable flux. Young‟s drones 
are intended to explore the tension at the heart of sustained sound. Exposing that these sounds are 
themselves complex singularities containing a series of overtones which are intensified in relation to the 
sounding of other prolonged pitches, allows Young to reveal the possibility of a musical materialism 
which presents together the properly quantitative aspect of duration and the qualitative feature of timbre. 
It is important to stress, however, that in terms of our sensory encounter, the complexity of the latter 
essentially rests on the prolongation of the former. For a listener to be fully aware of the timbrel subtleties 
of drone music, it is essential that their exposure to the sustained tone is of sufficient duration.
657
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It is also true that performed at high enough volumes, the persistence of drones masks extraneous 
information, and thus paradoxically is proximate to silence to the extent that it constitutes a ground – a 
point of strange, inertial stasis
658
 – which acts simultaneously to re-expose not only the possibility, but 
also the immanence, of movement and change. We might say that the apparently original function of both 
silence and noise are easily displaced into one another, and thus that drone music produces a particular 
noisy silence, responses to which invariably range from perturbation to approbation, from interest to 
obliviousness. As Rasch reminds us, because noise is destructive from the perspective of those trying to 
distinguish a specific message from within its generative multiplicity, but is simultaneously the ground 
from which genuine autonomy might be produced in the first instance, it must “be seen as inherently 
ambiguous, neither desirable nor undesirable in and of itself.”659   
 
 
d) Autotelism 
 
Yet, if duration and tonal presence or absence are central to quantifying musical being, they leave only 
partly unveiled the processual aspect of composition and performance.
660
 In particular, Robert Fink 
identifies this second lineage of musical minimalism as pulse-pattern minimalism, emphasizing his 
concern with “minimalism as repetition, particularly as repetition with a regular pulse, a pulse that 
underpins the complex evolution of musical patterns to alter listener perception of time and telos in 
systematic, culturally influential ways.”661 That repetition and process are elements fundamental to most 
music is not in dispute.
662
 They serve as mnemonic devices which provide cohesion at the level both of 
content and of structure, and in this process steer our perceptual directedness, our temporal as well as 
spatial situatedness (as Fink suggests). “Repetition in the traditional work appears as a reference to what 
                                                          
658
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has gone before, so that one has to remember what was forgotten,”663 in Mertens‟ provocative formulation 
of a teleological imperative: for a sense of direction and purpose to exist, the recollection of the past must 
imply the future.   
 
However, this should not distract us from the quantitative significance of minimalism‟s emphasis on 
process and repetition. If minimalist repetition provides a sense of motoric movement, often even forward 
propulsion, it is not a motion which is easily associated with a purpose, be this the stable and predictable 
build-up and release of harmonic tension, or an end arrived at through music‟s representative or 
associative aspects. Minimalism problematizes the notion of telos or purpose. Bertrand Russell – almost 
certainly taking into equal account potential scientific, mathematical, philosophical and political 
trajectories – reminds us that the teleological and the causal must be kept discrete, and that the type of 
knowledge these produces is distinct:  
 
When we ask „why?‟ concerning an event, we may mean either of two things. We may mean: „What  
purpose did this event serve‟ or we may mean „What earlier circumstances caused this event?‟ The answer 
to the former question is a teleological explanation, or an explanation by final causes; the answer to the 
latter question is a mechanistic explanation…[E]xperience has shown that the mechanistic question leads to 
scientific knowledge, while the teleological question does not.
664
 
  
Cursorily, it is worth mentioning that much contemporary thought on teleological operation – particularly 
that derived from General Systems Theory with its emphasis on dynamic teleological models involving 
multifinality, equifinality, circular causality, autopoiesis and so forth
665
 – poses significant problems for a 
reductive account such as Russell‟s above. We might add to these, from an entirely different perspective, 
the work of hermeneuts such as Gadamer, who argues that the notion of truth cannot be separated by 
science from the questions posed by art. This is not to suggest that a wholesale elision of either field into 
the other is possible, nor is it essential to insist that the relation of minimalism to a quantitative ontology 
has a necessary bearing upon the posing of teleological or mechanistic questions in themselves; it clarifies 
each in turn, without collapsing them into one another. For the sake of brevity we might distinguish 
between music as part of a representational teleology, which is purposive in relation to external elements, 
and music as an autotelic phenomenon, in which case it is purposive in terms of the internal relations of 
its constituent parts.  
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That we experience within music a sense of beginning and ending, and, between these, various types of 
tension and release, hinges on the understanding that what we term music emerges through a number of 
relations. In many cases such relations are essentially representational – of its programmatic and narrative 
references;
666
 of the nexus between composer, composition, performer and listener; of the process of 
music itself and the relation of part to whole, of instant to temporality. It is an immanent relation to 
sound, whether in its perception or production, which renders music essentially teleological or purposive.  
 
Accepting firstly that telos marks in music an overall sense of purposiveness – that the music is going 
somewhere in particular,
667
 which “gives the listener a non-ambivalent orientation and that attempts to 
inform him of meaningful musical contents”668 – it becomes possible to trace the differences between 
what Fink terms a classical (relational) teleology and recombinatory (autotelic) teleologies. Classical 
teleology, he argues, rests on two basic assumptions: an anthropic principle, according to which the 
purposiveness of music “maintains a basic phenomenological congruence”669 with the human experience 
of tension and release;
670
 and a formal principle which asserts that “the complex arc of [tension and 
release…] coincides exactly with the shape of the piece…[U]timately telos determines form.”671 Many 
critics, Wim Mertens amongst them, remain adamant that minimalism essentially abandons teleology,
672
 
invoking a “non-directed evolution in which the listener is no longer submitted to the constraint of 
following the musical evolution.” Not being compelled to follow a specific chain of significances, we are 
free to experience minimalist composition for what it is: generative process qua generative process. 
 
While Fink might not dispute this last point, he quite correctly doubts the view of teleology espoused by 
Mertens. In its place he proposes that minimalism exemplifies a recombinant teleology: “there is in fact 
no nonteleological experience of music in Western culture, only new recombinations of teleology not yet 
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recognized as transformations of goal-directedness.”673 Although Fink almost immediately retracts this 
strong hypothesis of recombinant teleology, what is significant in this proposition is that purposiveness is 
perfectly plausible both in concept and experience from outside of either the metaphysical or formalist 
paradigms through which artistic production might be understood.  
 
Fink‟s recombinant teleology must be understood as an attempt to account for the inner-purposiveness of 
minimalist music in its indifference to anthropomorphic scale
674
 and formalist protocols.
675
 If it subverts 
the extensive parameters, patterns and progressions which conventionally dictate movement in western art 
music, minimalism is not devoid of direction as such. It is conceivable that the timbrel subtleties of a 
single tone might indicate an inherent tendency towards other pitches, and hence to relationship. Equally, 
although a sequence of pitches might present only fragmentary testimony to existing teleological 
structures – principally, diatonic harmony and the melodic repetition and isorhythms (repeated rhythmic 
patterns) which habitually attend it – the assumption that such sequences cannot in themselves capture 
and orient attention speaks more of a limited understanding of structure than of any intrinsic property of 
music or sound.
676
 Pulse and rhythm, suspension and resolution, progression and cadence: these are all 
perfectly conceivable within minimal, modular, fragmentary or processual music.  
 
Music might legitimately be described as autotelic (self-directed and intrinsically purposive) when its 
self-referential capacity is simultaneously autopoietic (self-productive). To state the case otherwise: the 
fact that certain sounds follow other sounds is due to their internal properties and the relations these 
establish; simultaneously, for these sounds to be such as they are, these relations and the directions they 
imply must be seen as necessary; we are faced with the choice, either this necessity pre-exists as a 
structural demand, in which case we reinvest ourselves within in a teleological metaphysics, or the 
necessity is in fact produced within the sound itself as the potential for relation, in which case it is 
autotelic.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
673
 Fink, Repeating, 43.  
674
 The “time-frames listeners can recognize” (ibid., 44-5). 
675
 “Detach teleology from form, and an entire panoply of new arrangements opens up” (ibid., 46). 
676
 Ibid., 86.  
   135 
 
e) Modular process as sonic quantity 
 
Although the autotelic marks both lineages of minimalism identified here, it is considerably more 
prominent in minimal forms which draw their substance from process, repetition and pulse, than in drone 
works. Such minimalism in itself contains purposiveness sufficient to render external reference or relation 
non-essential. The first radically minimalist use of repetition as a structuring and autopoietic technique 
might be traced to Erik Satie‟s Vexations (Track 11),677 a composition which instructs the performer to 
repeat its spartan fifty-two beat material eight hundred and forty times without variation, a performance 
which lasts approximately eighteen hours.
678
 As suggested above, it is no great stretch to accept that 
repetition should be essential to coherence and structure in music and, indeed, art in general. However, 
that repetition should be capable of deconstituting conventional teleology, effecting a significant formal 
and associative amnesia, while simultaneously substituting for this loss a new type of tensional 
arrangement, is what makes its employment in minimalism remarkable.  
 
Variously taken up in the logic of serialism,
679
 of which Anton Webern‟s condensed miniatures are 
exemplary,
680
 the aleatory music of John Cage, and the work of eclectic composers such as Karlheinz 
Stockhausen, such repetition is pursued with particular clarity and force in pulse-pattern minimalism, to 
recall Fink‟s term. In particular, we might consider Philip Glass‟ Two Pages (Track 12),681 although a 
similar emphasis on modularity and process is evident in other early minimalist works, Terry Riley‟s 
jubilant early masterpiece, In C (Track 13),
682
 as well as Steve Reich‟s work Piano Phase683 amongst 
them. Glass‟ composition takes its name from the fact that its constituent modules were originally scored 
on two manuscript pages. This work is paradigmatic of both the composer‟s early and most formally 
severe output, as well as that brand of minimalism which hinges on the exposition of systematic and often 
audible processes. The performance score for Two Pages specifies neither instrumentation nor dynamics, 
although the Electra Nonesuch recording features piano and electric organ in unison.
684
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Its principal structural feature is the use of additive and subtractive modules. In the case of additive 
modules, a sequence, consisting of a number of pitches in a specific order,
685
 is repeated a number of 
times before being supplemented, either by a single pitch
686
 or by an additional series of pitches,
687
 which 
would then be repeated. For the compositional process to be transparent, such an additional series of 
pitches will normally be a variation on the first. These supplementary series can themselves be either 
additive – in which case they would present notes in addition to the original series688 – or subtractive – in 
which case they would present fewer notes than the original series.
689
 Such variation might equally be 
properly subtractive, in which case the sequence itself would contract.
690
 It is partly because complex 
instrumentation does not distract from this exacting structural systematicity that the compositional 
process is rendered maximally audible.  
 
Similar techniques are observable in minimalist literature and minimalist visual arts. In the case of the 
former, we might consider Samuel Beckett‟s “Company.” Here the modular phrase “To one on his back 
in the dark”691 undergoes various permutations in effecting within the overburdening density and inertia 
of the closed space within which Beckett sets this novel a minimal sense of agency and movement. 
Against the borders of self-consciousness, the boundaries of sensory and conceptual verification, and the 
existential limitation of the body within actual space, the narrator (Voice) struggles against the darkness 
of fading memory in order to guarantee the darkness (unknowability) of future contingency: “figments of 
the imagination whose function is aesthetic play,”692 affirming the struggle of creation itself. The additive 
transformation of the initial module is systematically balanced out by a recursion to the original formula. 
Thus, the unstable relation between agent and agency which is brought to a climax in the query, “Can the 
crawling creator crawling in the same create dark as creature create while crawling?”, is symmetrically 
predicated upon contrasting expansions of motionless darkness of the initial module. The imagination is 
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stirred to genuine poiesis – “visions in the dark of light,”693 and “the conjuring of something out of 
nothing”694 – which is clearly additive. This is almost immediately undercut, however – “Crawls and falls. 
Lies. Lies in the dark with closed eyes resting from his crawl”695 – and the piece comes to rest as it began 
“in the dark…Alone.”696  
 
Although far less formally rigorous than the examples set by musical modularism, Beckett‟s structural 
concerns are certainly comparable to those of phase-pattern minimalism. A still closer homology might be 
discovered in Robert Lax‟s poem, “word,”697 a minimalist miniature which presents a four-line stanza 
flanked by three, three-line stanzas, two at the start and one at the end, the first and the last being 
identical:  
 
word 
word 
word  
  
a word 
a word 
a word 
  
one word 
two words 
one word 
two words 
 
word  
word 
word
698
 
 
The first stanza – “word/ word/ word” – presents the initial module of the work. Here is echoed the 
concern which Derrida famously identifies in terms of the triplicate logic of identity – “There was 
immediately a double origin plus its repetition.”699 Admittedly, Derrida‟s logic speaks not merely of the 
manifest, but of the very possibility of identity. Nonetheless, Lax seems also to be asking the question, 
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how many times must a thing be repeated for this repetition contingently to stabilize the void at the heart 
of identity? The answer appears to be three: the first repetition marks the split and incommensurability 
between the lost unity of an idea and its presentation; the second repetition doubles the split, re-presents 
it, in order to stabilize presentation itself. Badiou would suggest that this repetition, or metastructure, is 
the minimal necessity for the presentation of any situation whatsoever.
700
 Word is clearly self-referential – 
it is the word “word,” and it traces, performs and encircles the performance of its content. Its reference is 
also external to the other repetitions of the module “word” in the stanza, as well as a more general law of 
consecution which underpins the traditional order of language: that one word will follow another word. 
These concretize – indeed, quantify – the minimal conditions in which poietic force and poetic 
presentation are able to coincide.  
 
By adding the indefinite article, a, the second stanza defines an expansionary supplement to the first: “a 
word/ a word/ a word.” This increment further concretizes and predicates what in a sense remains ideal in 
the first stanza – “word,” hovering between the substantial and insubstantial, becomes “a word.” 
Simultaneously this predication is a subtraction, however, for there is a definite quality, or arguably a 
certain purity which is retained in the idea, which is sacrificed through the addition of the indefinite 
article. “[A] word” hovers between the idea – the idea of identity and the reflexivity of the idea itself – 
and the definite; between “word” and the word. Lax resolves the problem in a remarkable and, indeed, 
minimal manoeuvre, by shifting to the numerical realm of specific quantity. The third stanza presents a 
more complex variation, the alternative “one word/ two words/ one word/ two words,” which is again 
both additive and subtractive in relation to the initial module, “word”. It is additive, first, in several 
obvious senses: the addition of the plural (“words”); the fact that these lines posit additional variations on 
the initial module; the internal variance of the stanza (the alternation of “one word” and “two words”) is 
itself a type of addition; and most significantly, the alternating lines also present rudimentary counting 
and addition, “one…two.” These lines also add definition: the indefinite article “a” becomes alternately 
“one” and “two.” Interestingly, such definition is also subtractive in a significant sense, since specificity 
is shown here to be subtracted from non-specificity.  
 
Interpreting word as a concrete poem
701
 – one in which the form and content of the poem reflect one 
another, the flow of language obeying its own meaningful prescription – we encounter the full sense in 
which this third stanza must be understood as deeply ambiguous. “[O]ne word” clearly is self-
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contradictory from the perspective of concrete reflexivity: it subtracts from its substantial, self-referential 
independence, since “one word” is, of course, not one word, but two words. In this subtraction, however, 
it refers back to “a word” of the second stanza, which, in turn, is a “word,” indeed the “word” of the first 
stanza: a single word struggling for its conceptual and concrete singularity. So, in a sense, the developed 
module “one word” subtracts from itself only to add quantitatively to the original module, while also 
affirming the intrinsic concrete value of “word.” The alternate line of the third stanza, “two words,” 
presents itself without such contradiction. Clearly, it is adding “a word” to the initial module, “word,” and 
so is “two words,” a self-reflexive, affirmative performance. Simultaneously it makes oblique reference to 
the two words of its alternating partner – “one word” – by providing an external point of reference for the 
latter. In returning to a repetition of the opening module and stanza – “word/ word/ word” – the poem 
seeks to affirm the quantitative, cumulative, modular, and repetitive character of materialization, and, 
more specifically, materialization through language. Having begun with a self-referential idea, and 
proceeded through its indefinite and then numerical quantification, we are closer to recognizing in the 
final stanza three singular and discrete words. Lax, through an exemplary, modular minimalism, points us 
precisely towards the conditions of internal and external reference which approximate the quantitative 
conditions of being.   
 
In the visual arts, a parallel emphasis on serial and modular expansion is evident in Sol le Wit‟s sculpture 
with its exposition of the modular logic of geometric structure. In HRZL 1, (Figure 51)
702
 a work 
composed of concrete cubes, we discover “ the realization of a numeric and geometric sequence of 
incremental units,” which, much like some of the open-ended additive techniques of Philip Glass, could 
“extend out indefinitely” in exposing the “variations available within an original premise…[and] within 
the basic cube and square form.”703 The work simultaneously pulls the viewer inward, along the central 
axis upon which it is aligned,
704
 and upward, along the diagonal line of its progressive levels. It transects 
space in a manner which is at once so systematic, impersonal and pervasive that it “set[s] art and reality 
on the same plane...[T]he selection of a regulated scheme…[reveals] works that self-referentially stand 
for what they are without illusionistic deception.”705 In the space shared between perceiver and work, the 
constituent cubes of HRZL 1, even more blatant in a sculpture such as 1 2 3 4 5 5 6 (Figure 52),
706
 cannot 
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help but recall the architectural, the “the geometry of the city.707” Yet, this should not detract from the fact 
that, in its modular expansion, the work exemplifies the autotelic thrust of minimalism in its 
geometrically quantifiable aspect.    
  
 
Figures 51: Sol LeWitt, HRZL, 1990                                                                     Figure 52: Sol Le Witt, 1 2 3 4 5 6, 1978.  
 
Of Glass‟ use of additive and subtractive modular repetition, Keith Potter writes the following:  
 
 Each work is constructed from a Basic Unit…The scores simply notate the expansions and 
 contractions of the Basic Unit that forms the structure of each work. They do this, though, by 
 grouping sub-units and their expansions or contractions into figures of varying lengths…Two Pages 
 represents Glass‟s first use of rigorous additive process in a composed-out score.708    
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It is somewhat unexpected that despite the composition‟s formal simplicity, despite its being little more 
than a “study in the elongation and subsequent contraction of a simple musical line,”709 it retains a certain 
complexity. A possible explanation might be found in considering the manner in which more complex art 
habitually conceals its own artificiality. To be maximally effective it presents its constitutive complexities 
as essential. There is no strain in affirming the realism and mimetic precision of Don Eddy‟s Private 
Parking V (Figure 52).
710
  
 
 
Figure 53: Don Eddy, Private Parking V, 1971. 
 
 
We are struck not by the virtuosity of the brush strokes that must accompany such a painting, but rather 
by the sheer fact that, were the context of our perception even slightly different, we might easily mistake 
the work for a photograph. Such technical complexities, with the possible exception of formal 
composition, easily could pass us by entirely by the very force with which such complexity coheres 
within a single work.  
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Similarly, Virginia Woolf‟s short story, “The Mark on the Wall,”711 presents, through a complex diction, 
syntax and structure of relations, the manner in which the curvatures of thought are habitually related to 
singular, phenomenal points – in this case, a mark on the wall of a room in which the narrator is seated. 
This realization serves not to dematerialize such physical points into the complexity of the linguistic, but 
rather affirms the integrity of matter obliquely within the complex of perception and perspective which 
language negotiates.  
 
We encounter the mark from several perspectives: first, as the minimal differentiation of substance within 
undifferentiated sensory experience, the “small round mark”712 of novelty, upon which attention and 
thought readily “swarm;”713 second, as a hole made by a nail, an intrusion into the integrity of the unified 
surface of reality (the wall), but also a functional absence which supports the possibility of represented 
phenomena (the “miniature” painting714); third, the mark as the possibility of something radically exterior 
to thought and perception, of “some round black substance”715 which draws us back from “the inaccuracy 
of thought”716 to the world of matter; fourth, “[i]n certain lights the mark on the wall seems actually to 
project from the wall…I cannot be sure, but it seems to cast a perceptible shadow,”717 suggesting the 
manner in which reality takes shape through the unsure but effective orientation of perception and 
thought, in sensory information ionised towards the polarity of material consequences.  
 
By tracing these complexities of thought through the subtleties of experience to which this self-conscious 
and subtly metafictional
718
 narrative alludes, Woolf affirms the comparability of the fictive and the Real: 
“[h]ow shocking, and yet how wonderful it was to discover that these real things…were not entirely 
real.”719 The narrative faithfully reproduces the complexity of the process through which the real, 
perception, and thought become entwined. Implicitly, it enacts a local version of Husserl‟s universal 
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phenomenological epochē, or a “method of parenthesizing”720 which aims to establish the independence 
of the realm of empirical consciousness from the external world of spatial and temporal conditions. The 
real – here the mark on the wall – re-emerges only when we bracket our insistence on the existential 
aspect of its being: “[w]e put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the 
natural attitude; we parenthesize everything which that positing encompasses with respect to being: thus 
the whole natural world which is continually „there for us‟.”721 In order to apprehend the noema or 
perceptual content of the mark on the wall with greater clarity, the narrator – and, to the extent that the 
imagination is able to reproduce this mark, also the reader – must apply a local epochē which enables the 
discernment of specific perceptual information from within an immensely complex situation. It becomes 
possible to weigh various perspectives, and to identify an object which corresponds to accurate 
observation. It is such a local exercise which, from a phenomenological perspective,
722
 allows us to 
follow the experimentation with the limits of phenomenal experience explicit in the narrative itself, while 
still speculating as individual interpreters on the nature of Woolf‟s mark. The present argument diverges 
fundamentally in this respect: although the reader follows these paths with the narrator, ultimately we do 
not recreate this full complexity in itself, but only its appearance. This appearance, which might easily be 
taken for genuine equivalence, reveals the forces which may be regarded as specific to representational 
literature, which seems to bind an excess of data through a medium that, despite the odds, we are capable 
of processing as a contingent whole.  
 
This is not to suggest that complexity clarifies. Nor should we underestimate that within an “environment 
[which] is always already more complex than any and all systems and the observations and operations 
they carry out”723 we might be tempted to explain the totality of aesthetic effect by “the quintessentially 
modernist and Enlightenment strategy…of reducing complexity via social consensus.”724 With the notable 
exception of those who come to a work with a specialized critical agenda in mind, we habitually 
encounter in most representational and teleological art an enjoinder to the hermeneutic task of first 
affirming the work as a totality in effect, before proceeding to a structured delineation of its constituent 
parts, references or meaning. Such propositions, in combining the normative functions of taste and 
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teleological judgment, potentially miss what is formalism‟s most obvious gain: that otherwise chaotic 
sensibility is unified not by reducing its complexity, but by rendering such complexity perceptible without 
having aesthetically to recreate the detailed processes of formation. Such works conceal that form itself is 
subject to formation, or that structure is subject to structuration.  
 
Minimalism by contrast – even in its monotonal, monochromatic, and most concrete literary 
manifestations, all of which emphasize immanence and presence – draws attention to the processual 
elements of both form and structure. Minimalism presents not only minimal material, but also minimal 
impediment to the generative or poietic process itself. The sheer immanence of this process, the quantity 
of information it presents as immediate, has the potential to overwhelm, appearing thus more complex 
than in the case of its referential aesthetic counterparts.  
 
The significance of the broadly-speaking formalist analyses of Two Pages undertaken by Wes York
725
 
and Potter
726
 becomes clearer when we consider that their meticulous deciphering does not reflect solely 
on the structure and effects of the music. Recalling the argument above regarding the autotelic character 
of pulse-pattern minimalism, the modular repetition and variation in Two Pages paradoxically draws 
attention to the manner in which musical change and progression occur, both from the perspective of form 
and from that of the perceiver. As such, minimalism represents nothing other than the process of 
production itself, and it is this poiesis to which formalist analyses obliquely attest. In Potter‟s analysis, the 
one hundred and seven constituent modules
727
 are grouped in four parts. Each part presents a different 
exploration of additive and subtractive procedures, mostly through permutation of a basic sequence, G-C-
D-Eb-F. The first involves what is described above as a subtractive supplement, in which what is added is 
a contracting restatement of the original material; the second is properly additive, and involves the 
symmetrical expansion and contraction of a sub-unit; the third involves a “still more complex additive 
structure” involving the addition of a second figure; the fourth involves additive repetition once again, but 
having abandoned the grounding pitch, G, shifts the referential ground of the listener. The effect – 
irrespective of towards which tone in the various relentless repeated sections the listener‟s attention might 
be directed, with the resultant variations in tonal gravity such differences solidify – is one of evolving 
displacement.  
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In the case of modular minimalism, a tension persists between asymmetry and rigorous mathematical 
order which stresses the already emphatic connection between repetition, additive and subtractive 
modularization, number, and a quantitative ontology. The transparency of these quantitative processes 
helps only to regionalize a certain aesthetic dislocation, a generative atopia. In particular, musical 
minimalism – even as it engages and interacts, retaining not only conceptual but often expressive links 
between composer, work, performer and audience – demonstrates itself as simultaneously self-reflexive, 
self-productive, self-structuring and self-sustaining. It is thus that minimalism is both committed and 
indifferent, and in this paradox it draws attention to the point at which what is normally taken as the 
qualitative realm of musical form and content, reveals its quantitative substrate. Minimalism‟s first 
lineage – the drone composition, the monochromatic canvas, the most austere and descriptive prose – 
indicates quantity through duration and sonic immanence, invariance of surface, the interplay of 
sustenance and silence, presence and absence. Modular minimalism – phase-pattern music, serial 
sculpture, the modular approach of much concrete poetry – exposing its autotelic bias, draws out the 
quantitative ontology of accumulation, series and counting. In both paradigms, we witness a shift from 
the critically and philosophically dominant assumption that at the heart of art‟s being we finally discover 
only a complex set of qualitative relationships. It is thus by the austere path of minimalism, that we 
discover a back-door – the aesthetic – through which we might take a few tentative steps towards a 
quantitative understanding of being.  
 
 
 
 
7. THE QUALIFICATION OF QUANTITY 
 
a) The refusal of quantity 
 
Regardless of whether its form is transcendental, logical, existential, or phenomenological, the refutation 
of the Absolute which inhabits most strains of contemporary thought is intimately bound to the refusal of 
quantity. Exemplary amongst such repudiations is the opposition offered by Horkheimer and Adorno to 
the manner in which the Enlightenment instrumentalizes reason by reducing thought to a correlate of 
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quantification.
728
 Nature, justice, economy and knowledge are unified under a supreme law of 
calculability.
729
 Quantity comes to dominate quality.
730
 It is the dogmatic extension of the quantitative 
claim that similarly subjugates multiplicity to unity,
731
 allows science to colonize, and thus mythologize, 
the poietic sphere,
732
 and installs the anthropic subject as maker and master of the material world.
733
 
Quantity reduces to a nodal relationship between subject and object “[t]he manifold affinities between 
existing things.”734 On this basis, it becomes possible to indicate a point of confluence between an 
“objectifying definition”735 that confirms the radical disconnectedness of concept and thing, grounded 
solely in the illegitimate ascendency of quantity, and a division of labour between science and art.
736
 
Horkheimer and Adorno claim that the maintenance of such oppositions is comprehensible only by 
passing through the heart of dialectical identification – “each thing is what it is only by becoming what it 
is not”. Just as subject and object, concept and thing, are ultimately interdependent, so too are art and 
science. “Science,” they claim, “becomes aestheticism, a system of isolated signs,”737 while “art as 
integral replication has pledged itself to positivist science, even in its specific techniques. It becomes 
indeed, the world over again.”738  
 
A philosophy of progressive enlightenment identifies as its transhistorical vocation the pursuit of freedom 
through the systematic elimination of what is unknown. To guarantee its momentum, such a philosophy 
posits close to its foundation the very chasm between intuition and concept, world and idea, which it 
seeks subsequently to seal.
739
 For Horkheimer and Adorno, the principal problem lies not in the potential 
circularity of this type of justification,
740
 but in the strategic error which philosophy makes in insisting 
upon quantity as an absolute and immanent pre-dialectic ground for its emergence. Equation becomes the 
master of the dialectic, restraining the sheer “abundance of qualities,”741 sealing the incalculable within a 
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“preemptive identification of the thoroughly mathematized world with truth.”742 Through asserting unity 
as both origin and goal,
743
 philosophy fails to recognize its dialectical foundation, and passes instead into 
a mathematical fundamentalism. To begin counteracting the “triumphant calamity”744 which proceeds 
from the instrumental application of such absolute quantification, we must undertake the dialectical 
enlightenment of enlightenment itself. 
 
Those situations which claim autonomy require particularly close attention, since their logic presents a 
fragmentary totalization of the rift between concept and world. Prime amongst these is art which, “[a]s an 
expression of totality…claims the dignity of the absolute.”745 In its poietic aspect, art becomes the 
generative subject of a world; in its mimetic aspect, it faithfully traces “the world over again.”746 These 
forces manifest through the distribution of sensible and cognitive information across the various species 
and media of art, a situation which proves strictly nonsummative. If the unity of art “can never be restored 
by the addition of these arts, by synaesthesia or total art,”747 we are yet called to postulate something 
integral or convergent in its stead, for art, ultimately, has definite referents. On one hand art offers itself 
as self-productive totality, but on the other, it is clear no additions of its parts can constitute the totality it 
claims to generate or translate. There is a clear disjuncture between art as self-productive totality and art 
as nonsummative synaesthesia which reproduces the rift which separates concept from thing. To grant 
consistency either to this separation or to its bridging, we are compelled to choose between the 
foundational, pre-emptive ascendency of quantity (and its concomitant suppression of quality), and 
critical consciousness, which functions dialectically through a transformative processing of difference as 
the essence of identity.  
 
Quantity subjects culture and society to a mode of domination from which an incalculable enlightenment 
promises liberation – an outside to the irrational state to which reason has dangerously regressed. The 
inheritance of a metaphysics of “true reality”748 must be challenged by passing through the void of 
identity, to a negative dialectics, which, Adorno claims, “change[s] this direction of conceptuality” – the 
compulsive movement towards predicated identity – through a “turn towards non-identity.”749 It is 
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possible to concur with much of the argument presented by Horkheimer and Adorno. They expose the 
dark potential that inheres in situations where like and unlike are counted-as one another – the tyranny of 
the One, prefiguring Badiou – and in which political, legal, ethical and economic equivalence become the 
rule. Retaining a critical antagonism towards the illegitimate reign of irrationality, their analysis sketches 
not a simplistic dystopia, but the possibility of a return to reason. By uncoupling thought from number, 
they recognize the antagonistic dynamic at the heart of cultural production – the ideological strain 
between quantity and quality – in which art emerges as a key negotiator.  
 
It is less clear how negative dialectics is not guilty of the same failure it criticizes in mathematics
750
 – the 
inability to adhere to its own axiomatic self-limitation which leads it to identify itself as foundational 
possibility. The negative dialectic operates by assuming the full decisional force of the axiom internally, 
thus positing itself as a totality which self-reflexively and necessarily undermines its own totality. Are we 
not asked merely to affirm a series of strategic inversions: decision becomes constitutive undecidability; 
positive identification passes into a “consistent sense of non-identity;”751 the ruthless quantification of 
reality becomes a refusal of quantity? It is finally an axiomatic decision to grant a certain authority to the 
dialectic which prevents this argument from drifting into a quasi-anthropological history of equivalence, a 
threnody for the sacrifices demanded by capitalist quantification. For all its strengths, the argument is 
founded upon a decision regarding number: number and enumeration, quantity and quantitative 
progression, constitute a “substrate of domination.”752  
 
By contrast, I suggest that quantity is simply an ontological substrate of pure indifference. Quantity is 
constitutively disinterested in quality. Is it not possible that ontological quantity passes into instrumental 
quantification at the precise moment at which quantity is itself held as the primary quality of every entity? 
Such a qualification of quantity ought to be counteracted faithfully by insisting on a quantitative ontology 
– the quantitative persistence of what in Being is in itself. 753 While indifference and nonidentity are 
retained at the rhetorical centre of Adorno‟s negative dialectics, they remain spectral and inexpressible 
not of necessity, but through a refusal of quantity in itself, which is accompanied by a radical conversion 
of quantity into quality. The critique of instrumentalization becomes itself instrumental, and it is not 
number which betrays us to this fate, but a growing insensitivity to fluctuating intensities of quantity. 
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Minimalism might be understood as the aesthetic attempt to translate such intensities without the 
mediating vocabulary of qualification. This it does not through an indiscriminate assertion of quantity, 
however. In almost all cases, minimalism renders with unprecedented clarity, the manner in which 
particular qualities and ontological quantity are co-emergent in the work. However, it also reveals the 
character of the absolute – that the work rests on the recognition of quantity qua quantity. This is not the 
paranoiac fear of externality which Horkheimer and Adorno suggest arrives with “the pure immanence of 
positivism,”754 and which results in the periodic claim that art can be sealed from reality. To the contrary, 
what is absolute in minimalism – whether it be revealed through reflective judgement or through the 
autopoietic emergence of the work – is that minimalism presents access to the Real.  
  
 
b) The One and the persistence of the universal  
 
Once we are willing to reject the Absolute and the Real, the suspension of quantity as the radix of being 
and the hypostatization in its place of quality as principle of ontological fundamentalism, are all too easily 
accomplished. The affirmation or negation of the world is henceforth, from the perspective of thought, 
devoid of absolute quantitative value or pure number. We are given over to what Meillassoux identifies as 
the dominant coordinating expression of western philosophy – the correlation of being and thought.755 In 
this respect, might we not return to that cornerstone of metaphysics, Parmenides‟ Fragments, to discover 
that if “the same thing is there for thinking and for being,”756 what is evoked is not the equation of thought 
and being, but the recognition of the Real (in the form of the One) as an absolute precondition. At the 
precise moment at which the Real is suppressed in favour of the equation of thought and being, the 
destitution of a radical or absolute notion of number and quantity appears not only desirable, but a 
necessity. If the quantitative and mathematical aspect of being periodically reaffirms its centrality – from 
Parmenides in antiquity, to Russell in modernity– a melancholia persists in its depths; a pervasive if silent 
acknowledgement that the conditions of thought through which the Absolute might legitimately be 
expressed in quantitative terms are always subject to paradoxes, fluctuations and regresses.  
 
To be clear, the preliminary recognition upon which a reclamation of the Absolute depends is the 
repositing of thought as the basis for contemporary materialism, although, we ought perhaps to follow 
Blackburn in terming this a radical physicalism, since “physics itself asserts that not everything that exists 
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is material; the world includes such items as forces and fields.”757 The transumption of the Real from the 
transcendental realm of pure ideas to the physical realm promises to salvage the Absolute by 
demonstrating the legitimacy of the claim that entities and thought participate equally in substantiality 
(materialism).
758
 This claim, it will be argued, must now appeal to something beside the doxa of an 
exhausted dualistic metaphysics. The conspicuous diversity of responses attests to the fact that this field 
remains contested. From the radical empiricism of William James‟ later monism, with its insistence that 
the distinction of mind from matter is predicated on different arrangements of the same fundamental 
material,
759
 through the eclectic materialist critique of ideology offered by Slavoj Žižek, to the Platonic 
recuperation of the substantiality of thought emphasized in the work of such ontologists as Badiou and 
Meillassoux,
760
 we discover a common orientation towards reanimating the relation between being and 
ontology. In more recent work particularly, the overwhelming concern lies in discerning genuinely radical 
change from within the almost overwhelming multiplicity of undifferentiated information which marks 
every continuous existential situation. Moreover, it promises us the means by which to persist with such 
radical change; to draw out its consequences.  
 
It is the latter process which underpins Badiou‟s definition of the subject: in brief, the subject as the 
ongoing process and ensuing effects of affirming the radical innovation that can only be heralded by a 
true event, a rupture across being itself. Persistence marks the manner in which entities follow the shape 
of the Real. It is the activity of the subject to trace this persistence. As Badiou notes, it is a matter of 
“subjectivation and a consistency.”761 “All that is required of us is to hold to […what can be completed] 
and to what cannot be completed,”762 to persist in the understanding of what is immanent to knowledge 
and what is infinitely potential. Persistence – the “pure patience of the subject”763 – reveals that the 
essence of hope is the manner in which the subject is able infinitely to commit itself to a situation which 
is both immanent and indefinitely distant. And it is this persistence which marks what Badiou terms 
fidelity.  
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“Hope is…the subjectivity of a victorious fidelity, fidelity to fidelity, and not the representation of its future 
outcome…[H]ope has nothing to do with the future. It is a figure of the present subject, who is affected in 
return by the universality for which he works.”764 
 
But is the knot of hope, potentiality and persistence limited to subjective activity, and, if not, how might it 
manifest from the perspective of entities? It is to this possibility that minimalism addresses itself. It does 
this both through those entities which are produced – the objects predicated upon the persistence of 
subjective activity – and those entities which exceed any such division – absolute entities or objects, in 
other words. If it is possible to conceive within a single paradigm, Badiou‟s assertion that persistence in 
itself (“fidelity to fidelity”) propels subjectal activity together with the claim that persistence, insofar as it 
exceeds any particular contingency, names the weave of entities within the Real, this paradigm must be 
one in which an object counts fully as a subject, but without being a subject. Such a situation is, finally, 
an extension of the limits of existence itself.  
 
If minimalism proves exemplary in this regard, it reveals itself, above any stylistic peculiarity, as a 
significant, if oblique, meditation on the nature of ontology. What persists in the exemplary minimalist 
work is nothing other than persistence itself – the persistence which traverses both subject in its relation 
to incompletion (a position which will be clarified below), and entities insofar as they exist qua the Real. 
In this light, the persistence of minimalism is a self-reflexive instantiation of pure persistence; and since 
persistence – as in the case of Badiou‟s formulation of hope – is not referential or predicative as such, but 
the innermost property of the Real, we are once again brought to the autotelic character of minimalism, 
and of its ontological status. The persistence of minimalism presents the process of producing objects 
without end – end, both in the sense of its being without a necessary final predicate, as well as its being 
without an externally directed purpose.  
 
The mere facticity of persistence – that an entity persists – is sufficient to produce in relation to the 
persistent entity, a theory of the universal. As Badiou notes, “[t]hought becomes universal only by 
addressing itself to all others.”765 Regardless of whether we take as the point of departure singularity or 
multiplicity, discrete entities or undifferentiated chaos, this is precisely the force that must persist if the 
One is to be universal: it must be One for all.
766
 Attempts to define the One advance only spasmodically, 
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if at all. We are today no more fundamentally certain of its ontological or conceptual actuality than was 
Parmenides, its first great theorist, for whom “[t]he multitude of sensible things a[re] mere illusion. The 
only true being is „the One,‟ which is infinite and indivisible.”767 In the fragmentary remnant of 
Parmenides‟ philosophical poem, the interrelation of modality and being is firmly established: “What 
routes of inquiry alone are there for thinking:/ The one – that [it] is, and that [it] cannot not be/…The 
other – that [it] is not and that [it] needs must not be.”768 The prescription is vast: within the scope of the 
One lie both the cosmos and existence. Ontology without some consideration of the One – whether in 
affirmation of contradiction – proves prohibitively difficult. We habitually stumble on the uneven ground 
left from the effort of sealing the rift between the One in itself, and our attempts to stabilize it through 
thought. We are returned to a decision, the very axiom from which Parmenides draws the force of his 
poem: “the decision about these matters, depends on this:/ Is [it] or is [it] not? but it has been decided, as 
is necessary/ To let go the one as unthinkable, unnameable…/but to allow the others, so that it is, and is 
true.”769 “Thus [the One] must either be completely or not at all.”770  
 
 
c) One and Multiple 
 
The paradoxes which attend the exposition of this fundamental ontological axiom – that the One is, or it is 
not – are nowhere elaborated with greater tenacity or insight than in Plato‟s Parmenides. By focusing on 
the minute detail of dialectic method, the work relentlessly interrogates the difficulties in establishing the 
essential ground of metaphysics. Being – which to be must itself be oriented towards consistency – 
reveals a great deal of instability in response to our attempts to impose upon it stability, either through 
thought or procedure, as form or as entity. We encounter a constant vacillation between the One and the 
Multiple in attempting to think either independently, or relatively. Here we might recall that the young 
Socrates of this dialogue, who, adhering to a still immature theory of forms, sets as the discursive target 
nothing other than a proof that the One and Multiple are in themselves mutually implicative: “if he should 
demonstrate... what one is, to be many, or conversely, the many to be one – at this I‟ll be astonished.”771 
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This doubt rests on an assertion of form as discrete for each entity, as somehow not subject to the 
inconsistencies of being. Form allows us to conceptualize the One as part of the multiple, totality of 
being, and the Multiple as part of the One, but it also presents a strict injunction against the outright 
confusion of these. We are barred from the One as Multiple, and from the Multiple as One.
772
  
 
The difficult recognition that Parmenides requires of the young Socrates, and indeed of the reader, is that 
the effective power of either form or entity, over one another or in interrelation, is finally a “power in 
relation to themselves”773 – a meta-relation. The aspect of form which is itself involved in formation, 
occurs not through the power of the entities that appeal to a certain form, so not by a mere metaphysical 
extension of form. Rather it takes place through an essential self-relation: of form to itself, and of entities 
to themselves. This is a power external to the subject of knowledge or any formal instantiation this might 
take. We can, therefore, not simply rely on a transcendental authorization of being by form. The One and 
the Multiple – examined both self-reflexively and in relation to one another – call our attention to the 
possibility that fundamental contradiction materializes whenever the essentially quantitative aspects of 
being such as totality, unity, and multiplicity are taken as the objects of ontological scrutiny. 
 
This problem Plato addresses in Parmenides through eight central hypotheses, each of which ends in an 
irresolvable paradox concerning the nature of the One, and so, too, of Being. The first hypothesis – if the 
One is, it is not Many
774
 – exposes, through a process of negative definition, the oblique conditions for 
understanding the One as absolute. Each of its eight constitutive theorems demonstrates an area of being 
in which the One cannot participate: part and whole, schema or shape, location, motion and rest, like and 
unlike, equal and unequal, time.
775
 Accepting the One as effectively barred from participatory being, 
compels us to speculate as to the condition under which the One could be, and yet not participate in 
existence. This ontological paradox must be understood as an extension of the first hypothesis, an 
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extension necessitated by the comprehensive dialectical method outlined earlier in the dialogue.
776
 
Philosophical rigour demands that we explore with tenacity both the positive and the negative conditions 
of a proposition. Here we are asked what it might mean to exist outside of existence: if the One cannot 
exist within ordinary being, then we are called to consider under what conditions it might exist as an 
extraordinary being by tracing from the perspective of Being,
777
 those same theorems exposed in the first 
hypothesis from the perspective of the One.
778
  
 
Here, temporality emerges as central to the interrogation of metaphysics offered in Parmenides. The 
dialectic exposition of the One confers a contractory coherency on the apprehension of time as 
inconsistent within Being. Yet, if the whole of Being were pure inconsistency, existence would be 
impossible. The unstable relation of the One to presence and futurity, to being and to becoming, is 
stabilized only through the proposition of the supplement to the second hypothesis, the Eudoxian Cut.
779
 
This Plato characterizes as an instant, a moment of transaction which allows us to account for continuity 
in an existential situation which is marked simultaneously by disjunction and transformation. The One, 
which in its Being appears to be entirely contradictory, and yet on another level perfectly operative, can 
only persist if an a-temporal instant is offered as an ontological hinge of sorts. The One is in some 
instants part of Being and in others not part of Being; at some instants in time and at others out of time; at 
some instants stable, and at others in flux.  
 
Hallward offers an admirable précis of Badiou‟s reconsideration of the dialectic of the Multiple and the 
One:   
 
[B]eing780 can be thought either in terms of the [M]ultiple or the [O]ne...[T]he only coherent conception of 
Being as One ultimately depends on some instance of the One either as transcendental limit (a One beyond 
being, or God) or as all-inclusive immanence (a cosmos or Nature)...[M]odernity and in particular modern 
science have demonstrated that...the idea of a One-All is incoherent...[T]herefore if Being can be thought at 
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all, it must be thought as multiple rather than One...[O]nly modern mathematics can think multiplicity 
without any constituent reference to unity. Why? Because the theoretical foundations of mathematics 
ensure that any unification, and consideration of something as one thing, will be thought as the result of an 
operation, the operation that treats or counts something as one; by the same token, these foundations oblige 
us to presume that whatever was thus counted, or unified, is itself not-[O]ne (i.e. [M]ultiple).
781
 
 
In this light we come to understand that genuine novelty is not merely the product of a subtraction from 
pure multiplicity. Such is the mechanics for ordinary existence. On the other hand, any systematic 
proposition of novelty must at some point come to terms with the idea of an instant, a point of sudden 
change. In a more contemporary expression, but one still remarkably faithful to Plato, Alain Badiou 
proposes this fundamentally unstable and aleatory point as an event: “There certainly is novelty in the 
event‟s upsurge, but this novelty is always evanescent.”782 The present work is invested in the event and 
the instant to the extent that these account for the sudden emergence of novelty and, so, constitute the 
necessary condition for the materialization and elaboration of novelty in its aesthetic register. Our 
contention is that minimalism illustrates the strain between the One and the Multiple exemplified at the 
heart of the emergence of Real entities. Its most significant works invariably amplify the manner in which 
matter is shaped as art, the force of its aesthetic effect and of its phenomenological presence. Upon the 
tense field between substance, concept and effect, minimalism recalls, through the instantiation of its 
objects, the occurrence of relative novelty itself – indeterminate intermediary of the One and Multiple.  
 
 
Rather, what interests us here is the mode of novelty with which the minimalist object confronts us, and 
which presents the minimal field upon which objectal taking-place and persistence can be discerned – a 
field which problematizes the proximity of the object to the event, and the mirage of the event within a 
material world of real entities. The interposition of the instant or occurrence establishes the necessary 
ontological condition upon which the claim that the One both is and is not, is not mere impossibility. The 
six hypotheses which follow the proposition of the instant in Parmenides elaborate an essential ground 
upon which the One both is and is not. Indeed the history of metaphysics is inscribed within this problem. 
It begins with the Aristotelian view that “the most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while 
remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contradictory possibilities,”783 and 
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manifests subsequently with particular force in Leibniz‟s exposition of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for existence. Briefly phrased, Leibniz insists on the following: that every entity must 
necessarily exist monadically, as an entity which is intrinsically possible within a possible world; that 
when such entities together comprise a possible world, they are said to be compossible; a possible world, 
which “might be defined as a maximum set of compossible individuals”784 is finally incompossible with 
any other possible world, which accounts for the singular existential charge which resides within the 
actual world.
785
 Accordingly, an entity cannot be impossible in itself or incompossible with other entities 
in an actual world.  
 
Attempting to unravel the difficult ontological configuration within which the One and the Multiple are 
compossible, the third and seventh hypotheses of Plato‟s Parmenides address themselves directly to the 
Multiple. The third – what is not-One is Multiple – is the direct compliment to the One as it is exposed in 
the first hypothesis.
786
 Turning to questions of appearance over pure Being in itself, Plato‟s seventh 
hypothesis probes the properties of the Multiple from the perspective of identity, of what is discernibly 
other to the One. Its principal insight is that if a simplistic atomic view of the world is implausible
787
 – if 
the One is not – then the others, which are not One, must ultimately subscribe to pure multiplicity. 
However, for the Multiple to appear at all, it must in some sense be held as One, and, consequently, both 
are at once limited and infinite.
788
  
 
In both hypotheses, the Multiple reveals Being as intimately connected to the interrogation of belonging. 
Examined closely, the third hypothesis sets up the quantitative conditions under which belonging is 
foundational to the shape of existence.
789
 Since the Multiple is other than the One, it must also consist of 
parts (in relation to the whole). Yet a part is not a part of many things – not a part of itself – but a part of a 
whole.
790
 In terms of existence, the Multiple thus makes possible the One without being One; it is 
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Multiple without forcing into existence pure Multiplicity which would bring with it essential 
inconsistency. Do we not discover here precisely the schema by which Alain Badiou distinguishes being 
– pure multiplicity – from existence, or multiplicity which is counted-as-One?791 Also, does this not 
prefigure that fundamental ontological ground of mathematical or quantitative relation and identity which 
is formalized in the set theoretical terms of the Axiom of Foundation – “[t]hat in every multiple, there is 
at least one element that „founds‟ this multiple, in the following sense: there is an element that has no 
element in common with the initial multiple?”792  
 
 Upon this distinction, the contradictory belonging of the seventh hypothesis veers away from 
impossibility and towards compossibility: the One and the Multiple both do and do not belong to the 
infinite. Recalling that the hypothesis is specific in its dismissal of the atomic, we find that what counts as 
One, multiple existence which nonetheless appears contingently unified, is apparently opposed to the pure 
Multiplicity of being qua being. However, what is arguably most significant here is that neither the One 
nor the Multiple exhausts the other. A model of compossibility emerges within the dynamic of this 
hypothesis: existence involves the appearance of entities within a specific world; entities – which are 
numerous and Multiple – are somehow counted as One. Being and existence, ontology and appearance, 
are actually predicated on the pre-existence of pure multiplicity as the fabric of the Real.  
 
Between positing the existence of the One in all things
793
 – the fourth hypothesis – and the affirmation in 
the seventh that for entities to arise or to appear in existence, the Multiple (when the One is not, or when 
the not-One is) must be counted as One, Plato examines more fully the properly negative aspects of the 
One. Demonstrating that the One is not, and has no part of existence, is the task of the fifth hypothesis.
794
 
Yet, even in non-Being, the One proves particularly resilient. It is only in relation to things that exist that 
the One can be said to inexist, and if this is the case, then the One retains a residual relation to existent 
entities, and must be treated as inextricable from being and becoming, in terms of the realization of 
existents as well as pure forces of generation. The sixth hypothesis presses beyond the question of 
relation, to the ontologically prohibitive proposition that the One has no state in Being whatsoever.
795
 This 
nihilistic deepening of the fifth hypothesis is also a negative response to the question central to the second 
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hypothesis – can the One be without participating in being. Here existence is precisely what is barred 
from the One, in order to necessitate a reclamation of the Multiple and of being in the seventh hypothesis.  
 
“[I]f One is not, nothing is.”796 Parmenides and Socrates, the interlocutors of the dialogue, concur on this 
point, yet since the terms in question have been problematized so thoroughly throughout the dialogue, it is 
no surprise that the final hypothesis
797
 offers no clear resolution. “Whether one is or is not, it and the other 
both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear in all things, in all ways, both in relation to 
themselves and in relation to each other.”798 Under the pressure of the dialectic method, the fantasy of 
unity – that which might be mistaken for an unambiguous foundation of the Real capable of anchoring 
thought and being to universality – is exposed as a form of metaphysical idealism which simply cannot 
stand up to its own logical demands. Yet, if the One is not, no simple solution is discovered by blindly 
asserting the Multiple in its place. For, as Plato understands, fixing the one generates a passage to the 
other: the One becomes Multiple; the Multiple appears as One. We are returned to the original claim of 
Parmenides, if the One is, it is not Multiple, only now with a considerably richer and more paradoxical 
understanding: just as pure being is Multiple, the moment it arises in thought or material, it exists, and, in 
existence, the multiple comes to be held as One. This situation – what counts as one, in the terms of Alain 
Badiou, which we shall nominate more simply as the Count for the present purposes – reminds us of the 
strategic aspect of unification, and that existence can only be reduced absolutely to the One at the greatest 
peril. Henceforth, a significant part of any critical vocation becomes the patient exposition of the 
situations in which, despite the absence of the One as the absolute condition of being, the force of 
unification is still in effect in existence.  
 
Admittedly, it would be deeply naïve to presume that it is only art that bears the responsibility for 
exemplifying this difficult pull between unity and multiplicity. Nonetheless, the traditional concerns of 
the aesthetic sphere – the poietic force of generation, the immanence of aesthetic substance, mimesis and 
the Real, the communication of meaning – frequently rehearse this fundamental metaphysical distinction 
with particular clarity. Exemplary amongst such instances is the poem, [This work has been and continues 
to be refined since 1969], by Robert Barry:   
 
 It is whole, determined, sufficient, individual, known, complete, revealed, accessible, manifest, effected, 
 effectual, directed, dependent, distinct, planned, controlled, unified, delineated, isolated, confined, 
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 confirmed, systematic, established, predictable, explainable, apprehendable, noticeable, evident, 
 understandable, allowable, natural, harmonious, particular, varied, interpretable, discovered, persistent, 
 diverse, composed, orderly, flexible, divisible, extendible, influential, public, reasoned, repeatable, 
 comprehendable, impractical, findable, actual, interrelated, active, describable, situated, recognizable, 
 analysable, limited, avoidable, sustained, changeable, defined, provable, consistent, durable, realized, 
 organized, unique, complex, specific, established, rational, regulated, revealed, conditioned, uniform, 
 solitary, given, improvable, involved, maintained, particular, coherent, arranged, restricted, and 
 presented.
799
 
 
This poem pulls between minimalism and conceptualism,
800
 simplicity and complexity, the One and the 
Multiple. Its form is thoroughly unremarkable, austere yet in no sense monolithic, presenting an inventory 
of qualifiers. These seem empty in the sense that by prescribing the same work that they claim to 
describe, impossibly asserting the latter even prior to effecting the former, these qualifiers remain devoid 
of any immediate external reference. Yet, the poem is simultaneously pregnant with significance, as its 
contained, non-referential minimalism is countered symmetrically by the expansive associations that arise 
in following the implications of the auto-generative adjectives which constitute the poem. Minimalism 
and conceptualism appear in this case to operate contrapuntally, located in an identical medium, but 
allowing for significantly different interpretive rules to be called into play.  
 
The claim explicit in the title of the poem – that “this work has been and continues to be refined” – 
presents a significant point of confluence for the divergent trajectories of the work, the poet and the 
reader. This moment of literary presentation, when the poem affirms its own existence as One, a singular 
and unified entity (“this work”), is necessarily coextensive with the many contingencies of an ongoing 
process of literary becoming (“has been and continues”), refinable, incomplete and multiple. As such, the 
poem is a conceptual place-holder for the deep paradoxes which characterize the creative process in 
general: the incompletion which inhabits many works at the generative and interpretive levels; the conflict 
between the finite and infinite parts of the work; an understanding that generative novelty also negates the 
so-called totality of that which pre-exists it.
801
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Simply read from start to finish, with a minimum of semantic reflection, the reader might well be tempted 
to mistake the deeply disjunctive syntax at the heart of the poem for a superficial but nonetheless binding 
unity. We are enjoined to affirm that the poem is, as its initial first constituent qualifiers claim, an 
exemplification of the One: “It is whole, determined, sufficient, individual, known, complete.” As the 
work progresses, a number of descriptors appear to offer themselves in reaffirmation of the One in a work 
which is “unified…isolated…harmonious…situated…limited…specific…uniform…particular... 
restricted.”802 Yet, if the poem instantiates the One, how might we account for the manner in which the 
Multiple reasserts itself in the work‟s being “dependent…varied…diverse…divisible…repeatable… 
complex…improvable, involved… arranged?” To address this apparent contradiction, it is worth recalling 
in full the concluding hypothesis of Plato‟s Parmenides: “whether one is or is not, it and the others both 
are and are not, and both appear and do not appear in all things, in all ways, both in relation to themselves 
and in relation to each other.”803   
 
Upon closer inspection, the poem offers an acute testament to the instability and indeterminacy which 
rapidly overshadow any attempt to claim the absolute ascendency of either the One or the Multiple. 
Indeed, the reader is invited to recognize numerous possible arrangements or syntaxes from within this 
parataxis. For Badiou, “the upshot of the aporias in the Parmenides...[reveal that] it is pointless to try to 
deduce the existence (or non-existence) of the One: it is necessary to decide, and then assume the 
consequences.”804 It is possible to discern this axiomatic imperative in the manner in which Barry‟s poem 
marks the conditions of its intelligibility as its primary concern, rather than the consolidation of either the 
Multiple or the One, by aligning “known…revealed…manifest…apprehendable, noticeable, 
evident…recognizable…realized… revealed… given… presented.” Alternately, we might construct a 
syntax which accentuates the dynamic role of critical thought in the conceptual stabilization of a poem 
unapologetically devoid of durable referential content: “accessible…explainable…understandable… 
interpretable …describable…provable.” Moreover, there is sufficient evidence here that the poem appeals 
to an immanent realism of the type endorsed in the present work, since it is 
“sufficient…known…revealed…persistent…actual…sustained…consistent.” Indeed, what is the 
counterpoint exposed in the poem between immanent revelation (the adjective “revealed” appears twice, 
close to the beginning) and the will to “discover” through patient, critical exposition? What balance is 
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struck between the poem as the stable manifestation of a transcendental generative, indeed poietic, force, 
and the poem as the indefinite progression of a multiplicity of contingent concepts?  
 
That no stable answer to these questions is forthcoming – that Barry‟s poem reflects the same 
undecidability between, and compossibility of, the Multiple and the One as is evident in Plato‟s 
Parmenides – emphasizes the manner in which minimalist and conceptual poetry attempt indirectly to 
indicate the undecidable part of thought and being which conditions both poietic creation and 
metaphysical possibility. The poem presents the charged generative situation in which the cumulative 
operation of the work – the poietic force which counts its constituents, its revisions and its indefinite 
parameters as One – is unified without being a totality, since the poem clearly prescribes its constitutive 
incompletion, its continuing refinement, its transposition or transumption from the realm of language to 
that of thought, concept and imagination.   
 
If it is pertinent here to recall that the minimalist aesthetic is popularly translated by Mies van der Rohe‟s 
Bauhaus dictum – less is more805 – it is also important to recall Perreault‟s claim, cited above, that what is 
minimal about minimalism is its means rather than its end
806
 – that there “is nothing minimal about the 
„art‟ (craftsmanship, inspiration, or aesthetic stimulation) in Minimal art. If anything, in the best works 
being done, it is maximal.”807 In this light, we might contend that Barry‟s poem presents the minimal 
conditions which need to be in place for a work to persist, to be coherent and intelligible, while still 
offering a remarkable insight to the generative plenum of poietic force.      
 
Thus, although constitutively incomplete, the work nonetheless generates a minimalist recognition of 
what might constitute the Real. Such a realism is knowable here only through an atopia, a poietic non-
space within which are incorporated the generative consonances and dissonances which arise between 
inspiration, concept, language, syntax, context and the improvisatory character of interpretation. The 
absolute independence and consequent indifference of the Real in no sense reduces the potential for 
difference, in much the same way as the One cannot finally reduce the Multiple. We discover unfolding at 
the heart of the poem, a startling example of the quantification of quality which marks the best 
minimalism. Each possible arrangement of the numerous constituent qualifiers of the work presents an 
instance of the Multiple being counted-as-One.  
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Minimalism and conceptualism intersect here, not merely in the way in which minimal means are brought 
to maximum effect, but also in the implicit focus of the paratactic force at work in the poem upon unity 
and Gestalt. Of similar significance are the unitary forms pursued by Robert Morris in his construction of 
“simple regular and irregular polyhedrons”808 (Figure 54)809 which effect a holism that is maximally 
engaged with both the conceptual and perceptual affirmation of objecthood in all three planes.
810
 Morris‟ 
exploration of this form of Gestalt is exemplary of minimalism‟s concern with the presentation of 
aesthetic unity, the passage of self-reference to aesthetic immanence, and the parenthesis of relations 
external to the work itself.  
 
 
Figure 54: Robert Morris, Untitled (Battered Cubes), 1966. 
 
Such works call to mind minimalist theories of nonreferentiality and nonrelationality.
811
 Ad Reinhardt, for 
instance, embraced a radical monadism, a rejectionist dogma of art‟s ontological singularity which is 
often nihilistic or apocalyptic in its tone: “Art-as-Art is a concentration on Art‟s essential nature. The 
nature of art has not to do with the nature of perception or with the nature of light or with the nature of 
                                                          
808
 Robert Morris, “Notes on Sculpture,” MA, 228 (222-35).  
809
 Robert Morris, Untitled (Battered Cubes), 1966. Originally exhibited Dwan Gallery, Los Angeles.  
810
 Ibid., 225-6. 
811
 Colpitt, Minimal Art, 41-58. 
   163 
 
space or with the nature of time or with the nature of mankind or with the nature of society.”812 This is 
nowhere more visible than in Reinhardt‟s most austere black canvases which, instantiating the minimalist 
logic of containment or convergence, exemplify the manner in which exclusion and restriction at once 
effect a poietic transumption, or the constitution in an atopian space of what is deconstituted in 
representational terms (Figures 55 and 56).
813
  
 
 
Figure 55: Ad Reinhardt, Abstract Painting No. 5, 1962. 
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Figure 56: Ad Reinhardt, Abstract Painting No. 5, 1962; three different exposures of contrast and brightness juxtaposed. 
 
By contrast, Michael Fried proposes deductive structures by which “[works] demand to be seen as 
deriving from the framing edge – as having been „deduced‟ from it,”814 such as is the case in many of 
Stella‟s shaped works (Figure 57).815  
 
 
Figure 57: Frank Stella, Empress of India, 1965. 
 
Refusing any engagement with the One or the Multiple, Reinhardt‟s monochromatic work exemplifies the 
manner in which minimalist works nonetheless count the Multiple as One by instantiating a monadic but 
rejective autonomy. In the case of Stella‟s shaped work, it is possible to deduce the One from the whole 
by the potent invocation of an aesthetic Gestalt. Several of Stella‟s Black Paintings address the relation of 
part and whole quite differently, however. Painted on regular, rectangular canvases, these works 
simultaneously intimate part and whole. The manner in which the chevrons of Die Fahne Hoch! (Figure 
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58)
816
 point to centre of the canvas unifies the work, offering it as a singularity or a whole, yet it is clear 
that the points at which such inward movement might converge (four large rectangles), while lying on the 
same plane as the work, lie beyond the canvas. In this case, the predication of the One clearly occurs 
elsewhere, and the work functions as its metonymic equivalent – the analogical echo of the operation by 
which multiplicity in existence might yet count-as-One. 
  
  
Figure 58: Frank Stella, Die Fahne Hoch!,   Figure 59: Kenneth Noland, Turnsole, 1961. 
1959. 
 
A more obvious visual analogy of the link between concentricity and unity emerges in considering the 
circular works of Kenneth Noland (Figure 59).
817
 The centre of the canvas – the node in relation to which 
both the expanding concentric series unfolds, as well as the target upon which visual attention is finally 
focused – functions as a quasi-original generative point, exemplifying what I subsequently argue is one of 
minimalism‟s principal modalities – containment. In each such cases of containment – Barry‟s poem, 
Morris‟ unitary structures, Reinhardt‟s monochromes and Noland‟s centred deductions – the minimalist 
work attests to the irreducible multiplicity of Being, rendering maximally transparent that it is quantity 
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which is at the heart of ontology, albeit its aesthetic instantiation will always be an exploration of the 
various techniques by which the Multiple comes to be counted-as-One.  
 
 
 
 
8. THE COUNT 
 
a) The subtraction of novelty  
  
For the sake of clarity, it is necessary at this point to rehearse the fundamental tenets of Badiou‟s 
ontology. Badiou argues that being qua being, pure ontology, is irreducibly multiple.
818
 However, he also 
recognizes that the history of philosophy and thought is scarred by the misapprehension that Being can be 
reduced to unity or the One: the contention that the One is, and all that is, is One.
819
 The Parmenidean 
thrust of philosophy, although subverted with particular force by transcendental philosophy, is never truly 
exceeded. In this respect, Badiou instigates a major ontological revolution when he offers a recoupment 
of Platonic thought
820
 within an ontology of the multiple,
821
 claiming through the conjunction of 
mathematical and philosophical proof that the One is not, and that pure being is both thinkable and 
obliquely presentable in terms of pure multiplicity.
822
 But if everything is multiple, how is it that things 
exist in any unified or substantive form, no matter how contingent this form may be? To account for this 
Badiou distinguishes between consistent and inconsistent multiplicity, or otherwise, structured and 
unstructured multiplicity.
823
 He claims that those things which can be said to belong to being qua 
existence, which exist, have consistency.
824
 Such consistency is presented in being as contingent unity or 
a there-is-Oneness, even though it does not exhaust or reduce multiplicity.
825
 The act of presentation is 
therefore dependent on multiplicity being counted-as-One, which, for obvious reasons, Badiou refers to as 
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the count-as-One, or, the Count.
826
 However, as the Count does not eliminate multiplicity from 
presentation, there necessarily remains some uncounted, inconsistent part – the void – in any presentation 
or existential situation.
827
 As the unpresentable part of every presentation, the empty set,
828
 the void is 
distributed everywhere.
829
 It is precisely that errant foundational element which is a non-element, 
subtracted from every Count, but by this very subtraction, implicit in the Count itself.
830
 By a sort of 
spectral presence, the void is thus unpresented in every Count.
831
 Consequently, for the Count as 
presentation to be guaranteed its consistency, it must be re-presented – literally presented a second time, 
or counted again.
832
 So there are two principal processes in the guarantee of the consistency of existence: 
presentation, or the Count; and re-presentation, or the count of the Count. To the extent that Badiou 
asserts that ontology is ultimately thinkable only in terms of structure and structuration,
833
 we could say 
that if presentation or the Count structures, re-presentation or the Count of the Count acts as 
metastructure.
834
 Within these basic conditions, entities appear with varying intensities,
835
 are subject to 
change,
836
 and sometimes also disappear, become inconsistent multiples, or enter into non-being (are 
destroyed).  
 
The crucial demonstrations of such appearance and disappearance take place in what Badiou refers to as 
the typology of Being, a further distinction within an existential situation in terms of belonging and 
inclusion. What belongs ()837 to a situation838 must also be present in it as an element,839 while what is 
included ( ) in a situation is incorporated by the state of situation as a whole, or re-presented. 
Numerically, elements included always exceed elements which belong,
840
 much as the potential of a river 
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to flow its course is not exhausted by the actual passage of water. Equally, we might argue that the 
potential flow of a river is contingent on the actual presence of water. In a similar manner, inclusion, 
despite its apparent quantitative superiority, is precisely a variation of belonging.
841
 Yet we miss 
something crucial if, standing in a river at a particular moment, we fail to recognize that the potentiality of 
its course is matched by the actuality of the water flowing round our bodies – a normal situation in which 
inclusion and belonging coincide. From these considerations, Badiou extrapolates his tripartite typology 
of Being: a normal situation, in which an entity belongs and is included, is presented and re-presented;
842
 
an excrescent situation, in which an entity is included without belonging, is represented but not presented 
and thus, in a sense, imported to a situation;
843
 a singular situation, in which an entity belongs but is not 
included, is presented but not represented – exported from a situation by other parts within the 
situation.
844
  
 
What remains unclear from Badiou‟s theory of the metastructure is precisely how to define the force 
which underlies the process of the Count. He is adamant that “[m]etastructure…cannot simply re-count 
the terms of the situation and re-compose consistent multiplicities, nor can it have pure operation as its 
operational domain.”845 It is therefore neither fully another presentation nor fully an operation. It is 
definitely self-reflexive, but since the structure on which this self-reflexivity rests itself is tied to the void, 
and so has no possible final predicate, it seems almost as though Badiou hands the metastructural 
operation over to an exponential and infinite reflexivity. Certainly, as with Badiou‟s entire system, this 
force is registered axiomatically, and thus in terms of directedness of thought. It is doubtful, however, that 
this formulation – or that which Badiou offers in relation to the trans-ontological event846 – satisfactorily 
unravels such force on its own terms. The present work aims in part to designate this gap between 
presentation and re-presentation not merely as an operation, but as a force. This force is ontological, to be 
sure, but merely claiming that it is the force of structuration goes only a little way in exposing it qua 
force. Finally, I will argue that what Badiou terms metastructure from the perspective of ontology, and 
re-presentation from the viewpoint of existence, is in fact precisely a para-ontological force which 
incorporates while recognizing the distinction of Being from existence – a poietic exemplarity self-
reflexively directed towards its autopoietic realization.   
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The charge of Badiou‟s existential system847 rests upon the possibility of radical beginning and change,848 
heralded by the sudden eruption of aleatory events.
849
 Such events are trans-ontological
850
 – “fundamental 
anomal[ies],”851 at once singular in their transection of an existential situation, yet drawn from the 
multiplicity of this same situation
852
 – and disrupting ontology itself as the advent of novelty.853 No event 
can be predicted or caused,
854
 and it disappears almost as soon as it appears.
855
 It is, however, “something 
which happens for this world, not in this world, but for this world…an affirmative split”856 constituting 
the conditions within which active configurations of knowledge are defined in retrospective relation to 
events.
857
 In naming an event, we engage in an ongoing process of discerning its consequences,
858
 
expressing fidelity to,
859
 and so defining, the vectors which emerge from an evental site.
860
 Thus the 
valences are generated which retrospectively locate the event to which they attest. Badiou terms these 
consequences a truth,
861
 and the manner in which truths take shape, a subject of truth.
862
 
 
In this sense, truth relates neither to correspondences nor transcendence,
863
 but to the radical potential for 
an ongoing realignment of existential information.
864
 Truth is a generic multiplicity, in the sense that it 
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contains no single “predicative trait”865 which predetermines its content;866 it is indiscernible from the 
objective perspective of a situation alone,
867
 and must be decided by commitment.
868
 Truth is infinite to 
the extent that its consequences are indefinitely progressive,
869
 constitutively undecidable, and yet elicit 
the potential for infinite affirmation.
870
 Situations in which truth appears finite, Badiou calls veridical: 
“anticipations of...what will have been if truth attains completion,”871 which projection is necessary for 
the achievement of knowledge. Finally, truth reinvigorates the universal, presenting “an incalculable 
emergence, rather than a describable structure,”872 a “universalizing diagonal,”873 which is constitutively 
incomplete and open, for all time, and potentially for every entity capable of expressing its fidelity.
874
    
 
Of particular concern to the present purpose is the manner in which art – one of Badiou‟s four conditions 
through which subject, truth and event are intertwined
875
 – exemplifies the universality of ontological 
quantity. More specifically still, our attention turns to minimalism for its austere quantitative modelling, 
which draws equal attention to the negation implicit in the disruption of the status quo instantiated by 
artistic novelty,
 876 and the positive activity of its taking-place. Synthesizing this apparent opposition is an 
intimate concern of the Count, and minimalists habitually interrogate, on symbolic terms, the difficulties 
of calculation through the incorporation of numerical and alphabetical sequences, phonemic utterances, 
lists and series of various kinds. That this symbolism is exemplary of the concrete aspects of the work, 
and the ontological situation to which these refer, is a key contention. In this light such minimalism 
attempts no less ambitious a task than to clarify metastructure itself – the Count of the Count, or the 
procedural interstice between what is presented or counted, and that which is represented or counted 
again.  
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The potential of aesthetic novelty in relation to the Count rests quite precisely on a further distinction of 
considerable importance to Badiou‟s ontology – that of destructive from subtractive negation. The former 
offers an eliminative account of novelty which asserts that emergent identity is related to the destruction 
of an existing state.
877
 The predicate of subtraction, by contrast, is poietic or productive, since the 
multiplicity upon which subtraction is performed remains undiminished. Art illustrates this point well:   
 
All creations, all novelties, are in some sense the affirmative part of a negation…because if a creation is 
reducible to a negation of the common laws of objectivity, it completely depends on them concerning its 
identity. So the very essence of a novelty implies negation, but must affirm its identity apart of the 
negativity of negation.
878
  
 
It is on the basis of a subtractive ontology that Badiou is able to draw out the consequences of his primary 
ontological axiom: “[w]hat has to be declared is that the [O]ne,879 which is not, solely exists as operation. 
In other words: there is no [O]ne, only the count-as-One.”880 To state the case in brief: if the One is not, 
then Being is Multiple. Yet, there is no way in which multiplicity in itself can be presented,
881
 which 
means a subtraction from pure multiplicity must take place in order for Being to be presented. It is this 
subtraction which we refer to as the Count. It is by such subtraction that we come to distinguish what 
appears and is presented in existence – that which is subtracted from pure or inconsistent multiplicity, 
which counts-as-One – from that which is indiscernible or unpresentable in existence – namely ontology 
itself, which is uncountable, infinite, inconsistent or pure multiplicity.
882
 In Hallward‟s estimation, 
“Badiou‟s subtractive conception of multiplicity sets him sharply apart from many of his contemporaries, 
who…generally seek in some sense to express, intuit, figure or otherwise articulate the multiple.”883  
 
 
b) Configuring the Count 
 
Most significant to the present argument is that the discernment of quantity or calculation is often most 
conspicuous in art which places an emphasis on accumulation. Central to this proposition is the 
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understanding that mathematical ontology renders infinity both actual and immanent.
884
 Such infinity is 
clarified by transfinite cardinality which reflects a law of identification by numerical substitution, or 
infinite metonymy, confirming that every set by which unities might be organized contains a potentially 
infinite number of subsets,
885
 so that there are an infinite number of infinities.
886
 The Count is not only 
eminently possible in this light, but an imperative.
887
 It is minimalism which the present work claims is 
most adept at offering an aesthetic configuration of the Count capable of intensifying that which Badiou 
intends ontologically by the term.    
 
Of the most transparent and significant aesthetic instantiations of the Count are presented in works of 
minimalism‟s two seminal composers, Philip Glass and Steve Reich. As discussed above, Glass‟ Two 
Pages is exemplary with respect to minimalist techniques of additive and subtractive modules, and the 
work is effectively a series of expansions and contractions predicated on strictly quantitative 
enumerations. More subtle, but no less subject to a logic of accumulation, is the pulse-pattern technique 
of Reich‟s Music for 18 Musicians (Track 14).888 The strict pulsation constitutes a persistent aural bulk, 
varied by the subtle addition and subtraction of voices and accompanying dynamic fluctuations which 
combine to give the music an almost undulating alternation of intensities which owes indubitably to 
cumulative, quantitative elements of musical substance. Of comparably physical terms, are the numerous 
serial sculptures of Judd and LeWitt, but particularly interesting for its articulation of an equally 
conceptual and physical approach to the Count, is Flavin‟s series of light sculptures, the nominal three (to 
William of Ockham) (Figure 60).
889
 This work presents with parsimonious clarity – recalling that such 
clarity is at the heart of ontological non-complication associated with Ockham, to whom the title refers
890
 
– a situation in which the ordinal and cardinal logics of enumeration coincide. The ordinal is evident in 
the sequencing of its components – respectively one, two and three fixtures – while cardinality regards 
these components, or groups of fixtures, as monads irrespective of number of fixtures in each group, and 
to this extent they contain both the potential for cardinal substitution and an ordinary quantitative 
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dimension. The nominalist affirmation of autonomous entities informs Flavin‟s search for “primary 
figures”891 which favour transparency and purity of form and medium over complexity.892  
 
 
Figure 60: Dan Flavin, the nominalist three (to William of Ockham), 1964.  
 
However, to the extent that Flavin‟s work effective instantiates a minimalist logic of distribution, its 
concern with monistic containment and order is supplemented by a far more corporeal experience of 
quantity. For the substance of this work is finally inextricable from its luminescence, and its expansion in 
every direction emphasizes that any account of its phenomenology necessarily incorporates sensory and 
conceptual experience. Equally concretized by somatic inference is the Count of Glass‟ “Knee-Play 1”893 
from the opera Einstein on the Beach (Track 15).
894
 Composed to be performed at high volumes, the 
thundering bass of the electric organ which opens the work, consists of three notes which outline the 
entire harmonic of the composition.
895
 This sequence, one of the simplest of all harmonic progressions, 
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but with a strong sense of gravity,
896
 is interrupted by the utterance of the number “two.” Zero and one 
perhaps implicit, the Count is already underway, although it is stilted, non-sequential and irregular – 
continued by the recitation of random single-digit numbers by two female voices over the steady thunder 
of the organ. The arbitrary calling of numbers gives way to two equally asymmetrical but clearly poetic 
monologues which are subsequently alternated with the numerical recitation. That this irregularity is 
framed by the powerful chordal progression is strengthened by the entrance of the austere ascending line 
of the chorus sung in octaves which stabilizes the progression, its tensions and resolutions.  
 
The encounter is indeed sublime, recalling that, for Kant, what marks an aesthetic of the sublime is 
precisely the manner in which Reason
897
 – which we quite legitimately associate with metastructure or the 
Count – stabilizes what is an initially overwhelming and discomforting sensory encounter with that which 
is “absolutely large.”898 The “negative pleasure” which results from sublime experience is a clear 
extension of Edmund Burke‟s contention, that “[w]hatever...excite[s] the ideas of pain, and 
danger...whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner 
analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime.”899 More important, however, is the Kantian distinction 
between the mathematical and the dynamical sublime. The former attempts to approximate sublime 
magnitude in spatial and temporal terms, by “numerical concepts”900 and the intuitive estimation of 
magnitude.
901
 The latter more evidently emerges in the dynamics of thought and the imagination, which 
allow us indirectly to confront and overcome the fear-arousing objects and situations: “we merely think of 
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the case where we might possibly want to put up resistance against [an overwhelming magnitude], and 
that any resistance would in that case be utterly futile.”902  
 
 Kant does not, however, signal here “that there are two kinds of sublime, the one mathematical and the 
other dynamical,”903 for “mathematical synthesis and dynamical synthesis do not exclude one another.”904 
Indeed, in “Knee-Play 1” the meeting of two languages of the infinite – mathematics and music – are 
clarified by these two dialects of the sublime. For where the pure quantity of these sounds – their scale, 
loudness and presence – refers to the dynamically sublime, the inclusion of numerical sequences by way 
of the explicit recitation of numbers and the implicit harmonic proportions of the music, recalls the 
mathematical sublime. It is precisely upon the productive tension of the two that the effect and coherence 
of the composition‟s Count rest. 
 
The recitation of numbers in “Knee-Play 1,” both aleatory and ordered, suggests both the spatial and 
temporal quantification of existence – the means by which fundamental material consistency and metrical 
regularity might be deduced. In other of his compositions, Glass prefers the fundamental pitch language 
of solfège, in which linguistic syllables (do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, ti) are substituted for sequential pitches. 
Significant echoes of this technique are discernible in John Adams‟ On the Transmigration of Souls,905 a 
threnody for those who died in the 9/11 attacks, which incorporates lists of names, addresses and 
telephone numbers as the haunting quantitative substitutes for those missing or dead immediately after the 
attacks. The cumulative and metonymic logics of sequences and lists are explored to great effect in Nico 
Muhly‟s “Archive” (Track 16)906 from the song-cycle Mothertongue. Muhly‟s is a fascinating exploration 
of number and listing as means of instantiating fundamental musico-linguistic material, but also offers a 
subtle investigation of their role as mnemonic ciphers:
907
 postcodes, addresses, telephone numbers, 
alphabetical lists and solfege syllables reflect not only on intrinsic quantities, but act as markers for place, 
identity, and the crossing of personal, interpersonal and cultural histories. Thus, the postcodes delivered 
with a growing aggression and intensity in “Monster” (Track 17),908 the final movement of the 
Mothertongue cycle, might as legitimately be interpreted as the markers for the reduction of humanity to 
numerical sequences – as in the numbers assigned to prisoners, the biopolitical tattooing of the Shoah, or 
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identity- or social security numbers – as they might be reference to the space which individuals occupy 
and in which they interact.
909
  
 
The archive is not unknown to the minimalist aesthetic: at the heart of Josipovici‟s novel, The Inventory, 
is an exhaustive list of the unspecified items of a deceased man‟s estate, a list which occasions the 
disturbing insight that human life is bound to a utilitarian, statistical abstraction. Equally we might look to 
the example of Samuel Beckett‟s work, which in numerous places reflects the realization that existence is 
numerically quantifiable and approximated by a Count. Hence the poignancy of the unforgiving 
minimalism which opens “A Piece of Monologue:” “Birth was the death of him. Again. Words are few. 
Dying too...From funeral to funeral. To now. This night. Two and a half billion seconds. Again. Two and 
a half billion seconds. Hard to believe so few...Thirty thousand nights. Hard to believe so few.”910 
 
Yet it is continuity, rather than the discontinuity of death, however imminent, which fuels the Count. 
Indeed, continuity is central to Muhly‟s “Archive” – a Count within which number is replaced by the 
rapid recitation of the letters of the alphabet, a sequence which retains its ordinal and quantitative 
significance. Finally, as the complexity of musical information mounts, so other verbal information is 
introduced – numbers, addresses, narrative fragments. However, the alphabetic litany which opens the 
work remains a powerful marker of radical poietic material – both musical and linguistic – and the 
necessity of subjecting these to some sort of archival Count in order to generate aesthetic cohesion and 
the possibility that such substance persists.   
 
Of a different but no less provocative species is the alphabetic Count of Aragon‟s well-known poem, 
“Suicide:”  
 
 SUICIDE 
 A b c d e f 
 g h I j k l 
 m n o p q r 
 s t u v w 
  
x      y    z
911
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The central contention of the work is that by its taking-place, the substance of the poem self-reflexively 
consumes its poetic potential. The mediating activity of the poet, becomes one of perpetual, self-
sacrificial exhaustion, indeed suicide. No means of figuring poiesis remains except the statement of the 
quantitative constituents of the poem in their most minimal form: “letters of the alphabet spelled out in 
sequence.”912 The Count is contained by an admirably severe concision, one which displaces meaning 
into form,
913
 form into the atomic elements of writing – elements which are recalculated by the alphabetic 
sequence to indicate the “finite and infinite possibility of the limited set;”914 the suicide of predetermined 
entities constitutes a rebirth of poietic language. It is the affirmation of poietic potentiality which must be 
recalled at the heart of the Count, lest it become a purely procedural operation. This is nowhere clearer 
than in the subtle optimism which is invested in both poetry and reader in the concrete poem by Eric 
Andersen, “I Have Confidence in You,”915 which, to my mind, presents the best of minimalism and its 
productive relationship to quantitative ontology:   
 
 
Figure 61: Eric Andersen, I Have Confidence in You, 1965. 
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9. MINIMALISM OF NEGATION AND THE TAKING PLACE OF QUANTITY 
 
 
a) Minimalist negation made manifest 
 
Minimalism reasserts the quantitative element of the Real, and thus the basis for a quantitative ontology, 
not by suppressing quality, but rather by presenting minimal impediment to the experience of the qualities 
in themselves – whether perceptual or conceptual – of a particular aesthetic object. However axiomatic 
the formalization of ontology may be, a realist position – a minimal phenomenology of the type to which 
aesthetic minimalism appears to testify – can never be reduced to a decision between quantity and quality. 
Both quantity and quality persist in the minimalist object. However, if it is the qualities of an object 
which render it intelligible, this persistence – itself the mark of the Real – is knowable only through the 
mute indifference of quantity. For quality and quantity to coexist in an object, they must be grounded in 
the Real – the persistence, necessarily contingent and within a progressive temporality, of quantity.  
 
Minimalism habitually aspires to render the qualities of its objects maximally visible through various 
processes of reduction, formal simplicity, repetition, and processual transparency. In extreme instances, 
minimalism proscribes quality itself. Ad Reinhardt, most famous for the black monochromatic paintings 
referred to above, provides us with a poignant negative manifesto – his “Six General Canons or the Six 
Noes” and “Twelve Technical Rules (or How to Achieve the Twelve Things to Avoid)” – which comes as 
close as one might realistically hope to a militant minimalist engagement between aesthetics and nihilism:   
 
No realism or existentialism…No impressionism…No expressionism or surrealism…No fauvism, 
primitivism, or brute art…No constructivism, sculpture, plasticism, or graphic arts. No collage, paste, 
papers, sand, or string…no ‘tromp-l’loeil,’ interior decoration, or architecture.916 
 
No texture…[Painting] techniques are unintelligent and to be avoided. No accidents or automatism…No 
brushwork or calligraphy…No signature or trademarking…No sketching or drawing…No line or 
outline…No shading or streaking…No forms…No figure or fore- or back-ground. No volume or mass, no 
cylinder, sphere, or cone, or cube…No push or pull. „No shape or substance‟…No design…No 
Colours…Colours are barbaric, physical, unstable, suggest life, „cannot be completely controlled‟ and 
“should be concealed.‟ No white. „White is a colour‟…White on white is „a transition from pigment to 
light‟ and „moving pictures‟…No light…No space. Space should be empty, should not project, and should 
not be flat…Space divisions within the painting should not be seen…No time…There is no ancient or 
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modern,  no past or future in art. A work of art is always present.‟ The present is the future of the past, and 
the past of the future…No size or scale…No movement. „Everything is on the move. Art should be 
still‟…No object, no subject, no matter. No symbols, images, visions or ready-mades. Neither pleasure nor 
pain. No mindless working or mindless nonworking. No chess playing.
917
 
 
Reinhardt‟s manifesto attempts to conceptualize an art of pure quantity. It proscribes all relation, and so 
any process which potentially might end the predominance of a work‟s particular qualities over its generic 
existence. As a set of theoretical propositions, it “takes Minimalist reductivism as far as, or farther than, it 
can go.”918 Reinhardt‟s ideal forces both artist and artefact from the traditional ground of aesthetic 
expression – representation, relation, imagination, expression, communication – and into the realm of 
pure quantity. So taxing is the process of generating such work – either in terms of its radical conception, 
or as the telos of a process of extreme reductionism, eliminativism or rejectivism
919
 – that it is difficult to 
imagine Reinhardt‟s work exercising anything other than a relentless pressure towards non-existence. Yet, 
this would fail to capture the manner in which these paintings, in the very midst of his relentless 
uncompromising refusal, effect a powerful instantiation of the Real, examined in the terms exposed 
above, as the quantitative part of an entity which persists in the forward passage of time according to 
certain contingent existential conditions or laws.  
 
“Reinhardt‟s career represents a progressive simplification of the two primary elements of representation 
on canvas: form…and colour,”920 suggests Strickland. Here is envisioned “the end of the fundamentally 
delusory enterprise of representation.”921 Reflected in this work is an apotheosis of the confluence of the 
minimalist aesthetic with the modernist desire for autonomy. Its will is to evade the existential chains 
imposed by mimesis and its accompanying compulsion to repeat, and by repetition, to master the world.  
As Yves Alain Bois explains, such extreme abstraction as Reinhardt‟s,  
 
[f]reed from all extrinsic conventions...was meant to bring forth the pure parousia of its own essence, to tell 
the final truth and thereby terminate its course. The pure beginning, the liberation from tradition, the „zero 
degree‟ that was searched for by the first generation of abstract painters could not but function as an omen 
of the end. One did not have to wait for the „last painting‟of Ad Reinhardt to be aware that through its 
historicism (its linear conception of history) and through its essentialism (its idea that something like the 
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essence of painting existed, veiled somehow, and waiting to be unmasked), the enterprise of abstract 
painting could not but understand its birth as calling for its end.
922
  
 
Extending Yves Alain Bois‟ claim that abstraction is emblematic of aesthetic modernism,923 might we not 
say that minimalism, by the manner in which is seeks absolute abstraction as its post intimate quantity, 
reflects once again a remarkable pull between the modern and the postmodern; between art as presentness 
and anti-art as pure presence.  
 
The “Six Noes” infringe on the notion of an aesthetic purity conventionally guaranteed by the assumption 
of the critical and terminological norms established in the notion of a movement. However, we should not 
mistake Reinhardt‟s ban on realism for a decisive subversion of the Real – at least in the terms in which it 
is proposed in the present work – but rather as a progressive challenge to the subjugation of quantity to 
quality. This brand of minimalism claims as its imperative an absolute objecthood which opposes the so-
called objectification of the aesthetic work through the clearly subjective processes of creative generation 
and interpretation. Probing the limit between formlessness and form, Reinhardt‟s work culminates in the 
negative presentation of the poietic process itself. Its domain is the minimal aggregation of the aesthetic 
qualities required for the senses to cohere upon the work, or, stated otherwise, the properly quantitative 
element of the work at its most radical. In view of this threshold, Reinhardt‟s concern with negation 
paradoxically constitutes a significant point of poietic affirmation, one which emerges from the minimal 
persistence required for an object to emerge in existence, in conception or actuality, and to be recognized 
as existent rather than non-existent. This minimal point – an austere but decisive gesture of generation – 
recalls the void, the charge of nothingness which seems to echo in every tracing of the passage between 
radical presence (“[a] work of art is always present”) and absolute absence (nothingness). Such is the 
flavour of a minimalism which emerges by tracing the progressive intrication of abstraction and reduction 
in the work of Reinhardt. This is clearly evidenced by following the development and progressive 
abstraction in Reinhardt‟s career and work.  
 
Along with much abstract art, Reinhardt‟s early work presents a sustained interrogation of space itself. In 
Study for a Painting (Figure 62),
924
 line and shape constitute simultaneously the regular geometries of 
mathematics and the irregular shapes of biomorphic allusion. The effect is a dynamic alternation between 
a static two dimensionality and the depth of movement generated both by the chromatic composition of 
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the work and the arrangement of its irregular constituent shapes. In contrast to the rapid alternation of the 
atonal black and white, Reinhardt‟s deployment of primary colour – red, in particular – renders irregular 
the pace at which the viewer perceives the work. The relation between figure and ground further exploits 
this movement. The central quadrilateral, outlined in black and which is bordered on the left by a tapering 
green band, recedes towards the right, but, simultaneously, by virtue of the placement of the elliptical 
figure on the right hand side of the painting, its top edge is brought towards us. At the same time, 
however, the irregular red shape retires to the rear of the field, leaning away from the viewer. Reinhardt 
reflects not only on space itself, but also on the competing perspectives which attend visual perception, 
each of which also institutes a particular temporal relation between subject and object.  
 
       
Figure 62: Ad Reinhardt, Study for a Painting, 1938.                         Figure 63: Ad Reinhardt, Collage, 1950. 
 
This abstract rehearsal of the fundamental aspects of our visuo-spatial experience – colour, depth, 
movement – is driven further in Reinhardt‟s later work. By the time of Collage (Figure 63),925 completed 
in 1940, fluid biomorphic figures have given way to a cubist concern with simultaneism,
926
 visual 
interruption and a stricter geometric approach to the division of space. Here we see the manner in which 
Reinhardt attempts to resolve the problems associated with the accurate distillation of spatial dimensions 
by working in relief. If Study for a Painting recalls the gestural tension between radical constructivism 
and abstraction exposed in the work of such painters as Miro, Kandinsky and Malevich, then Collage 
brings to mind the influence of cubism, Mondrian‟s neo-Plasticism and the work of American 
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abstractionists Burgoyne Diller and Stuart Davis.
927
 The frenetic composition of Collage reflects upon the 
process through which “circles and semicircles disappeared” in Reinhardt‟s art, “as organic shapes were 
rejected for rectilinearity and…polygons were gradually simplified into what he called „bricks‟.”928  
 
Complex composition increasingly gives way in Reinhardt‟s work to an austerity which pinpoints and 
contains the most fundamental elements of visual expression. He also preferred increasingly minimal 
titles,
929
 removing all reference to technique and focusing instead on the sequence in which works were 
produced, numbering them meticulously, and on his significantly reduced palette – various tones of white 
and grey in the case of Number 107 (Figure 64),
930
 and of red in Abstract Painting (Red) (Figure 65).
931
 
The formal regularization progressively explored in terms of line and texture in his earlier work, is 
increasingly displaced into subtler gradations and contrasts of tone. Thus, the vestiges of a gestural 
abstract expressionism, which are still evident in the strong horizontal strokes of the lighter greys and 
whites of Number 107, are practically invisible in the later work. Abstract Painting (Red) is divided into 
seven rectangular horizontal bands of equal height. Every second band, beginning either at the top or 
bottom, is subdivided along its length into three squares. The work alternates between three shades of red: 
a deep maroon and a lighter orange which are distributed closer to the edges, and a brighter, vivid red 
which points towards a centre, noticeably absent inasmuch as it is struck through by a solid bar of the 
lighter orange hue. Reinhardt‟s monochromatic932 canvas is cleverly constructed to effect through the 
containment of the work a self-referential stability without sacrificing the dynamism which keeps the eye 
unsettled, rendering the work aesthetically interesting. In this sense, the painting works transumptively to 
indicate poiesis itself: it provides a unifying locus, while simultaneously engendering a radical dislocation 
– a distribution between sense and concept which, finally, is atopian.  
 
The vestiges of abstract expressionism are still clearly evident in the strong and frequent horizontal 
strokes of Number 107, the lighter whites affirming not only the remnants of Reinhardt‟s concern with 
gesture, but also the dominance of spatiality and depth in much early abstract art. In Abstract Painting 
(Red) these have given way to far stricter geometry, a regularization of frequency and movement. Thus 
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Reinhardt explores a subtler and more austere understanding of space and time: these are intrinsic 
quantities, Real in themselves, and immanent to the work rather than revealed in terms of its specific 
qualities. The exposition and containment of the Real as poietic force by means of formal and technical 
minimalism, is intensified by Reinhardt‟s increasing production of black monochromes, Abstract Painting 
(1957) (Figure 66)
933
 being exemplary amongst these.   
 
                         
Figure 64: Ad Reinhardt,                Figure 65: Ad Reinhardt,                    Figure 66: Ad Reinhardt,  
Number 107, 1950.                  Abstract Painting (Red), 1952.              Abstract Painting, 1957.  
 
            
The persistent lessness of Reinhardt‟s art is exemplified well in the black monochrome, Abstract Painting 
(1957) in which the tonal variation is even finer, and the geometry more ambiguous, than in the earlier 
monochromes, despite the work not sacrificing any of its regularity. A close examination of this work – 
for although Reinhardt‟s painting has a certain immediacy, it also characteristically draws out perception 
by its chromatic subtleties
934
 – reveals that its constituent rectangular bands run both horizontally and 
vertically. A central vertical band – only hinted at in the bright red of Abstract Painting (Red) – emerges 
clearly in Reinhardt‟s black work. With its top and bottom tucked behind the painting‟s darkest shade of 
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black, and its centre forcefully interrupted by a lighter band of a reddish hue, Reinhardt constructs a 
masterful monochromatic weave which renders practically indistinguishable stasis and movement, non-
illusionistic flatness and dimensional fluctuation. It is no longer clear that the grounds for such aesthetic 
judgements can be deduced from a patient analysis of the work in terms of either its formation or its 
referential significance. Such minimalism
935
 readily relinquishes the currency which the artist historically 
possesses. Should we wish to regard Reinhardt an abstract expressionist,
936
 his would be an expressionism 
which buries the traditional mediation of genius by a coordination of inspiration, intention, gesture and 
effect, and moves to subject such expressionistic techniques as the brush stroke, sculptural or musical 
texture, to a stringent containment of its parts and processes.  
 
Despite pushing our understanding of colour, pictorial illusion and the presentation of space significantly 
towards a point of negation, Reinhardt‟s minimalism in fact pivots on the containment of all content, 
space and even time. Moving towards an absence of tonal variation altogether, the later black works of 
Reinhardt, as also of Brice Marden, reject all formal properties and relation in order to commit to a 
tireless approach to the Real – this, despite the protestation of the first of Reinhardt‟s six noes. At the 
heart of this “most austere reductivism imaginable”937 returns sublime presence – a now which 
“dismantles consciousness,”938 in Lyotard‟s estimation, exhibiting that the “art object no longer bends 
itself to models, but tries to present the fact that there is an unpresentable.”939 Our task, henceforth, is one 
of discovering the means by which minimalist negation and containment are able to pursue their sublime 
vocation of heightening our access to the persistence of the Real.  
 
 
b) Negation, sublation and lessness  
 
As regards the numerous possible aesthetic techniques of negation, Barrett Watten‟s account proves 
particularly instructive:  
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negativity is common to a range of concepts that include non-identity, antagonism, nihilism, revolt, 
defamiliarization, rupture, opposition, dissociation, conflict, delusion, void, emptiness. Negativity as it 
occurs „in the field‟ so to speak, with the radical forms and interventions of the avant-garde, partakes of one 
or all of these modes – even as its final horizon, a denial of positivity, locates each instance as a potential of 
critique.
940
 
 
It is certainly possible to match a considerable number of minimalist works to each of these negative 
concepts or procedures. If monochromaticism is most obviously associable with radical notions of “non-
identity...nihilism...dissociation...void, emptiness,” there are also works within the ambit of minimalism 
and post-minimalism which expose negation in a more assertive light. Bruce Nauman – whose 
endeavours span the numerous media of visual and conceptual art – habitually draws us back to the 
violent tension between resistance and injunction indicated by the word “no.” This is nowhere more 
forcefully exhibited than in his Clown Torture series.
941
 These are thoroughly disturbing works – 
variously combining projections and stacked colour monitors, each with a separate soundtrack which, 
together, produce through their highly obstructive sonic interaction an effect as startling as it is 
discomfiting.
942
 These explore the tragi-comic figure of the clown in various of its visual, historical and 
allegorical manifestations. Hyperbolic mannerisms and obsessively repeated words, phrases and catches 
of narrative are ceaselessly looped to effect a “poetics of confusion, anxiety, boredom, entrapment, and 
failure.”943 These works are allied to the best Beckettian tradition of negation and failure as 
accomplishment. In fact, I believe it is no exaggeration to suggest that Nauman‟s work intensifies and 
condenses Beckett‟s already highly minimalist vision by instantiating literary sonic occurrences of 
considerable immediacy; maxims for unremitting existential repetition, one might say. In relation to 
Beckett‟s writing, we are witnesses to existence in the sense that we come to recognize in the 
disintegration of conventional narrative language the birth of a new language, more faithful to the lacuna 
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at the centre of experience.
944
 We must pass right through this process of negation in order to arrive 
within the austere poietic positivity which characterizes Beckett‟s oeuvre.945  
 
By contrast, Nauman confronts us with aesthetic work from which we either recoil, or which draws us 
into the position of voyeurs. In the Clown Torture works, in particular, we confront the most intimate 
pathologies in a disturbing and fascinating public spectacle. In many of Nauman‟s video and sound 
installations repetitions and loops of distinctly minimal material effect what is unquestionably a self-
referential poetics – the maddening self-prescription of Pete and Repeat/It Was a Dark and Stormy Night 
(Track 18)
946
 is exemplary in this regard. Yet the more intensely self-referential Nauman‟s work becomes, 
the more resistant it seems to interaction with the perceiver, and in this sense impresses itself upon us as 
an object solely of voyeuristic consumption. Particularly remarkable amongst such pieces is No, No, New 
Museum (Clown Torture Series) (Track 19/Figure 67/Clip 1).
947
 The work consists of looped footage of 
two clowns in the traditional attire of the jester – head to head, for they appear on separate monitors, the 
uppermost inverted. Each rehearses a stubborn and singular litany, generating from minimal means an 
unsettling and asynchronous rhythmic counterpoint with only one word – no. This gesture of negation, 
verbal as well as physical (they stamp and jump defiantly), exposes with traumatic immediacy the 
questions of violence, cruelty, frustration, anger, absurdity, redundancy and resistance. Of more 
immediate interest, is the manner in which the verbal act of negation – the articulation of “no” – in fact 
resists elimination. To say no repeatedly effects neither the destruction of an active nihilism, which 
Critchley describes in terms of an overcoming,
948
 nor does it amount to an irreversible progression 
towards the void, to an absolute absence conceivable only in terms of pure destruction. Indeed, we cannot 
know precisely what is being denied, resisted or refused in Nauman‟s No, No, New Museum, but we can 
be certain that in the very act of this negation, “something is taking its course,”949 to recall the phrase 
which Beckett repeatedly employs in “Endgame” in pointing to the sheer facticity of finitude and the 
passage of time in existence.  
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Figure 67: Bruce Nauman, No, No, New Museum, 1987.  
 
 
Blanchot – arguably the writer closest in spirit to Beckett in terms of his thematic concern with the 
confrontation between thought and the generative act; with the writer faced by nothingness, and the 
encounter of the subject with death
950
 – captures this sense magnificently when he claims of art that “the 
work...is neither finished nor unfinished: it is. What it says is exclusively that: that it is – and nothing 
more. Outside of that, it is nothing. Anyone who tries to make it express more finds nothing, finds that it 
expresses nothing.”951 Anything which the work potentially could mean is always lost to its contingency, 
and so what is left in terms of the essence of the work is nothing but the facticity of the work itself – that 
the work exists qua force rather than as an entity – and that this is the precondition for the taking-place of 
any contingent situation upon which meaning or significance could be predicated.  
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Here I believe it is possible to recognize an aesthetic outline of the ontological position which 
Meillassoux adopts in relation to facticity. Facticity can no longer be simply understood in terms of the 
existence of facts, for facts themselves cannot be adequately modelled in terms of knowledge of the 
entities which exist in a given world.
952
 Nor can facticity be unravelled by necessary or contingent 
correlation between thought and an entity.
953
 Both return us to an anthropocentric vision which fails to 
acknowledge the essentially chaotic state of being qua being,
954
 mistaking events for moments of 
transcendence,
955
 and points of origin for causes. Instead, facticity must be understood as the force of the 
absolute itself: that which affirms that “[t]here is nothing beneath or beyond the manifest gratuitousness 
of the given – nothing but the limitless and lawless power of its destruction, emergence, or 
persistence.”956 In this light, facticity refers to “the absolute necessity of the contingency of everything”957 
which functions according to a principal of unreason – “that there is no reason for anything to be or to 
remain the way it is.”958 Although to claim that minimalism actively pursues this factical logic would be 
an exaggeration, it presents few intrinsic impediments to knowing the aesthetic entity such as it is. In its 
most transparent examples, minimalism discovers a mediation of the contentless facticity of Blanchot‟s 
vision of art, and Meillassoux‟s conviction that “it is the contingency of the entity that is necessary, not 
the entity.”959 
 
Art‟s persistence lies in the manner in which, even at its most nihilistic, it activates within itself a field of 
resistance to the possibility of absolute negation. “[T]he writer will continue to remain dependent on the 
very language that is to be dissolved,”960 writes Weller of Beckett‟s essentially constructive relation to 
negation.
961
 It is tempting to recognize in this the echo of Hegelian determinate negation, according to 
which every entity is determinate
962
 as the result of a process of differentiation and implicit negation: 
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“whatever individuates something distinguishes it from all others by contrast.”963 “The „different‟ is just 
this,” Hegel tells us, “not to be in possession of itself, but to have its essential being only in an other.”964 
The inside is affirmed not only through its opposition to an outside, however. “Spirit becomes object 
because it is just this movement of becoming an other to itself.”965 What is negative in relation to a 
determinate entity is also its innermost quality.  
 
Recognized as confluent, intrinsic self-contradictoriness and extrinsic differentiation effect the dynamic, 
positive calculation of the dialectic process Hegel identifies in terms of the negation of negation, or 
sublation.
966
 “The fact that in the affirmation of something we must also comprehend its negation does 
not constitute a contradiction that results in nothingness. It permits us to reach a higher content where 
both the abstract affirmation of something and the necessary relation to that which negates it flow 
together in unity.”967 In the dialectic emergence of a determinate entity, the contraries968 which inhabit 
any identity are simultaneously preserved and abolished; modified through their interaction, “render[ing] 
them no longer contraries, and therefore no longer self-contradictory in virtue of their reciprocal 
containment.”969 If Hegelian dialectics970 always involve finite entities predicated on a series of negative 
relations, then there can be no stable, independent, unmediated ground upon which such entities can be 
forwarded other than these relations of negation themselves. This appears to legitimise the otherwise 
counter-intuitive claim that “absolutely nothing may thus be found at the level of finite 
determinations.”971  
 
Yet, while it may be possible to agree with the proposition that the knowledge of identity takes shape 
through a structurally negative process, this process should not be mistaken for identity itself. Badiou 
explains that for the Hegelian argument to hold, any determinate entity necessarily witnesses “[t]he 
passage from the pure limit…to the frontier…[which] forms the resource of an infinity directly required 
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by the point of being.”972 In the face of “absolutely nothing,” the pure negative relation of being, 
something rather than nothing marks a pure limit, a stable and determinate One.
973
 Nonetheless, we 
cannot ignore that any apparently stable limit exists simultaneously as a dynamic frontier of relations and 
negations.
974
 From within this alternation of limit and frontier, Badiou claims that for Hegel “the point of 
being, since it is always intrinsically discernible, generates out of itself the operator of infinity…Infinity 
becomes an internal reason of the finite itself, a simple attribute of experience in general.”975 Norris 
argues convincingly that this decision stems from Hegel‟s suppression of the relation between 
mathematics and concept.
976
 Quantitative, bad infinity (a mindless law of quantitative repetition
977
) is 
opposed to qualitative, good infinity – the infinity necessarily at work in the passage from limit to 
frontier, in any process which ends in determinate negation. Sublation, in this light, is the predication 
“that would finally transform the bad into the good, or the quantitative into the qualitative mode of 
infinity.”978 In accordance with this understanding, the repetition of negation which we evidenced above 
in Nauman‟s work, for instance, presents the shift from an accumulative negation, which might indeed 
imply destruction or elimination, to the negation which marks good infinity – the sublation involved in 
the mere facticity of repeatedly saying no.  
 
Yet the quantitative question is not so easily suppressed in favour of the qualitative: “Hegel‟s notion of 
the „good‟ infinity not only bears a curiously close resemblance to the „bad‟, but also counts as „good‟ on 
his own submission…[simply because] it remains within the compass of the dialectical schema.”979 
Accepted as the predetermined theoretical target, the mechanisms which support sublation are 
strategically elevated above those which render it problematic. Minimalism in this light might historically 
have been delineated in terms of nihilism, and limited to effecting tropes of various structures of 
sublation. As it happens, it is the irreducibly positive aspect of form which most influences the minimalist 
aesthetic, yet this should not distract us entirely from the fact that sublation, as constructive negation, is 
crucial to understanding several of the characteristic structural and semantic austerities of aesthetic 
minimalism.  
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In minimalist literature, negation is as often related to structure as it is to content (insofar as these can be 
separated in the first place). In Joan Didion‟s Play It As It Lays, for instance, the novel‟s numerous events 
are legitimately interesting taken individually. Yet, finally they dissolve into an increasingly featureless 
continuum, itself reflective of the growing vacuity of its principal character, Maria Wyeth, when viewed 
as part of the quasi-epic journey undertaken by her ceaselessly driving the highways of California. 
Similarly, the plethora of descriptive information offered by the fictions of Raymond Carver and Alain 
Robbe-Grillet – the former most often in terse, clipped dialogue;980 the latter in exhaustive description – 
seldom feed into the standard principles of narrative organization. For Robbe-Grillet the mimetic 
accuracy of his painstakingly detailed physical descriptions of objects and actions are separated decisively 
from the usual teleological thrust and linearity of prose fiction.
981
 In the opening of The Voyeur, for 
example, numerous phrases derived from the sensory perception of the central character, Mathias, are 
repeated in fragments – gradually adapted and asymmetrically looped,982 shifting between various real 
and imagined scenarios,
983
 negating, even as it traverses, the temporal course and linear expectations 
conventional to narrative. Even so, we do not encounter a chaotic maximalism, but a distinctively literary 
minimalism: a lean plot presented obliquely in a prose stripped of any affective excess, but replete with 
vivid, descriptive detail of objects and their material contexts, and rapid shifts in perspective.
984
  
 
Such minimalist techniques
985
 condition the oblique presentation of the murder at the centre of the novel, 
to which we might append Robbe-Grillet‟s significant and self-conscious description of narrative 
objectivity as constructed from “exact but false memories.”986 The tissue of such minimalist objectivism 
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is composed of signifiers progressively emptied of their symbolic content – a literary tradition which 
might be traced through the work of the Futurists and Cubists, through the phonemic poetry of 
Khlebnikov as much as through Stein‟s emphasis on the sufficiency of the written thing, the “nouns 
[which] are the name of anything”987 which, as unavoidable as they are uninteresting,988 compel us 
towards the distinctly minimalist vision of aesthetic composition in which “[b]eginning again and again is 
a natural thing.”989 
 
The narrating voices of Beckett‟s oeuvre, forever in self-reflective doubt of their own efficacy,990 
habitually manifest an alternate vision of sublation in the face of negativity. A near symmetry is 
maintained between proposition and negation in the recognition that “something is taking its course,”991 
yet finally it is towards a compound negation that art tends – that which we might term a minimal 
sublation, or the minimal positive element of a diminishing art object. It is this sense which lies behind 
the repeated succession in “Ill Seen Ill Said” of the neutral phrase, “neither more nor less” by the 
imperative, “Less!”992 Beckett‟s fatigued but unwavering search for existential lessness993 effects an 
intense minimalism in which radically reductive strategies at once contain and distend the media through 
which the aesthetic work is instantiated, and, in some cases, even transume the work from one medium to 
another.
994
 Beckett delineates an ideal minimalism in terms of the pursuit of “[l]ess. Ah the sweet one 
word. Less. It is less. The same but less.”995  
 
The “[s]ilence at the eye of the scream”996 – the disappearance of the voice which marks the 
incomprehensible moment of our own organic finitude – is countered by vocality as an affirmation of 
existence, for “once there is speech, no need of a story, a story is not compulsory, just a life.”997 Here it is 
profitable to touch on Agamben‟s conception of Voice998 as that which is most intimate to humanity 
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precisely because it marks the distinction of utterance from meaning,
999
 but moreover in the manner it 
calls us beyond itself, to “thinking language as such”1000 beyond the “scission of voice and word.”1001 In 
this space, where the Voice falls silent, existence as it is presented in language confronts death. Only 
when we are able to dwell in pure language,
1002
 beyond any reference to time or persistence, do we move 
beyond the radical trauma of being thrown into Being,
1003
and beyond the condemnation of existence to a 
passive persistence stripped of activity and its valences with the infinite.   
 
In this light, to go on
1004
 might be understood in terms of an ateleological persistence, a compulsion even 
within an atopian existential situation which excites no valences – “neither here nor there where all the 
footsteps ever fell can never fare nearer to anywhere nor from anywhere further away.”1005 Although we 
can agree that it is more of the same which concerns Beckett, it is all too easy to neglect the sublative 
more with which Beckett clearly is concerned when he writes of the narrator‟s footfalls in “Heard in the 
Dark I,” that “many more will be necessary. Many many more.”1006 Indeed, the question of physical 
footfalls – the repeated pacing backwards and forwards of the character May – shapes Beckett‟s 
eponymous play.
1007
 This remains one of his most significant statements regarding the predicative 
character of repeated and cyclical movement, both physical and formal. It is thus that “the motion alone is 
not enough, I must hear the feet however faint they fall.”1008 The impetus provides “clearly audible 
rhythmic tread,”1009 is increasingly subject to pauses as the work progresses, attempting to “dramatize 
deterioration with visual and aural diminuendo.”1010 Yet even the thought of negation reinstates a minimal 
requisite intensity of existence, as demonstrated by the tentative persistence of the work‟s closing: “Will 
you never have done? [Pause.] Will you never have done...revolving it all? [Pause.] It? [Pause.] It all. 
[Pause.] In your poor mind. [Pause.] It all.”1011 
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In Beckett‟s “Quad,”1012 a formal symmetry between appearance and disappearance marks a minimally 
positive account of negation. The structure of the work unfolds with the movement of its four players, 
who appear one by one, differentiated by the primary colours of the robes they wear, and mirroring one 
another in symmetrical movements which bisect and triangulate various possible courses from corner to 
corner of the square space within which the action of the play is contained. Approaching the centre of the 
square, they take a small circular, clockwise deviation, both to avoid collision as their paths cross one 
another, and also to mark symbolically an inarticulable void at the centre of the aesthetic work, which can 
only be indicated obliquely. Thus, both in concept and in form, a positive element continues to be derived 
from negativity.  
 
Comparable models of formal sublation are evident in minimalist music and visual art. In terms of the 
former, Steve Reich‟s compositions which take shape through the cyclical phasing of melodic material 
present excellent examples. Separate sound sources, initially synchronized and which present identical 
melodic material, are gradually moved out of phase with one another. During this process, each source 
negates the initial integrity of the other, while simultaneously bringing about new, albeit contingent, 
melodic singularities. The process is cyclical, and the composition eventually returns to its initial state so 
that, much like a Beckettian narrative, we might say that despite the considerable number of discrete 
states which are discernible in the work, these remain part of an ateleological distension of its basic 
material. The aesthetic means by which we encounter the subtle, minimalist survival of negation extends 
into the sculptural realm in works such as Carl Andre‟s Cedar Piece (Figure 68),1013 which is constructed 
of identical wooden units, “laid on top of one another on the floor,”1014 “as if to stress that there is no 
hierarchy of position or relationship among the parts of his sculpture.”1015 Andre‟s emphasis is on the 
physicality of his material,
1016
 emphasized by the “repetition of modular units”1017 and declining a 
transcendental understanding of sculptural space.
1018
 The negotiation of positive and negative space in this 
work – the tension which exists between the X formed on every side of the piece, the receding space 
towards its central axis and the large concave oval at its corners – must therefore be viewed in its most 
literal light as a rehearsal at its most elementary level of the emergence of art from space, of the 
subtraction of form from formlessness.  
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Figure 68: Carl Andre, Cedar Piece. 1959, reconstructed 1964. 
 
If many of minimalism‟s most significant works call us to trace the positive passage from what is 
“absolutely negative” in negation to the subtractive element of negation – marking the most essential part 
of an aesthetic entity‟s emergence – others explore more directly the relation between aesthetics and 
destruction. With Splashing (Figure 69),
1019
 Richard Serra turns minimalism towards that which is 
“chemically elemental,”1020 using molten lead, “synonymous with weight,”1021 and hurling it at the 
intersection of various walls and floors. Such effort defines a minimalism which stages the meeting of the 
expressionistic gesture of the artist, the urban environment, matter at its most brutal, and natural forces 
such as gravity, Newton‟s third law (action-reaction) and the rate and manner of the solidification of 
liquid metals.
1022
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Figure 69: Richard Serra, Splashing, 1968. 
 
The effort of the artist unquestionably requires a certain physical force – much as is the case with the acid 
action painting of Gustav Metzger – and critics have recognized in Serra‟s work something “inherently 
more kinetic and menacing”1023 than earlier minimalism. Chave goes so far as to suggest that “it is more 
often the case with Serra...that his work doesn‟t simply exemplify aggression or domination, but acts it 
out.”1024 A similarly extreme sense of negation is apparent in some concrete poetry: parts of Hanjörg 
Mayer‟s “fortführungen” (Figure 70)1025 present lines so densely overlaid that all sense is destroyed 
except the bare facticity that it is some form of typescript; Gappmayr
1026
 goes further still, almost entirely 
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negating text by superimposing a large black block over his writing, from behind which only the most 
minute marks are visible (Figure 71).
1027
  
 
            
Figure 70: Hansjörg Mayer, from fortführungen, 1964.     Figure 71: Heinz Gappmayr, Untitled, 1964.                                
 
 
c) Taking-place 
 
In the face of such extremes, it is necessary to recognize that despite any sublative (hence structurally 
negative) process through which identity emerges, that identity itself, in its taking-place, is fundamentally 
positive. No matter how minimal the distinction between self-affirmation and auto-erasure, it is only sheer 
destruction which negates the banal, existential positivity that “something is taking its course,”1028 to 
recall Beckett. 
 
Giorgio Agamben offers an intriguing account of how the teaching of the thirteenth century theologian, 
Amalric of Bena, reclaims transcendence – indeed, the infinite – from within the very taking-place of 
existence, despite the almost overwhelming pull of existential situations towards limitation, finitude or 
even annihilation. According to this doctrine (subsequently declared heretical), it is in the most intimate 
moment of the present tense that we encounter infinite perfection: “The transcendent…is not a supreme 
entity above all things; rather, the pure transcendent is the taking-place of every thing.”1029 Accordingly, 
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what is good “is the taking-place of the entities, their innermost exteriority,” while what is evil is “the 
reduction of the taking-place of things to a fact like others.”1030 What is radically positive is that which 
habitually is overlooked – the facticity of existence; that entities exist. Meillassoux, to recall, grants a 
similar privilege to facticity, albeit from the perspective of post-naïve realism, as opposed to the 
pantheistic transcendentalism Agamben recognizes in Amalric‟s thought. The most intrinsic part of an 
entity is its persistence – its taking-place as a contingent quantity across a period of time within and as the 
Real. It is the facticity of persistence which renders existence always positively charged – potential, yet 
immanent.  
 
The coincidence of the Real with the proposition offered by Agamben in terms of transcendental 
immanence/immanent transcendence – that which is “not somewhere else…[but rather] the point at 
which…[entities] grasp the taking-place proper to them, at which they touch their own non-transcendent 
matter”1031 – emphasizes that being in itself is decisively prior to any specific relation of being. Entities 
which exist return to themselves qua existence, and it is in their being just as they are that they participate 
in the pure multiplicity of being without themselves being pure multiples (Badiou would call such entities 
examples of a multiple-one).  
 
Is it possible to suggest that in its taking-place an entity counts itself as one? Through the generation of 
aesthetic objects which testify to the taking-place of the Real, minimalism exemplifies that which is 
immanent, and which is prior to any relation – of meaning, effect, or significance. Minimalism offers a 
tabula rasa on which nonrelational and independent aesthetic entities come unto themselves – the 
transumption of an entity from its material topos to its poietic atopos. In this way the radical material of a 
quantitative ontology is established apart from quality as such, while still acting as ground for the 
emergence of the same. Qualities emerge and are incorporated into elaborate, meaningful sequences on 
the basis of the Real, which, in turn, is informed by a quantitative understanding of Being.  
 
The taking-place of quantity, so central to minimalism, presses us into the problematic aesthetic region 
where the difference between conceptual and actual negation is easily missed. Should the negative shape 
which accompanies the process of identification become indiscernible from the threat of the actual 
annihilation of an entity, then the price which such a practice demands from us is undoubtedly too high. 
Aesthetic minimalism frequently traces the extreme boundaries of this distinction, pressing us towards the 
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often uncomfortable proximity of pure quantity and pure destruction. It summons us to vigilance: to an 
awareness of the simplicity of taking-place, to the facticity of an entity‟s persistence, and to an 
unambiguous positivity at the heart of that which is Real. Regardless of whether we aspire to minimum 
through a process of progressive abstraction and simplification, or regard minimum as integral ground 
upon which an entity might be defined, minimalism reflects a concern with this parsimonious facticity. If 
the distinction between existence and inexistence is minimal, it is nonetheless paramount.  
 
This is an essential characteristic of Samuel Beckett‟s work. He presses the difficult interaction of 
structural negation and destructive negation in a direction quite distinct from Hegelian sublation, towards 
the transcendental change central to the negativity of Schopenhauer‟s philosophy. This, Weller notes, is 
the moment “in which the very distinction between subject and object is overcome”1032 through a real 
abolition which exposes a “nothing other than nothing”1033 which can be mediated positively only by a 
type of ecstatic or rapturous quasi-transcendence.
1034
 Importantly, such quasi-transcendence does not 
actually leave the field of Being in relation to which it gestures its transcendence. Much as in the case of 
Amalric‟s taking-place, transcendence is immanent to existence. For Beckett, writing describes the 
theatre of thought. Thought, in its turn, is both our point of access and final barrier to the stuff of 
existence. As is well acknowledged, Beckett is particularly concerned with the most minimal intensities 
of existence: the moment of death, and those situations in which death seems imminent, but in which we 
persist nonetheless. These are moments of extraordinary self-reflexivity. Yet it would be an error to 
regard Beckett‟s work as conventionally metafictional. He is not writing about writing, or even directly 
about the creative process, although much might be implicit in this regard. Beckett writes about thought, 
or more specifically he writes about thinking about thought. More accurately still, Beckett, at his best, is 
writing about thinking about the intense struggle between thought and the absence of thought as 
analogues for Being and non-Being. Language and its mediation through the voice and writing might be 
our most obvious points of access to this struggle, but they are not necessarily our most immediate, hence 
the significance of physical movement, theatrical staging and the mediation of the voice by sound 
recording and radio, and of the body and its movement by television and film.  
 
As Meillassoux astutely notes, the phenomenological assertion that it is impossible to gain knowledge of 
the intrinsic nature of Being is predicated on the assumption that Being is inextricable from thought:
1035
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the dogma that “[w]e cannot represent the „in itself‟ without it becoming „for us.‟”1036 For the most part, 
Beckett‟s work offers a significant radicalization of this relation between Being and thought, but remains 
subdued by its own phenomenology insofar as it refuses or fails to disengage from thought. Yet 
occasionally, and only momentarily, we encounter in this remarkable writing a poietic intuition of the 
Real: the work acts as the minimal place-keeper of that which is independent of either thought or 
existence. At this point art assumes the responsibility of presenting generic being, which is to say, of 
presenting the force of generation itself as the singular point entirely exterior to existence. This is the 
mode of generic being which Beckett gestures towards in terms of death, and which Agamben refers to as 
whatever being, “what is most difficult to think: the absolutely non-thing experience of a pure 
exteriority.”1037 For Beckett, although writing is itself a gesture subject to the weakness and transience of 
its own inscription of Being, and one that cannot ordinarily effect the fantasies of exteriority that it 
reports, it nonetheless traces the severe limitations of its powers with such patience and persistence that it 
becomes a strange source of consolation. To be certain, Beckett understands well that it is not only 
eminently possible, but necessary, for all living organisms to die. What writing witnesses is the struggle 
of consciousness to render pure exteriority an object of knowledge by recognizing the minimal point at 
which the entity expresses itself as a vanishing trace of its own existence.  
  
The mere taking-place of the voice, language and writing, partner the persistence of the body and the 
material world, and condition, however tentatively, the possibility of a recuperative gesture. Beckett‟s no 
is thus not negative, so much as it is subtractive, to use the term central to Alain Badiou‟s thought. It is 
vital here to recall the difference between Being and existence. The former, in Badiou‟s formulation, is a 
field of pure multiplicity. Existence, the particularity of an entity or situation, is subtracted from being, 
but without in any sense diminishing its multiplicity. Subtraction discerns something positive within 
existence from that which, in every sense, is indifferent to either positivity or negation. Subtraction is thus 
simultaneously negative and positive: the former insofar as it negates through existence the illusion that 
multiplicity is a totality, and hence a particular quantity rather than quantity in-itself; the latter inasmuch 
as that which is subtracted is indeed a positing and sustaining of new entities.  
 
We might say that Beckett‟s work devotes itself to subtractive points of existential transition between 
exteriority and interiority. At one point, subtraction problematizes the relation between minimum and 
nothingness, as well as any possible representation of the instant of vanishing from existence. At another 
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point this transition is that at which an entity begins in its persistence within the Real, that is, enters into 
the progressive temporal situation according to the contingent laws through which it coheres. In both 
cases, this transition presents an attempt to come to grips with quantity, as a point of minimal negativity: 
the least possible for existence to persist, and the least necessary for existence to persist.  
   
We might say that minimalism persists insofar as it is complicit with the Real. While what is Real is 
necessarily independent of any particular entity, and so also indifferent to the qualities of such entities, it 
is not indifferent to the quantitative facticity of the taking-place of these entities themselves. This point is 
perhaps clearest in the case of Hegelian dialectics, where saying no converts itself into the minimal 
positive facticity of “something taking its course,”1038 to recall Beckett‟s existentially pointed phrase. As 
we have seen, the manner in which structural negation recuperates positivity is well accounted for in the 
Hegelian dialectic. The properly procedural element of taking-place – that act and facticity are confluent 
in describing that something takes place – further pulls the positive from the flames of negation, and 
seems also to attest to the re-ascendency of quantity in the consideration of Being.  
 
Even in extreme cases of negation it is necessary to recall this residual procedural positivity. Beckett‟s 
“Texts for Nothing” pursues pure absence relentlessly – “Is it possible, is that the possible thing at last, 
the extinction of this black nothing and its impossible shades, the end of the farce of making and the 
silencing of silence.”1039 As is often the case in Beckett‟s work, the human voice – “a voice murmuring a 
trace,” the fading intensity yet stubborn persistence of consciousness1040 – mediates not only between 
existence and non-existence (“extinction”), but also between being qua existence (entities) and being qua 
being (pure multiplicity). If negation and the fantasy of its absolute predication in nothingness accentuate, 
in the words of Levinas, the “weariness which is a weariness of everything and everyone, and above all a 
weariness of oneself…the weariness concern[ing] existence itself,”1041 it also returns us to the procedural 
aspect of our being.  
 
Poiesis might manifest in consciousness as the “the farce of making,”1042 but its ontological significance – 
the production of novelty, perhaps even something out of nothing – retains a radical significance. Of this 
existential pull between affirmation and negation, Beckett asks the following: “And whose the shame, 
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having to say…so many times the same lie lyingly denied, whose the screaming silence of no‟s knife in 
yes‟s wound, it wonders.”1043 In existence, if presence is always weakened by the apparently negative 
structure of identification, that negation is itself the primary stuff of Being is cast into radical doubt by the 
sheer presence of our quantitative being. There is no denying that this presence is weakened, indeed 
injured, by the “same lie lyingly denied” – our stubborn denial of the fact that we remain unable to 
articulate the moment of our disappearance – whether passive or active, violent or non-violent. The 
impossibility of finitude, in a significant sense, conditions our possible responses to finitude.  
 
 
 
 
10. THE TENSION OF NOTHINGNESS AND MINIMUM 
 
a) Nihilism and an approach to minimum 
 
There are many ways of saying no, and although such saying is itself existentially positive, this should not 
lull us into the fantasy that its consequences cannot involve genuine destruction or elimination. Several of 
these concerns play out in the various species of nihilism, “in its origin [as]…a failure to accept the world 
as it is, resenting the fact that the world is devoid of a goal, unity or meaning,”1044 and discovering ways 
“to endure the meaninglessness, the chaos of the world.”1045 For Simon Critchley the experience of 
constitutive absence is permeated by an overwhelming sense of disappointment: political disillusionment 
in the prospect of universal justice, and religious disenchantment provoked by the pervasive failure of 
universal meaning or transcendental truth.
1046
 So entwined is nihilism with the emergence of 
philosophical reason, that it is no exaggeration to see it as the implicit operator in the work of Socrates, 
which places at the heart of the dialectic the pull between the consistency of existence and the desistance 
of nothingness. Negativity is intimated equally in the immanence of Being – uncovered through both 
formal and informal procedures of dubitation – as it is in the possibility of transcendence, which negates 
the ordinary situation of being.  
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Nihilism and the via negativa of apophatic theology often reveal deep concordances insofar as they are 
plaited together in much scholastic thought. The summit of the latter is reached in the work of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, which maintains that if the existence of God is in-itself unknowable to us, it is still possible to 
affirm this existence – either through revelation, which positively circumvents the field of knowledge 
entirely, or through oblique means, which are both a posteriori and structurally negative.
1047
 Aquinas 
articulates the latter in terms of the quinque viae
1048
 – the five paths or arguments which he develops from 
Aristotle in affirming the existence of God. He argues that knowledge is conditioned on the limits 
presented by material existence, and that it is therefore impossible to grasp the essence of God or to 
deduce the relation between the transcendental and immanent (material) from the vertiginous absence of 
knowledge regarding this divine essence. Rather, we are obliged to begin any such inquiry into the 
existence of God immersed in the field of effects themselves and, through negative interrogation, 
patiently to eliminate uncertainty. This constitutes a significant strategy in the apophatic or negative 
theological tradition, influencing not only subsequent generations of theologians and philosophers, but 
also those who engage more directly with nihilism.  
 
It was the German philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi who first employed the term nihilism to oppose 
what he saw in the transcendental idealism of his contemporaries
1049
 as a dangerous reduction of the 
conceptual and the existential to a single field of absolute solipsism.
1050As Critchley reports, “for Jacobi, 
Fichtean idealism is nihilism…because it allows the existence of nothing outside or apart from the ego 
and the ego is itself nothing but a product of the „free power of the imagination.‟” 1051 Jacobi, a man of 
conservative faith, held that the philosophical systematicity of both idealism and atheism end in nihilism. 
His (Jacobi‟s) opposition to nihilism is at least in part vindicated by the activity of the Russian nihilists of 
the 1860s and 1870s. The transposition of nihilism from the sphere of metaphysics to the field of anarchic 
and often violent political practice occurs in the context of social disillusionment and the failure of the 
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systematic programme of idealist thought to instigate decisive change.
1052
 An essential field of conflict 
becomes apparent between the nihilistic politico-aesthetic disposition of Chernyshevsky, the poetry of 
Lermontov, and the novels of Turgenev
1053
 on the one hand, and what Dostoevksy, in an oppositional 
mode apposite to that offered by Jacobi, decries as “the nihilisms or indifferentism of the Russian 
educated classes…[in which] suicide is the only logical conclusion.”1054  
 
The coordinates of Russian nihilism remain within the greater constellation marked axiomatically by 
Jacobi in which one either opposes nihilism by affirming the existence of God, or embraces atheism, 
annihilation and Nothingness.
1055
 It is Nietzsche – arguably the most penetrating modern thinker of the 
relationship between nothingness, thought and being – who steps decisively beyond the field of mere 
consolation or disappointment in relation to religion:    
 
The new fundamental condition: our conclusive transitoriness. I – Formerly one sought the feeling of the 
grandeur of man by pointing to his divine origin: this has now become a forbidden way…One therefore 
now tries the opposite direction: the way mankind is going shall serve as proof of its grandeur and kinship 
with God. Alas, this, too, is vain! At the end of this way stands the funeral urn of the last man and 
gravedigger (with the inscription „nihil humani a me alienum puto‟[I judge nothing that is human as alien to 
me – the words of Roman playwright Terence]).
1056
 
 
Insisting that religion is the cause of nihilism, rather than its antidote, Nietzsche moves decisively apart 
from the prevailing social, political and theological thought of his time. Our principal task becomes one of 
recognizing that “nihilism is a failure to accept the world as it is.”1057 Responding adequately to the 
religious nihilism, which “posits some values superior to life and negates life in the name of those „higher 
values‟, values that are a condition of all other values” requires a radical reconsideration of the 
transcendental. “[T]he will for a moral interpretation or valuation of the word now appears to be a will to 
untruth.”1058 Yet the drive to a horizon which “at last…seems to us again free, even it is not bright”1059 is 
undiminished. If our highest values have been rendered inoperative – if “God is dead. God remains dead. 
And we have killed him”1060 – we can in no sense legitimise a melancholic, inertial drifting in existence. 
To the contrary, if what was mistaken for absolute truth is indeed a world in which fable has effective 
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capacity,
1061
 we are enjoined to participate, to press towards the discovery of our “innate disposition to 
seek in all things that which must be overcome in them.”1062  
 
The central promise of Nietzsche‟s philosophical agenda resides in overcoming the destitution which 
emerges when we capitulate to the destructive element of negation: that strictly void part of being which 
cannot be presented as such except through annihilation. From a sustained resistance to a simplistic 
understanding of value, meaning and truth it becomes possible to recuperate some of those pivotal 
elements of thought itself. In the understanding of existence this engenders, the emphasis shifts from 
stable Being to unstable becoming. “Nihilism,” Vattimo maintains, “is still developing.”1063 In this light 
nihilism cannot be asserted plausibly as an accomplished task – either in historical or in metaphysical 
terms – and it unceasingly obliges us to redefine our relation to it.1064 The accomplished nihilist is the one 
for whom the challenge of discovering “new categories and new values that will permit us to endure the 
world of becoming,”1065 is ongoing.  
 
Both the existentialist and the hermeneutic heirs of the Nietzschean legacy see this clearly. The affinities 
between the versions of nihilism offered by Nietzsche and Heidegger become unavoidable, according to 
Vattimo, as soon as we accept that the transformation of value lies at the heart of any nihilist equation.
1066
 
Likewise, the work of Sartre or Levinas, only imaginable within the orbit of Nietzschean existentialism, 
concerns itself with the transformatory potential of a consideration of nothingness
1067
 and nihilation.
1068
 
Equally, the pervasive mood of postmodernism – doubt regarding the prospective predication of 
universality by the paths opened by humanism
1069
 – cannot be comprehended merely as reactions against 
the apparent failures of modernity, but must also be understood, so asserts Vattimo, as a positive field, 
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inaugurated by Nietzsche. According to Vattimo, the particular project of Nietzschean nihilism 
inaugurates the postmodern era.
1070
 However, this project also proves a problematic proposition, since it 
advocates the view that nihilism is something to be overcome, drawing it back into constructive discourse 
and preventing its delivering up the nothing it seems to promise.   
 
The task of defining nihilism is intimately bound to the transformation rather than the destitution of value: 
a trans-valuation. “[N]ihilism is the consumption of use-value in exchange-value,”1071 suggests Vattimo. 
Such situations of existence are increasingly decoupled from either transcendence or telos, feeding into a 
dystopian Marxism in which we experience a “generalized reification…the reduction of everything to 
exchange-value,”1072 and what remains in circulation is the force of forcing without any real direction, or 
the energy of instruments without any real instrumentality. “Nihilism does not mean that Being is in the 
power of the subject,”1073 as many, including Jacobi and the Russian nihilists, insist. “[R]ather it means 
that Being is completely dissolved in the discoursing of value, in the indefinite transformations of 
universal equivalence.”1074 Nihil or nothingness – doubtless the most slippery of all concepts – requires of 
us a patient discernment of the most plausible amongst a series of possible responses. Critchley identifies 
five possible responses. The first is a refusal of nihilism, reaffirming an essentially naive, even religious, 
metaphysics,
1075
 while the second is an indifference to nihilism, which habitually resolves itself in an 
annoying agnostic cheerfulness.
1076
 Perhaps most pervasive in the contemporary west, is a passive 
nihilism which accepts the diagnosis of meaninglessness and makes no great effort to reconstitute these 
conditions.
1077
 By contrast, active nihilism embraces “a violent force of destruction…which imagines 
itself as the propaedeutic to a revolution of everyday life.”1078 Finally, Critchley believes it is possible to 
delineate nihilism – a delineation which rests on a broadly deconstructive approach that “keep[s] open the 
slightest difference between things as they are and things as they might otherwise be…Hope against hope. 
Austere messianism. Very little.”1079 
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b) Nothingness and existence 
 
Rescuing nothingness from nihilism is an activity which affirms that the least which is possible – 
minimum – remains a positive phenomenon. Accomplishing this extraction requires the reiteration, 
following Badiou, of a central ontological position of the present work: Being itself is explicable only in 
terms of pure multiplicity, and is non-identical to existence.
1080
 The latter arises within pure multiplicity, 
is itself composed of multiples, but does not eliminate multiplicity. We might clarify the existential field 
by schematizing it according to the three principal ways it is given within a general situation of Being: 
existence – the positive arising or appearance of entities; inexistence – the disappearance of entities; 
nonexistence – the non-appearance of entities. The last is necessarily difficult to grasp, as it attempts to 
approximate non-Being from the perspective of Being, or, stated otherwise, to represent the situation in 
which the very potential that an entity could emerge is entirely impossible. Returning in this light to the 
distinction between existence and Being, it becomes clearer that pure ontological nothingness can be 
admitted, even as an impossibility, only if we capitulate to that most totalizing and religious of all 
dogmas: that the One is. For, if pure nothingness is synonymous with non-existence, then it belongs to 
pure multiplicity, which is something;
1081
 but if it participates neither in existence nor in Being, then as 
non-Being, it has no part in multiplicity. In this light, it is necessary to dispense with non-existence as a 
possible key to comprehending nothingness, for this would effectively revive the apophatic dogma that 
God is Nothingness.
1082
  
 
The absence of a simple equation between nothingness and non-existence returns us to the patient, if often 
paradoxical, interrogation conducted within the ambit of existentialism. Here the tension between 
existence and non-existence is habitually at its greatest. In this regard, we might recall firstly that, for 
Heidegger, nothingness cannot be despatched by any metaphysics. In fact, nothingness proves to be the 
proper subject of a metaphysics freed from precisely such an ontotheological limitation of Being as 
mentioned above, which Heidegger‟s project sets itself to dismantle.1083 In so doing, he recentres the  
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question of nothingness in a manner which remains stubbornly unsatisfied by any recourse to the familiar 
dialectic formula of Hegelian thought, that “becoming is the transition between being and 
nothingness.”1084 Neither does Heidegger accept that nothingness can be rendered impotent by the manner 
in which it is rejected by science – which refuses it on the basis that it can distil from nothingness no 
object which it is able to quantify or scrutinize
1085
 – or by logic1086 – which locates nothingness at the 
furthest extreme of a process of negation, as a “formal concept of the imagined nothing”1087 resting on 
“nonbeing pure and simple.”1088 “[T]he nothing is the nothing,” Heidegger contends, “and if the nothing 
represents total indistinguishability no distinction can obtain between the imagined and the „proper‟ 
nothing.” Nothingness is by this estimation most certainly real.1089 As to whether we arrive at nothing by 
a process of negation, or whether nothingness is a point of departure, Heidegger is unambiguous: 
“nothing is more original than the „not‟ and negation.”1090  
 
By claiming for the notion of Angst
1091
 the status of a Grundstimmung, a fundamental pre-cognitive mood 
marked by an “indeterminate unease or dread,”1092 Heidegger believed he had uncovered a reliable point 
of contact between nothingness and the finitude of Dasein.
1093
 “Being and the nothing do belong 
together,”1094 he suggests, “because Being...reveals itself only in the transcendence of Dasein which is 
held out into nothing.”1095 In Being and Nothingness – the opening of which is an extended meditation on 
the contradiction at the heart of Heidegger‟s What is Metaphysics? – Sartre understands nihilation as the 
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necessary manner by which negation makes differentiation, and consequent identity, possible,
1096
 and that 
this is an intrinsic operation insofar as “only Being can nihilate itself.”1097 It is difficult not to counter this 
claim with the essentially Kantian observation – simple but compelling – that there is no manner of 
reaching this conclusion unless some sort of transcendental consciousness is presupposed. Certainly, an 
existential position sensitive to the situatedness and circularity of any hermeneutic by which it might seek 
to unravel its own nature,
1098
 exhibits an awareness of this problem, but such an awareness is far from an 
adequate resolution. For instance, from the outset of Being and Nothingness, Sartre demonstrates an 
admirable grasp of the difficulties which consciousness brings to the examination of nothingness.
1099
 
Nonetheless, we can proceed only by an axiomatic decision – an extension of the Parmenidean axiom of 
the One – which finally diminishes the claim of consciousness in this regard: either nothingness is, or it is 
not. Having decided in favour of the former, there are considerably fewer impediments to accepting that 
nothingness possess a paradoxical agency – “the nothing itself nihilates;”1100 “nothingness is not”1101– 
which somehow circumvents either external- or self-reference. Fundamentally ineffable, such agency 
conditions the irreconcilable situation in which “[n]othingness can be conceived neither outside of Being, 
nor in terms of Being.”1102 Thus, not only is it possible that “[n]othingness beyond the world accounts for 
absolute negation” – since the agency of nothingness and that of Dasein, defined in terms of the 
appearance and subsequent directedness towards finitude of beings within a world, are viewed as 
inextricable – but also that we are able to endure the caesura which Sartre contends is a “permanent 
possibility”1103 in any relation of a questioner to the question of nothingness.1104  
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In clear distinction from the earlier account of Being as essentially quantitative, the representation of 
nothingness offered by Heidegger and Sartre is noteworthy for its qualitative contours. After all, it is by 
various processes of qualitative distinction, differentiation, negation and synthesis that nothingness is 
pursued. A quantitative account of nothingness would need to retain a degree of indifference – of 
ungivenness – foreign to both thinkers. Two particularly interesting interventions in this difficult field 
arrive in Emmanuel Levinas‟ elaboration of the il y a1105 – the “impersonal, anonymous, yet 
inextinguishable „consummation‟ of being, which murmurs in the depth of nothingness...[which,] 
inasmuch as it resists a personal form, is „being in general‟”1106 – and in Giorgio Agamben‟s formulation 
of a metaphysical “ungroundedness”1107 which reveals an unmediated belonging in language.  
 
Agamben‟s thoughtful work on the great struggle within which our metaphysical, cognitive and linguistic 
relations to nothingness embroil us, continues to receive considerable and deserved attention. We restrict 
our present commentary to a few remarks regarding the manner in which Agamben has sought to redress 
the Heideggerian legacy in which nothingness is taken as the ground upon which the essential activity of 
Being takes shape as a relation to finitude. In Language and Death Agamben traces this “fundamental 
ontological dimension”1108 to the occurrence of Voice – a disposition “[n]o longer the experience of mere 
sound and not yet the experience of a meaning,”1109 between “the voice as sound...or the animal 
phonē,”1110 and the production of linguistic meaning.1111  
 
Of a particular resonance here is the affective presence which marks Meredith Monk‟s minimalist-
inflected vocal music. Exemplifying the composer‟s search for “clear and simple structure[s] that would 
allow for primal yet transparent vocal qualities,”1112 Monk‟s “Arctic Bar” (Track 20)1113 is a potent 
instantiation of minimalism‟s affective capacity – habitually glossed over, but undeniably significant to 
its popularity and critical success. Simple, direct and exuberant, this work exhibits the peculiar 
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combination of predictability and angularity which characterizes the minimalist approach to harmonic 
rhythm,
1114
 constituting the ground upon which Monk‟s singularly “expressive personal style”1115 takes 
shape. At once atavistic, passionate and rational,
1116
 “Arctic Bar” evokes “the elemental, bracing clarity of 
the northern landscape.”1117  
 
Although its words are of no actual language, their emotional immediacy is undeniable. This is a happy 
song, with no small hint of affective inebriation (its setting is, after all, a bar). The work explores a radical 
vision of vocality qua breath, as a most immediate performance of eudaimonia – a human life of 
goodness, virtue, fulfilment and happiness.
1118
 Monk‟s minimalism does not sidestep the voice as a 
mimetic intermediary: it imitates the rhythms and intonation of Inuit speech, and most certainly the barks, 
yelps and howls of husky dogs or northern wolves, and the play of plosives with dotted whining 
diphthongs is intoxicating in its vivacity. Similarly evocative is the hocketting of breath-effects between 
Monk and Een – the inhalation and exhalation of panting voicelessness, which is a radical marker of 
organic processes of vocality, also evoking the hardships and toils typical of the northern cold, and 
strengthening the sense of kinship between the two characters in Facing North. The physicality of the 
landscape is equally audible: apparently barren, but in fact pulsing with life,
1119
 its vital expanses echo in 
the sustained octaves towards the end of the work.  
 
As a counterpoint to the starkness of the music which surrounds it in Facing North, “Arctic Bar” offers a 
moment of intimacy and vulnerability in a landscape of extremes. Here the interplay, between the 
contained simplicity of the repetitive piano obbligato and the buoyant, improvisatory vocal lines, renders 
maximally transparent the tension between regularity and unpredictability
1120
 which characterizes the 
pursuit of eudaimonia. In The Fragility of Goodness, Nussbaum elaborates the classical view according to 
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which eudaimonia is predicated very precisely upon accepting or overcoming the vicissitudes and 
unpredictabilities which mark existence. Eudaimonia necessarily involves activity: “[t]he good condition 
of a virtuous character…is a kind of preparation for activity; it finds its natural fulfilment and flourishing 
in activity.”1121 My claim is that “Arctic Bar” is affective of happiness precisely to the extent that it 
prompts both an internal and external sense of activity:
1122
 the former, structurally, in the momentum 
which the interplay of the subtly asymmetrical repetitive accompaniment and improvisatory vocal lines 
effect; the latter, in the affective relationship its vocality establishes with the listener. In both cases the 
minimalist exposition of Voice qua embodiment and as a passage to the pre-linguistic, is crucial. Indeed, 
Nussbaum maintains that “all human experiences are embodied, and thus realized in some kind of 
material process. This given, human emotions are finally embodied processes as well. However, the 
question is, are there any bodily states or processes that are constantly correlated with our experiences of 
emotion.”1123 
 
 In this light, the question posed by Monk‟s “Arctic Bar” is the following: is there something in the 
physics of this music – the combination of its vocalic expressiveness and direct, repetitive figures – which 
is capable of triggering the relatively consistent affective material we identify as a type of happiness? If 
this is indeed the case, then it might be possible to suggest that Voice reaches beyond mere form and 
structure, to the most radical positive relation between material and affect. Regarding such an 
unambiguously affirmative existentialism Agamben is rather more cautious. For him, Voice tries to grasp 
the “event of language”1124 within an “interstitial”1125 topos – a place of “originary negativity sustaining 
every negation”1126 insofar as it reveals a radical “ungroundedness,”1127 the “negative ground of man‟s 
appearance in language.”1128 The conceptual trajectory is in numerous places proximate to the concerns 
regarding nothingness developed by Heidegger and Sartre:
1129
 “Voice signifies...to become capable of 
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another death – no longer simply a deceasing, but a person‟s ownmost and insuperable possibility, the 
possibility of freedom.”1130  
 
Yet, we ought not to miss that Agamben urges thought beyond this impasse. Certainly it is true that he 
regards Voice as the topos upon which the corresponding human faculties of language and death relate to 
one another.
1131
 Through an interplay of structural negation,
1132
 language and death interrogate one 
another: reflection on our linguistic capacity entertains a fascination with persistence, just as the reflection 
on existential persistence reveals that our most ready means of indicating the place of Being is through 
the event of language.
1133
 However, persistence is clearly thwarted by finitude and death, even as our 
awareness of our own death is subject to a failed negotiation between language and the experience of 
existence.
1134
 To the extent that Voice traverses this boundary between language and finitude, it indicates 
the taking-place of language in time. However, it is towards the “taking-place of language as time”1135 – 
towards language qua language,
1136
 or an Absolute which is beyond any “difference between showing and 
telling, being and entity, world and thing”1137 – that Agamben‟s thought directs us. By “indicating the 
pure taking place of language without any determinate event of meaning,” Agamben suggests “there is 
still the possibility of thought beyond meaningful propositions.”1138 Here is a significantly novel 
articulation of archaic nothingness which, in fact, makes room for the recuperation of the facticity of 
positive Being where it seemed most remote. To accomplish this, Agamben sets himself the ambitious 
task of identifying “the originary mythogeme of metaphysics in the silence of the Voice”1139 – a tentative 
gesture beyond this silence, towards “language without Voice, a word that is not grounded in any 
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1132
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meaning,”1140 and which “remains to be thought as the most human dimension.”1141 It seeks the aperture 
to a manner of existing outside of our bondage to absolute negativity – to make of this ungroundedness an 
“ethos of humanity by grasping the simple fact of our „having‟ language.”1142  
 
Here, where the connection between the aleatory frailty but persistence of the human voice becomes 
apparent, Beckett‟s writing – its growing silence and increasing disembodiment by various technologies 
of reproduction and mediation – exhibits a increasing discomfort in relation to the apparent compulsion to 
exist. Voice marks our spectral, linguistic citizenship of a poietic atopia even as it retreats, in this 
withdrawal intimating precisely the aesthetic thought beyond meaning which, no longer bound in a 
relation to finitude, recognizes its infinite vocation of presenting the taking-place of the Real. In their 
opposition to the Heideggerian measurement of Being as a relation to finitude, Agamben and Badiou 
share a commitment to discovering the radix of pure Being qua infinitude, albeit Badiou‟s formulation of 
multiplicity takes its shape from mathematics, while Agamben asserts the primacy of language. For the 
latter, it is in-fancy
1143
 – the radix prior to language1144 that is necessary for Being to emerge through 
language – which we approximate in trying to grasp language qua language. Language, insofar as it 
carries meaning, presents the vehicle for an existential maximalism. Language qua language, on the other 
hand, seeks to expose that, prior to meaning, language exists as pure means
1145
 – an admirable 
minimalism, for certain. In aesthetic terms, might we not recall Perreault‟s claim, cited above, that 
“[w]hat is minimal about Minimal Art...is the means not the end,”1146 extending it to suggest that perhaps 
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what is minimal is that in minimalism we discover pure means, without ends – an art which understands 
itself as a gesture towards its own immanence?  
 
Art has not been shy in attempting to grasp the aesthetic situation through which we encounter language 
qua language, albeit this has seldom been discussed under the rubric of minimalism. Gertrude Stein‟s 
Sacred Emily is a particularly fine literary exemplar of several of minimalism‟s most poignant techniques 
of reduction. Both identical repetition and incremental addition and subtraction powerfully communicate 
poietic distension – the transfiguration of the poem from its status as a container of meaningful references 
towards existing as a self-referential concrete entity composed of and within a language barely able to 
cohere by the sheer weight of its presence. From this poem comes Stein‟s most celebrated line – “Rose is 
a rose is a rose is a rose”1147 – a symbol of her concrete relation to language and of the pretensions of 
language to a universalist nominalism. “[W]hen language was new,” she claims “...the poet could use the 
name of the thing and the thing was really there.”1148 To the modern writer, it is apparent “the 
excitingness of pure being ha[s] withdrawn from [language]”1149 in which case we are left with the task 
either of revitalizing its exhausted nouns, or of recognizing something Real at the heart of language itself. 
To a critical interlocutor Stein once responded regarding her famous line: “Now listen! I‟m no fool. I 
know that in daily life we don‟t go around saying „is a…is a…is a.‟”1150 Here repetition alludes not only 
to a faithfulness to phenomenological experience “whereby each restatement reflect[s] the flux of 
change”1151 in the writer, but also to a poietic yearning for the decontamination of the relation between 
word and thing and to a language firm in relation to its own objecthood (language qua language). If this 
reiteration “demystif[ies] the emphatic nature of nomination and the evocation of being,”1152 as Blanchot 
suggests,
1153
 it is in order to rework the concrete ground upon which noun and word grasp one another. 
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Although in entirely different registers, the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets and Lettrists similarly regard 
their work as an exposition of the concreteness of language qua language. The poetry composed and 
improvised by Isidore Isou (Track 21),
1154
 the seminal figure of Lettrism, identifies the letter as the most 
minimal element of language. By “always taking all the letters together; unfolding...the marvels brought 
about by letters...creating an architecture of lettric rhythms,”1155 Isou believed he had discovered a means 
of presenting “transitions between feeling and saying”1156 – a manner of “concretising silence; writing 
nothings.”1157 Often as brutal as it is primal, this work offers perhaps the most plausible poetic equivalent 
of the radical situation which Agamben conceives in terms of in-fancy.
1158
 Shifting from letter to word, 
the couplets of Barrett Watten‟s “Complete Thought” are remarkable ciphers of the problematic relation 
of discourse and world addressed by L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poetry – ideas explored initially in the 
eponymous journal – and also striking examples of minimalist containment: 
 
I 
The word is complete. 
Books demand limits. 
... 
VI 
Worn-out words are invented.  
We read daylight in books. 
...  
XIII 
Connected pieces break into name. 
Petrified trees are similar. 
XIV 
Everyday life retards potential. 
Calculation governs speech.   
... 
XVIII 
Language ceases to be the future. 
Thinking becomes a religious device.
1159
  
 
The insight Watten provides in this work is to a language inextricable from thought, yet which is also 
buried by this same inextricability. That nothingness is that against which language tarries as its very 
destiny, is a point close to Watten‟s heart.1160 For when language qua language loses its potential for an 
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organic unity with thought, it is handed over to a situation in which “[l]anguage ceases to be the future,” 
and we are once again subjugated by an ontotheological politics in which thought is reduced to a mere 
“religious device.” Our political and economic being in language is increasingly governed by a 
“calculation,” as we are pressured towards providing evermore accurate epistemological accounts of 
reality – the “books” in which “worn-out words” become the currency substituted, displacing existential 
immediacy. Watten identifies in Ron Padgett‟s quasi-sonnet, Nothing in That Drawer, a potent symbol of 
language qua language and the original relation it might have born to the Real. Repetition empties the 
poem of the essentially artificial fantasy that there need exist containers or nodes of meaning by effecting 
in the reader a certain existential amnesia: “[s]uddenly, the entire universe turns into the dark matter of 
nothing in that drawer: that‟s all we get.”1161 
 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer. 
Nothing in that drawer.
1162
 
 
While we cannot reasonably expect to find a more minimal expression than Nothing in That Drawer 
within a conventional poetic form – Padgett‟s own self-reflexive Haiku, “First: five syllables/ Second: 
seven syllables/ Third: five syllables”1163 perhaps comes closest – there are many for whom the actual 
physicality of writing, etching, typing or inscribing appears a more radical exposure of the stuff of 
language. Cy Twombly‟s work1164 is interesting in this respect, since often it is formed from the same 
scriptoral gestures as those of writing. Exemplary of his “language of indiscernible writing”1165 are Cold 
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Stream (Figure 72)
1166
 and Arcadia (Figure 73).
1167
 In the former we encounter a repetitive urgency,
1168
 an 
inscription repeatedly looping across itself in a manic attempt simultaneously to uncover and recover the 
threatening nothingness of the pre-linguistic blank page and black canvas. The reticent marks of the latter, 
by contrast, expose “the intensity of the tremor of communication,”1169 its diaphanous “calligraphic 
gestures...barely touch[ing] the page.”1170 Much as the letters which spell Arcadia are faint but 
unmissable, so, too, do Twombly‟s pieces evoke a complex poietic relationship with history and time,1171 
“revitalizing the tracings of the hand, to write in archaic symbols of temptation and possession.”1172 His 
aesthetic consciousness is moulded unambiguously from the stuff of Classical Greece and Rome,
1173
 yet 
sacrifices none of its relation to the contemporary, or its capacity for negotiating a poietic path between 
the singularity of its aesthetic expression and its universality as ur-script.   
 
  
 
Figure 72: Cy Twombly, Cold Stream, 1966. 
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Roland Barthes, who paid significant attention to Twombly‟s oeuvre, identifies in his work a carefully 
disintegrated calligraphy of letters, handwritten words, and “marks of measurement...tiny algorithms.”1174 
These are scriptoral gestures in the precise sense recognized by Agamben: here we encounter an 
exposition of aesthetic means without end, or means where the only end or telos is their radical resistance 
to any further decomposition.
1175
 Writing fills the space of language in an attempt to think its depths qua 
nothingness. In this sense Twombly‟s scriptoral work1176 presents the substance of a minimal quantity – a 
visual continuum
1177
 “without [clear] beginning or end”1178 – in which contingently unifying calculation 
comes from “combining the small and the smallest elements.”1179 What is most remarkable of this work, 
even at its most intricate, is that it maintains at its aesthetic centre an “absolute spaciousness”1180 – a 
rareness
1181
 and thought of absence,
1182
 which mark a minimal radix from which we apprehend the poietic 
exhalation of the work – that it “does not grasp at anything; it is situated, it floats and drifts.”1183  
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Figure 73: Cy Twombly, Arcadia, 1958. 
 
Musing upon Twombly‟s negotiation of matter and nothingness, Barthes offers a compelling 
metaphysical proposition: “the essence of things is not in their weight but in their lightness.”1184 From the 
perspective of the Real, however, it is certainly impossible to know whether or not language qua language 
– if this is what such an essence attempts to approximate – legitimately claims to encounter nothingness, 
except as an analogy. The evasiveness of pre-linguistic nothingness is equally evident in situations 
belonging to Voice as it is in those conceived in terms of writing, and slides away from definition 
regardless of which expressive medium these appropriate. It may well be that the Real is most intelligible 
in terms of existential lightness, but it is difficult to accept that any confrontation with nothingness is not 
simultaneously weighed down by pervasive ignorance. It is perhaps the vocation of minimalism to expose 
the Real by examining the aesthetic both of extreme rareness and lightness, as well as of weight and 
density. The task of contemplating nothingness as a nihilating heaviness in Being is an onerous one given 
that this thought must remain a response to that which is ungiven in existence – to that which is absolute, 
independent, Real. Setting our horizons beyond a Heideggerian nothingness which nihilates, beyond 
Agamben‟s in-fancy and its substitution of pre-givenness for an essential ungivenness, this radix must be 
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a presentation which has no equivalent either in material or conceptual representation. It is singular, in 
Badiou‟s terminology – present without being represented.1185 In language easily approachable by 
aesthetics, it is perhaps that which Levinas designates by the il y a which comes closest to this notion of 
nothingness as presence.
1186
  
 
 
c) The minimal presentation of nothingness 
 
The shift in Levinas‟ thought, which affirms the absolute alterity at the heart of the ethical relation as the 
means of transcending the finitude of Being,
1187
 is perhaps over-documented. As a result, it is easy to 
underestimate the centrality of the il y a – which recognizes Being in general as a presence so relentless it 
cannot even be conceived in a dialectic relationship to absence – to the entire corpus of his work.1188 
Accompanying the intuition of the il y a is a privation which, for Levinas, induces a “weariness of 
oneself,”1189 which prompts his search for the extra-ontological situation he identifies in terms of an ethics 
of absolute alterity.
1190
 Yet, the il y a is perhaps not as mercurial as Levinas‟ somewhat hyperbolic 
descriptions might suggest. To understand what Levinas intends by the term, it is first necessary to 
understand his adaption of the ontico-ontologcial difference of Heidegger by distinguishing but not 
separating
1191
 existence (Being) from existents (beings).
1192
 In short, the il y a designates the totality of 
Being – being qua being which Badiou believes may be accurately apprehended by mathematics, but 
which, for phenomenologists such as Levinas, can be entertained in terms of knowability only as the 
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entirety of the force of Being.
1193
 The problem, as Levinas detects, is that “thought slips imperceptibly 
from the notion of Being qua Being,
1194
 that by virtue of which an existing being exists, to the idea of a 
cause of existence, a „Being in general.‟”1195 
 
What can be experienced of this force of Being differs depending on whether we approach it in terms of 
existence – in which case the force of the il y a is one of pure presentation1196 – or from the perspective of 
existents – where we can apprehend it only negatively,1197 or obliquely in terms of a “modality of 
being.”1198 The il y a is that of Being which cannot be represented.1199 It is a pre-conceptual,1200 pre-
reflective and pre-cognitive response to Being which defies equivalence;
1201
 it is the pervasive atmosphere 
of horror
1202
 which Levinas believes follows the threat of absolute existential anonymity;
1203
 an 
experience of the weight of Being,
1204
 the faint rumble falling towards complete silence,
1205
 the insomnia 
of an endless night in which exhausted vigilance is perpetual;
1206
 a dying within which there is no 
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subject – is a principal term in Levinas‟ writing. See Levinas, “Shadow,” 9; EE, 23, 37, 44, 52, 82, 88; TO, 33, 47-8, 
52, 62, 65-7. See also Richard A. Cohen, Ethics, Exegesis and Philosophy: Interpretation After Levinas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2001), 176 and Wall, Radical Passivity, 5.   
1204
 TO, 35, 62; EE, 51, 76; IRB, 46.  
1205
 It is towards a “being in complete silence” (IRB, 212) that the “anonymous rumbling of existence” (EE, 23) 
seems to point us. 
1206
 “I am going to characterize the there is...by a vigilance without possible recourse to sleep,” (TO , 48-9), where 
sleep is not a state of unconsciousness, but a “modality of being” (EE, 84). See also EE, 55, 64; Robbins, Altered 
Reading, 94. 
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death.
1207
 In its immanent ungivenness, the il y a “transcends inwardness as well as exteriority; it does not 
even make it possible to distinguish these...The subject-object distinction by which we approach existents 
is not the starting point for a meditation which broaches being in general.”1208 The il y a, existence such as 
it is, could be apprehended only if all existents were annihilated.
1209
 This would be existence “full of the 
nothingness of everything.”1210  
 
That we are not consumed by pure presence, the “presence of absence...[which] embraces and dominates 
its contradictory,”1211 owes, for Levinas, to the simple reason that Being, in any context we might 
potentially grasp, is always an experience of Being.
1212
 “[T]he fact of being given is the world,”1213 he 
asserts. “Through taking position in the anonymous [il y a] a subject is affirmed.”1214 Levinas terms this 
adoption of a position hypostasis, which, in short, amounts to the upsurge of an existent.
1215
 Although the 
il y a “is the place where hypostasis will be produced,”1216 it offers no conventional ground.1217 It is rather 
a grounding force from which is subtracted another force – the hypostatic force by which a minimal 
concept
1218
 takes shape, which suspends the non-conceptual indeterminateness of the il y a in which 
“anything can count for anything else.”1219 Hypostasis is thus a beginning,1220 an instantiation1221 through 
which a minimal consciousness emerges.
1222
 From such consciousness is derived the directed experience 
which appears in terms of “the indissoluble unity between the existent and its work of existing.”1223  
                                                          
1207
 The unremitting presence of the il y a defines existential persistence in terms of “an abyss between the present 
and death,” a “the strangeness of the future of death” (TO, 81). See TO, 50-1, 69-73, 81-2; EE, 56-7, 77; Levinas, 
“Shadow,” 11-2; Robbins, Altered Reading, 92, 96; Wyschogrod, Emmanuel Levinas, 9.  
1208
 EE, 52. 
1209
 TO, 46-7. 
1210
 EE, 53. 
1211
 Ibid., 60.  
1212
 In this respect, Levinas is a very conventional phenomenologist. If, however, we regard the il y a in terms of its 
facticity – and Levinas is unambiguous on this point (ibid., 3, 51, 61, 85; TO, 42,45-7,) – we should be cautious of 
overstating its relation to experience (EE, 52), either in Wall‟s terms as “our „oldest‟ experience” (Wall, Radical 
Passivity, 29), or Critchley‟s (paraphrasing Blanchot) as the “experience of consciousness without a subject” 
(Critchley, Very Little, 58). 
1213
 EE, 30. 
1214
 EE, 82. 
1215
 Wyschogrod, Emmanuel Levinas, 7-8. 
1216
 TO, 50.  
1217
 Ibid., 47.  
1218
 Here concept refers a non-physical substantive.   
1219
 EE, 54.  
1220
 TO, 67.  
1221
 The instant describes the temporal point, without duration, at which an existent arises from existence (EE, 72). 
1222
 “[L]ife in the world is consciousness inasmuch as it provides the possibility of existing in a withdrawal from 
existence” (ibid., 37-8). Elsewhere, Levinas describes such consciousness in terms of the solitude of the existent 
within existence (ibid., 84; TO, 54-5, 67). 
1223
 Ibid., 43.  
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Hypostasis, however, reveals a significant tension in Levinas‟ thought between interiority and exteriority, 
and the manner in which these negotiate our understanding of subject and object. As the proper ingression 
of an existent into existence, hypostasis marks “the apparition of a substantive.”1224 Since hypostasis is 
also a “localization of consciousness”1225 this process is predominantly associated with a process of 
human “subjectivization”1226 which directs the incipient subject towards the specificity of identity.1227 Yet, 
it is clear that activity is not simply withheld from ordinary things. A hypostatic entity holds together two 
points of definition: it is “that which is,”1228 and also that which “is a subject of the verb to be.”1229 By 
assuming Being,
1230
 by taking-up beginning in Being, an entity clearly marks its fundamental positivity 
qua activity. However, as differentiation within the indifference of the il y a, the activity of consciousness 
is in fact a “retrograde movement.”1231 It attempts to pin down “what cannot disappear”1232 in that which 
has already taken place.
1233
  
 
Here we might allow Harman‟s insight to the “unbridgeable gap between being in general and this being 
in general as experienced”1234 to resonate on its own terms:  
   
The anonymous work of existence occurs in the sheer labor of things at being what they are, and not in any 
supposed access we might have to this labor, not even a noncognitive sort of access. The il y a...however 
devoid it may be of specific features, already stands at an infinite remove from the infernal work of objects. 
It is not being itself that is experienced...but only being as being. No two realities could be more 
different.
1235
 
 
                                                          
1224
 EE, 83. 
1225
 Ibid., 67.  
1226
 Ibid. By subjectivizing, Levinas means the process of producing a subject, and so this term is roughly equivalent 
to subjectivating which, following Badiou, is generally preferred in the present work. On Levinas‟ anthropocentric 
bias regarding hypostasis, see Graham Harman, Tool Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Chicago 
and La Salle: Open Court, 2002), 242. 
1227
 TO, 67.    
1228
 EE, 83. 
1229
 Ibid. 
1230
 Ibid.  
1231
 Wyschogrod, Emmanuel Levinas, 8.  
1232
 Ibid. 
1233
 As far as our retrospective comprehension of the il y a is concerned, Levinas is unambiguous: it “is a 
relationship only by analogy. For the Being which we become aware of when the world disappears is not a person or 
a thing, or the sum total of persons and things; it is the fact that one is, the fact that there is” (EE, 8). 
1234
 Harman, Tool Being, 239. 
1235
 Ibid.  
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The very possibility of recognizing the subjectivating activity of hypostasis arises only because of an 
asymmetry which persists in the relation
1236
 of every existent to alterity (that is, radical externality). In 
one sense, the balance of existence always favours the plenitude of objects – “to be in the world is to be 
attached to things;”1237 “human life in the world does not go beyond the objects that fulfil it”1238 – but at 
the same time, existents ceaselessly tip towards the subject, are at the subject‟s “disposal,”1239 precisely 
because even the minimal intervention of consciousness excites from the subject an extraordinary 
valence.   
 
Thus, while there is every reason to contend, as does Harman‟s daring analysis, that Levinas‟ thought 
centres on the “improved status of concrete things”1240 – after all, “Being...is scattered across the full 
multitude of entities that inhabit the world,
1241
 defining each as being just what it is”1242 – it remains 
impossible to deduce from this that either subject or object can be associated with fundamental activity as 
such.
1243
 Like Heidegger, Levinas locks givenness and facticity together – the “world is given;”1244 but the 
“fact of being given is the world”1245 – paradoxically rendering knowability subordinate to its own 
terms.
1246
 
   
In short, every entity presents the quantitative dimension of the il y a, of pure Being, but, from a 
phenomenological perspective, this can be apprehended only by a qualitative subtraction from this 
fundamental quantity. It is upon this point that the present work departs from Levinas. It is no act of pre-
cognitive, analogical approximation, or any tool of representation, that renders the il y a knowable. The il 
                                                          
1236
 In my view, it is unclear in Levinas‟ early work whether this relation is potential or actual, or whether alterity is 
finally located in the il y a, the Other, or both. 
1237
 EE, 27.  
1238
 TO, 63. 
1239
 EE, 30.  
1240
 Harman, Tool Being, 237. Llewelyn identifies in Levinas‟ work a “quest for concreteness” (Llewelyn, 
Emmanuel Levinas, 22).  
1241
 This formulation seems something of an ontological equivalent to Edwin Hutchins‟ distributed cognition which 
aims “to put cognition back into the social and cultural world...[by] mov[ing] the boundaries of the cognitive unity 
of analysis out beyond...the individual person,” (Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, Mass and 
London: MIT, 1995, xiv), recognizing that it is distributed across social groups, between structures of internality and 
externality, and through time (Arthur M. Glenberg, “Radical changes in cognitive process due to technology: A 
jaundiced view,” Cognition Distributed: How cognitive technology extends our minds, ed. Itiel E. Dror and Steven 
Harnad (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2008), 76). 
1242
 Harman, Tool Being, 241. 
1243
 Arguably, Harman goes too far in focusing his claim that all entities “take a stance within the world and 
command our attention” (ibid.) through the thought of Levinas. 
1244
 EE, 38. “[T]he fact of being given is the world” (ibid., 30). 
1245
 Ibid.  
1246
 This would amount to a recursive epistemological position in which knowledge is always derived from the 
structures of knowledge which we are given in order to know.   
   226 
 
y a is knowable because it is, in fact, nothing other than the Real which persists indifferently in any entity 
– its simplest quantitative being. Like the Real, the il y a cannot not take place in every entity: it cannot be 
declined, nor is it able to desist by any force of its own. These are absolute to the entity in the precise 
sense reserved by Meillassoux: an “outside which was not relative to us, and which was given as 
indifferent to its own givenness to be what it is.”1247 The il y a and the Real similarly configure that which 
in every entity is proper to its persistence without furnishing it with any particular qualities. This is not 
too far from that which is noted above in Harman‟s terms as the “sheer labor of things at being what they 
are.” “The key to the structure of reality would lie not between being and beings, but in beings 
themselves.”1248    
 
The Real is the depth, weight, and density of every entity qua self-relation.
1249
 “Not grace but gravity 
characterizes the il y a,”1250 as Llewelyn notes, which reverses Barthes notion of an essential lightness in 
existence. Such self-relation is not, as Robbins mistakenly suggests, contingent on any type of 
performativity,
1251
 but rather subject to an inertness which bars it from identification even as it admits it to 
the Real. Yet, if the instant of hypostasis
1252
 presents a point of suspension, there remains no simple 
exit
1253
 from the burdensome impassivity of Being.
1254
 Consciousness cannot fully withdraw from itself, 
and it is this curious impotentiality of the subject in relation to its own impotence that stimulates Levinas 
to probe the il y a in its manner of supervening upon vitality and death. In sharp contradistinction to the 
Heideggerian conviction that the care for Being is inextricable from an existent‟s relation to its finitude, 
for Levinas the mark of existence is precisely its relation to infinitude,
1255
 to the “the eternal futurity of 
                                                          
1247
 AF, 7.  
1248
 Harman, Tool Being, 240. Llewellyn emphasizes “internal dialectic of [a being‟s] internal engagement with its 
own existence” (Llewelyn, Emmanuel Levinas, 32). 
1249
 Although of a different phenomenological register, there is a certain similarity here to the manner in which 
Merleau-Ponty suggests of reality that we must “delve into the thickness of the world” (PP, 204). See also Taylor 
Carman, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 180, 190-2. 
1250
 Llewelyn, Emmanuel Levinas, 28. In aesthetic terms, this is a significant alternative to the standard modernist 
fare regarding an epiphanic, transfigurative as the truth of Being, especially as revealed in art. Particularly as regards 
the connection of minimalism to the il y a, we might oppose to Levinas‟ “gravity” the final phrase of Fried‟s 
quintessentially modernist reproof of minimalism in Art and Objecthood : “presentness is grace” (Fried, Art and 
Objecthood, 147). 
1251
 Robbins, Altered Reading, 99. See also Llewelyn, Emmanuel Levinas, 13-4. 
1252
 Here it is important to note Llewelyn‟s distinction of monist hypostasis – subjective substantiation – from plural 
hypostasis – substantiation by the Other (ibid., 182-3). 
1253
 EE, 57; TO, 50.  
1254
 As Llewelyn usefully points out, we should not mistake the “transcendence to a new state of existence,” which 
is shaped, for Levinas, by alterity, with “excedence that would be the exit from existence.” (Llewellyn, Emmanuel 
Levinas, 11).  
1255
 I should like to point to several agreements between the ontology of Levinas and Badiou. In resisting Being as a 
question of finitude, both commit to a vision of ontological infinity: the il y a attempts to grasp the same 
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death,”1256 so that in existing we are fixed in perpetuity to the “duration of the interval – the 
meanwhile...[which is] never finished, still enduring.”1257 This “time of dying,”1258 presents the temporal 
intuition that “[n]othingness is impossible,”1259 and particularly so from the perspective of an existent. 
Consequently, “death qua nothingness”1260 is simply a fantasy of no longer being bound to the immanence 
of Being and its revelation of the bankcruptcy of any future event of metaphysical redemption. Death is 
the most banal of all existential occurrences – this is above all the lesson of the il y a – and the time of 
dying becomes a marker for the manner in which an existent reaches for its minimal existential intensity.  
 
Critchley encapsulates the situation well in suggesting that “representations of death are 
misrepresentations”1261 The laconic1262 prose of Maurice Blanchot – exemplifying a “carefully 
constructed dynamic of eschewal and restriction,”1263 the austere markers of a certain brand of 
minimalism which he shares with several prominent nouveaux romanciers
1264
 – exhibits its consciousness 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
fundamental multiplicity Badiou describes as being qua being (MP, 81), although where Levinas asserts that the 
infinite aspect of the subject owes to the incommensurable encounter of a subject existing within the il y a and 
absolute alterity, introduced via intersubjectivity (EE, 99-100), Badiou is adamant that the process of subjectivation 
is a positive localization, a finite expression tied to the production of an infinite truth (BE, 396-9). Both endorse a 
notion of an event through which subjectivity arises, but whereas for Levinas this is a hypostatic instant which gives 
rise to subjective consciousness (EE, 70-1; TO, 52), for Badiou the event is a trans-ontological eruption of pure 
novelty in Being, and has nothing to do with consciousness (BE, 189-90, 397; Alain Badiou, “The Event as Trans-
Being,” TW, 100). Rather, an event presents the possibility of realigning the contents of a situation – a process of 
subjectivation, or what Badiou calls the pursuit of an infinite truth (Badiou, “Truth,” 129). Alterity, for Badiou, is 
thus located solely in the event which actively sets in motion a process of subjectivation, whereas for Levinas, it is 
in practical terms an encounter which takes place subsequent to the emergence of a subject – admittedly of any such 
encounter we will be able to say that alterity must always already have been a possibility from the outset for this 
encounter to have taken place. These philosophers respond to similar intuitions regarding Being, but whereas Badiou 
formalizes these in relation to set theory – that is, a language which resists self-referential paradox – Levinas 
remains caught within what Meillassoux describes as the “correlationist circle” (AF, 5) of phenomenology, in which 
every intuition of externality inevitably undermines itself by the fact that it is, finally, offered on the basis of a point 
of access, from the perspective of consciousness as positive phenomenon (the subject remains rooted to itself). 
1256
 TO, 71.  
1257
 Levinas, “Shadow,” 11. See Critchley, Very Little, 32, 70-2; Wall, Radical Passivity, 24.  
1258
 Levinas, “Shadow,” 11.  
1259
 TO, 73. “It is nothingness that would have left humankind the possibility of assuming death and snatching a 
supreme mastery from out of the servitude of existence” (ibid.). 
1260
 Levinas, “Shadow,” 11. See also TO, 50-1. 
1261
 Critchley, Very Little, 73.  
1262
 Leslie Hill notes of Blanchot‟s narrative a significant reversal, “of suspense as completion and completion as 
suspense” (Leslie Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 145. 
1263
 Motte, Small Worlds, 26.  
1264
 In addition to its stylistic paucacity, it is replete with “[m]oments of repetition, recurrence, or return,” (Hill, 
Blanchot, 154), which are similarly and obsessively deployed both by Robbe-Grillet and Beckett, foremost amongst 
others. 
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of this point by offering a powerful vision of the time of dying.
1265
 Exemplary in this respect is “Death 
Sentence,” the two distinct narrative sections of which attest to the significant conceptual consonances 
between Levinas and Blanchot, albeit the latter arrives at these through a primarily poietic field
1266
 to 
which the former is not particularly sensitive.
1267
 Indeed, from the first, Blanchot specifies that here is an 
act of writing
1268
 – a necessarily circuitous presentation of the generative conflict which plays out in 
literature between the poietic production and the mimetic imitation of the Real.
1269
 In the first part, which 
centres on the dying of J., we are presented with the following startling exchange between J. and her 
nurse:  
 
I know that...[J.] sometimes talked to her at night for quite a long time: she asked her to describe some of 
the suffering she had witnessed as a nurse; and she asked her, „Have you ever seen death?‟ „I have seen 
dead people, Miss.‟ „No, death!‟ The nurse shook her head. „Well, soon you will see it.‟”1270  
 
J. dies awaiting the arrival of the writer, a confidant who has witnessed her protracted illness, 
subsequently undergoes a miraculous resurrection, and then a second death two days later, but seems to 
remain bound within an atopos of nightmarish ambiguity – a persistent cycle of decline, death and 
resurrection.
1271
 The true terror of this interminability
1272
 – of this “infinity of a timeless instant”1273 – is 
revealed in a growing awareness that J.‟s prophetic utterance – “soon you will see [death]” – is directed 
not to the nurse, but to the reader, and is fulfilled, although finally frustratedly, in the climactic attempt of 
                                                          
1265
 Through a set of oppositions which tails off, perhaps not inappropriately, into ambiguity and vagueness, Hill 
suggests that for Blanchot death is “both extreme possibility and extreme impossibility, finitude and infinity, limit 
and limitlessness, experience and anonymity, meaning and meaninglessness” (Hill, Blanchot, 151). 
1266
 See Maurice Blanchot, “The Gaze of Orpheus,” GO, trans. Lydia Davis (Barrytown: Station Hill, 1981), 99-104; 
Maurice Blanchot, “From Dread to Language,” GO, 7.   
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1269
 I take conflict to be at the heart of a memorable line close to the work‟s start – “I am almost sure that the words 
which should not be written will be written,” (Maurice Blanchot, “Death Sentence,” The Station Hill Blanchot 
Reader: Fiction and Literary Essays, trans. Lydia Davis, Paul Auster and Robert Lamberton, ed. George Quasha 
(Barrytown: Station Hill, 1999), 131), and those which begin its “metatextual epilogue” (Hill, Blanchot, 145). Hill 
notes how this epilogue was removed in the text‟s republication (ibid., 145, 255) – “These pages can end here, and 
nothing that follows what I have just written will make me add anything to it or take anything away from it. This 
remains, this will remain until the very end” (ibid., 187). 
1270
 Blanchot, “Death Sentence,” 141-2.  
1271
 As Fynsk notes, this second death “may not finish anything: her second death is offered only as a citation of the 
first” (Christopher Fynsk, Language and Relation: ...that there is language (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996), 248). 
1272
 See ibid., 250.  
1273
 Hill, Blanchot, 150.  
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writing to transgress its own medium
1274
 in a gesture of poietic self-extinction, marked when J. points to 
the writer with the words “[n]ow then, take a good look at death.”1275  
 
“Death Sentence” attempts to exemplify that the “language of literature is a search for th[e] moment 
which precedes literature.”1276 Fynsk describes Blanchot‟s quest in writing for a “literature [which] 
communicates an uncommunicating presence that is not quite self-presence and never quite posits itself 
but nevertheless stirs and persists.”1277 To reach for this position, writing needs first to confront “the 
materiality of language...the fact that words are things.”1278 Inasmuch as writing affirms in its very 
materiality the exact point at which language substitutes itself for the concreteness of whichever entity is 
its referent, it equally witnesses in this moment of representation, the fact that this entity is capable of 
being annihilated.
1279
 In this mimetic movement, language binds itself both symbolically and actually to 
death.
1280
 Yet, if the referents of language cease to exist – or if language is deployed to things which do 
not exist but which could exist, or could have existed – language does not cease as a force (of 
signification). This persistence, a “reawakening of the interminable,”1281 is indicative of the manner in 
which Blanchot reaches for the il y a by an argument structurally identical to the one Levinas offers.
1282
 
Fynsk submits that for Blanchot, beside any particular reference, “the persistence of the word as 
word...becomes the indication or expression of the il y a...The self-reflection or self-offering of language 
becomes the showing of the il y a.”1283  
 
It is certainly accurate to describe this disposition of language as a species of conceptual minimalism: by 
a severe self-limitation, language reflexively affirms its status as thing, and so exemplifies a mimetic 
economy which is distinctly minimal, since language no longer refers to an external world, but rather to 
the self-referential field of poietic force. The force of writing effects “existence without being existence 
                                                          
1274
 Hill declares this to be a “narrative of the very limits of narrative” (ibid., 151). 
1275
 Blanchot, “Death Sentence,” 149.  
1276
 LRD, 46. 
1277
 Fynsk, Language and Relation, 233. 
1278
 LRD, 46. Blanchot goes on: “[a] name ceases to be the ephemeral passing of nonexistence and becomes a 
concrete ball, a solid mass of existence…[with] rhythm, weight, mass, shape and then the paper on which one writes 
the trail of ink, the book” (ibid.). 
1279
 Fynsk, Language and Relation, 232. 
1280
 LRD, 47.  
1281
 Maurice Blanchot, “Sleep, Night,” The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln and London: U of 
Nebraska P, 1982), 267. 
1282
 TO, 46-7; EE, 51-2. See Fynsk, Language and Relation, 233-4. Hill, however notes divergences regarding the 
relation of neutrality to the il y a: Levinas considers the neutrality of Being to be synonymous with its absolute self-
identification, a formulation Blanchot refuses (Hill, Blanchot, 138-9). 
1283
 Fynsk, Language and Relation, 234-5. This is “[n]ot a language full of images, but a language that has become 
the image of language, figuring by this nonreflection the dissimulation of being itself” (ibid., 236). 
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which remains below existence, like an inexorable affirmation without beginning or end – death as the 
impossibility of dying.”1284 The second part of “Death Sentence” addresses in somewhat brutal terms, this 
relation between poietic effort – in the present context we could perhaps label this the narrative 
malconstruction of reality – and the manner in which the inconsistencies and vacuities of literature 
obliquely approach the il y a , or what I here term the Real. Close to the end, the writer discovers – with a 
horror which is finally directed at his own willing of an amnesic state, the “forgetfulness of things,”1285 
since, in fact, he already knows what N. is about to reveal – that she has had her head and hands cast by a 
sculptor,
1286
 consenting to the production of a spectral double, manifested where the poietic act of the 
sculptor and her own auto-mimetic desire bisect one another. Of this uncanny proto-mimetic entity, 
Blanchot writes: “[a]nd now that thing is over there, you have uncovered it, you have looked at it, and you 
have looked into the face of something that will be alive for all eternity, for your eternity and for mine! 
Yes, I know it, I know it, I‟ve known it all along.”1287 The Image of N., emptied of all its content yet 
charged with presence, marks the manner in which the poietic enterprise simultaneously exceeds its 
creator, any prototype to which it may be coordinated, and, finally, itself. It invokes a preconceptual 
eternity, and provokes within us the horrifying confrontation of existent with the sheer indifference of 
existence.  
 
Blanchot‟s identification of writing as the medium most capable of presenting the il y a1288 is based not on 
any particular effective or affective power it possesses – in fact, if anything is clear, it is that writing is 
singularly powerless – but on the ease with which its self-reflexivity can be determined and confirmed.1289 
What Blanchot tends to ignore, is that any medium through which we might encounter the il y a as datum 
is itself already mediated by consciousness. In fact there lies no revelation whatsoever in saying that we 
encounter the presence of the il y a in a particular existent, for the il y a is precisely the Real, a minimal 
condition for the existence of an entity, prior to and indifferent to the givenness of this entity. The 
movement from this banality to the claim that art, and writing in particular, can in fact manifest the il y a 
in itself is, as Fynsk notes, “more on the order of a slippage than an argumentation.”1290 Still, it is an 
intuition at least partly endorsed by Critchley
1291
 and Robbins,
1292
 and the latter‟s claim regarding “an 
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1285
 Blanchot, “Death Sentence,” 183.  
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 Ibid., 185.  
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 Fynsk, Language and Relation, 236.  
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utter intrication of art and the il y a” is obvious at least as regards the presence of Being in any existent, 
but incorrect in assimilating this intrication to the manner in which we are apparently compelled to 
approach the il y a in aesthetic terms.
1293
  
 
 
d) Aesthetic facticity – disappearance and persistence 
 
Here it is necessary briefly to trace Levinas‟ position on art.1294 Art‟s relation to the existential position 
that it is “impossible to die”1295 opens a significant question which, to my mind, is habitually ignored: 
what, if anything, lies between hypostasis and the il y a?
1296
 I agree with Harman‟s assertion that the il y a 
“refer[s] not to a special event, but to a permanent and universal feature of reality as a whole,”1297 yet 
emphasize amidst this agreement, that we hope in vain actually to encounter the il y a through any 
substantive object or thing, for the simple reason that the il y a is a “field of forces.”1298 From Levinas we 
have gathered that it is through hypostasis that a subject emerges into a world of things
1299
 – that is, 
entities unpolarized in Being – by establishing a relation with these things. In a significant sense, this 
relation converts these things from mere things into objects.
1300
 Yet it would be inaccurate to claim that 
through this process subjects and objects entirely forsake their fundamental thinghood: this would 
demand a decisive scission of thing, object and subject from the il y a – an empty proposition, for the very 
fact that anything which is, affirms in the first instant that there is. 
 
Thus, between the hypostatic instant – which indicates the emergence of subjects and objects – and the il 
y a – Being as the field of forces indifferent to any particular existent or process – resides the thing. Such 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1292
 Robbins, Altered Reading, 93, 97-9.  
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a thing marks equally the facticity of the il y a and potential for the taking-place of hypostasis. To the 
extent that certain art exhibits a drive towards autonomy
1301
 in terms of a constitutive resistance to 
reduction which would render it a meaningful object at the disposal a subject, it might embody precisely 
such an intersticial thing.
1302
 Art exposes the “very inwardness of things.”1303 Such is the case with much 
minimalism, which presents itself in terms of thinghood (for the sake of terminological consistence, we 
might prefer to call this objecthood).  
 
Levinas‟ “ontology of art”1304 takes shape in the space opened by Kantian aesthetics, albeit negatively. It 
attempts to apprehend art in “what one might call a „non-aesthetic‟ dimension,”1305 in which the sublime 
and formlessness exercise ontological precedence over beauty and form.
1306
 Not that art cannot consist of 
beautiful forms, but these do not constitute its essence, which is discovered in its curious exoticism to the 
experience of ordinary existential situations.
1307
 Hence, Levinas pays particular attention to the abstraction 
which characterizes much modern art:
1308
 
 
[In modern art,] objects attest their power as material objects, even reach a paroxysm of materiality. 
Despite the rationality and luminosity of these forms when taken in themselves, a painting makes them 
exist in themselves, brings about an absolute existence in the very fact there is something which is not in its 
turn an object or a name, which is unnameable and can only appear in poetry. Here is a notion of 
materiality as opposed to thought and mind...For here materiality is thickness, coarseness, massivity, 
wretchedness. It is what has consistency, weight, is absurd, is a brute but impassive presence; it is also what 
is humble, bare and ugly...Behind the luminosity of forms, by which beings already relate to our „inside,‟ 
matter is the very fact of the [il y a].
1309
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Levinas‟ aesthetics is unusual in its claim that art withdraws from objects what is usually seen as the 
prerequisite for their apprehension – form.1310 “Art does not belong to the order of revelation. Nor does it 
belong to that of creation,”1311contends Levinas. The latter proposition – one which the present work 
disputes – is offered to strengthen the case for the hypostasis of the subject and its encounter with alterity 
as world-producing events. The former (regarding revelation) attempts to extract art from its conventional 
complicity with an economy of mimesis.
1312
 Indeed, Levinas insists that art exhibits an “absolute 
existence,” a radical materiality with all the “impassive presence” which discloses that which emerges 
from behind rather than through the “luminosity of forms” through which reality is represented.  
 
We understand the situation more accurately when we discern that even when art represents the world 
faithfully, its manner of augmenting the Real is not mimetic,
1313
 but rather it returns to objects their 
character as things – their radical objecthood which “extracts them from th[eir] belongingness to a 
subject.”1314 Art “presents things in their materiality and not as representations.”1315 “Art does not know a 
particular type of reality,”1316 Levinas stresses, but, rather, clarifies the “very obscurity of the [R]eal.”1317 I 
cannot agree with Levinas that, in its “deconceptualization of reality,”1318 the aesthetic realm should be 
conflated with the ineffability of the shadow.
1319
 This hands the being of art over to the same epistemic 
conditions he claims it resolutely opposes.
1320
 In this respect, I wonder whether the facticity of the il y a – 
that there is
1321
 – does not reveal its indifference rather as overwhelming presence of inexhaustible 
potentiality – undirected, perhaps, but not simply oblivious to the objects through which it courses.  
 
Thus, I cannot go so far as to say that art presents the il y a. This is certainly implicit in various remarks 
offered by Wall, Bruns, Critchley and Robbins
1322
 – arguably by Levinas himself.1323 Conflating art and 
the il y a in terms of identity – what else could be the basis of such a presentation? – misses that their 
proximity is defined by their shared presentation of non-identity, of non-conceptuality, and that this 
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proximity is sufficient. This mode of presentation Levinas identifies in terms of the image: the existential 
residue from the passage of pure Being into existence, yet which transgresses the identitarian limits of 
both subject and object as they arise through hypostasis. While the “phenomenology of images insists on 
their transparency,”1324 they do not merely “point [...] towards objects; instead, images are the doubles of 
objects, resemble them, in the sense that shadows resemble things.”1325 In this manner, an image acts as 
an “allegory of being.”1326 Art offers the image “in place of the object itself”1327 as well as of concepts1328 
– as a “disincarnation of reality,”1329 at once extracted from the ordinary flux of temporal passage,1330 
while simultaneously exemplifying the facticity of the Real (that there is). The image appears by a force 
of resemblance, which is the process by which art transfigures
1331
 the ordinary qualities, properties and 
likenesses of its objects into existential quantities in which “the very existing of a being, is doubled up 
with a semblance of existing.”1332 Through the image, which “neither yields the object nor replicates it in 
an ontological sense,”1333 we encounter art in its ambiguity: it both disengages from and draws us into an 
altered relation with Being;
1334
 its existence exemplifies fixity without stability
1335
 and 
“communicativity”1336 without a particular message.  
 
Returning to Blanchot‟s “Death Sentence,” it is at this point clearer all that is at stake in the image, 
spectral but Real, of the plaster casting of J. and N. Here is a situation where art exemplifies the il y a. 
Neither subject nor being qua being, art “places in parenthesis the fugivity of the Real,”1337 evoking the 
intersticial time of dying, the image of which appears between the existent and its existence. Art testifies 
that there is – to the facticity of the il y a or the Real. The more minimal its aesthetic, the more 
transparently we apprehend the lacuna which, as Agamben argues, is situated at the centre of any act of 
testimony. Like Blanchot, Beckett thematizes our relationship to the Real in terms of death and the nearly 
intolerable tension between the shocking ease with which death strikes living entities and the inability of 
consciousness to master finitude. Characters are habitually reduced to their most rudimentary modes of 
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existence – to inert bodies merely occupying space, barely capable of movement; to disembodied 
instances of self-reflexive thought, proverbial figments of their own imagination; to voices and visions 
struggling through their sensory being against the inescapability of the raw facticity of their existence.
1338
  
 
Exemplary in this respect is “Rockaby,” Beckett‟s short dramatic work in which a “[p]remature old”1339 
woman in a rocking-chair interacts with her own voice – a recording, presumably intended to be the 
product of her imagination – rehearsing, perhaps even negotiating, her death in an “essential, minimalist 
poem.”1340 The relationship of the embodied voice to its disembodied counterpart is rather ambiguous. It 
is uncertain whether the utterance, “More”1341 – with which the embodied woman punctuates the text, 
each time setting in motion the mechanical movement of the chair
1342
 and the recitation, by her uncanny 
double, of the eventless solitude of her existence – is offered as supplication or instruction, whether it is 
intended to provoke pathos or resignation. The occasional convergence of the two voices, which chant 
together “time she stopped,”1343 only reinforce the disparity with which any conscious act relates to its 
own disappearance – a gulf, of which death is the emblem, skilfully woven from a monologue of 
incremental repetition which competes with the best visual and musical minimalism.
1344
 Precisely through 
the minimalism of this work we encounter existential persistence at its most quantitative: the call for more 
of Being.  
 
The woman becomes increasingly dependent on this vocalic spectre,
1345
 the technologically mediated 
condensation of her imagination and memory, and we become acutely aware that her refrain, more, 
paradoxically marks a progressive existential lessness.
1346
 Increasingly reliant on its disembodied double, 
any remaining immanence fades to a bleak point in the work‟s final lines: 
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fuck life 
stop her eyes 
rock her off 
rock her off 
 [Together: echo of „rock her off,‟ coming to rest of rock, slow fade out.]1347 
 
The woman dies – at least, this is suggested by the slow inclination of her head at the close of the work1348 
– but, unsurprisingly, death is not a simple accomplishment here.1349 Subjectivity, as in most of Beckett‟s 
work, is forwarded only indirectly and through a veil of ambiguities and rhetorical failures, through the 
ruptured relations of the text between its internal coherence, the immediacy of its physical 
performance,
1350
 and the mediatory role it adopts between playwright and audience, and, most 
significantly, through its technological mediation. If, as Agamben argues, vocality mediates between 
being qua being and human existence, then this art – which, in the technological abstraction of the voice 
from the body imposes such a forceful field of containment upon subjectivity – exposes precisely the non-
conceptual topoi to which the work of Agamben and Levinas similarly allude in terms of a nothingness 
which evades nihilation.  
 
That technological reproduction might be more effective in prescribing reality – this is certainly a 
possible implication of the expiry of this woman at the instigation of her disembodied voice – and, 
moreover, in describing the Real, remains an unsettling proposition.
1351
 As unambiguously concrete as it 
is symbolic, Beckett points to a situation which exceeds human subjectivity – a time of dying which is the 
“possibility of a future without me, an infinite future, a future which is not my future.”1352 This work also 
clarifies the proximity of the aesthetic relation of the facticity of the il y a – that there is – to minimalism: 
both take shape along a trajectory of reductionism, abstraction and rarefication which is easily mistaken 
for pure absence, nothingness and the void. Aesthetic and existential minimalism similarly evoke a 
profound recognition: that in the pursuit of minimum we are returned to that which is most Real – the 
taking-place of entities.   
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In A Zed and Two Noughts,
1353
 amongst Peter Greenaway‟s most theoretically demanding films, the 
balance of negativity and positivity in such taking-place is meticulously interrogated. Exploring the 
intersection of mythology, science and art, the film centres on the attempts of two brothers, Oliver and 
Oswald – scientists at a zoo – to explain and mourn the death of their wives in a car accident by pseudo-
scientific means. Oliver becomes obsessed with the moment at which being passes into existence, 
repeatedly watching a “pseudo-BBC film series called Life on Earth,”1354 while Oswald, using time-lapse 
photography, begins to document the process of decay itself. Having revealed to Alba, their lover 
(separately and together),
1355
 that they were born joined at the hip, the physical appearance of Oliver and 
Oswald becomes increasingly indistinct, and their project becomes a “cinema poised...at the exact 
moment between life and death.”1356 The film attempts to grasp the point of death by recasting post-
mortem existence itself as a type of life – a time of dying.  
 
Their documentation of decomposition appropriates Darwinian taxonomy in an “evolution of death”1357 
which begins with a rotting apple and progresses through the decay of a prawn, angelfish, a crocodile, a 
swan, a dog, and a zebra. Using stop-motion photography, they break this process down to its most 
minimal elements – the image of an instant, but a dead instant, a potent aesthetic reflection of the tension 
between hypostasis and the il y a if ever there were one. Rapidly played in sequence, these narrate an 
alterior life – a life-of-death – “stop-motion allows us to see changes that would be imperceptible in real 
time...Applied to nature, this process has a pronounced alienation [sic] effect. Corpses act out a macabre 
„living‟ death, one that seems grotesquely unnatural”1358 as they bloat, shrink, are consumed and rot to 
nothingness. Here the resonance with Rancière‟s identification of the sentence-image in cinema is clear, 
as we witness the “change of regime between two sensory orders,”1359 by which conventional narrative 
logic is disrupted by the image, but yet subject to the ungainly sequencing of a “paratactic syntax.”1360 
Rather terrifyingly, this cinema adopts a deadly work of its own, its completion “demand[ing] fresh 
bodies in order to construct a climax and a kind of closure.”1361 This culminates in the brothers‟ attempt to 
capture their joint suicide and decomposition by the same technology through which they endeavoured to 
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arrest the essence of persistence from decay. This plan is thwarted when their bodies and equipment are 
overwhelmed by snails – they execute their plan on Alba‟s aptly named country estate, L’escargot – 
causing the latter to break down. We are brought to the disheartening realization that all the effort of 
science and art is finally for nought. 
 
Given the complexity of Greenaway‟s vision, it is perhaps surprising how many elements of aesthetic 
minimalism are discernible in A Zed and Two Noughts. Apart from the use of serial repetition in the stop-
motion photography – which, as noted, ties together aesthetic reductionism and physical decay – 
Greenaway often uses his screen as a canvas on which to rehearse chromatic relationships, particularly 
between black and white,
1362
 but also primary colours
1363
and the fundamental visual processes of casting 
light and shadow.
1364
 An interesting formalism is discernible in key images of the film, perhaps most 
notably in the blue neon sign of the opening scene (Figure 74) – zoo, literally a zed and two noughts – and 
which fades, letter by letter, as Oliver kneels, weeping, on the street where the fatal accident occurred.  
  
 
Figure 74: Still from opening of A Zed and Two Noughts, Peter Greenaway, 1985. 
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Here we discover the spectrum of the film‟s concerns condensed into a single vanishing image. It evokes 
the physical space of the zoo in which “the artificial, arbitrary bringing together of incompatible 
species”1365 takes place. This arbitrariness is what makes taxonomy necessary, and the several systems to 
which the film appeals converge in the letter zed: alphabetic ordering, the zenith of the Darwinian ascent 
(albeit the decaying zebra is surpassed in the progressive animalization of the human body). The fading of 
the zed (Figure 75) foreshadows the inability of these systems to stabilise order, or to offer satisfactory 
connection of decay to loss and grief, and the two brothers – the two noughts, OO, Oliver and Oswald1366 
– are left without consolation.  
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Figure 75:Sequence of two stills from opening of Zed and Two Noughts, Peter Greenaway, 1985. 
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The disappearance of the second nought, reduces the conceptual cinematic topos to the single O (Figure 
76). Visually, this distinctly recalls the light art of Dan Flavin or Olafur Eliasson, and the sculpture of 
Ronald Bladen. This solitary nought installs zero as an existential target of sorts – the absence to which 
all existence seems to tend. At the same time, however, we are reminded that the nothingness which we 
might associate with death or disappearance is not void: we witness that the progress of decay installs 
another, uncanny, second life – a life without consciousness, but which is still marked by physical process 
and effect.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 76: Sequence of stills from Peter Greenaway, A Zed and Two Noughts, 1985). 
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e) The argument regarding minimalism and perception 
 
The point at which this final O disappears (Figure 76) marks not nothingness, but the minimal distinction 
of the static instant from the passage of time. This is not only evident from Greenaway‟s use of stop-
motion animation, but is also implicit in the soundtrack for the film composed by minimalist Michael 
Nyman. As indissociable as Greenaway‟s images might be from Nyman‟s memorable melodies, the 
genesis of this music usually occurs independently, with minimal initial reference to visual themes.
1367
 
Yet there exists a rare synergy in this work which draws into a provocative proximity the significant 
temporal, existential and scientific concerns exposed above, and an aesthetic field upon which the lucid, 
formalist austerity of minimalism meets the opulent formality of the Baroque.
1368
 This is clearly audible in 
“Time Lapse,” (Track 22),1369 the composition which accompanies the opening sequence cited above as 
well as many of the laboratory scenes. Its rhythmic, repeated chords make clear reference to the 
predilection for homophonic texture which characterizes several musical genres of the Baroque
1370
 – here 
Nyman draws on a “Dies Irae” of Heinrich Biber1371 – and well complements scenes which exploit the 
regular punctuation of stop-motion photography,
1372
 offering in its vigorous yet stately pulse a 
counterpoint to Greenaway‟s uncanny evocation of decay as a time of dying.  
 
Indeed, a surprisingly productive field of comparison exists between minimalism and the Baroque, the 
exploration of which has tended to distinguish between their formal similarities, their reception and 
consumption as cultural products, and their affective consonances. From a formalist perspective, there are 
certainly legitimate points of contact. In the first instance, minimalist and Baroque music are comparable 
in their use of sequences, or repeated patterns – harmonic, melodic or rhythmic – which, through their 
repetitions and variations, are a principal structuring force of the music. Both are also concerned with 
rendering the compositional process transparent.
1373
 This could not be more unambiguously presented 
than in Glass‟ “Floe,” (Track 23),1374 which patiently states and then combines each element of its ecstatic 
content most conspicuously. Responding respectively to the exaggerated complexity of late Renaissance 
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polyphony and the serialism developed by the Second Viennese school and their successors,
1375
 Baroque 
and minimalist composition sought to reanimate the most fundamental material from which harmony and 
harmonic progression are derived. The basso ostinato, or ground bass, in baroque music – a repeated bass 
motif which outlines cyclical patterns of harmonic movement
1376
 – finds close parallels in minimalism.1377 
More recognizable, still, is the presence of melodic sequences, isorhythms
1378
 and the extensive use of 
arpeggiated lines.
1379
 We might only compare a celebrated passage from the opening movement of 
Vivaldi‟s La Primavera concerto (Track 24)1380 to one from Glass‟ “Knee-Play 2” from Einstein on the 
Beach (Track 25)
1381
 to adduce this proximity. The arpeggio offers a suitable vehicle for the simultaneous 
exposition of harmonic and melodic material, and while we exercise just caution in resisting, with Fink, 
the equation of minimalism and baroque music through any one such vehicle – stylistic marker, 
theoretical principal, or compositional process
1382
 – we do equally well in recalling that the search for 
aesthetic novelty often begins with a sustained re-examination of aesthetic foundations.  
 
By definition, any radical aesthetic proposition revisits the possibility of defining its own essence. In this 
sense every aesthetic period exposes some sort of minimalism – doubtless one could contend that the 
sparseness and transparency which characterizes late eighteenth century classicism is somewhat minimal. 
However, where classicism‟s innovations are clarified by the manner in which material is coordinated by 
hierarchical forms and structures, those of the baroque are apprehended in the very midst of process and 
procedure. Taking seriously Reich‟s proposition that the minimal heart of music is located in the very 
production of its constituent sounds,
1383
 we might note similarly that it is through the performance of 
baroque music that one becomes a witness to the intimate process by which transparent simplicity and 
opaque complexity are held together, generating in their dialectic interplay a dynamic sonic field from 
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which music takes its shape. Both monodic immediacy and intricate polyphony reach back to the very 
radical taking-place of a sonic entity in terms of its melodic, harmonic, rhythmic, dynamic and timbrel 
elements. Harmony and melody constitute one another in a single musical occurrence. We search 
patiently for that elusive point at which sound reveals itself as music: between will and body, inhalation 
and exhalation; between presence and absence, existence and nothingness – between hypostasis and the il 
y a. 
 
Fink downplays such speculative thought. “Seeing a link between minimalism and Baroque music does 
not mean casting back two centuries for some elusive tonal essence the two styles share,”1384 he claims. 
He contends that we look instead to music‟s “societal function”1385 and how music is consumed1386 to 
explain such proximities. Rather than insisting on a transhistorical analysis of consumption – noting, 
comparing and decoding types of consumer and consumption of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
on the one hand, and the twentieth and twenty-first centuries on the other – Fink suggests that the early 
postmodern pattern of consumption itself produces the proximity of minimalism and the Baroque in the 
sense that it is this “new culture of repetitive listening”1387 which conditions our perception of 
resemblances in the first instance. That “the infancy of...[minimalism] was saturated in the actual material 
sound of a commercially driven technological transformation of [Baroque music]”1388 is itself a 
contentious claim.
1389
 Accepting the popularity of the so-called barococo revival and its inextricability 
from technologies of mass-dissemination which shape reception
1390
 still leaves us at a considerable 
distance from affirming Fink‟s somewhat conservative uncoupling of production and reception, 
separating an impeccably educated composing elite from an apparently pedestrian and undiscerning 
listener-consumer.  
 
Nonetheless, Fink‟s analysis of minimalism in terms of its status as commodity – its rise within a climate 
of accelerated capitalism marked by the symmetrical expansion of a culture of consumption and the 
consumption of culture
1391
 – is one of considerable value. In his work we discover an important variation 
on similar insights reached by Kenneth Baker, who stresses in minimalism‟s emergence “the broad 
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background of American mass production,” in which artists “responded to the cynical superabundance of 
industry by using its services to produce objects calculatedly unlike what the cornucopia of mass 
production disgorges,”1392 and Hal Foster, who contends that “[m]inimalism and pop often approximated 
a serial mode of production that related them like no previous art to our systematic world of commodities 
and images. With this serial mode of production came a different mode of consumption.”1393 Meyer 
provides considerable insight to the “„culture sell‟”1394 fashion, design, advertising and journalism achieve 
by coupling themselves to the minimalist avant-garde of the 1960s – “the logic of Novelty was the logic 
of consumption”1395 – and Strickland,1396 Chave1397 and Mertens1398 offer similar observations within a 
broadly materialist critique of cultural economy.   
 
The danger of excessively labouring the point regarding minimalism‟s socio-economic moorings resides 
in the potential suppression of its aesthetic features. We easily miss that the principal means of 
recognizing resemblance resides in aesthetic perception itself, upon which minimalism places novel and 
paradoxical demands.
1399
 Minimalism seems to harness the very force of the concept in exposing the 
immanence of its media and their relation to sensation and perception:
1400
 neither obtains absolute 
primacy, and an attempt to isolate one always returns us to the other, alternating between „intellect as 
determinative dimension...[and] the observer‟s bodily awareness as the standpoint from which he must 
construe an artwork‟s rationale and his own role in determining what he sees.”1401 The immanence which 
minimalism attempts to evoke in terms of “some sort of presence or concrete thereness”1402 in its objects, 
abandons transcendence to a radical taking-place of matter.
1403
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Donald Judd‟s contention is that minimalism manifests in terms of specific objects.1404 Each of these is a 
unified quantity, a “thing as a whole”1405 which is determined not by any internal or external relation of 
particular parts, but by the fact that it is expressly indifferent to resemblance, representation or illusion.
1406
 
The media or materials in which such an object consists are “simply materials,”1407 and it is by this 
minimal being that “[t]hey are specific.”1408 Claiming that “[a] work needs only to be interesting,”1409 
Judd installs interest as the correlate of specificity, and an experiential cipher for the displacement which 
minimalism effects within traditional aesthetics. Not only is Kantian disinterestedness decentred by a 
concern with aesthetic intensity, presence or immanence, but many minimalists sought to circumvent the 
view that their aesthetic work involves reflective judgment at all. To recall Kant, reflective judgment 
defines the aesthetic situation in which our encounter with particular sensory data is normalized by the 
submission of this data to concepts. These concepts allow us to “ascend from the particular in nature to 
the universal,”1410 so that, finally, aesthetic experience as it is encountered in a particular object 
presupposes the potential subjugation of its aesthetic qualities to concepts.
1411
 By contrast, Judd‟s idea of 
specific objects demarcates aesthetic entities which themselves claim universality inasmuch as they are 
absolutely singular in their stark nonconceptuality. Thus they are interesting without commanding our 
obeisance to a transcendental principle.  
 
In the celebrated essay, “Art and Objecthood,” Michael Fried takes an extremely forceful line against 
such minimalism – or literalist art,1412 as he terms it – claiming that on the basis of its overly literal 
understanding of its vocation simply to exist, it negates conviction regarding art‟s historicity, substituting 
for the modernist “transcendental „presentness‟ of art...the mundane „presence‟ of things.”1413 Aesthetic 
perception appeals to a sense of “[e]ndlessness, being able to go on and on, even having to go on and 
on”1414 – the “temporality of perception,”1415 or “duration of the experience.”1416 It is this reduction of art 
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to “a mundane time”1417 which Fried views as antithetical to the advancements of modernity.1418 Such art 
functions by a sort of theatricality which divests it of any specific force by allowing the aesthetic object to 
drift, apparently “inexhaustibly,”1419 between pure sensation and structuring perception on the one hand, 
and, on the other, generic conventions and aesthetic disciplines.
1420
 Such inexhaustibility owes not to “any 
fullness [within the object]...but because there is nothing there to exhaust.”1421 In this sense, the 
theatricality which Fried places at the centre of minimalism – “the production of objects designed 
exclusively to produce a response”1422 – suggests a hollow aesthetic sensibility. Theatrical objects claim 
as their own a sheer presence which, in fact, is coerced from the perceiver in the form of an anonymous 
but irremissible aesthetic awareness.
1423
 Theatricality obscures the epiphanic promise that aesthetic 
modernism sought to conserve: that “[p]resentness is grace;”1424 that externality and autonomy in their 
intricacy are inextricable from the possibility of freedom.
1425
    
 
Minimalism understood thus deflects aesthetic integrity from the object to the vicissitudes of aesthetic 
perception as experienced by an embodied subject, while simultaneously transforming this subject from a 
simple viewer to a beholder.
1426
 “The objects exists on its own all right; what depends on the beholder is 
only the experience,”1427 notes Walter Benn Michaels in his assessment of Fried‟s argument. “But, of 
course, the experience is everything – it is the experience instead of the object that Minimalism 
values.”1428 The beholder performs a constructive role inasmuch as the objects of canonical minimalism 
are dependent on perception for their integrity; yet the beholder is simultaneously rendered passive, even 
impotent, as he is able neither to ignore nor fully to apprehend the work in its sheer quantity.
1429
 In short, 
minimalism requires a new mode of perception: “to discover and project objecthood as such,”1430 it must 
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recast itself as “an object in a situation – one that, virtually by definition, includes the beholder,”1431 and, 
finally, “belongs to the beholder.”1432  
 
For Robert Morris,
1433
 despite the ill-fated search for an absolute artwork – a work which would be 
constituted by a single quality or a single part
1434
 – minimalism diligently generates unitary forms (Figure 
77).
1435
 These are “bound together...with a kind of energy provided by the gestalt...in such a way that they 
offer a maximum resistance to perceptual separation,”1436 eschewing the relation of any internal parts, as 
well as the possible reduction of their singularity to any quality which could be determined from a 
position of externality, or a relation to other objects.
1437
 Thus, as Berger observes of Morris‟ L-Beams, 
“while the logic of the form‟s uniformity is understood, the visual inconsistency of their positioning 
precludes seeing them as the same.”1438 Remarkably, the unitary form remains indifferent – “neutral and 
austere” – even as it draws the beholder into an active perceptual relation by the sense of presence its 
scale commands, a bodily relation more usually reserved for our interaction with other people.
1439
  
 
Every unitary form coheres qua its own paradigmatic exposition
1440
 – its production of, and manifestation 
within, the para-ontological sphere
1441
 of its own intelligibility;
1442
 an imbrication of the self-reflexivity 
and reflective judgment which confirm the facticity of the work persisting as it is within the Real. 
Likewise, we might recognize in Morris‟ position the aesthetic paraphrase of what Badiou grasps 
ontologically when, accepting the fundamental axiom that the One is not, that which seems to be One, 
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must, in fact, be multiple. The unitary form is an aesthetic analogue for that which by its resistant 
engagement with perception is counted-as-One.  
 
 
 
Figure 77: Robert Morris, Untitled (L-Beams), 1965-7. 
 
Returning to the question of presence, Foster maintains that minimalism is best comprehended in 
epistemological terms
1443
 – in his estimation its aesthetic sphere is defined by a self-reflexivity concerned 
with the conditions of its perception and intelligibility. I incline towards the proposition that minimalist 
presence is the para-ontological condition by which its objects exemplify their relation to the Real. By 
analogy, we might recall the manner in which Aristotelian categories simultaneously delineate and retain 
ontology, and ask whether minimalism might not be interpreted as a homological mirror – an oblique 
return to ontology offered by restraining epistemology by the very terms it values most? “[A] brute but 
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impassive presence,”1444 Levinas reminds us, is the pivot of the existential understanding of Being itself. 
By the persistence of its emphasis on presence, minimalism exhibits its passion for the Real (adapting 
Badiou‟s phrase)1445 – a reflexive exemplification of the “relationship art entertains with the real, or what 
the real of art is.”1446Exposing this relationship, art must come to “exhibit its own process...[and] to 
visibly idealize its own materiality;”1447 to generate by its “erasure of every content”1448 the destruction 
neither of quality nor of meaning as such, but the recognition of their supplementarity to what of every 
quantity is Real.
1449
 In this way it subtracts from its own material
1450
 the “minimal difference”1451 between 
the proper place of an entity and its taking-place, between its pure presence and the representation of 
presence.
1452
 
 
We discover in this minimal difference the ontological elaboration of Foster‟s claim that, “[a]s an analysis 
of perception, minimalism prepared a further analysis of the conditions of perception.”1453 Dan Flavin‟s 
installation at the Hamburger Bahnhof in Berlin is remarkable in this respect (Figure 78).
1454
 A prime 
example of the transumptive logic of much minimalism, defining the proper topos of this work proves 
exceedingly tricky. Its constituents are distributed between several locations and dislocations, material 
objects and the organs and processes of perception: the iridescent material which each fluorescent fixture 
contains; the electricity which triggers the chemical reactions responsible for the luminescence of these 
fixtures; the actual light which the fixtures emit; the manner in which this light is apprehended, processed 
and transformed by the sensory and associated apparatus of our bodies; the materiality of the fixtures 
themselves, their way of occupying space and relating to the architecture of the hall – reflected, deflected 
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and limited by floors, walls, pillars, arches, windows and the ceiling; and finally from the perspective of a 
passer-by to whom the entire building might become a work of light art (Figure 79).
1455
 
 
 
Figure 78: Dan Flavin - untitled (Hamburger Bahnhof, Berlin), 1996. Interior view. 
 
 Figure 79: Dan Flavin - untitled (Hamburger Bahnhof, Berlin), 1996. Exterior view. 
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That “perceptual presence”1456 is distributed in such a way has led numerous minimalists to a brand of 
phenomenology loosely sympathetic to Maurice Merleau-Ponty‟s central proposition: that perception is a 
dynamic and constructive process,
1457
 a practical synthesis of “lived-through correspondences”1458 of 
sensory data and sensation which our embodied existence actively generates.
1459
 Perception is the 
“original text”1460 which donates purposiveness to reality by indicating “a direction rather than a primitive 
function”1461 which conditions the interaction of a body with entities of the world by which it is 
surrounded, each of which has a particular existential style.
1462
 In the process by which perception stylizes 
reality,
1463
 art is of particular significance to Merleau-Ponty since, “[w]ith all its sensuous means, it is art 
which gives this dimension [of embodied perception] its fullest expression.”1464 If “elementary perception 
is already charged with a meaning,”1465 how much more so might the specialized aesthetic perception be 
which exposes the full intensity of a specific medium? Recognizing that “no language ever wholly frees 
itself from the precariousness of mute forms of expression,”1466 those of art nonetheless remain 
remarkable for the manner in which they intensify perception by the imbrication of the body with a 
particular medium.  
 
The autopoietic definition of biological systems is instructive here, and fundamental to all living systems 
and those which operate homologically. “A creature endowed with a central nervous system must succeed 
in externalizing and constructing an outside world before it can begin to articulate self-reference on the 
basis of its own bodily perceptions…perhaps by a sort of transcribing of the brain‟s “double closure” into 
an inside/outside distinction within consciousness,”1467 according to Luhmann. In this light, Merleau- 
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Ponty‟s insistence on the ontological autonomy of art, a field which is yet constituted of entities 
“accessible only through direct contact,”1468 rehearses the existential conditions central to the maintenance 
of human consciousness in its autopoietic capacity. Here is a theoretical ground upon which the 
minimalist notion of unmediated presence might be forwarded. By the processes of perception, the objects 
of art are neither mediated nor represented, but, rather, constituted and presented. No rift exists between 
intention and reception in the medial continuity of the work qua perception. Merleau-Ponty‟s claim that 
art exists as a “nexus of living meanings”1469 furnishes a radical vision of all art as implicitly 
anthropocentric.  
 
In a similar register, Mikel Dufrenne acknowledges art as a physical articulation of perception
1470
 within 
the “plane of presence”1471 – the world as it is presented in its undefined encounterability and 
perceptibility – in which case art presents perception in a particularly concrete manner.1472 It is in the 
sheer physicality by which the aesthetic imbrication of presence and perception is made manifest that 
“our body is comparable to a work of art.”1473 However, significant caution must be exercised in the 
relation of anthropocentrism to anthropomorphism: if the latter habitually implies the former, the 
assumption that the former necessarily leads to the latter is false. Perhaps this last point is what directs 
Fried to the contention that a “latent or hidden...anthropomorphism”1474 preoccupies even the most 
literalist work. Recognizing the minimalists‟ concern with maximally effective scale, Fried tactically 
reduces minimalism‟s claims regarding unmediated presence to a question of scale, and scale to one of 
anthropomorphism. Fried‟s implicit phenomenology is one in which access to the existence, emergence 
and transformation – not solely of organisms, but of entities in general – is predicated upon anthropic 
gesture. The present argument departs considerably in this respect: without denying the constructive 
nature of perception, its primary concern lies with the manner in which the Real, by its sheer indifference, 
conditions the coherence of every entity qua its persistence. Thus, if for minimalism, “there can be no 
conceptual, or mediated, equivalent to laying eyes on something in its presence,”1475 this is not due to its 
qualities, as such, but because minimalism institutes a “new regime of [perception, in which]...the 
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beholder‟s presence is not external to the art object, and that the object is partly determined by the 
beholder‟s presence and response.”1476 Thus minimalism‟s paradoxically engaging disengagement from 
questions of meaning
1477
 stems precisely from a radicalization of questions of presentation and 
representation according to which “perception is made reflexive in...[its] works and so rendered complex” 
even as it struggles with nothingness.
1478
  
 
 
f) Minimal intensity and existential appearance 
 
The encounter of thought with nothingness reaches in three broad directions. The first is ontotheological: 
nothingness is understood in terms of substance, which is to say, as the instantiation of non-Being, or at 
least in terms of nonexistence. The second regards nothingness as a question of relation, or of the radical 
ground upon which relation is possible: a complex, unequal and finally non-dialectic relation between 
Being and non-Being, existence and nonexistence. Third, it is possible to view nothingness as a point of 
exit or of entrance between existence and Being. This is the view implicit in work as different as that of 
Levinas and Blanchot, Agamben, and Badiou. In the case of Blanchot and Levinas, nothingness is a point 
of exit – linked intimately to death, or rather the impossibility of death; for Agamben, nothingness 
becomes obliquely visible upon an inarticulable threshold
1479
 between externality and interiority; for 
Badiou, nothingness is at once a sort of ground and a point of entry into existence. From the quantitative 
ontological mould adopted in the present work, and its consequent emphasis on positive manifestation, 
nothingness is more adequately accounted for as a point of entry to than exit from existence. In this sense, 
nothingness is simply a point of contact with being qua being, pure multiplicity – which is to say that 
nothingness points to Being as undifferentiated multiplicity, but also as pure potentiality.  
 
Accepting Badiou‟s claim that it is solely mathematics which is capable of presenting Being qua pure 
multiplicity,
1480
 does not proscribe the poietic instantiation of the aperture between nothingness and 
existence, or comprehension of the variable existential intensities which attend every such point of 
appearance or disappearance. Measuring the vocation of art against that of mathematics, it becomes 
possible to recognize something of an ur-quantity, which is to say the quantitativeness of any quantity. 
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From this recognition is drawn that “every [existential] situation is infinite”1481 – a claim grounded both in 
mathematics and in ordinary logic
1482
 – and the logical observation that there is no manner of dividing or 
counting multiplicity that reduces multiplicity as such. 
 
To exist is to participate in infinite multiplicity according to Badiou, which is significantly at odds with 
the Heideggerian understanding of Dasein as being towards finitude. This allows us to recognize that an 
existential situation, which arises from pure Being, is infinite to the precise extent that we understand it as 
a subtraction from pure multiplicity. “[E]xistence is the proper intensity with which a multiple inscribes 
itself into the infinity of a situation.”1483 To apprehend the Real at is most radical, it is necessary to 
recognize “the existence of a minimum [of intensity], which corresponds to non-appearance.”1484 Only 
against the possibility of non-appearance is the poietic force which in minimalism underpins the sheer 
facticity of appearance itself fully comprehensible.  
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PART THREE: MINIMALISM AS TRANSUMPTIVE    
                            EXISTENTIAL LOGIC 
 
 
 
11. THEORETICAL OBJECTHOOD 
 
a) Objects in search of a theory 
 
Several years ago, while preparing to give a class on literary value, I set about finding examples where the 
distinction between art and commonplace objects was less than clear, and which exposed the 
contingencies which accompany various judgements of value. A friend pointed me to a website which 
presents pairs of similar objects – one an actual artefact, the other an ordinary functional thing. What a 
wonderful leveller for those naive enough to suppose that aesthetic sophistication rests on knowledge, 
judgement, subtlety or taste! Having spent a substantial amount of time studying minimalist sculpture, I 
should have been less surprised that, even in the case of those objects which clearly appealed to a broadly 
minimalist aesthetic, I was able to hazard only the most tentative of guesses at the identity of the art 
object in many of these pairs. After all, one of the principal aims of many minimalists is to level the 
distinction between ordinary things and artefacts by reducing or eliminating the traces of artistic facture. 
These works offer little in terms of meaning or content, and so resist easy explication. In minimalism we 
encounter an aesthetic field scattered with objects in search of a theory.
1485
  
 
Regarding the apprehension of objects, most models recognize that interpretation is practically, if not 
entirely, coincidental with the perception of the object in question.
1486
 Our concern, however, lies less 
with the consequences of interpretation, than with adequately treating the objects of minimalism on their 
own terms.
1487
 Minimalism‟s persistent regard for the object qua its objecthood prompts us to reconsider 
theory at its radix: when theorizing, do we begin with objects or do we begin with concepts? Waugh 
suggests that “[t]o theorize...is simply to exercise one of the most vital capacities of being human, for 
there can be no rational or reflective life without the capacity to stand back and to form second-order 
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judgements about the world and our own behaviour in it.”1488 Waugh‟s point relates primarily to what 
Eagleton describes in terms of theory as “human activity bending back upon itself, constrained into a new 
kind of self-reflexivity.”1489 “Just as all social life is theoretical,” claims Eagleton, “so all theory is a real 
social practice.”1490  
 
For Mieke Bal, a particularly promising means of synthesizing the material, theoretical and meta-
theoretical spheres, is the theoretical object.
1491
 Usually the predicate of some artistic practice, such 
theoretical objects are at once practical and conceptual, and habitually stimulating numerous and often 
highly contradictory responses across a spectrum of theoretically grounded situations.
1492
 The theoretical 
object is able to bridge the material and the ideal
1493
 in an attempt to come to grips with the urgent 
reappraisal of the role of objects,
1494
 both in culture and more general existential terms. As the carriers of 
cultural memory,
1495
 the singular capacity of theoretical objects is to draw together numerous otherwise 
incommensurable concerns.
1496
 Indeed, many of the examples deployed above to weave together the 
ontological, existential and aesthetic concerns of minimalism constitute theoretical objects, engaging 
headlong the theory-praxis paradox which Bal paraphrases as follows: “only practice can pronounce on 
theoretical validity, yet without theoretical validity no practice can be evaluated.”1497  
 
At this point, given Bal‟s focus on “interdisciplinarity in the humanities,”1498 we do well to recall, as does 
Waugh, that theory necessarily presents itself in the same axiomatic terms established by the institutional 
rift between the natural and the human sciences.
1499
 Wolfgang Iser takes the position that the hard-core 
theories of natural science – systems of laws, deductively formed and applied as a means of predicting – 
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contrast strongly with the soft theories of the humanities – constructivist, flexible and adaptable.1500 
However, Iser presses this theoretical rift too far in insisting that the “humanities are not a problem-
solving undertaking. Instead, their prime concern is to achieve understanding.”1501 The conservative 
hermeneut is the hero of the humanities only if we are willing to exercise a subtle but decisive ban on the 
freedom of conceptual movement. Yet surely thinkers of any discipline are equally concerned with 
establishing accurate parameters for their subjects in order to address what is as yet unknown or 
undifferentiated – solving the problems of a given subject – as they are with understanding the contents 
and significance of these problems. To miss this is to miss the polyvalence of thought itself. 
 
A theory of minimalism would be neither properly scientific nor merely soft. Ultimately it would attempt 
to address one question only: can art allow objects to be just objects? Moving carefully towards an 
answer, we might consider generalizing to minimalism in all its media Waugh‟s recognition – that in the 
theorization of literature there is “a fundamental contradiction at the heart of its activities: that in the end 
its instrument of analysis, language, is one that is shared with its object of analysis.”1502 If the great desire 
of the minimalist object is for an absolute autonomy with no referential content, then a theory of 
minimalism must ultimately be determined by the terms offered by these very same objects. It is intensely 
difficult to contemplate a theory which does not rest on causality, yet this is precisely what minimalism 
asks of us. Our primary concern is therefore neither what causes minimalism, nor what minimalism, in 
turn, causes. These are, of course, interesting questions, but would hand the minimalist object over to 
terms which are not necessarily its own. In this rather dim light we are led to a very narrow corridor in 
which a working theory of minimalism is marked only by self-description and exemplarity.  
 
 
b) The gains and risks of meta-theory 
 
It is difficult not to recall two iconoclastic essays at this point: Susan Sontag‟s Against Interpretation,1503 
and Stephen Knapp and Walter Benn Michael‟s Against Theory. Both present a radical species of 
theoretical minimalism, albeit they mirror one another in almost diametric opposition. For Sontag, the 
great error lies in the reduction of art to content, since this content then encourages an univocal code of 
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interpretation
1504
 which “impoverishes,”1505 “tames,”1506 and “violates”1507 art, preventing us from 
undertaking the real task of criticism, which is “to show how it [the artwork] is what it is, even that it is 
what it is, rather than to show what it means.”1508 Knapp and Michaels, on the other hand, target theory 
rather than interpretation or meaning. In their estimation, “the theoretical impulse...always involves the 
attempt to separate things that should not be separated: on the ontological side, meaning from intention...; 
on the epistemological side, knowledge from true belief.”1509 Theory should be abandoned because, 
finally, it amounts to no more than the set of strategies people have employed to evade their direct 
responsibility to the work itself.
1510
   
  
Despite numerous and possibly irreconcilable differences between their approaches,
1511
 Sontag shares 
with Knapp and Michaels a common desire to radicalize our relation to art, allowing art to resonate on its 
terms. They agree that it is theory – for Sontag, hermeneutic theory, for Knapp and Michaels, any 
systematic theory whatsoever – that attempts to appropriate the objects of art. For both, resistance 
emerges through a vehement anti-institutionalism, a suspicion of method, and an affirmation of the 
ontological autonomy of art.
1512
 Art may have any number of effects, yet these are fundamental to its 
practice and not a theory which precedes and informs its practice. “Theory is not just another name for 
practice,” note Knapp and Michaels. “It is the name for all the ways people have tried to stand outside 
practice in order to govern practice from without.”1513Although the authors admittedly limit the context of 
their statement, it is difficult not to hear in such claims something of a maxim, that praxis obviates the 
need for theory. What, then, might we make of a self-limiting theory such as an “emancipatory 
theory...[which] has built into it a kind of self-destructive device.”1514Aimed at producing concrete 
subjects, situations and objects which are free of some particular restriction, such theories might indeed 
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become practices. It is a dangerous moment when we are prepared to foreclose on potentiality itself – for 
such is the wager of an emancipatory theory – in the name of what already exists.    
 
Is it not possible that minimalism envisages a situation in which, contra Knapp‟s and Michaels‟ doubt, 
theory is internal to an object? All this really requires is the simple recognition that a minimalist object as 
it is also affirms the fact that it is.
1515
 This may be paraphrased in a familiar formula: theory is 
coincidental with praxis. This is illustrated in minimalism by the fact that minimalist praxis centres on 
objects as they are, and a theory of minimalism aims, in my view, for no more than the facticity of these 
objects, that these objects are as they are. It is Linda Hutcheon‟s description of poetics as an “open, ever-
changing theoretical structure by which to order both our cultural knowledge and our critical 
procedures”1516 which translates most closely the broad aim of the present work. “Poetics would not seek 
to place itself in a position between theory and practice,” Hutcheon argues, “but would seek a position 
within both.” 1517 The poetics of minimalism describes all those objects which instantiate a coincidence of 
theory and practice where both resonate the aesthetics we have previously defined as minimalist.  
 
Still exceedingly provocative on the complicity of theory and practice is Paul de Man‟s thesis that what 
resists theory is nothing other than theory itself. It is not the refusal of hierarchy, system or method
1518
 
which renders theory problematic in de Man‟s view. That theory is dependent on the same mode of 
reading
1519
 which it directs towards its objects to domesticate them, suggests an internal intricacy which 
manifests as self-referential resistance. As Waugh notes, de Man‟s “main interest in theory lies 
in...revealing the impossibility of defining theory.”1520 It is not theory qua theoretical practice which 
concerns de Man, but rather a poetics in the sense defined by Hutcheon: preserving those concrete 
singularities through which theory and practice might be instantiated simultaneously. Here is a meta-
theory which stands resolutely, and self-consciously, against meta-theory! What greater resistance to 
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theory might we imagine than precisely this theoretical impasse, which opposes both any theoretical 
protocol that would neutralize praxis, as well as that rhetoric which would sacralise the aesthetic?  
 
As noted earlier, what is designated by the term meta occupies a conspicuous threshold: in its thorough 
self-reflexivity, it is introspective and gives voice to that which is intrinsic and internal; yet, in promising 
an objective view it moves to a position of externality. That meta-theory is immersed in the very 
complexity from which it claims to subtract itself in order to act as arbiter,
1521
objectifying in the process 
the dynamics between theory and practice, is a point of tremendous significance. Failing to acknowledge 
its own contingency, such a meta-theory might be mistaken as being absolutely binding, in which case it 
not only installs itself as praxis, but in so doing withdraws its relation to actual praxis (which conceivably 
takes place entirely independently of any theoretical proposition).
1522
 Such a meta-theory might 
conceivably objectify reality in such a way that actual practice, now uncoupled from a relation to any 
theory, would seem increasingly unpredictable and anarchic, while meta-theory presents itself as ever 
more self-evident. In such a case, the force of theory, falsely elevated, transmutes all too easily to pure 
coercion. It is to prevent such ominous situations from arising that the resistance of theory in relation to 
itself is eminently significant. “Just as resistance of objects is a necessary condition of the possibility of 
knowledge,” notes Culler, “...so resistance to theory may be seen as a necessary force, which calls theory 
to account.” 1523  
 
In seeking to understand precisely how theory holds itself to account, we turn to de Man‟s remarkable but 
difficult formulation: “[n]othing can overcome the resistance to theory since theory is itself this 
resistance.”1524 To make significant sense of this, we must take as given that theory necessarily indicates 
practice, but only inasmuch as a practice presupposes a theory.
1525
 A practice, to be considered as such, 
rather than as simply a phenomenon, already implies that it is the predicate of a theoretical field to which 
it overtly or tacitly appeals. It requires little insight to recognize that many competing theoretical 
propositions might legitimately explain a single practice, just as multiple practices can be related to a 
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single theory. If, in this light, we might accept that the identity of any particular practice is contingent, it 
follows that such a practice would not appeal to a theoretical field as the source of an absolute account of 
itself. A theory only ever provides an incomplete account of a practice, but because it is only knowable as 
theory in relation to practice, we might say that it also provides an incomplete account of itself. In this 
sense, theory is the resistance to theory from the perspective both of self-presentation and of practice. In 
terms of the former, theory resists itself because it intrinsically implies a practice which it neither 
contains, nor for which it can fully account. From the perspective of practice, theory resists itself since 
any practice already contains theory to the extent that potentially it can be theorised.  
 
The point to be taken for the present is the following: while theory and practice are logically coextensive 
– each implying the other in the very act through which each identifies itself – because theory resists 
itself, but practice does not, the actual pursuit of a poetics will always be weighted in favour of practice. 
Accepting this imbalance, we begin to see why – particularly in the case of minimalism which, above all, 
exemplifies an aesthetic practice of the Real – we can legitimately claim to encounter objects in search of 
a theory. Minimalist objects are knowable firstly in the transparency of their practice, through their 
instantiation, in the terms of Sontag, of “the luminousness of the thing in itself, of things being what they 
are.”1526  
 
It is true, however, that a minimalism divorced from its objects, or pursued on a particularly abstract 
level, might seem to occupy a space perilously close to that threatening position in which meta-theory is 
installed as an absolute. Clement Greenberg famously criticizes minimalism for its failure to realize the 
apotheosis of modern abstraction it promises, through which the distinction of art from non-art might be 
eliminated.
1527
 “Minimal Art remains too much a feat of ideation, and not enough anything else.”1528 In 
Greenberg‟s analysis, minimalism falls prey to its own “ratiocination,”1529 to the extent that we are 
confronted not with the sheer presence to which minimalism pretends,
1530
 but merely with the idea of 
presence, so that “what they want to mean betrays them artistically.”1531 The implication, that what is 
minimal about minimalism remains essentially an idea or concept, seems to hand the practice of 
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minimalism over to a theoretical operation, reaffirming the rift between sensation and ideation at the very 
moment it pledges to bridge these.  
 
Perhaps, because minimalism tends to draw attention so strongly to its objects themselves, rather than to 
explanations of their causes or consequences, its theorisation might appear drawn between its materialist 
commitment and meta-theoretical abstraction. Yet in its practice, minimalism reveals that there is no 
necessary reason why its objects should be predicated exclusively on either conceptual or materialist 
terms, or that one should exclude the other. Perhaps the key to understanding minimalism lies in 
recognising that there is no intrinsic opposition between the two. Holding together the most descriptive 
aesthetic theories and the most abstract meta-theoretical reflection might seem contradictory from within 
qualitative logic which dominates the appearance of minimalism‟s objects, but it is non-contradictory in 
relation to the quantitative radix of their Being. This affirmation is central to claiming that minimalism 
exemplifies the Real.  
 
 
 
 
12. CONCRETE VISUAL ATOPIAS 
 
a) Preamble regarding minimalism and concretism 
 
Regarding the constellation of minimalism and concretism a brief preamble is necessary. The discussion 
which follows suggests not that the concrete aesthetic, described below, and the minimalist aesthetic – the 
historical and ontological contours of which are described above – can simply be subsumed under a 
transcendental thematic, nor that their intrinsic properties necessitate their conjunction. Rather, the 
present claim is that at its most minimal, the concrete aesthetic offers a particularly intense field of 
exemplarity within which the minimalist existential logic of transumption is visible. Indeed, we might say 
that, at its most intense, minimalist concretism is constituted precisely in terms of a meta-exemplarity: a 
field of exemplarity which demonstrates the functioning of the example, and which, in its turn, intensifies 
our apprehension of the taking-place of the Real. In this light, concretism presents a singular, 
transhistorical continuum – a field of potentiality from which might be drawn remarkable focal points 
upon which the confluence of expressive media, disciplines and genres is maximally visible precisely 
through the generation of concrete minimalist aesthetic objects. Simultaneously, the finest minimalist 
   264 
 
concretism exemplifies not only minimalism, but also the Real: we might say that concretism itself 
constitutes a sort of iconology of the Real.  
 
 
b) The visible traces of theurgical poiesis   
 
Amongst the many instantiations of minimalism, the meeting of the concrete and the conceptual is staged 
with particular clarity in those genres of poetry which radicalise the interrelation of literature, music and 
the visual arts. Steiner goes as far as to claim that “the attempt to overreach the boundaries between one 
art and another is [...] an attempt to dispel (or at least mask) the boundary between art and life, between 
sign and thing, between writing and dialogue.”1532 Perloff recalls that poetry as we understand it emerges 
“from the Greek poiesis, a making or creation,”1533 being focused further in the “Medieval Latin, poetria, 
the art of verbal creation.”1534 Thus conceived, poiesis asks us to probe the very stuff of poetry, to press 
beyond form and trope to the medium which itself carries creation, the radical stuff upon which the very 
potential of poetry‟s taking-place is conditioned.  
 
Yet neither poiesis nor any medium through which it is conveyed seem to submit themselves readily to 
our scrutiny. This difficulty stems from Plato‟s “ancient quarrel” between philosophy and poetry,1535 an 
antipathy which may be extended to art in general inasmuch as the latter aspires to exceed its status as 
mimesis, the imitation of the apparent world which itself is only a representation of the true and perfect 
Forms which precede it.
1536
 Art is often understood as the polemical ground upon which what is real 
                                                          
1532
 Wendy Steiner, The Colour of Rhetoric: Problems in the Relation between Modern Literature and Painting 
(Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1982), 2-5. In Bohn‟s estimation, Steiner‟s vision dissolves not only “the 
traditional barriers between the reader and text; it erases the boundaries between the text and the world” (Willard 
Bohn, The Aesthetics of Visual Poetry, 1914-1928 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986) 8). As regards the former, 
reading visual poetry naturally presents several challenges to the conventional relationship of reader to text by 
undermining verbal, grammatical and hermeneutic norms (presenting what is perhaps the interart equivalent of 
Barthes‟ writerly texts). As regards the latter, since in interartistic poetry the text is – by virtue of is intermedial 
constitution, which eschews the conventions of mimetic art – something which is presented, rather than merely 
represented, it belongs as much to the Real as does any other object. 
1533
 Marjorie Perloff and Craig Dworkin, “Introduction: The Sound of Poetry/The Poetry of Sound,” The Sound of 
Poetry/The Poetry of Sound, ed. Marjorie Perloff and Craig Dworkin (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 2009), 
1. Collection hereafter SP/PS. 
1534
 Ibid. 
1535
 Plato, Repubic, 607b/1211. 
1536
 “It is true then about some of these things that not only the Form itself deserves its own name for all time, but 
there is something else that is not the Form but has its character whenever it exists,” to recall the Platonic doctrine of 
Forms (Plato, “Phaedo,” trans. G.M.A. Grube. Plato Complete Works, 103e/89. Forms, which are perfect, true and 
good, are prototypical. The objects of ordinary experience are mere representations of these, while art merely 
imitates what the world represents of Forms and so is ontologically inferior, and morally dangerous insofar as it 
   265 
 
battles with what merely appears to be real, where the poietic production of reality comes up against the 
mimetic reflection of reality.
1537
 Culler relates how an historical bifurcation conditions any project of 
poetics: the Classical view asserts a “criticism...linked to generic categories based on mimesis...and to the 
rhetorical analysis of efficacious speech”1538 in terms of the “norms of genre, verisimilitude, and 
appropriate expression;”1539 Romanticism introduces the “concept of literature as expression”1540 which 
“expresses the state of affairs, the language, the genius that gave rise to them.”1541 Danto observes a 
similar polarity in his epochal essay, “The Art World,” between the imitation theory of art, in which art is 
fundamentally mimetic, and the reality theory of art, in which art materializes through radical poiesis. In 
terms of the latter, artists are “to be understood not as unsuccessfully imitating real forms but as 
successfully creating new ones, quite as real as the forms which the older art has been thought...to be 
credibly imitating.”1542 This considered, the question of medium becomes intricate with the disputed radix 
of art itself. If art is mimetic, its success in representing its subject is matched in proportion by the 
transparency of its medium.
1543
By contrast, the opacity of its medium is of considerable significance to 
poietic art, which, in claiming to produce the Real, refuses to reduce art to a question of its content (what 
it is about) as is the case with mimetic art.
1544
 In the most austere cases of an art which makes poiesis its 
first concern – such works which are virtually synonymous with minimalism – the “artwork is only the 
material it is made from; it is canvas and paper, ink and paint, words and noise, sounds and 
movements.”1545 
 
At the end of this pursuit we discover poetry which is at once conceptual and concrete. In its conceptual 
dimension it is meta-theoretical, abstracting from itself the force of mediation or transumption. In its 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
pretends to the absolute good of Forms. Danto‟s discussion is particularly insightful in this regard (Danto, 
Transfiguration, 7-9; 11-4), as is that of Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 253-9). Making a similar point, 
Montag offers the following (in a passage explicitly unsympathetic to Deleuze‟s analysis): “[t]he current description 
of art and culture as simulacra are quite simply Platonic in the most traditional sense...Plato argued that the 
particular is a representation of the form and that art is a representation of the particular and thus a representation of 
a representation...His denunciation of art as mere appearance is not based on the hypothesis of its immateriality but 
precisely the opposite: its irreducible materiality” (Warren Montag, “What is at Stake in the Debate on 
Postmodernism?,” Postmodernism and its Discontents: Theories, Practices, ed. E. Ann Kaplan (London and New 
York: Verso, 1988), 98). 
1537
 Danto, Transfiguration, 13. 
1538
 Jonathan Culler, “Introduction: Critical Paradigms,” PMLA, 125.4 (2010): 905. 
1539
 Ibid., 906. 
1540
 Ibid., 905. 
1541
 Ibid., 906. 
1542
 Arthur C. Danto, “The Art World,” Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition: An Anthology, 
ed. Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugon Olsen (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 28. 
1543
 Danto, Transfiguration, 151-3. 
1544
 Ibid., 159. 
1545
 Ibid. 
   266 
 
concrete dimension it consists of vision, sound and language in their rawest states, cognising itself in 
terms of pure medium. It is in recognising the persistent tension in any radical conception of poiesis – 
between imitation and the Real, between concrete and concept, between medium and mediation, and, 
finally between art and life – that Steiner‟s claim above gains momentum. With respect to the critical 
understanding of medium as poem, this tension manifests in the pull between the individuation and 
interpenetration of poetic media. One might legitimately emphasise the pursuit of these media in isolation, 
claiming that sound poetry, visual poetry, and language-centred poetry ought to be understood from 
within their individual trajectories.
1546
 Equally, the transfiguration of medium to poem can be seen to rest 
on some stabilising poietic force which is designated, but not defined, by a generic aesthetic term such as 
concretism.
1547
 The historical analysis of poetic medium as poem benefits most from the stratification of 
separate media, while the aesthetic approach to understanding these, benefits from the development of 
operative terms and concepts.  
 
It is disappointing that, despite its ubiquity, poetry centred on vision, sound and language as media should 
remain undervalued: “the critical response to visual poetry over the years has been disappointing,”1548 
announces Bohn, and Perloff remarks similarly of sound poetry, that, “however central the sound 
dimension is to any and all poetry, no other poetic feature is currently as neglected.”1549 If the concerns 
shared by minimalism and various types of aesthetic concretism are significant, the interrogation of these 
remains beset by historical problems. “Concrete poetry is a small part of a larger picture,” claims 
pioneering experimentalist, Dick Higgins. “[I]t would...be a misprision to discuss it in isolation from 
sound poetry, aleatory poetry, and the other intermedial poetries with which it shares many strategies, 
purposes and much of its history.”1550  
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The conscious combination of text and image begins not with poetry, however, but with the invocations 
of purportedly magical amulets. These have functions ranging from incantations against malicious spirits 
to the treatment of illness, in which cases the pictograph was both the prescription and the cure.
1551
 This 
essentially talismanic use, progresses, according to Bowler, to a more mystical view of calligraphy in 
which writing is “connected not only with ...technique, skill and art, but also with...spiritual and moral 
character.”1552 The venerable lineage of visual poetry, while not strictly separable from the “magical and 
mystical impetus to shape texts,”1553 may be identified with the desire to integrate more fully the poietic 
(generative), aesthetic and symbolic aspects of text and form. Such practices can be traced as far back as 
the Greek technopaegina of the third century BC,
1554
 since which time visual poetry has proved an 
abiding concern, practised both globally and transhistorically. Hellenistic calligrams – works constituted 
of single or multiple graphemes in the form of an object, often an object related to the work on a semantic 
level – were shaped by the careful arrangement of lines and a prescribed pattern of reading (Figure 
80),
1555 a technique adopted by the Romans in their carmina figurata. In the Arab world, by contrast, 
where problematic religious implications of certain types of figuration persist, forms tend to be 
calligraphically determined, objects emerging from the careful reshaping of letters (Figure 81).
1556
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1960s. Ed. K. David Jackson, Eric Vos and Johanna Drucker. Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1996. 367-416. 
Individual contributions, such as that in the quotation above, will be cited in the form that follows: Higgins, 
Symphosymposium, 398. Collection hereafter EVC.  
1551
 Berjouhi Bowler, The word as image (London: Studio Vista, 1970) 7-8; 119. Notable examples exist in almost 
all ancient cultures, and such talismans are by no means uncommon in the contemporary world (ibid).  
1552
 Ibid. Again, this is a widespread view held by calligraphers from the Far East, to the scribes of medieval Europe. 
1553
 Ibid., 9.  
1554
 Ibid. See AVP, 1. 
1555
 Simias of Rhodes, Egg calligram, 3
rd
 century BC, Rhodes (Bowler, Word, 57). To be read from the outside 
towards the centre, this egg-shaped bucolic poem also serves to draw attention to the nature of poetry (ibid., 128). 
Possibly, like an egg, a poem is contained by its form, but this form itself contains the potential for poiesis. Figures 
81 to 83 appear in Bowler‟s excellent anthology as indicated in parenthesis.  
1556
 Amuletic tughra, Iran. Date unspecified (ibid., 29). “Tughra writings are the most ingenious use of Arabic script. 
A sentence from the Koran or a common prayer is written in a way that the composition outlines a [form]” (ibid., 
124). In this example, a face is composed of four words – Allah, Mohammed, Ali and Hassan – which mirror each 
other to make up the left and right halves of the face (ibid.).  
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Figure 80: Simias of Rhodes, Egg calligram. 3rd century BC,   Figure 81: Amuletic tughra, Iran. Date  
Rhodes.        unspecified.  
 
 
 
               
Figure 82: Hanuman Calligram, Sanskrit, 19th century.            Figure 83: Massoeretic Text, Hebrew, 14th century. 
Edition of Ramayana.               British Museum, London. 
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Calligrammatic poetry is prevalent both in Urdu and in Sanskrit. Notable amongst the latter for its 
immense detail, is the figure of Hanuman (Figure 82) which is formed by a narrative which encompasses 
his entire life, from birth to his death.
1557
 Visual poems, mostly of a religious nature, are equally 
widespread throughout Medieval Europe – from Armenia and Turkey in the south east, to Germany in the 
north west – and throughout the sub-continent. Of the finest religious calligrams are Hebrew massoeretic 
texts: “the massorah, which is the critical emendation found on certain pages...[u]nexpectedly, in some 
manuscripts...is shaped into patterns”1558 (Figure 83).1559  
 
It was only at the start of the seventeenth century – the dawn of the early modern period in western 
Europe – that the first English calligrams of any poetic significance were produced. As Sloane notes, it 
was not uncommon for the attitude of seventeenth century poets towards the visual to “swing 
inconsistently back and forth between what were considered either primarily Aristotelian or primarily 
Platonic conceptions of knowledge obtained through the senses.”1560 This dialectic is expressed with some 
force in the manner in which concrete visuality is interrogated in much of their poetry. Whether through 
particularly evocative diction or physical form, Sloane confirms that “the tendency to visualize ideas 
reached its zenith in the early years of the seventeenth century.”1561 Thus, the strong lines of the 
metaphysical poets frequently became so strong as to take on physical form. There is indeed a curious, if 
indirect, commentary on the Platonic doctrine of Forms here. Such poetry draws attention to the symbolic 
character of writing, affirming the force of representation at the level of both semantics and form – in 
what the poem means and the physical shape it takes to convey or enhance this meaning. Yet their form 
merely reflects, rather than predicates, the logos of such poems which – particularly in view the 
predilection of the best of these pattern poems for religious themes – remains in an important sense 
transcendental. This is reflected in George Herbert‟s “The Altar” (Figure 84)1562 and Robert Herrick‟s 
“The Cross,” which are exemplary of the calligrams of this period. Also significant is the emblem – a 
                                                          
1557 Hanuman Calligram, Sanskrit, 19
th
 century. Edition of Ramayana (ibid., 22). Hanuman is an Indian deity, one of 
a mythical ape-like race, the vanaras, and a devotee of Rama in the Indian epic, the Ramayana. 
1558
 Ibid., 128. 
1559 Massoeretic Text, Hebrew, 14
th
 century. British Museum, London (ibid., 53)  
1560
 Mary Cole Sloane, The Visual in Metaphysical Poetry (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981), 5). To 
recall, albeit in very inadequately schematic terms, Plato believes that a faint knowledge of the ideal which precedes 
sensory experience, while Aristotle believes that knowledge is acquired through sensory experiences.   
1561
 Ibid., 24.  
1562
 George Herbert, The Altar, 1633 
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visual genre inherited from the Renaissance consisting of a motto, a symbolic illustration, and an 
epigrammatic exposition of these in formal verse
1563
 – which is well-represented by Geoffrey Whitney‟s A 
Choice of Emblems (1586) and Francis Quarles‟ Emblems (1635).  
 
Concerning Herbert‟s poem, one must recall that the altar is a favourite motif of visual poetry,1564 not only 
connecting the work to the formal rites of religion, but also connecting poietic inspiration to the surrender 
and sacrifice of the self to the divine.
1565
 “The Alter” is a fine example of the visual poem as symbol: its 
physical form (as altar) reinforces the conceit which gives the poem its momentum – the heart as altar – 
while its true subject transcends either word or form, since the heart is finally a cipher for the human soul 
and its relation to God.  
 
Figure 84: George Herbert, The Altar, 1633. 
 
 
Between the seventeenth century and the present the relation of visual and verbal art has been exposed in 
numerous and often rather contradictory ways. We might consider the mystical intricacy and virtuosity of 
William Blake‟s illuminated poetry in relation to G.E. Lessing‟s celebrated essay on aesthetics, Laokoön. 
                                                          
1563
 These epigrams were often not present in early Renaissance emblems, but became increasingly detailed and 
meditative in the case of the metaphysical poets (ibid.). 
1564
 Bowler, Word, 129.  
1565
 This impulse might be traced to ancient Dionysian and Orphic cults in Greece which emphasise enthusiasm, or, 
as it meant then, the fusion of the human and the divine (Russell, History, 24-7, 30-1).   
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The point of comparison between painting and poetry has historically rested on a common symbolic or 
analogical appeal. The Horatian maxim ut pictura poesis – as is painting, so is poetry – expands upon its 
classical radix, and strikingly paraphrases the dominant Baroque and Neo-Classical understanding that 
what renders the literary and pictorial comparable, is finally symbolic – the shared and somewhat abstract 
evocation of images to which they both appeal.
1566
 “Symbolic or allegorical art,” of which calligrammatic 
poetry is exemplary, “thus seem[s] a natural point of convergence and cooperation between literature and 
art.”1567 For all its stylistic innovation and visionary appeal, work such as Blake‟s remains traditional in 
this respect. The Romantic period witnesses a radical intensification of aesthetic self-consciousness,
1568
 
particularly in the case of poetry.  
 
The fragment poem and the philosophical fragment reflect simultaneously on their poietic genesis and 
their particular poetic attributes in terms of subject, language and form. We might recognise in this 
specialisation of medium something of the shift heralded by Lessing, from an historical focus on the 
likeness to which both painting and poetry appeal, to a focus on the force of relation itself. For two things 
to be related, they must in an important sense retain their individuality, which is why Lessing “deplore[s] 
this confusion of genres”1569 which weakens both painting and poetry. Lessing insists that for the visual 
arts or literature to thrive, it is necessary to differentiate the dominance of space in the former from the 
fundamentally temporal concerns of the latter.
1570
 On this basis, Lessing‟s Laokoön is taken to justify an 
increased separation of poetry from painting as the basis for their mutually benefitting one another.
1571
 
“Lessing‟s objections to the neoclassical ut pictura poesis argument contributed to the general shift in 
aesthetic thinking that marks the romantic period,”1572 says Steiner, as art qua mimesis gives way to art 
qua expression.
1573
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1566
 Steiner, Colors, 6-10. 
1567
 Ibid., 9. 
1568
 Waugh, Practising Postmodernism, 3-4. 
1569
 René Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963), 126. 
1570
 Steiner, Colors, xiii. 
1571
 Ibid., 12-3. 
1572
 Ibid., 14.  
1573
 Ibid. Danto points to the limitations of both purely mimetic and antimimetic understandings of art (Danto, 
Transfiguration, 13, 21, 68-9, 76-83).  
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c) Locating the atopia of poetry 
 
“A Throw of the Dice Never Will Abolish Chance,”1574 one of the great poems of Stéphane Mallarmé‟s 
oeuvre, has a strong claim to being an inaugural work of the Modernist avant-garde. It combines 
typographical experimentation (varying capitalisation, type and size of the lettering) with careful attention 
to the Gestalt of the poem, “a certain distribution of space”1575in which words and lines are carefully 
arranged so that they seem “now to speed along and now again to slow down the motion.”1576 The poem 
institutes a particularly concrete type of self-reflexivity:
1577
 its visual form intensifies its concern with 
chance as a force of both generation and negation – the poem, subject to aleatory forces, imposes a node 
of order, “a limit on infinity,”1578 while retaining its proximity to “the void in which all reality is 
dissolved.”1579 Mallarmé reminds us that the true significance of poiesis lies in its making possible the 
place of poetry – “Nothing...will have taken place...but the place”1580 – recognising that the problem of 
meaning remains undecidable, subject to contingent rules which are not, strictly speaking, poietic. “The 
labor of writing is no longer a transparent ether,” Derrida tells us. “It catches our attention and forces us, 
since we are unable to go beyond it with a simple gesture in the direction of what it „means,‟ to stop short 
in front of it or to work with it.”1581  
 
To work with the poem means firstly to recognise that its form is, in fact, a type of performance.
1582
 Here 
we are at once reminded of the Kantian position, in which “[f]orm is the unmistakable „space‟ 
of...aesthetics”1583 insofar as it “denote[s] the difference between determination and the determinable in 
                                                          
1574
 Stéphane Mallarmé, “A Throw of the Dice Never Will Abolish Chance,” trans. Daisy Aldan, Poems for the 
Millennium: The University of California Book of Modern & Postmodern Poetry, Volume One: From Fin-de-Siècle 
to Negritude, ed. Jerome Rothenberg & Pierre Joris (Berkeley: U of California P, 1995), 53-76. Anthology hereafter 
PMV1. 
1575
 Stéphane Mallarmé, Preface, Throw, 53.   
1576
 Ibid.  
1577
 The Noigrandes concrete poets regard this as the inaugural work of aesthetic concretism (Haroldo do Campos, 
Symphosymposium, 376; Clüver, Symphosymposium, 376-7 and Claus Clüver, “Concrete Poetry: Critical 
Perspectives from the 90s,” EVC, 268; Marjorie Perloff, “Concrete Prose in the Nineties: Haroldo de Campos‟s 
Galáxias and After,” Haroldo de Campos: A Dialogue with the Brazilian Concrete Poet, ed. K. David Jackson 
(Oxford: Centre for Brazilian Studies, 2005), 144. 
1578
 Mallarmé, “Throw,” 69.  
1579
 Ibid., 73. 
1580
 Ibid. 72-3. Figures 85 and 86 demonstrate the importance of typography and layout in Mallarmé‟s poem, its use 
of capitalization, empty space and line break, which, for the sake of fluency, have not been rendered exactly in the 
present quotations from the poem. 
1581
 Jacques Derrida, “Mallarmé,” trans. Christine Roulston, Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1992), 114. 
1582
 See Derek Attridge, The Singularity of Literature (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 108-9. 
1583
 Rodolphe Gasché, The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003), 10. 
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general.”1584 In this sense, form constitutes the field of potentiality upon which the fusion of thought, 
thing, sensible intuition and experience takes place
1585
 without which the “formation of a representation of 
objects”1586 would be impossible. Form is at once the founding premise and horizon with regard to poietic 
taking-place, in which light we come to understand that poetic form is neither transcendental nor static, 
and might be comprehended more readily as a process, the “putting-into-form of...formation.”1587 Form, 
in this sense, is a processual shaping of the generative force of poiesis which recalls and reinforces the 
necessity both of structure and of structuration in any existential situation.  
 
“A Throw of the Dice” exhibits a remarkable grasp of the complexities of form: it is both singular in 
instantiation and universal in its evocation of poietic force.
1588
 Badiou offers the following evocative 
précis of the poem: “[u]pon an anonymous maritime surface, an old Master mockingly shakes his hand, 
cupped over dice, hesitating before the throw [of the dice] for so long that it seems as if he‟ll be 
swallowed up before the gesture will have been decided.”1589 The subject of the poem is chance, the 
significance of action and inaction in relation to chance,
1590
 and the undecidability which inhabits aleatory 
situations.
1591
 Mallarmé leads us to the “impossibility of rational choice – [the impossibility] of the 
abolition of chance”1592 – through that most encompassing archetype of ontological flux, the ocean,1593 
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 Ibid., 12.  
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 Ibid., 8.  
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 Ibid., 6. 
1587
 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German 
Romanticism, trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: State U of New York P, 1988), 105. It is with this 
phrase that Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy attempt to convey the urgency of the critical project which Romanticism 
regards as inseparable from literature. To pursue poiesis requires more than an understanding of form itself or even 
an analysis of how form itself is formed (“the putting-into-form of form” (ibid., 104)). Finally, we require insight 
into the process of formation in the full presence of its taking-place – the “putting-into-form of…formation” – which 
confirms the correlative dynamism between poiesis and poetic form. 
1588
 Badiou defends the “universality of great poems” on philosophical rather than formal grounds (Alain Badiou, 
Handbook of Inaesthetics, trans. Alberto Toscano (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2005), 46), but if we are willing to 
concede that poetic form and Badiou‟s topology of the event are homological in that they both constitute dynamic 
foundations (BE,175) – of the instantiation of poiesis and of the production of novelty respectively – while 
simultaneously transecting and interrupting the ordinary state of being, the two views are comparable. Badiou offers 
two remarkable readings of Mallarmé‟s poem: the first in Mediation Nineteen of Being and Event (BE, 191-8) 
examines the poem as analogy to Badiou‟s model of the event; the second in Handbook of Inaesthetics (Badiou, 
Handbook, 46-56), political in tenor, relates the poem to tension between mastery and non-mastery, choice and non-
choice, in contemporary politics. 
1589
 Ibid., 46. 
1590
 The poem generates the situation “such that to act or not to act, to throw or not to throw the dice, amount to 
equivalent arrangements” (ibid., 50).  
1591
 BE, 193-4.  
1592
 Ibid., 195. 
1593
 Regarding the noise of pure Being, connected analogically to the sea, Michel Serres notes that “[t]he silence of 
the sea is mere appearance. Background noise may well be the ground of our being” (Serres, Genesis, 13).  
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brought into proximity with the inadequate and human approximation of these inestimable forces, the 
throw of the dice. This action represents the force of poiesis. The wager is the poem itself. The latter 
emerges from the generative chaos of the aleatory event, attempts to unify in its taking-place the elements 
of pure Being, and failing to do so, recedes into the recognition that poiesis is finally incapable of 
approximating Being, which is to say, multiplicity itself. “The number...even if it existed...even if it began 
and even if it ceased...even if it summed up...this would be no worse nor better but as indifferent as 
chance”1594  
 
 
Figure 85: Stéphane Mallarmé, A Throw of the Dice Never Will Abolish Chance, 70-1. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Returning to the poem, according to Badiou “the metaphor of all evental sites being on the edge of the void is 
edified on the basis of a deserted horizon and a stormy sea” (BE, 192), recalling that Badiou defines the evental site 
as an abnormal multiple which is presented in a situation, without any of its elements being presented in a situation, 
which therefore is “on the edge of the void, or foundational” (ibid., 175). It the ontological condition, as grasped in 
set theory, of an empty ground upon which an event takes place – an event which conditions but does not itself 
actually participate in a situation (hence that the elements of the site can remain unpresented).   
1594
 Mallarmé, “Throw,” 70-1 (Figure 85). 
   275 
 
In Badiou‟s estimation, the poem “joins the emblem of chance to that of necessity, the erratic multiple of 
the event to the legible retroaction of the count. The event in question...is therefore that of the production 
of an absolute symbol of the event. The stakes...are those of making an event out of the thought of the 
event.”1595 Important here is the recognition that poiesis does not produce the event, but produces the trace 
of an event. Mallarmé‟s poem, in this view, points towards the eventality of the event, “the „pure 
event‟”1596 which attempts to grasp that which “lies beyond what is, what purely happens.”1597  
 
It is significant that Badiou should deploy the “emblem” – the principal genre of seventeenth century 
visual poetry – and “symbol” – those things which “embody their meanings and explain their mode of 
embodiment,”1598 in Danto‟s terms. The concrete and conceptual are conjoined – continuous and 
complementary – as the scattering of words across the page, anticipates the surrender to chance, the throw 
of the dice; the typographical experimentation (italics, upper-case letters, and words of different sizes) 
generates fragmentary narratives, short sequences in which the poet attempts to impose order upon the 
disorder which finally overwhelms the work.  
 
Mallarmé heralds many of the significant aesthetic concerns of Modernist and Postmodernist art. In 
search of a poetry “freed from any scribal apparatus,”1599 as Rancière suggests, the poem exhibits a 
tangible anxiety regarding the difficulties of autonomy, a question brought into focus through the poet‟s 
thematic and formal concern with aleatory operations, which were to influence numerous future paths of 
aesthetic thought. The possibility of univocal interpretation, perhaps of meaning itself, is revealed as a 
radical uncertainty – a sentiment echoed, often amplified, in the work which follows. This vision cannot 
be separated from a radical reconsideration of poetic form, lineation and diction. It is not, I believe, too 
much of a stretch to suggest that “A Throw of the Dice” is the first aesthetically significant concrete 
poem, far exceeding the representational logic of the calligram in its integration of its visual and 
conceptual elements, so that these simultaneously reflect on themselves, and reflect on one other. As a 
concrete exemplar of chance, the poem is caught in the productive paradox of being at once autopoietic 
and “indifferent” to its productive capacities. This is one of the central issues which concrete poetry 
                                                          
1595
 BE, 193. Norris relates Badiou‟s analysis of the poem as “a subtle registration of the way that various imagined 
events impact upon the very process of thought – not ...the state of consciousness – that it seemingly described, 
represents or narrates” (Norris, Badiou, 123). 
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 LW, 516.   
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 Ibid. 
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 Danto, “Art World Revisited,” 41. 
1599
 Rancière, Future, 95.   
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confronts, since “[i]n the last analysis the poems are their own justification. The fact that they exist is 
enough.”1600 
 
There is much to recommend the poem as a prototypical form of minimalism. The economy of 
Mallarmé‟s style veers towards austerity. Its experimentation with lineation and visual arrangement is at 
times fragmentary – a fragmentariness which augments its subject, chance, and which is also 
characteristic of those works which are generated by aleatory operations.
1601
 At other moments it exposes 
the material and processual aspects of textuality itself at their most fundamental. We might only think as 
far as the carefully constructed diagonal of the “LET IT BE” sequence1602 arranged across two facing 
pages, which begins slowly from the top left, drawing attention to the topographical isolation of the 
“Abyss” and the nullity it threatens, which accelerates rapidly in self-conscious, diminutive lines towards 
the centre of the textual surface, gathering there, coming to a near halt, before tapering more slowly, 
ponderous and hesitant, towards the bottom right (Figure 86). These words, as carefully arranged as they 
are chosen, draw attention to negative space – the blank, empty space of the page, a “visual silence, which 
creates a privileged space for the text and its individual images.”1603 The work in its most severe concrete 
elements recalls the minimalist concern with containment. That this containment fails – that chance, 
which itself marks a sort of minimalism of intervention on the part of the artist, is finally atopian – 
compels us to recognize and retrace the same transformative logic which is in the present work defined in 
terms of transumption. A minimal intervention transforms the fundamental material of the poem in order 
to generate the poem as such. This seems to endorse of “A Throw of the Dice” as an early instantiation of 
aesthetic concretism, and while it would be absurd to conclude that Mallarmé was a committed 
minimalist, it would be even stranger to ignore the fact that several of the work‟s most notable 
characteristics – concerns regarding medium, style and poiesis itself in their most radical forms – are 
intrinsic to any minimalist enterprise. In this sense, we come to recognize aspects of minimalism as 
transhistorical phenomena insofar as minimalism concerns radices intrinsic to art itself, rather than any 
act of artistic or critical will.   
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 AVP, 2. 
1601
 In this respect, one might consider “Language Event One” – the Surrealist symcomposition in which each poet 
writes two unrelated clauses which are then combined at random (Louis Aragon, George Sadoul, Benjamin Péret, 
Suzanne Muzard, Yves Tanguy, André Breton, Elsie Péret and Pierre Unik, “Language Event One,” PMV1, 472-3), 
or the fragmentary works produced by the more thorough aleatory techniques of Jackson Mac Low and John Cage.  
1602
 Mallarmé, “Throw,” 58-9. 
1603
 Bohn, Visual Poetry, 4. 
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Figure 86: Stéphane Mallarmé, A Throw of the Dice Never Will Abolish Chance, 58-9. 
 
That the ontological precision
1604
 of “A Throw of the Dice” should be matched by its innovative formal 
presentation explains its perceptible influence in much of the poetry which follows it. The poem‟s 
fragments, hesitations, empty spaces and typographical variation bring an unprecedented depth of 
reflexivity between the conceptual and the concrete in the understanding of visual poetry, Mallarmé, 
whether despised or emulated, was unquestionably a significant influence on visual poetry as well as on 
the refinement of a broadly minimalist aesthetic which would come to prominence in the twentieth 
century.  
 
“Refined, redesigned, and redefined, visual poetry has been the object of countless schools and 
movements,”1605stresses Bohn. In the early twentieth-century, these visual poets pursued two principal 
routes. The first path, upon which we encounter the Imagists, Ultraists and Surrealists, emphasises the 
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 Norris, Badiou, 121. 
1605
 AVP, 1. 
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iconic aspects of the visual poem – its capacity to offer an intensified view of its objects.1606 By contrast, 
Futurism, Dada and Vorticism express an iconoclastic disruption, a constitutive displacement which 
deposes the conventional hierarchy between word and visual design.
1607
   
  
In terms of the intensified iconic value of poetry, the example of the Imagists is instructive, and also of 
some relevance to a firmer grasp of the minimalist aesthetic. Like many other movements in twentieth 
century literature, Imagism self-consciously defines its own parameters in a number of manifestos, 
anthologies and historical reflections produced between 1914 and 1917. According to Hughes, the 
Imagists are influenced to a significant degree by the progressive French poetry of the symbolists and 
cubists,
1608
 and draw a “common stimulus”1609 from the aesthetics of T. E. Hulme, “who quite reasonably 
may be called the „father of imagism.‟”1610 Indeed, Kermode claims that “[t]he principles of the Imagist 
manifesto...are all Hulmian.”1611 Hulme‟s aesthetic theory1612 is based on a view of nature in terms of an 
essential discontinuity between the vital and the mechanical, the intuitive and the scientific.
1613
 We are 
left with a problematic relativism when these are collapsed into one another – the Romanticism which 
Hulme asserts mistakes humanist values for absolute value;
1614
 a deluded search for infinity.
1615
 In setting 
the scene for the emergence of Imagism, and in opposition to Romanticism, Hulme champions what he 
asserts is a neo-classical aesthetic – a poetic “holding back, a reservation”1616which marks the poet‟s 
awareness of his or her finitude. “In the classical attitude you never seem to swing right along to the 
infinite nothing,” he tells us. “You are always faithful to the conception of a limit.”1617 
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 These objects might belong as easily to a realist as to a surrealist frame of reference. Its iconic quality rests on 
the transparency of its representation, rather than the nature of that which is represented. 
1607
 Cubism presents a difficult case, since it claims that its iconic insight is entirely continuous with its iconoclastic 
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 Glenn Hughes, Imagism and the Imagists: A Study in Modern Poetry (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1960), 4-9. See 
Frank Kermode, Romantic Image (London: Fontana, 1961), 134-5; 144-5. 
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 Hughes, Imagism and the Imagists, 22. 
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 Ibid., 9.  
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 Kermode, Romantic Image, 149-150. 
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 Kermode, ibid., 136. Hulme derives much of his philosophical justification from Bergson. This connection is 
discussed principally in two essays by Hulme: T. E. Hulme, “Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” Speculations: Essays on 
Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Herbert Read (London: Routledge, 1936), 143-169; and T. E. Hulme, 
“Intensive Manifolds,” Speculations, 173-214. 
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 Hughes, Imagism and the Imagists, 14.  
1615
 T. E. Hulme, “Romanticism and Classicism,” Speculations, 116, 119 (111-40); Kermode, Romantic Image, 139-
141. 
1616
 Hulme, Speculations, 120.  
1617
 Ibid. 
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Yet it is on an understanding of the image that his entire metaphysics rests. “Images in verse are not mere 
decoration, but the very essence of an intuitive language”1618 which conveys reality. Poetry, in its turn, 
carries the responsibility of communicating images in concrete terms, not through “discursive meaning 
[...],”1619 but through an immediacy made possible by the well-constructed poem. In contrast to prose, 
which reduces concrete reality to a syntax of abstract signs or markers, poetry embodies a concrete 
language of images which “always endeavours to arrest you, and to make you continuously see a physical 
thing.”1620 The poetry this attitude engenders is thoroughly classical, in Hulme‟s terms, possessing a “dry 
hardness”1621 which focuses on “accurate description,”1622 “confined to the earthly and the 
definite...[revealed in] the light of the ordinary day, never the light that never was on land or sea.”1623 
Convinced of the “inadequacy of language,”1624 that “[p]lain speech is essentially inaccurate,”1625 the poet 
must invent new metaphors by maintaining a close connection to concrete, finite things.
1626
 Kermode 
summarises the situation well in noting that, for Hulme, “[p]oetry, by virtue of the image, is; prose merely 
describes. One is end, the other means. What poetry seems to be about is therefore irrelevant to its 
value.”1627 
 
Here we might recall Levinas‟ formulation of the image precisely as art‟s means of maintaining 
communicativity outside of any particular message. Operating within a field of resemblance, the image 
constitutes an existential residue of the passage between Being and existence, and consequently abstracts 
our ordinary relation to material objects as well as concepts. Despite considerable divergences, it is 
notable that the philosophical understanding of the image clarifies the view of the Real adopted by both 
thinkers. For Levinas, the image allows art to enter into relation with its own facticity. By Hulme‟s 
account, the image allows poetry to penetrate to the heart of the Real in a manner not dissimilar to the 
claim I make for minimalism in the present work. What separates Imagism from minimalism, despite this 
and numerous other stylistic similarities, is its reliance on a form of mediation – analogy – which does not 
fully come to terms with its medium. The poetic medium remains opaque, even as poetry reaches for a 
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 Ibid., 135. 
1619
 Kermode, Romantic Image, 142.  
1620
 Hulme, Speculations, 134.   
1621
 Ibid., 126.  
1622
 Ibid., 127. 
1623
 Ibid. 
1624
 Hughes, Imagism and the Imagists, 17.  
1625
 Hulme, Speculations, 137.  
1626
 To the romantic imagination, subsumed by emotion which distorts the actual plenitude of our response to the 
world, Hulme opposes fancy – the modern poet‟s response linked to concrete, finite things (ibid., 137-8). 
1627
 Kermode, Romantic Image, 142. 
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clearer relation to real things.
1628
 To recall, minimalism exemplifies the facticity of the Real, and a 
reliance on the essentially metaphysical idea of the Image cannot easily be reconciled with such facticity. 
As Kermode argues, Hulme never truly escapes a mystical elevation of the Image which emerges from 
the romanticism he derides:
1629
 the “twin concepts of the isolated artist and the supernatural Image to 
which he gains access”1630 remain present in his thought, and, indeed, in Imagism in general.  
 
As a literary movement, Imagism owes its genesis to the friendship which grew from a rather heated 
disagreement in 1909 between Hulme and F. S. Flint following a critical review of the former‟s work by 
the latter.
1631
 They soon found themselves in general agreement on the importance of accurate poetic 
presentation stripped of excess verbal complexity, establishing their own group for discussion. In April of 
the same year they were joined by a young Ezra Pound, who had arrived independently at a strikingly 
similar aesthetic position, and who, in 1912, coined the term Imagiste to describe their work and, 
particularly, the poetry of H.D. (Hilda Doolittle) and Richard Aldington. 1913 saw the publication of two 
Imagist manifestos – one by Flint, the other by Pound – and in 1914, Pound edited the first anthology of 
Imagist work, Des Imagistes.
1632
 Amy Lowell joined and rapidly came to dominate the group, advocating 
a looser definition of Imagism which conflicted strongly with Pound‟s rigorous poetic discipline. Pound 
left the group for the more radical Vorticists, and Lowell published the remaining Imagist anthologies 
under the title Some Imagists Poets in 1915, 1916 and 1917.
1633
 By this point the momentum of the 
movement was all but spent, although its proclivity for concreteness, objectivity, directness and self-
sufficiency would remain influential, and is almost certainly felt in some of the poetry we may 
legitimately categorise as minimalist.  
 
                                                          
1628
 Recalling Danto‟s insight that mimetic theories of art seek to render their media transparent, while theories 
which claim that art produces reality itself, maintain the opacity of their constituent media (Danto, Transfiguration, 
159), it is somewhat paradoxical that Hulme should insist that poetry is capable of both simultaneously: it must 
relate to the external world, making the Real more perceptible, while reaching for this perceptibility through the 
indirect means of analogy. The negative observation, that plain speaking is unclear, does not justify the claim that 
metaphor (since it is apparently in opposition to plain speaking) is capable of clarifying the Real in the manner 
suggested by Hulme. 
1629
 Kermode, Romantic Image, 133-5; 139-140.  
1630
 Ibid., 178. 
1631
 Peter Jones, “Introduction,” Imagist Poetry, ed. Peter Jones (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 15-6 (13-43). The 
review spoke in derogatory terms of the Poet‟s Club of which Hulme was a member. 
1632
 The principal poets of Imagism are H.D., Richard Aldington, Ezra Pound and Amy Lowell, and the numerous 
other poets associated with the movement, some more legitimately than others, include T. E. Hulme, F. S. Flint, 
Ford Madox Ford, James Joyce, William Carlos Williams, Skipwirth Cannell, Allen Upward, John Cournos, 
Marianne Moore, John Gould Fletcher, and D. H. Lawrence.  
1633
 See Jones, Introduction, 15-6.  
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Its manifestos lay out clear objectives for poetry: “[d]irect treatment of the „thing‟...absolutely no word 
that d[oes] not contribute...[and], regarding rhythm: to compose in sequence of the musical phrase, not in 
the sequence of the metronome.”1634 Held together by a doctrine of the image – which is conceived by 
Hulme as an intuition of the Real, and by Pound‟s as “that which presents an intellectual and emotional 
complex in an instant of time”1635 – these principles are made manifest in a poetry which, in Hughes‟ 
paraphrase, is marked by “[h]ardness of outline, clarity of image, brevity, suggestiveness, freedom from 
metrical laws.”1636 Consider Pound‟s “In a Station of the Metro,” by some way the poet‟s most austere 
Imagist poem, an evocative miniature which illustrates these attributes with subtle force: 
 
The apparition of these faces in the crowd: 
Petals on a wet, black bough.
1637  
  
Here is presented a singular instant – one differentiated from a generic multitude; a clarification and 
intensification of the ordinary; a poetic subtraction which repeats and amplifies Pound‟s claim regarding 
the image. In these lines we may trace those microscopic poetic points upon which the haziness of the 
reader‟s imagination tips into the crystalline hardness of the image. At this point the represented image is 
indeed an “apparition,” something which leaves the realm of the undifferentiated and enters a space of 
intense presence, mediating in this poietic intuition a deep experience of its concreteness. This is also the 
point at which the indiscernible part of identity shifts into the specificity of “these faces.” Imagist poetry 
provides clarity – it recognises those faces as these faces – but not by rendering the strange familiar, or by 
forcing anonymity into the form of a homonym. The point at which the image seems most intimate, is 
also the one where the hardness of the poem is reaffirmed: the “petals” are most significant when their 
ephemeral singularity is rendered almost transparent, stuck against the “bough,” a symbol of both stability 
and a certain inflexibility. The hardness of the poem reaffirms that the world does not give itself over to 
simple domestication; the image reveals an aspect of the world which is strictly impenetrable
1638
 and, in 
this sense, alterity is affirmed as that which guards the Real against the reduction of concrete poiesis to 
prosaic equivalence, to recall Hulme. 
 
                                                          
1634
 F.S. Flint, “Imagisme,” Imagist Poetry, 129 (129-130).  
1635
 Ezra Pound, “A Few Don‟ts By An Imagist,” Imagist Poetry, 130 (130-4).   
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 Ezra Pound, “In a Station of the Metro,” Imagist Poetry, 95. 
1638
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That that poem manipulates the pace of our perception
1639
 is confirmed by examining its tempo and 
rhythms. Like all Imagism it abandons regular metre, but this is not to say it is arrhythmic. The first line 
divides into three accelerating figures – “the apparition,” “of these faces,” and “in the crowd” – followed 
by a significant retardation in the second line. The figures of the first line consist respectively of five, four 
and three syllables. The initial figure begins with an isolated unstressed syllable (“The”) followed by the 
rapid-fire tetrasyllabic “apparition.” It continues with a second tetrasyllabic foot (“of these faces”), the 
assymetrical “of these” followed by a stressed then an unstressed syllable (“faces”). The final unstressed 
syllable carries its momentum into the anapaest which closes the line (“in the crowd”). The caesura here 
resides in the verbal arrangement of the poem on one level – the colon which punctuates the line-break is 
strengthened by the slow transition between the heavy, voiced plosive (“d”) at the end of the first line, and 
unvoiced plosive (“p”) which begins the second.1640 It is also a poietic caesura inasmuch as the strength of 
the image is conveyed by the metaphor formalised in the second part of the poem. Somewhat hesitantly, 
the second line opens with the syncopated iamb, “Petals,” then briefly accelerates in the central anapaestic 
foot (“on a wet”), ending with a progressive ritardando in the two final stressed syllables (“black 
bough”).1641 
 
This brief account of some of the poem‟s technicalities is not offered anecdotally, but in support of 
Kermode‟s observation that, for Hulme, “the meaning [of the poem] is the same thing as its form, and the 
artist is absolved from participation with the discursive powers of the intellect.”1642 I believe this may be 
generalized to the best Imagism. Whether it is the image which determines the technicalities of poetic 
language, or vice versa, is less significant than the recognition that the two are inextricable in the poem. 
In this particular sense, the Imagist poem perpetuates the self-reflexive strain established by the Jena 
romantics.  
                                                          
1639
 This recalls Šklovskij‟s understanding that “the poetic image…aims to destroy the tendency towards habituation 
and serves to lengthen and intensify the process of perception” (D. W. Fokkema and Elrud Kunne-Ibsch, Theories of 
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 The change here in the point of articulation – from the back, dorsal, “d” to the front, bilabial “p” – necessitates a 
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articulated out loud. Quite simply, this adjustment takes time. The same sort of phenomenon may be noted in the 
final three words of the poem – “wet,” “black,” and “bough” – between the alveolar “t” and the velar which end 
“wet” and “black,” and the bilabial “b” which begins “black” and “bough.” 
1641
 It might be argued that the line ends with a spondee, but to my mind, given that the poem‟s tempo is decreasing, 
it makes more sense to see these syllables as separate. 
1642
 Kermode, Romantic Image, 143. Once again, this point bears a striking resemblance to the critical 
pronouncements of several minimalists. 
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Despite this desire for unity between form and content, and despite its being a thoroughly visual poetry – 
Hulme emphasizes the visual and physical nature of the Image – the Imagists experiment very little with 
concrete form. Notable exceptions are the patterned lines of Marianne Moore‟s wonderfully titled “You 
Are Like the Realistic Product of an Idealistic Search for Gold at the Foot of the Rainbow,” and the 
minimal, clipped couplets of much of William Carlos Williams‟ work,1643 which draw significant 
attention to the physical spaces between words, lines and stanzas. We nonetheless encounter intensely 
visual examples of a different order in this poetry. One might only think of the remarkable second stanza 
of H.D.‟s “Evening:”  
 
The cornel-buds are still white,  
but the shadows dart  
from the cornel-roots –  
black creeps from root to root, 
each, leaf 
cuts another leaf on the grass, 
shadow seeks shadow,  
then both leaf 
and leaf-shadow are lost.
1644
 
 
Other poets render the image knowable through plain lines – austere, hard, and descriptive. The opening 
of Aldington‟s “Pickett” is exemplary in this respect:  
 
Dusk and deep silence… 
 
Three soldiers huddle on a bench 
Over a red-hot brazier,  
And a fourth who stands apart 
Watching the cold rainy dawn.
1645
 
 
These lines are interesting for the minimalist sensibility they demonstrate – this could be a passage of 
Hemingway‟s, Robbe-Grillet‟s or Carver‟s prose, merely shaped into verse – but more especially for the 
manner in which the image is rendered static through description, while the passage of time between two 
instants (“dusk” and “dawn”) is given a dynamism through its absence: time is accelerated by a 
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 William Carlos Williams writes his best Imagist poetry after the demise of the movement, and many argue that 
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 H.D., “Evening,” Imagist Poetry, 63. 
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 Richard Aldington, “Pickett,” Imagist Poetry, 57. Similar, although not as bare or focused as Aldington‟s poem, 
is Lowell‟s “Spring Day” (the poem is arguably more Impressionistic than it is Imagistic).  
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symmetrical lack of presentation of actual and textual silence, reinforced by ellipsis and the physical 
space between stanzas. At other times, the clarity of the image is sought through an evocative 
synaesthesia, as exemplified in the wonderful penultimate line of Amy Lowell‟s “In a Garden” – “And 
the scent of lilacs was heavy with stillness.”1646  
 
 
d) Futurism and the poignancy of direction   
 
The Imagist concern lies with presenting the Real, minimally mediated by a poetic language focused on 
accurate description, simple lines, divested of the need for exegesis and any lyrical excess. In this sense, it 
is formally minimalist.
1647
 Yet this is seldom the case in practice, on top of which the retrospective 
idealism of the Imagists seems able to attend to the unyielding acceleration of the early twentieth century 
only obliquely. Concurrently, other projects expressed a far greater urgency and militant orientation 
towards the future, grounding themselves in a dynamic revolutionary affirmation that aesthetic novelty 
and the demolition of exhausted values
1648
 would constantly replenish one another in an exhilarating and 
infinite affirmation of existence: “once again we hurl defiance to the stars,”1649 in the celebrated terms of 
Marinetti. Marjorie Perloff (in a phrase she adopts from Renato Poggioli
1650
) identifies this as the futurist 
moment – a moment of extreme dissatisfaction with the status quo, generic to any revolutionary avant-
garde; a moment which tips into a militant utopianism and pledge of fidelity towards futurity itself; a 
moment at which artists are convinced that something entirely new is imminent.   
 
The start of the twentieth century saw groups of young artists – deeply dissatisfied with the stagnation and 
complacency of the establishment in its various social, political and cultural guises
1651
 – take on coherent 
programmes, defining a number of concurrent movements. The principal among these are Cubism, Italian 
Futurism, Russian Futurism and Vorticism.
1652
 To comprehend both the importance and difficulties of the 
futurist moment as it manifests in these movements, it is necessary to juxtapose Perloff‟s observation, that 
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in these is “produced a short-lived but remarkable rapprochement between avant-garde aesthetic, radical 
politics, and popular culture,”1653 with Agamben‟s cautionary remark, that “where there is movement 
there is always a caesura that cuts through and divides the people...identifying an enemy.”1654 It is not 
surprising that an aggressive utopianism should flirt with proto-fascist rhetoric. Still, the extent of the 
horror which Marinetti‟s exalted prophesy – that war is the “world‟s only hygiene”1655 – provokes in 
hindsight, could not realistically have been predicted in 1909. As Sellin notes, the glorification of war and 
violence was common to the major poets of Cubism, Futurism, Dadaism and Surrealism and appears in 
numerous works of Apollinaire, Marinetti, Tzara, Mayakovsky and Breton.
1656
 A sense of crisis 
dominated the existential mood, and those who appealed to this futurist moment were convinced that an 
aggressive aesthetic stance could project itself beyond catastrophe. Indeed Futurism only “makes a degree 
of sense as a willed aesthetic attitude,”1657 when it expresses a will to art.1658  
 
In its various expressions, this futurist moment is marked by a shared assertion of simultaneism as the 
nucleus of modernist aesthetics. Art attempts to capture the dynamic situation in which sensory 
information, and the forms and media which convey this information, can be presented concurrently – 
whether by a synaesthesia, a logic of formal interpenetration, the innovative aesthetics of performance, or 
collage. Thus, for simultaneists the “juxtaposition, within the same construct, whether visual or verbal [or, 
indeed, musical], of different time frames”1659 is concurrent with an “interpenetrative spatial disruption 
[which] is supposed to represent the affective character of the spectator‟s perceptual experience.”1660 
Speed and noise, youth and vigour, excitement and innovation, technological acceleration and urban 
growth seem to propel existence itself forward.
1661
 At times simultaneism even promises a sort of utopian 
politics, an aesthetically generated collective consciousness.
1662
 Given the stakes, it is not surprising that 
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there exists some disagreement as to the origin of the term,
1663
 its conceptual debts,
1664
 and over its 
applicability or inapplicability to various artists and movements.
1665
   
 
According to Butler, where Cubism “value[s] formalism for its own sake...[the Italian] 
Futurists...demanded involvement and commitment.”1666 In formal terms, Cubism – along with 
Constructivism and De Stijl – are certainly the forebears of an abstract expressionism which establishes 
the nonreferential conditions in which minimalism‟s radically reductive aesthetic could come to 
prominence.
1667
 Are the excesses of Futurism antithetical to this conceptual course? May we suppose that 
the Futurist proposition that “EVERYTHING OF VALUE IS THEATRICAL,”1668 together with its 
proclivity for “improvisation, [and] lightning-like intuition,”1669 are opposed to formalism, and hence also 
to minimalism, which is regularly conceived of as formalism‟s extreme pole? Futurism emphasizes a shift 
from a distanced, passive, respectful obedience in relation to the work, to one of unbroken closeness and 
continuous participation,
1670
 once again affirming its overtly political dimension. In Butler‟s judgement, 
“the spectator is involved in the struggle, because [the work‟s] depiction turns upon a rhythmic 
interdependence between subject, object, and environment.”1671 Yet this theatricality does not bar it from 
minimalism.  
 
Indeed, Hal Foster, reminds us that “minimalism breaks with late modernism through a partial reprise of 
the historical avant-garde,”1672 and although we overstate the case by conflating the two, we might also 
recall that in his 1967 essay, “Art and Objecthood,” Fried views minimalism as an anti-art precisely on 
account of its theatricality.
1673
 For Fried, “the literalist [minimalist] espousal of objecthood amounts to 
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nothing other than a plea for a new genre of theatre; and theatre is now the negation of art.”1674 Whatever 
art might be, it must be harboured in the epiphanic potential of the work itself, which minimalism, by this 
account, hands over too completely to the beholder, and hence to a sort of theatre.
1675
 If his 
characterization is legitimate, minimalism certainly shares its theatricality with Futurism. Not 
insignificantly, the Futurists themselves envision their synthetic theatre as a type of minimalism in which 
performances would be “very brief,” aiming “[t]o compress into a few minutes, into a few words and 
gestures, innumerable situations, sensibilities, ideas, sensations, facts, and symbols.”1676 This resembles 
the attitude often espoused by critics of minimalist literature, that their objects are the containers of 
compressed meaning in which “everything said must contain all that has not been said.”1677 “It’s stupid to 
write one hundred pages where one would do,”1678 in the words of Marinetti.   
 
The Futurist partiality towards “ABSOLUTE DYNAMISM”1679 sets it against the traditional business of 
form – ensuring stability and predictability, differentiating and mediating the chaotic stuff of what is 
unformed. Returning to the three existential logics of transumption introduced earlier, might we say that a 
formalist aesthetic contains the object, while Futurism – which extends our conception of artwork from 
within the heterogeneous, interpenetrative nexus of elements from which it is constituted – operates by a 
logic of distension? This is by no means an unreasonable suggestion. Yet, as minimalism shows with 
particular clarity, that a work appeals primarily to one logic does not prohibit its secondary involvement 
with another logic (or other logics). For instance, while formalism is a model of order for the serial, wall-
mounted boxes of Judd‟s oeuvre (Figure 87),1680 or for the rigorously prescribed, mathematically coded 
movement of Beckett‟s “Quad I” (Figure 88), this is not the case for the sublime, interpenetrative 
atmospheres generated by Dan Flavin‟s celebrated installation of variously coloured lights on the spiral 
walkway of the Guggenheim Museum, (Figure 89),
1681
 or of Philip Glass‟s Strung Out (Figure 90),1682 
which recalls Futurist and Dada performance through the manner in which the music is arranged across 
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the stage, requiring the performer to engage in a type of slow, ritualistic dance, as he or she moves from 
beginning to end.   
 
 
Figure 87: Donald Judd, Untitled, 1966. 
 
 
Figure 88: Samuel Beckett, Quad (still from colour version), 1981. 
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Figure 89: Dan Flavin, Untitled (to Ward Jackson, an old friend and colleague who, when, during  
Fall, 1957, I finally returned to New York from Washington, and joined him to work together in this  
museum, kindly communicated), 1971.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 90: Premiere performance by Dorothy Pixley-Rothschild of Philip Glass’ Strung Out,  
November 1968, New York.  
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We might extract two mildly comforting aesthetic maxims from this situation: mistrust any activity which 
overhastily gives names to artistic movements; and have faith in the universalizing potential of poietic 
logic (in relation to the artwork). Regarding the first, in naming their activities, artists and critics 
habitually claim to do things which, in fact, they do not or cannot accomplish. The second, fortunately, 
shows that this does not matter very much, because any artwork might manifest according to apparently 
disparate poietic logics – logics which are themselves devoid of determinate content, but which deepen 
our awareness of the relation of an artwork to poiesis, and of poiesis to the Real. In this light, 
simultaneism names a poietic logic
1683
 which permeates aesthetic works in appealing to a futurist 
moment, even though these moments may be quite different.
1684
  
 
There can be little doubt that Cubism, which was an accepted term by early 1912,
1685
 owes the 
simultaneist thrust of its aesthetic to Italian Futurism. The Prose of the Trans-Siberian and of Little 
Jeanne of France,
1686
 the collaborative masterpiece of poet Blaise Cendrars and his wife, painter Sonia 
Delaunay,
1687
 is a pioneering work of simultaneism not, according to Butler, on the basis of the 
“associative juxtaposition within the verbal text,” but “upon its interaction with the painting...which 
accompanies it.”1688 In this, it recalls the symbiosis of William Blake‟s poetry and illustration, and 
anticipates the work of Max Ernst, such as The Hundred Headless Woman.
1689
 However its semantic 
concerns are also plainly Futurist: its subject is a journey of initiation of the sixteen-year-old poet, filled 
with a confused superabundance of violent, erotic, irrational and revolutionary energy. Establishing that 
the simultaneist effect of Cendrar‟s poem owes more to the manner in which the visual and verbal 
elements extend one another – rather than to the internal, self-referential arrangement of its verbal 
elements, points from a logic of containment to one of distension – recognizing a dynamic poietic field 
which is atopian insofar as it escapes any simple location.   
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Apollinaire – the self-appointed spokesman of the Cubists1690 – identifies four principal routes of Cubist 
expression: scientific cubism, which expresses internalised geometric principles; physical cubism, which 
coordinates its elements through visual perception; instinctive cubism, which is informed by intuition; 
and orphic cubism, which is “the art of painting new structures out of elements which have not been 
borrowed from the visual sphere, but have been created entirely by the artist himself, and been endowed 
by him with fullness of reality.”1691 In Apollinaire‟s view, simultaneism takes on its full force in light of 
the aesthetic objectives of Orphism. “[W]orks...must simultaneously give a pure aesthetic pleasure, a 
structure which is self-evident, and a sublime meaning.”1692 Here is an anticipation of the aesthetic 
extreme that will manifest in terms of minimalism as soon as the unmediated presence, self-reflexive 
transparency and sublime effect for which Apollinaire campaigns, are pressed towards a greater level of 
abstraction and an austere approach to aesthetic medium.  
 
In practice, despite that fact that he “deplored the Futurists,”1693Apollinaire‟s visual poetry reveals their 
significant influence.
1694
 If many of these poems appeal to a traditional calligrammatic logic
1695
 – words 
formed into a single icon or sign, their “textual values...read against the visual imprint of a shape whose 
referential frame inflects the entire text”1696 – others attempt to generate a syntax of signs.1697The force at 
the heart of the visual poem is increasingly located within the concrete visual and structural relation of the 
words themselves, rather than in the iconic relation of word to image. Drawing on the technique of 
collage – which moves beyond the early Cubist analytical delineation of space in relation to objects, to a 
“synthesis or building up of separate objects on the picture plane”1698 – Apollinaire claimed to offer a 
“new representation of the universe, [t]he most poetic and the most modern.”1699 Indeed, what sets 
Apollinaire apart from his predecessors, and provides impetus to the subsequent visual poetry of high 
Modernism, is his sensitivity to the capacity of his medium to generate new interartistic topoi. The proper 
medium of “Horse Calligram” (Figure 91) is neither visual nor verbal; nor is it a simple composite of the 
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two. Its concern lies with the production of something entirely new, which Apollinaire believed would be 
discovered through the simultaneism exposed by collage. This is certainly an exaggerated claim. It is true 
that such works as “Horse Calligram” present skilful examples of an “„autoillustration,‟ which makes 
words take on the visual form of an object,”1700 and that these works involve an accelerated notation and 
reading in which “connections made by movements of the eye are supposed to inspire an innovatory type 
of inference.”1701 However, as Bann notes, that “lines of text are ingeniously manipulated in order to 
imitate natural appearances,”1702 should not persuade us of the concreteness of such works in the strong 
sense of the “parallel development of structure and content,”1703 of sense, concept, medium and meaning. 
Nor were these concerns unique to Apollinaire: historical precedents abound, most notably in the case of 
the Arabic tughra, while Apollinaire‟s contemporaries, Cendrars, Marinetti and Cangiullo, express similar 
interests.
1704
   
 
 
  
Figure 91: Guillaume Apollinaire, Horse Calligram, 1918. 
 
                                                          
1700
 Butler, Early Modernism, 170. 
1701
 Ibid. 
1702
 Stephen Bann, “Introduction,” CPIA, 11 (7-27). 
1703
 Ibid., 16. 
1704
 Ibid., 166; Bohn, Visual Poetry, 16-7. 
   293 
 
Aesthetically more significant is “Lettre-Océan” (Figure 92),1705 a “psychovisual collage”1706 which 
reveals Apollinaire‟s work at its perceptually most dynamic and its conceptually most profound. The 
poem takes its title from postal terminology, a letter sent across the ocean, between Apollinaire in 
bourgeois Paris, and his brother, Albert, in a politically unstable Mexico City.
1707
 Three principal visual 
figures emerge in the poem. The first is the postcard, marked by the stamp and wave-like postmarks, 
which is a partial reconstruction of narrative fragments exchanged between the brothers.
1708
 The second, 
the larger of the circular figures, on the right side of the poem, is a representation of the Eiffel Tower 
from above, marked by the verbal transcription of the tower‟s height: “Haught de 300 metres” (“Height of 
300 metres”).1709 From this point the sounds of the city fan outward in expanding concentric circles, from 
the sound of factory sirens (“hou”), to that of an autobus (“rro, o o to ro ro ro”); the sound of a 
gramophone (its “zzz” and fragmentary catches of melody) and the creak of the poet‟s new shoes (“cre”), 
presumably as he walks through the city.
1710
 Combining the visual and auditory perception with the poet‟s 
thought,
1711
 the poem, embodied by the tower, “radiates lines of words”1712 which on one level represent 
the transmission of radio waves or telegraphic messages
1713
 but, on another, establish the poem, as a 
“symbolic axis mundi:”1714 “[w]ith the location of the poem at its centre, the action radiates outward...to 
encompass the arrondissiment, the city, the nation, the continent, and the whole world.”1715 The third 
figure, the smaller of the two circular shapes to the bottom left, represents “a bunch of keys on a ring.”1716 
At its centre is the topographical marker, “Sur la rive gauche devant le pont d’Iéna” (“on the Left Bank 
opposite the Jena Bridge”). Bohn stresses that since this is the actual location of the Eiffel Tower, critics 
habitually misinterpret this as a second representation of the tower.
1717
 According to Bohn, that these are 
keys is “strengthened by the shape of several of the verses and by the line “Des clefs j’en ai vu mille et 
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mille” (“I have seen thousands and thousands of keys”)”, and, allegorically, by the fact that several of 
these keys are political slogans “each of which claims to be the „key‟ to an ideal society”1718 
 
 
 
Figure 92: Guillaume Apollinaire, Lettres-Océan (1918)  
 
 
 “The poem does not simply imitate an object,” notes Butler. “It can lead one to ask how the spatial 
arrangement of a series of messages might affect their meaning.”1719 This resonates with Johanna 
Drucker‟s description of concrete poetry in terms of the “work [which] has a distinct shape on the page 
and loses a part of its meaning if it is rearranged or printed without attention to the typeface and form 
which were part of the poet‟s original work.”1720 “Lettre-Océan” is thus amongst the founding gestures of 
modern concretism. It also speaks of something purely poietic. The topography of Paris is 
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schematized,
1721
 displaced into words and visual design, manifesting a poietic atopia – a non-space which 
is spatialized by its poietic taking-place, and which becomes concrete in this process of transumption.
1722
 
To clarify, our suggestion is not that Apollinaire‟s calligrammatic poetry is minimalist, when clearly it 
acts as the container of a great deal of complexity, but that it exemplifies through its simultaneist, 
concrete mould an early modernist vision of the aesthetic transumption which is radicalized and 
intensified by minimalists.  
 
Led by Marinetti, the Italian Futurists amplify the simultaneist aesthetic in their work by vigorous generic 
innovation.
1723
 Marinetti recognized and lauded the manner in which contemporary advertising and 
journalism were restoring dynamism to stagnant aesthetic formulae.
1724
 Embracing several of these 
techniques, the Futurists were also astute to the importance of public spectacle, staged impressive 
spectacular performances, and quickly elevated the manifesto to the foremost avant-garde genre of the 
day through their tireless dissemination of aesthetico-political propaganda.
1725
 The innovations they 
brought to sound and visual poetry were considerable. Having abandoned “traditional syntax, metre and 
punctuation,”1726 the Futurists were free to experiment with layout and typography. Marinetti‟s “After the 
Battle of the Marne” (Figure 93) 1727 exemplifies this concern in terms of the use of different types and 
sizes of lettering – recalling Mallarmé, it is true – and experiments with the collagic overlaying of texts. 
This spirit extends to Marinetti‟s unorthodox use of colour, the incorporation of mathematical and 
numerical symbols,
1728
 and its incorporation of sonic elements, whether onomatopoeic – the repeated “ta” 
in “After the Battle”1729 – or orthographic – adding or subtracting from the number of vowels and 
consonants in words.
1730
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Figure 93: Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, After the Battle of the Marne,  
Joffre toured the front by car, 1914. 
 
These experiments were captured in the phrase parole-in-liberta – words-in-freedom – through which 
Marinetti sought a positive poetic response to the technological acceleration of modernity in which he 
placed such great faith.
1731
 Free verse, Marinetti concluded, is not as free as it supposes.
1732
 Finally, it 
reinforces the general imposition of limits upon the senses, affirming that the “structure of language 
mirror[s] the oppressively hierarchical nature of society.”1733 Words-in-freedom, with all the formal, 
linguistic, sonic and visual innovation they brought, were supposed to liberate the senses and emotions on 
the one hand, and words themselves, on the other. “Words, which...had been held in the service of 
communicating information, were to be re-imagined as material things in themselves...Rather than serving 
as referents, they were now deemed self-illustrative, identified with their own aural and visual 
properties.”1734  
 
This experimental attitude, with its increased focus on the concreteness of the sign, spread rapidly across 
Europe. It discovered significant resonances in the advanced intermedia experimentation of Russian 
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poets,
1735
 and England, too, manifests a futurist moment in the work of the Vorticists.
1736
 That Anglo-
American critics have regularly mistaken the rhetorical animosity of the Vorticists towards Italian 
Futurism for a reliable indicator of the former‟s autonomy from the latter, 1737 should not distract us from 
the simple fact, as Perloff sees it, that “Vorticism would not have come into being without the Futurist 
model.”1738Marinetti‟s aesthetic had a considerable impact on Pound,1739 who, to recall, had left the 
Imagists for the Vorticists, and who considered “energy, force, dynamism...[and] simultaneity”1740 – 
distinctly Marinettian terms – central to his poetic vision.  
 
 “Its typographical and synthetic innovations were nevertheless startling,” 1741 suggests Perloff. In BLAST, 
the publication through which the Vorticists disseminated their ideas and work, we encounter “a visual 
format that recalls the advertising poster or billboard rather than the page to be consecutively read from 
top to bottom and from left to right.”1742 Advertising, to be effective, must intensify and exploit the 
economic dimension of the sign. By exploring this logic, the Vorticists progress towards a poetic 
distinction of the minimal, nuclear element of this commercial semiotics. Despite its stylistic incongruity 
with the exploits of BLAST, a similar concern is reflected in journalistic terms by the “emergence of a 
more taut and bare prose style in the newspapers of the day…[which] reflected the sense of increased 
velocity in daily life”1743 which is exemplified in the non-fictional writing of proto-minimalist Ernest 
Hemingway.  
 
The Vorticists integrate poetry, manifesto, experimental layout and illustration in an attempt to “give one 
a sudden feeling of vertigo, of plunging into an abyss of space,”1744 “an acceleration into depth”1745 in 
which the hope is to encounter “a radiant node or cluster.”1746 Led by Wyndham Lewis, they express an 
often brutal and dystopian vision of the self-executing collapse of the modern world, triggered and 
accelerated by the proliferation of technology, the diminution of the notion of value in a dehumanised 
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world.
1747
 In this respect, Vorticism represents a cynical appropriation of the futurist moment: a curious 
prospective retrospection in the sense that it seeks to stabilize a future catastrophe through a luminous 
point in the poiesis of the present – a cautionary threnody of sorts.   
 
 
e) An event between art and non-art 
 
The First World War and its terrifying technologies of death sparked radical doubt in even the most 
ardently utopian Futurist technophile. Within the choking dystopianism of collapsing empires and the 
failing politics of a hollow humanism, Dada was born – choking on, then spitting out the art of the past, 
and nourishing itself in the fervent belief that it was “essentially different.”1748 Dada resists positive 
definition as thoroughly as it does negative definition: it can be clarified by no attribute or set of 
attributes, nor by the fact that it lacks these. “The work of Dada,” suggests Welchman, “behave[s] more 
like a variable than a constant.”1749 Deprived of a stable set of objects, we come closer to our object only 
obliquely, by tracing the signifying force of Dada qua force, which, in Sanouillet‟s estimation, amounts to 
installing the name, Dada, as logos.
1750
 “Dada was a word, a brand new, meaningless and magic 
word,”1751 a prime word, in the terms of Marcel Duchamp, “which can be divided only by itself and by 
unity.”1752  
 
Dada intoxicates, not merely to confuse, but so that we can again experience, in the intense clarity of 
critical sobriety, the problematic nature of “the accepted...referential function of sign systems.”1753 As 
Caws claims, Dada‟s “drunkenness...can deliver us from what Tristan Tzara – the figure most intimately 
connected to the movement through its entire course – calls the „lazy habit‟ of living.”1754 Negation is 
merely the necessary prelude to sublation and the revolutionary manifestation of poietic novelty: “„[w]hat 
we wanted was to make a clean sweep of existing values, but also, in fact, to replace them with the 
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highest human values.‟”1755 Dada attempts to discover by anarchic means the radical point at which an 
elemental or primal aesthetic
1756
 and a fundamental politics
1757
 can coincide. “[U]nder...[its] emblematic, 
ironic and rather baffling name,
1758
 there came together an international constellation of artists, groups, 
periodicals, books and works, radically affirming the freedom of man and the irrepressible claims of the 
life impulse in all its manifestations.”1759 No-one, least of all its practitioners, was entirely sure where the 
perimeters of their project lay, yet they were uniformly convinced “it was through art that Dada...[would 
make] good its insurrection.”1760  
 
Exposed by this conviction are two parallel fields of tension: the first between art and non-art, the second 
between generation and destruction. Here art addresses not only its own existential conditions (in the first 
case), but those of being in general (in the second). The stakes are high, and, unsurprisingly, the spectrum 
of strong critical judgements ranges from the condemnation of Dada as an irretrievably nihilistic 
enterprise,
1761
 to those dedicated to its heroic elevation.
1762
 Most convincing, however, are the accounts 
which recognise in Dada a dialectic desire, an attempt to engender through its diverse expressions both 
aesthetic and social revolution.  
 
Dada‟s negotiation of the distinction of art from non-art, and relatedly, of the relationship between poiesis 
and destruction, rests on the self-understanding that its primary task is to expose the very manner in which 
the Real is shaped by a dialectic movement.
1763
 To recall, it is on the back of the dialectic that the modern, 
progressivist vision of history comes up against the moment of dialectic self-consciousness at which 
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history apparently comes to an end by grasping its own contingency. Dada aggressively rejects history 
and the structures through which it is communicated, but it seems unable to move beyond historicity – the 
force by which an entity emerges in the present with an awareness of its own contemporaneity, and so 
exists in an implicit relation to the past it ostensibly negates, launching itself thus into the imminent 
potentiality of the future. Inasmuch as it exemplifies the resilience of historicity, Dada also presents the 
minimal condition for the type of closure which defines an historical situation as such. Sanouillet intuits 
precisely this point when he writes that “with Dada, we live inside a closed world…The critic or the 
historian can only write or talk about Dadaism and the Dadaists, not about Dada and the Dadas.”1764 
“Dadaism created while Dada was destroying.”1765This is only an “apparent paradox,”1766 however, since 
the poietic force – that force which the dialectic itself promises to harness – becomes visible only through 
the maximal tension produced by a minimal contact, between the generic taking-place of the work – 
Dadaism – and the anarchic singularity of the work itself – Dada.  
 
Dada exemplifies a radical modernist aesthetic
1767
 in the very moment that it expresses its hostility to 
modernism as a whole.
1768
Yet, as Lyotard insists in his examination of Duchamp, “[i]nconsistency is not 
insignificance.”1769 Indeed, Dada‟s deliberate inconsistency is what marks it in relation to an event in 
Badiou‟s sense of this term: an aleatory, trans-ontological rift; a subtraction from the existential state – a 
negation which also posits something absolutely new. We might say that Dada‟s inconsistency acts as a 
cipher to its eventality. It intuits this event through its irrational yet productive suspicion of any physical 
or formal laws pertaining to aesthetics. These Dada judges as “arbitrary, random, „precise but inexact‟ (as 
Duchamp says to Steefel), without any assignable reference. A self-referring law, a contract with 
oneself...From the fact that the law is itself not legitimate...comes the result that you have no guarantee of 
conforming to it.”1770 Dada is exceptional in the sense exposed by Agamben – it creates “a zone in which 
application [of the law] is suspended, but the law…as such, remains in force.”1771 Here is a “moment of 
vigorous conflict in the zoning of [aesthetic] practices.”1772  
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Dada eludes and subverts discipline and genre,
1773
 and occasionally generates something entirely new. 
From the manner of its emergence, which emphasizes simultaneously the eschewal of external causal 
relation and mimetic reference, Dada reveals that its abiding concern is finally one of self-containment. 
Its most intense poietic moment is also its most intimate, yet it plays by nobody‟s rules, least of all its 
own.
1774
 Here are objects in search of a theory. However, since it is anarchic in relation to any aesthetic 
norms, any such theory must extend from the innermost potentiality of the object itself. It is thus that 
Dada “transforms art [itself], reinventing every discipline from within.”1775 Moving within the existential 
ambit of the minimalist logic of transumption, and particularly its distensive and distributive modalities, 
and claiming to be free from history, cause and telos, Dada represents itself as the decisive moment 
within which objects are allowed to be just objects.
1776
 This is evident from Tzara‟s famous (if basic) 
recipe for chance poetry – strips of text are cut from a source, placed in and then picked from a bag, and 
then notated
1777
 – which dislocates poietic force from its original source, allowing it simply to take-place. 
Equally we might look to the visual poetry of Raoul Hausmann (Figure 94),
1778
 or the “schematic 
mecanomorph works,”1779 or machine portraits, of Francis Picabia (Figure 95)1780 to witness the 
germination of a proto-minimalist expression of transumption unconstrained by tradition.  
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while acting as “a model for the highest order of denotative (one-to-one) exchange between word and image in 
systems of representation.” (ibid.). The poem appeals to a logic of self-referential transumption precisely to the 
extent that the potential for replication and execution which inhere in its design at once contain and distribute its 
poietic heart.  
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Figure 94: Raoul Hausmann, Material for                  Figure 95: Francis Picabia, Poéme banal, 1918. 
 Painting, Sculpture, Architecture 1918, 1918. 
 
The manner of Dada‟s transumption is intensified as its concerns become increasingly abstract. There 
persists in such cases the apparent paradox that the increased abstraction – indeed, minimization – of the 
referential content of the work, is accompanied by its concrete physical, manifestation as an actual object. 
Duchamp‟s ready-mades are exemplary in this respect. These are everyday objects, identified and 
selected, divested of any particular significance, and then reinvested with aesthetic importance. Following 
Danto, these are mere things transfigured into artworks,
1781
and have a different ontological status from 
their prototypes.
1782
 Although qualitatively indistinguishable, the artwork is quantitatively more intense, 
more knowable in terms of the taking-place of the Real. A prototypically minimalist gesture, the 
readymade augments that element of Dada which Tzara characterizes in terms of an art more art.
1783
 The 
readymade reaches towards an art more Real. Dada re-exposes a fundamental shift in the modern 
conception of realism, from a faithful reflection of the natural world to the location of an essential poietic 
element which is coincidental with the Real.
1784
 The Surrealists
1785
 – many of whom initially considered 
                                                          
1781
 Danto, Transfiguration, 149. 
1782
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1783
 Dachy, Dada Movement, 8. 
1784
 For leading Dadaist, Hugo Ball, this entails an investment in an aesthetic anti-naturalism in order to expose 
something almost super-natural at the heart of art (DS, 19).   
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themselves Dadaists – were convinced that they had discovered and could bring to light the very force of 
poiesis which the Dadaists had intuited only negatively.
1786
 This poietic force is reflected in the term 
surreal itself, which “has two meanings: more-real, and more-than real.”1787 The Surrealist project revives 
a waning Platonism, particularly in the case of Magritte, for whom “thought is…a universal, originary 
process, the raw material of all expression and activity, conditioning language and image alike.”1788 It is 
on this quasi-transcendental basis that Surrealism claims to subsume within a sphere of poetic unity
1789
 
“the clash of signification at the interface of different codes,”1790 containing under the sign of poetry1791 
any number of disciplines, media and genres.  
 
Although the rhetoric of Dada rejects the sort of unifying gesture of thought which the Surrealists 
embrace, there can be little doubt that they are similarly comprised of heterogeneous elements, and that 
this heterogeneity is finally regarded as the substance of reality, rendering what is real in a significant 
sense indistinguishable from what is more-real. Consider Duchamp‟s most celebrated readymade, 
Fountain (Figure 96).
1792
 This work sets in motion a startling dynamic, problematizing the distinction of 
art from non-art, and, in so doing, invigorating the relation of the readymade to the Real. To test the 
aesthetic resolve of a supposedly open forum for contemporary art in New York,
1793
 Duchamp submitted 
this work under the pseudonym Richard Mutt – a urinal, roughly signed on one side, which in any 
situation is a symbol of a deeply awkward conjunction of the private and the public.
1794
 When the urinal 
becomes art, and when the gallery becomes a public toilet, we might legitimately suggest that a certain 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1785
 Surrealism – which is antithetical to minimalism inasmuch as it seeks to demonstrate that the essence of art 
resides in elements of meaning not transparent to consciousness, and which must be uncovered through the various 
techniques of automatism (DSCMA, 124-5) – is for the most part bracketed in the present study. 
1786
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 Daniel Albright, Modernism and Music: An Anthology of Sources (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 2004), 
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 Welchman, “After the Wagnerian Bouillabaisse,” 83. 
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 Ibid., 84. 
1792
 Marcel Duchamp, Fountain, 1917. There is some dispute as to whether Dada should be dated from the first 
readymades produced by Duchamp in 1913 and the subsequent association in New York of Duchamp, Picabia and 
Man Ray, or to the establishment of the Cabaret Voltaire in Zurich (and the association of Tzara, Ball, Arp, 
Huelsenbeck, Richter, Hennings and Janco). Ades and Caws endorse the former (DSCMA, 111; DS, 10-1; Mary Ann 
Caws, “Dada‟s Temper: Our Text,” Dada Spectrum, 219-225), while Dachy clearly prefers the Zurich Dadaists as 
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 DS, 11. 
1794
 The traditionally private act of urination takes place in a public space – separated from ordinary space, it is true, 
but where people nonetheless go to do that which is private together. The individual urinal – as opposed to the 
trough-like ones which one might still encounter in more rustic public toilets – restores a symbolic, though not 
actual, element of privacy to the act. 
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revolution of a concept has taken place. For the present, the question of particular significance, however, 
is whether or not the Real resides with greater intensity in the real thing (the urinal) or in the readymade 
(the urinal as artwork). Inasmuch as the Real is actually indifferent to the mode of its presentation, the 
question is meaningless; but insofar as we are dealing with existential intensities – which is the actual 
quantitative wager on the term more-real – we are obliged to note that the artwork is in an important 
sense more-real than the simple urinal.  
 
 
Figure 96: Marcel Duchamp, Fountain, 1917. 
 
Regarding the transfiguration of non-art to art, Duchamp explains that the artistic status of the readymade 
rests on a generative dynamic governed by choice. From this choice, a new concept, context and name for 
the work are able to establish themselves. “[The artist] CHOSE it. He took an article of life, placed it so 
that its useful significance disappeared under the new title and point of view – created a new thought for 
that object.”1795 The resonances with Danto‟s argument regarding the transfiguration of mere things to art 
are striking. Although Danto‟s primary examples are taken from Pop and minimalism, it is arguably the 
Dada readymade which presents modernism‟s most intense moment, an event in relation to which such 
transfiguration itself becomes commonplace. Danto recognizes that since it is possible that an artwork be 
                                                          
1795
 Marcel Duchamp qtd. Dachy, Dada, 71. Richard Wollheim offers an interesting discussion of the manner in 
which this emphasis on decision redefines the concept of the artwork (Wollheim, “Minimal Art,” 396).  
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entirely perceptually indiscernible from an everyday object,
1796
 the distinction of art from non-art must be 
sought elsewhere than in the qualities of the entity in question.
1797
 Without denying the significance of 
context,
1798
 or of the formal sanction provided by the institutions of the artworld,
1799
 art presses beyond 
both the aesthetic question of representation and the contextual question of historical emergence. There is, 
for Danto, an ontological distinction to be made between art and non-art.
1800
  
 
The present claim is that the ontological differentiation of art from non-art owes to the fact that the former 
is quantitatively more-real than the latter – at very least insofar as it exemplifies the rules it prescribes for 
itself. “[E]ach example,” Danto suggests, “constitutes a sort of ontological argument in favour of its own 
designation.”1801 Furthermore, as Danto notes, when “„real‟ is used in contrast with 
representation...[s]omething is „real‟ when it satisfies a representation of itself.”1802 It is the capacity of art 
to abstract itself from within the undifferentiated profusion of reality which marks it as Real. As we have 
seen, the Real – defined by the fact that some quantity irreversibly takes-place – conditions the possibility 
of reality. Paradoxically, reality‟s primary reference is not the Real in this sense, but to the relations 
which exist between entities through which their qualities become visible. An art of the Real – 
exemplified by the readymade, and more clearly even by minimalism – abstracts itself from such relation 
through an act of self-aggregation: it limits the significance of its own qualities and content, and stresses 
as its defining moment the raw facticity of its taking-place as art. What follows such an object in terms of 
meaning and significance, although easily mistaken as essential, is in fact coincidental to that which 
renders the object Real.  
 
In relation to the Real, Fountain confronts us with a radical type of aesthetic abstraction. It is not 
concerned with the deconstitution or distillation of form, structure, content or medium.
1803
 Here 
abstraction is inseparable from the force of manifestation itself. It continues the work of poietic 
concretism begun by Mallarmé – confirming a certain symmetry between the event by which poiesis 
becomes concrete and eventality itself. Where Duchamp differs in this respect, is that the readymade 
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reveals that the more concretely poiesis is rendered, the more devoid of content it becomes. This is why, 
in the case of Fountain, the transformation of the ordinary thing to art can be accomplished by neither any 
formal nor by any conceptual property as such. As Duchamp intuits, the selection, reception and 
exposition of the readymade rest upon an axiom: either this is an artwork or it is not. Yet, when art is at 
its best, this difference is infra-thin, a term which Duchamp employs to describe the minimal gap between 
a thing and its self-identity.
1804
 In deciding this question, “aesthetic judgment is an infra-thin passage and 
an indifferent difference, something that does not have a name, and even less a concept,”1805 suggests 
Thierry de Duve. The minimal distinction which admits Fountain to the realm of art compels us to strip to 
their barest our aesthetic norms, and the categories by which we understand these.  
 
The readymade declines to be named in any simple relation to medium or genre.
1806
 Although its primary 
objective is to provoke aesthetic decision, it is no surprise that the implications of such a decision should 
transform how we interpret the value of the art-object, and that its use value gives way to aesthetic 
value.
1807
 The readymade “articulate[s] the tense relation between art and commodity,”1808 and resists 
being merely a “displaced commodity.”1809 If ultimately it is treated as a new genre, the readymade 
warrants this treatment not by drawing out comparisons to the standards of sculpture or urinals, but by its 
very refusal of association. Rejecting relation, Fountain sets its own boundaries, affirming the logic of 
containment at its centre. The transfiguration of the object to art presents an internal expansion of the 
terms which it contains – a distension in other words.1810 At the same time, the readymade presents the 
poietic manifestation of a new medium, and so appeals equally to a transumptive logic. “[F]or Duchamp, 
the art work…is neither purely verbal nor purely visual (or musical), nor is it an intermedia composition,” 
Perloff maintains. Rather, the transumptive logic emerges in what Duchamp regards in the terms of the 
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 Century 
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infra-thin as a type of nominalism which makes art Real
1811
 – a minimization of relation and distinction 
which “distinguishes the same from the same;”1812 the minutest possible delay1813 between taking-place as 
an event and taking-place as an instant.
1814
  
 
In this light, Fountain suggests the potential universality of the minimalist aesthetic, while also 
demonstrating that it is perfectly conceivable for a single object to manifest concurrently more than one of 
the three logics of minimalist transumption – containment, distension and distribution – identified in the 
present work. Yet, despite its smooth, monochromatic, symmetrical appearance, and although it is formed 
by the processes and materials conventionally reserved for industrial manufacture,
1815
 it would be 
incorrect to label Fountain a minimalist sculpture.
1816
 Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine that the 
radical position adopted by the minimalists could have taken hold were it not for Dada‟s proto-minimalist 
proclivities. Critics of minimalism uphold this claim. Strickland discerns Duchamp‟s influence on 
Rauschenberg‟s combines and Morris‟ Column;1817 and despite the latter having produced the iconic grey 
polyhedrons which bring together the monochromatic and geometric traditions of abstract sculpture, 
Maurice Berger quite rightly argues that the diversity of Morris‟ work points beyond minimalism to a 
neo-Dadaist sensibility.
1818
  
 
Wollheim, in the essay “Minimal Art,” argues that the stylistic austerity of Reinhardt‟s monochromatic 
canvases – “only minimally ahead of the tabula rasa [they] supersede[…]”1819 – and the readymades of 
Duchamp – works of which there are “preexistent facsimiles or highly undifferentiated objects”1820 – are 
associated by their displacement of the evidence of physical work
1821
 to the realm of concept.
1822
 As we 
have seen, in Greenberg‟s terms, minimalism belongs to the Dadaist anti-art tradition, but, devoid of the 
presence to which it aspires, is incapable even of generating much interest in this respect.
1823
 Yet, as Hal 
Foster suggests, “if the first great misreading is that minimalism is reductive, the second is that it is 
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idealist.”1824 Above I contend that the opposition in minimalism between concept and object is one which 
is forced by rhetoric rather than anything intrinsic. If we are to understand either Dada or minimalism as 
expressing a type of conceptualism, it must be on condition that this is the concept at its most material – 
that which clarifies the Real, which renders the Real more-real. 
 
Kenneth Baker reiterates the Dadaist legacy in minimalism in terms of questions of the object, reality, and 
presence, and, contra Greenberg, he suggests that it is the material presence (above any concept) sought 
by the minimalists which not only distinguishes them from Dadaists, but also renders their work 
genuinely novel.
1825
 Turning minimalism subtly towards its dialectic and mediatory dimension, Barbara 
Rose‟s “A B C Art” interprets this art as incorporating elements of Dada and Constructivism.1826 This 
view is echoed by Foster,
1827
 by Meyer
1828
 – especially in discussing Flavin and Andre1829 – and Perloff 
who, explaining theatricality in minimalism, juxtaposes Fried‟s essentially anti-Dadaist stance to the 
Constructivist position in which the work “exist[s] only in relation to the environment and the viewer, that 
they were affected by conditions external to their own materiality.”1830 
 
We become increasingly aware that Dada operates as a kind of aesthetic stem-cell. It reflects, reflects 
upon, or influences a range of aesthetic movements. As we have seen, surrealism develops from the 
Dadaist aesthetic, and on the level of form, Dada consolidates the most revolutionary aspects of cubism 
and futurism. In many of its best works – particularly its typographical experiments and phonetic poetry – 
it addresses aesthetic concerns strikingly similar to those reflected in Constructivism and De Stijl.
1831
 At 
its most abstract, its desire for directness reflects the spirit of abstract expressionism and minimalism, as 
we have already witnessed.  
 
These aside, Dada influences or generates the prototype for many of the most radical experiments of the 
neo avant-garde artists of the 1950s and 1960s.
1832
 Shattuck argues that Dada‟s asystematicity and 
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heterogeneity epitomize a mode of radical romanticism,
1833
 and it is not surprising in this light, that of its 
most pervasive concerns – aleatory operations – should take hold so fervently in the neo-romanticism of 
postmodern culture.
1834
 Chance, to which the Dadaists regularly appeal, becomes a central concern in all 
expressive media. The Surrealists make a loose but significant appeal to chance as an engine of poiesis, 
and more rigorous aleatory operations are evident in the work of the Black Mountain and Fluxus groups – 
most iconically in the multifaceted oeuvre of John Cage
1835
 – as well as in many of the most significant 
new media, digital and hypertext experiments, those of Alison Knowles and Stuart Moulthrop amongst 
them. Perloff, meanwhile, suggests that the poetry of leading contemporary avant-gardists – amongst 
other she names Bök, Goldsmith, McCaffery and Drucker – would be inconceivable without the 
revolutionary attitude heralded by Dada.
1836
 Through the challenge to the distinction of art from life which 
the readymade issues, and by extending the logic of collage to three dimensions, Dada anticipates the 
“vernacular realism”1837 of an art of assemblage – “a means of creating works of art almost entirely from 
pre-existent elements.”1838 Assemblage itself develops in several directions: Robert Rauschenberg‟s 
combines integrate painterly technique with “blunt undisguised things;”1839 Alan Kaprow creates entire 
environments or installations, often redefined, by the involvement they call for from the viewer, as 
happenings;
1840
 and the wholesale revision of the environment instigated by such daring experiments as 
Christo‟s and Jeanne-Claude‟s Wrapped Coast1841 – a 2.4 kilometre stretch of Little Bay, Sidney, which 
was wrapped in a giant 92 900m of fabric, held in place for four weeks by rope.
1842
  
 
Like its forebears, the neo-Dadaists Fluxus group
1843
 was as heterogeneous as it was active. Anarchic, 
occasionally nihilistic, but tirelessly experimental, Fluxus embraces numerous genres and disciplines in 
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the same moment as it transgresses these. It figures its aesthetic dynamic in terms of events rather than 
happenings, opposing its anarchically determined, but carefully prescribed, “unitary gesture[s]”1844 to 
more “improvisatory permissiveness of most [h]appenings.”1845 The group stretches what might be 
legitimately understood in terms of conceptual and performance art, video and sonic art, and the 
experimental extremes of visual and sound poetry. Of its most significant practitioners are also amongst 
the best minimalists, including the composers Terry Riley and La Monte Young, visual artist Robert 
Morris and interart poet, Emmett Williams. Indeed, the concrete poetry of the latter instantiates amongst 
the most rigorous types of minimalism imaginable.   
 
 
 
 
 
13. SONIC OBJECTS AS MINIMALIST POETRY 
 
 
a) Solid sounds 
 
The term object poem
1846
 is offered by critic Harold Rosenberg to describe the poetic logic adopted by 
artworks which are constituted by the selection and arrangement of particular prefabricated objects. These 
works – which aim “to pin down a state of being in the concreteness of things”1847 – intuit that the 
concrete exemplification of the futurist moment in works such as Duchamp‟s readymades and neo-
Dadaist assemblages is not only material, but belongs equally to concept and language. Exhibiting a 
disjunctive parataxis, the object poem demands a “new type of reading,”1848 one which reaches beyond 
any particular medium, or combination of media, towards the force of poietic coherence itself through 
which the material object – whether its matter is plastic, sonic, conceptual or kinetic – is transumed or 
transfigured to an art object.   
 
That the concrete substance of the object proves, in this light, to be as contingent as that which defines the 
poem itself again prompts us to move from the visual sphere to that of language and sound in order fully 
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to comprehend the logic of transumption. Sonic objecthood is of particular interest in this regard, 
precisely for the manner in which it manifests with such material force extraneously to many of the 
habitual markers of materiality. In this light, Perloff is quite correct in claiming that “the sound of poetry 
[is] – in all senses of the word – significant.”1849 Its consonances and dissonances, its rhythms and 
repetitions, its tones and intonations, and its rhymes and resonances have always been integral to the 
poetic enterprise itself. The historical imbrication of poetry, sound and music is as venerable as it is 
complicated. It is closely tied to the means of its transmission, regarding which it is useful to keep in 
mind Cole‟s observation that “[i]n all cultures of which we have knowledge...word literacy has preceded 
music literacy.” Since “there is no parallel with the slow evolution of word writing,”1850 a significant rift 
exists between modern musical notation – organized around the specification of exact pitch, duration and 
metre,
1851
 and which has remained largely unchanged since late Medieval times – and the communication 
of musical information paratextually, through the supplementary graphemes
1852
 which link sound and 
poem.
1853
 In this sense, there is a tradition of notating sound poetry which stretches back almost two and a 
half millennia, and which, we can reasonably assume, reciprocally informs and is informed by a 
vernacular oral tradition of performance.  
 
Within the western tradition, classical sources provide many useful descriptions of the manner in which 
poetry has always been tied to performance.
1854
 For confirmation, we need look no further than Plato‟s 
address to Ion – “you rhapsodes and actors, you and the poets whose work you sing”1855 – or Aristotle‟s 
description of how “rhythm, melody, and verse…[are sometimes] all used together, and in others 
introduced separately one after another.”1856 The most fundamental aspects of poetry emerge through the 
union of our intrinsic mimetic capacity, which “delight[s] in works of imitation”1857 and a musical “sense 
of harmony and rhythm natural to us.”1858 Many of poetry‟s most conspicuous elements are the sonic 
devices through which it mimes the natural world. Against nature, poetry measures itself, determining the 
proportions of its rhythmic structures; from nature it derives onomatopoeia; and upon nature it 
superimposes patterns of its own invention – principally metre, rhyme and other sonic consonances.  
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Poetry, for the Ancient Greeks, is as much an art of recitation and musical performance as it is a rhythmic 
construction within language. The early cultic hymns of public ritual
1859
 were adapted to every social 
situation, from political contestations to the drink-fuelled debates of symposia
1860
 – elaborated in the 
parody of iambic verse which gives rise to comedy, and the heroic narrative of epic poetry which sparks 
the genesis of tragedy, with which it shares a thematic gravity.
1861
 Central to the structural integrity of 
tragedy is the chorus, the group of singers which offer both exposition of, and commentary on, dramatic 
action.
1862
 The chorus recalls the “ritual poetic forms”1863 of tragedy‟s theurgical roots, singing or 
chanting in various metres, completing or complementing the dialogue between characters. The 
interventions of the chorus exemplify the manner in which Ancient Greek music – “the art of the 
Muses”1864 – emphasizes the “unity of poetry, melody, and gesture in archaic and classical culture.”1865 
“Besides singing,” West identifies the prevalence of “a technique of reciting verse with instrumental 
accompaniment”1866 akin to chanting. A distinctly minimalist aesthetic adheres to the performance of this 
poetry: “clarity and purity of tone, resonance, and coincidence with the accompaniment were the virtues 
commended.”1867 In this art, simplicity and linearity are valued not as an end in themselves, but because 
they clarify the work, allowing poetry, music and performance to reflect and intensify one another, 
“characterizing the text in relation to its poetic genre.”1868 
 
It is fortunate that although only a few fragments of notated music survive from classical antiquity,
1869
 the 
means of their accurate deciphering is contained in the numerous theoretical treatises produced by the 
Greeks and Romans in their attempts to work out the systematic elements of the acoustic universe.
1870
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These fragments – mostly didactic excerpts or choral prompts1871 – were notated using letters adapted 
from the alphabet and inscribed above the poetic text.
1872
 Rhythm, metre, duration and tempo were 
relative to the syllabic stresses of the poem.
1873
 As music was largely transmitted by repetition and 
memorization,
1874
 and because an improvisatory spirit permeated almost every genre of Greek poetry, 
“words, rhythm, and music...were each time adjusted to the requirements of the moment.”1875 Two 
Delphic hymns to Apollo (Track 26)
1876
 – the first composed anonymously in 138 B.C., the second by 
Limenios in 128 B.C. – remain the most complete records of Greek music, exemplifying well the manner 
in which instrumental accompaniment amplifies the clarity of the chanting chorus, and the alternation 
between recitation and melody. From Imperial Rome, only a single haunting fragment survives – “four 
mutilated measures,”1877 by the celebrated Roman poet, Terence (Track 27).1878 
 
The comparative study of chant – across various religious traditions, cultures and historical periods – 
reveals four essential categories of incantation: recitative chant, in which a single reciting tone is used for 
an entire text with occasional variations at the ends of phrases; syllabic chant, in which each syllable is 
assigned a single tone, which tones are then sequenced to constitute a melody; neumatic chant, in which 
short embellishments of a few notes often occur on single syllables; and melismatic chant, in which 
numerous tones can be assigned to individual syllables, and thus exhibit complex types of ornamentation. 
Neumatic and melismatic cantation, generally melodically intricate, are more closely associated with our 
understanding of music than of poetry. For this reason it is necessary to leave aside the more ornate 
traditions of Gregorian and Byzantine chant, noting rapidly that it is no exaggeration to claim that Greek 
poetic recitation presents the single most universal influence on western literature and music, and the 
many subsequent attempts to coordinate poiesis and sound at their most fundamental levels. There is 
almost certainly some continuity between the chant forms of the medieval church, east and west, and the 
music of Imperial Rome.
1879
 Before the Carolingian imposition of the Gregorian liturgy and its chant 
across Europe in the thirteenth century, a variety of regional forms thrived, many of which clearly 
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manifest their ancient ancestry. The Old Roman chant of the pontifical liturgy of seventh century Rome 
presents a “meeting point between the music of Greco-Latin antiquity and the Middle Ages”1880 (Track 
28).
1881
 Older still is the Mozarabic chant of Latin Hispania (Track 29),
1882
 consolidated in the fifth 
century by the Visigoths,
1883
 the Benevantan and Milanese chant of Lombard south Italy, which is “pure, 
archaic, and elaborate...full of formulaic repetitions,”1884 and the Gallican chant which is now entirely 
extinct.     
 
By contrast, much syllabic and recitative chant expresses a palpably poetic sensibility. To the first 
Delphic hymn we might fruitfully compare Muhammad Hassan‟s masterful recitation of Surat Al-
Fatihah, the first part of the Qur’an (Track 30)1885 and Tibetan Buddhist chant from the Thami monastery 
(Track 31).
1886
 In the case of the former, the means are minimal, yet the effect is as considerable as it is 
poetic. The melody alternates between two principal reciting tones with occasional and subtle micro-tonal 
embellishments which elicit the remarkable syncopation innate to the language, and generate the slight 
imbalance which renders the stable tone and rhyme at the end of each phrase so effective. In the latter, the 
rapid, even-paced reciting-tone of the mantra – over which the more expressively inflected tone of a lead-
chanter drifts, and which is intensified at various points by the startling unison of the trisyllabic phrase om 
ma hum
1887
 –  demonstrates well the potential proximity of speech, chant and verse.  
 
Two of the most perceptive thinkers on the relation of sound and poetry – Jacques Roubaud (a founder of 
Oulipo) and Dick Higgins (a pioneer and tireless, if controversial, advocate of intermedia concretism) – 
agree that sonic poetry is necessarily separate from music and song. According to Higgins, “[o]ne thing 
that sound poetry is not is music,”1888 while Roubauld is unambiguous in asserting that “[a] song is not a 
poem and a poem is not a song.”1889 Both affirm the normative potential of genre, or the purpose of 
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establishing the conditions upon which their respective taxonomies are maximally coherent.
1890
 In a 
significant sense, they are, of course, correct: sound poetry is not music, just as a shrub is not a tree. Yet, 
we must also consider that sound poetry makes little sense qua poetry if we fail to hear the resonance of 
the aesthetic which Hellenic culture recognized in terms of music – the integration of poetry, song and 
gesture. This musical aesthetic of ancient drama informs not only the liturgical interplay of medieval 
chant
1891
 and mystery and morality plays,
1892
 but also influences the trobar – the art of the troubadours 
(and later, the trouveres): those travelling musician-poets whose song, centred on pastoral motifs and 
romantic love, “indissolubly interlaces a particular language to its music”1893 (Track 32).1894  
 
From the innovations of the troubadours, poetry consolidates its most stable melodic property. “Rhyme as 
we know it came to the fore...by means of the troubadour verse and the evolution of an emphasis on 
sound.”1895 Yet, just as song and poetry seem most intimate, they part company: poetry asserts its 
autonomy from music, and “in relation to other types of language arts.”1896 Although historians of poetry 
seldom make the observation, this rift most likely has less to do with any generic innovation, and more to 
do with the rapid rise of polyphony – the increasingly complex interaction of melodies becomes an end in 
itself and, for the most part, does not deal sympathetically with the semantic or formal properties of the 
verse. For poetry, the result is the development of lyrical forms such as the sonnet independently of the 
direct influence of music. Certainly, verse is still set to music – we need only think of the remarkable 
corpus of John Dowland in this regard – but even in such cases, lyrical poetry retains an independence it 
did not previously possess. In this light it is perhaps not surprising that between the fourteenth century 
and the end of the nineteenth century the relation between poetry and sound is governed by the lyrical 
genres. In fact, poetry becomes virtually synonymous with lyricism, even though, as we have seen, there 
is considerably greater sonic interest in the history of poetry than the history of the lyric is able to 
express.
1897
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b) Intermediation as generic expression 
 
Intermediation, understood as “a conceptual fusion of scenario, visuality...audio elements”1898 and 
language,
1899
 has, in Higgins‟ estimation, “always been a possibility since the most ancient times.”1900 In 
this light, we should not overlook the particularly remarkable revival of the ideals of Greek tragedy in 
sixteenth century Florence. Two aristocratic groups – the predominantly intellectual Camerata dei Bardi, 
and the performers of the Accademia degli Alterati
1901
 – debated the classical notion of music, 
concluding, despite their differences, that only in returning to ancient models could a new mode of 
expression be found in which “music shares integrally with the words in unfolding the drama”1902 to be 
portrayed. Opera – as this radical, transgeneric, intermedia project came to be known1903 – aimed at 
nothing less than the resurrection and contemporary perfection of the aesthetic philosophy they believed 
the Greeks had practised, but which had been lost to the West. Despite its occasional stylistic flourishes, 
the aesthetic ambition of early opera is essentially minimalist in much the same sense as its Greek 
precursor: both strive for rhythmic clarity, formal transparency, and an immediacy in the relation between 
poetic text and its sonic properties. “Without neglecting to be song, music must contrive to be 
declamation...known in general as the reciting style...expressing as faithfully and as vividly as possible a 
more or less dramatic verbal style.”1904 A mature example of this style can be heard in the opening 
recitative of Claudio Monteverdi‟s Orfeo in which the rhythms of speech are clearly discernible in the 
narrative declamation of the shepherds (Track 33).
1905
 Although opera rapidly becomes extremely 
elaborate, abandoning the classical model, it retains a certain concern with aesthetic unity and immediacy,  
as is clearly evidenced in the Wagnerian use of Sprechgesang
1906
 and the search for a Gesamtkunswerk,  
“uniting every branch of art,” recognizing that “[t]he endeavour of Art is therefore all-embracing.”1907  
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It is at first surprising that the minimalists should discover in opera arguably their most successful 
vehicle. Yet, recalling its austere Greek origins, the late Renaissance emphasis on directness of 
expression, and the Wagnerian revival of the notion of absolute art in the Gesamtkunswerk, we encounter 
a genre which, for all its opulence, is predominantly concerned with generating a forceful access to the 
Real. This capacity is revealed in Philip Glass‟ first operatic trilogy, all three works of which extensively 
explore the reflexive relationship between music and language. The examination offered by Glass and his 
librettists is particularly interesting, as throughout the cycle they employ languages not in common usage: 
Einstein on the Beach incorporates the abstract language of mathematics, closely reflected in the additive 
and subtractive processes of the compositional process, with the non-linear poetry of Christopher 
Knowles, whose “neurological impairment and a strikingly unusual way of viewing his own world”1908 
helped him to write texts of “startling originality;”1909 Satyagraha, a political work based on Mahatma 
Ghandi‟s early political life and his philosophy of passive resistance, is written in Sanskrit;1910 and 
Akhnaten, a potent exploration of the parallel logic of religion and politics in the foundational gesture of 
monotheism,
1911
 is largely compiled from various fragments in the language of ancient Egypt.
1912
 On the 
other hand, Alice Goodman‟s libretto for John Adams‟ first opera, Nixon in China – which deals with the 
historic 1972 meeting between Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong – is written entirely in rhyming 
couplets.
1913
 Consider the following chorus close to the opera‟s opening (Track 34):1914  
 
The people are the heroes now 
Behemoth pulls the peasant‟s plow 
When we look up, the fields are white 
With harvest in the morning light 
And mountain ranges one by one 
Rise red beneath the harvest moon.
1915 
 
Not only does the verse follow a traditional lyrical mould, but, as in the classical tradition, speech is 
imitated closely in the refrain – “The people are the heroes now/ Behemoth pulls the peasant plough” – in 
terms of both the limited melodic range and the rhythmic material used by Adams. The heroic pastoral 
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imagery which begins “When we look up” is conveyed by distended rhythmic figures, of triplets against 
the quadruple metre, maintained in the steady flow of eighth notes passed between woodwind, brass 
synthesizer (harpsichord) and in the pizzicato quarter notes in the lower strings. The white “morning 
light,” in which the harvest – a powerful symbol of the prosperity of the people –is revealed, passes 
without interruption into the rising harvest moon, its red light reflected in the “mountain ranges” it 
progressively renders visible. The image here is one of the rise of communism in China. Labour, like the 
rhythmic accompaniment of the orchestra, is ceaseless and unlimited by the time of day. If the harvest 
begins at daybreak, it continues into moonlit night. We are enjoined to juxtapose the rapid flow of 
chronological time – the working-day – with the cyclical temporality of day and night, lunar cycles, and 
the seasons. We might understand the tension between temporal passage and cyclical repetition – and 
between the speech-like declamation of the opening two lines and the heroic lyricism of those which 
follow – in terms of a continuum of revolutionary time. This is of particular significance in light of the 
Maoist emphasis on the necessity of an “ongoing, permanent revolution,”1916 and its transposition from 
urban to rural societies, from factory to field. As is an habitual consequence of syncopation, the subtle 
displacement of the word “plow” at various points, strengthens moments of regularity and cadential 
arrival. Rhyme, for its part, reinforces the sense of consonance and containment which complements the 
immediacy so central to minimalism. Similar observations might be noted of the interaction of verse and 
music, word and voice, in the varied and sophisticated song-writing of Nico Muhly, the most interesting 
composer to adapt the sonic vocabulary of musical minimalism in recent years, and of the remarkable 
minimalism of Louis Andriessen, in which the object is made virtually tangible by musical means. In this 
respect, the opening of the four-part musical theatre work, De Materie, is exemplary: the orchestra 
literally hammers out in sound the bruteness of matter, one hundred and forty four “instrumental 
fortissimo crashes (toccata!)”1917 which introduce the theory of the visionary Dutch philosopher, Gorlaeus 
(1591-1612), arguably the world‟s first atomic physicist who reinvigorates the classical atomism of 
ancient Greece
1918
 (Track 35).
1919
  
 
At its best, minimalist opera – incorporating under the banner of music any art which intensifies the force 
with which it communicates, while retaining a radical, immediate and essentially materialist 
understanding of each of these – explores the objectal logic we might identify in terms of a sonic object 
poem. It presents a strong case for the survival into contemporary aesthetics of the ancient notion of 
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music in which poetry and sound are inextricable. On this basis, sound poetry is more than “poetry in 
which the sound is the focus,”1920in Higgins‟ terms. It includes, in McCaffery‟s estimation, “the many 
instances of chant structures and incantation, of nonsense syllabic mouthings and deliberate lexical 
distortions still alive among North American, African, Asian and Oceanic peoples...[the] ludic strata...in 
the nonsense syllabery of nursery rhymes, mnemonic counting aids, whisper games and skipping chants, 
mouth music and folk-song refrain.”1921  
 
 
c) Homonymy, homophony and solidity 
 
McCaffery isolates three phases in the development of sound poetry. The earliest is identified in terms of 
the “vast, intractable area of archaic and primitive poetries,”1922 which, I believe, discovers its most 
significant instantiation in the classical model and its various elaborations. More recent are the avant-
gardist efforts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the “several diverse and revolutionary 
investigations into language's non-semantic, acoustic properties”1923 which include the Futurists, Dadaists 
and a few scattered experimentalists – Christian Morgenstern, Lewis Carroll and Edward Lear amongst 
them.
1924
 Most recently, in the 1950s and beyond, sound becomes a central pursuit in the search for a 
concrete poetic aesthetic. This poetry extends beyond the limitations of the score, word or phoneme, 
beyond the body and the voice, to an understanding of the sonic poetic object as the pure force of 
mediation itself. This is intimately bound to development of sound recording technologies which express 
the “possibility of „overtaking‟ speech by the machine.”1925 
 
It is the second of these phases which is approximated by the futurist moment – that point of revolutionary 
utopianism identified earlier. Striking works of experimental sound poetry are produced by both the 
Russian and Italian Futurists, and key Dadaists from the Zurich and Berlin avant-garde scenes. 
Attempting to press to a linguistic point of origin for the rich rhymes, rhythms, alliterative and 
onomatopoeic potential of the Russian language, poets such as Velimir Khlebnikov, Alexey Kruchenykh, 
Ilia Zdanevich (Iliazd) and Vladimir Majakovskij are instrumental in uncovering a poetry which is 
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“spontaneous [and] instantaneous.”1926 Sound, in their estimation, is the element most capable of 
achieving the sense of simultaneism and movement common to every brand of futurism.
1927
 In poems 
such as “Ballad of the Dancer” (Track 36),1928 Kruchenykh presses the rhythmic onomatopoeic element of 
poetic language in novel directions, beyond the mimicry of concrete sounds, towards something wholly 
more abstract. Here the accents and stresses of dance are clearly audible: it opens with a vigorously 
accented alternation of rapid, multi-syllabic upbeats and regular, heavy downbeats (0”-10”), which 
proceeds through growingly even syllables and a subtle ritardando (0”-15”) through a bridge (16”-33”) 
with its several dramatic fermata or pauses and melodically perceptible imperfect cadence,
1929
 and into a 
second motif which begins irregularly, but culminates in a waltz or minuet, with its characteristic staccato 
third beat which leads into an accented first beat (42”–52”), concluding with an onomatopoeic click of the 
heel to end the dance and poem.  
 
More notable in relation to minimalism, is Kruchenykh‟s phonemic work – brief, repetitive and entirely 
onomatopoeic
1930
 – in which “poetry must revert to a more primitive, more libidinal, outburst of organic 
orality.”1931 Consider “zok zok zok” (Track 37),1932 which explores a range of phonemes, points of 
articulation, patterns, permutations and reversals. If it is clear that this exposition of the fundamental units 
from which language is constituted is a distinctly minimalist activity, it is also the case that Kruchenykh‟s 
belief that his poetry was generating an alogical, transrational explodity
1933
of significance might be 
viewed as easily as the foundational gesture of an aesthetic maximalism. To the contemporary ear, the 
rhetorical theatricality of Kruchenykh‟s recitation is more outlandish than it is interesting. Yet, we cannot 
fail to discern in its feverish urgency, an intense commitment to futurity, one which is intensified in the 
eclectic and conceptual approach to poetic sound adopted by his poetic colleague, Khlebnikov.  
  
The radical understanding of poiesis which Khlebnikov endorses rests on the symbolic union of number 
and etymology. A mathematician by training, the poet became increasingly concerned with discovering 
and figuring, a numerical basis, for reality.
1934
 The implausibility of Khlebnikov‟s mathematical efforts 
                                                          
1926
 Perloff, 21
st
 Century Modernism, 131.  
1927
 Butler, Early Modernism, 146. 
1928
 Alexey Kruchenykh, Ballad of the Dancer, 1951. 
1929
 This imperfect cadence presents an F# major chord – the sub-dominant chord in C# major – into the dominant 
chord, G# major (it could also be written as C#: IV-V).   
1930
 Perloff, 21
st
 Century Modernism, 124-5. 
1931
 Christian Bök, “When Cyborgs Versify,” SP/P S, 130 (129-41).   
1932
 Alexey Kruchenykh, zok zok  zok. Sound source undated. 
1933
 Nancy Perloff, Sound Poetry, 101-2, 104-5. 
1934
 Perloff, 21
st
 Century Modernism, 143-4. 
   321 
 
are less significant than their affirmation of a super-sensible radix at the heart of language and poetry. 
Poetic language is henceforth a zaum language, captured in “phonemic and morphemic play...beyond (za) 
mind or reason (um). Zaum is most persuasively translated by the neologism beyonsense. Indeed, 
neologism is at the heart of this vision of poiesis, once again charging a poetic language exhausted by 
familiarity and which ignores is own strangeness.”1935 The task of the poet is to uncover the etymological 
radices of words from within the complex lattice of phonic similarities, and to generate a genuinely novel 
poetic vocabulary, extracted from either history or utility,
1936
 to constitute a translogical poetics.
1937
 Sound 
is of particular importance to Khlebnikov, and in a striking anticipation of the concrete and minimalist 
problematization of external reference, “the material form of the signifier is thus [regarded as] its 
meaning,”1938 so confirming a distinctive vision of sonic objecthood.   
 
The most celebrated product of Khlebnikov‟s “elaborate etymology”1939 is the sound-poem “Incantation 
by Laughter” (Track 38),1940 which builds an elaborate set of permutations from the root, sme, of the word 
laugh, or smekh. Gary Kern provides the following translation:   
 
O laugh it out, you laughsters! 
O laugh it up, you laughters! 
So they laugh with laughsters, so they laugherize delaughly. 
O laugh it up belaughably! 
O the laughingstock of the laughed upon – the laugh of the Belaughed laughsters! 
O laugh it out roundlaughingly, the laugh of laughed-at Laughians!  
Laugherino, laugherino, 
Laughify, laughifcate, laugholets, laugholets,  
Laughikins, laughkins.  
O laugh it out, you laughsters! 
O laugh it out, you laughsters!
1941
 
 
The poem, Perloff explains, “uses suffixes, for example, to turn the stem into plural nouns…verbs…or 
adjectives and adverbs. And stems are often joined to suffixes that don‟t go with them.”1942 In other 
words, having grasped the fundamental lexemes, graphemes and phonemes of poetic language, it becomes 
possible to assert the universal poetic applicability of any number of etymologically derived and 
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phonically coded neologisms. In these, “every letter is letter perfect”1943 precisely because such poetry 
enables us to move from the letter as such to the self-sufficiency of the word as such
1944
 – to a patterning 
of reality which begins with the distension of the smallest poetic particles, the minimal difference 
between the sounding of these particles and their identity,
1945
 and in expanding, empties the referential 
reserve of the sign so that we are left with a sonic object without content; the uncanny echo of a hollow 
laughter. 
 
For Khlebnikov, poetic sound constitutes a metaphysical field in which phoneme and poiesis come 
together in an extension of any ordinary reference or historical account. In this respect, he resembles the 
theorists of classical Greece who pursued a transcendental principle through which sound, matter and 
mind were potentially woven together. Arguably, the principal elements of sonic poetry are as intrinsic to 
existence as they are to music or poetry: duration is fundamental to every sonic object, encompassing its 
beginning and ending, and constituting the necessary condition for rhythm and metre to take place; 
frequency determines the very material composition of objects, which, in sonic objects, includes pitch, 
intonation and rhyme. That the sonic instantiation of poiesis is of considerable ontological significance is 
affirmed by both Attridge and Stewart. In particular, it is rhythm which instantiates duration as a “real-
time event,”1946 providing poetry with its momentum.1947 In Attridge‟s estimation, “[r]hythm is one of the 
most familiar experiences of our daily lives. We are all constantly making and encountering rhythms.”1948 
Similarly, in her defence of the centrality of poetic rhythm and rhyme, Stewart remarks that “our speech 
rhythms are only a small instance of rhythm as a force in nature, indeed a force in the cosmos.”1949 She 
proceeds with a radical claim – that “[r]hythm indeed may be a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of 
human life, for the embryonic heart begins to beat at eighteen to twenty-one days after conception; at that 
point there is no blood to pump, no function for the heart to serve, but if the beat stops, the embryo 
dies.”1950  
 
In the sense that rhythm is both observable in the material world, and an intimate part of poietic 
generation, it is simultaneously natural and super-natural. The latter is the case if, as does Aristotle, we 
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believe that certain art is capable of perfecting form
1951
 by penetrating to the heart of the principles of 
nature, not merely reproducing them. Above I suggest that it is possible to analyze Kruchenykh‟s 
“Ballad” by discerning a pulse and contingent points of metrical stability, much as one would for a 
musical composition. Carper and Attridge identify within the basic components of musical metrics – the 
alternation of beat and off-beat – the key to understanding poetic rhythm.1952 In “zok zok zok,” although 
the basic material is phonemic, the momentum of the poetic medium emerges as a result of repetition and 
variation, which, as Attridge argues, are fundamentally rhythmical: “rhythm is what makes a physical 
medium…seem to move with deliberateness though time, recalling what has happened (by repetition) and 
projecting itself into the future (by setting up expectations), rather than just letting time pass it by.”1953 If, 
for Khlebnikov, poiesis is located primarily in the singular sonic structure of the phoneme, the 
“possibilities of chant and charm, zaum and word-magic”1954 rest on a morphology which is intrinsically 
rhythmic – it requires the repetition and relation of certain elements.   
 
The knowability of these qualities of poetic sound is supported by their potential quantification – their 
being rendered regular by metric divisions and patterns of rhyme. Metre asserts a principle of definite 
quantification within a poetic situation which is rhythmic: it includes discrete elements taking-place in a 
temporal relation to one another, even when these elements exhibit little or no awareness of their own 
quantitative dimension. Metric “units are countable, and the number is significant,” notes Attridge, 
“[transforming] the general tendency toward regularity in rhythm into a strictly-patterned regularity that 
can be counted and named.”1955 Rhyme, for its part, presents the minimal condition of poetic consonance. 
Such consonance is potentially both quantitative and qualitative, and transects equally the fields of sound, 
vision, shape and concept. Even as it affirms the taking-place of a poetic entity, it also allows us, perhaps 
asks us, to anticipate the future shape of the poem or aesthetic work.
1956
 In this sense, rhyme and metre 
confirm that differentiation and organization are intimately connected to the guarantee of futurity in the 
poietic imagination.   
 
Stewart emphasizes with admirable clarity the comparability of rhyme and metre, and the manner in 
which they supervene upon rhythm:  
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Rhyme offers a particular kind of pattern, one that is only partly determinative. Unlike rhythm, which may 
exist as pure haptic or tactile feeling, rhyme comes with acoustical, if not always semantic, content; and 
unlike meter, which remains ideal, rhyme is always realized or manifested. There is a certain balance 
between the will and contingency which is effected in rhyming.
1957
 
 
This captures very precisely the spirit of the best sound poetry. Rhyme is no longer solely a question of 
homophony, but is also a measure of existential consonance. These are high stakes indeed, and lie close to 
those which Giorgio Agamben exposes, in his analysis of Aristotle, in terms of the tension between 
object, idea
1958
 and concept. He suggests that objects are synonymous in relation to the concept through 
which their identity is amplified, which grants them “the same name and the same definition.”1959 “These 
same phenomena, however, that relate to each other as synonyms become homonyms if considered with 
respect to the idea.”1960 Homonyms have “the same names but different definitions.”1961 
 
To clarify Agamben‟s manner of distinguishing concept from idea it is necessary to recognize that here he 
follows Aristotle‟s commentary, in Book Alpha of his Metaphysics, on the Platonic association of idea 
(Form) and number.
1962
 Phrased reductively, a concept supports the existential definition of phenomenon 
in its relation to other phenomena, while an idea refers to the ontological essence of the phenomenon.
1963
 
The name is invented to approximate the idea – to testify to the potentiality of an immanent 
transcendence/transcendental immanence, for what else would be the case were the name and idea to 
coincide? – while the concept allows specific properties to be defined or elaborated in relation to an 
entity. In trying to grasp the relation between idea, concept and object, a referential impasse emerges: “an 
insufficient conception of self-reference blocks us from grasping the crux of the problem.”1964The idea, to 
which we must apparently ascribe the ground for consistency itself, is knowable only self-reflexively, and 
so is tied to the object on the basis of assertion alone. Meanwhile, the concept, which supposedly 
coordinates the properties of the object, has no absolute basis, so that “if we try to grasp a concept as 
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such, it is fatally transformed into an object, and the price we pay is no longer being able to distinguish it 
from the conceived thing.”1965  
 
We are compelled once again to consider the connection between being and belonging which constitutes a 
central concern of identity. An idea expresses the set or class to which an object belongs, but cannot itself 
situate the object within this set – the object always expresses itself with respect to an idea. A concept, on 
the other hand, encompasses the properties and relations by which an object expresses itself in terms of 
identity, proper to a particular set or class. Yet, the concept is incapable of including itself within this 
dynamic situation without being collapsed into it. This singular property of the concept – singular in the 
strict sense that it is “presented but not represented”1966 – Badiou identifies in terms of its being the 
founding element of a set, which means it cannot be included in the very situation it prescribes and to 
which it most properly belongs. These “non-predicative expressions”1967 present a site of struggle between 
the phenomenal being of an object and its “being-in-language”1968 – its possession of a name; the manner 
in which, through a simultaneously self-reflexive and significatory force, the name becomes appended to 
an object.   
 
The question I wish to pose in this regard follows: what might transpire if we transpose Agamben‟s claim 
that the homonym advances a field of coherence between distinctly defined entities, to the realm of 
aesthetic perception; might it be plausible to suggest that the homophone prompts a recognition of 
existential consonance between entities similar to that which is claimed for the homonym? As is often the 
case, the precision of Agamben‟s ontological thought rests on the degree to which, at singular existential 
points, seeming and Being are indiscernible.
1969
 By extension, might it be possible tentatively to propose 
that, under the peculiar poetic condition here broadly termed concrete, the homophone suggests the 
manner in which sonic seeming effects sonic Being – the manner in which the force by which two or more 
sounds that resemble one another is sufficient to render their relation to one another of equal existential 
solidity to the sounds themselves. In this light, the challenge which the homonym and homophone – the 
bases of rhyme – present to thought is one of recognizing the consonance between the forces of self-
reflexive identification and signification, and the force of generation or poiesis. Discovering such 
consonance – the coincidence of seeming and Being – would bring together the transcendental and 
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immanent, and it is perhaps this exceptional sort of sonic objecthood towards which Khlebnikov reaches 
in trying to discover the radix of sound at the heart of a word‟s sense.  
 
This example is followed by the Italian futurists,
1970
 of whom Khlebnikov and Kruchenykh are frankly 
dismissive: “[t]he Italians caught a whiff of these Russian ideas and began to copy from us like 
schoolboys, making imitation art.”1971 It is certain, however, that Marinetti must be credited with the first 
sustained poetic engagement with technology. Central to the narrative of “The Founding and Manifesto of 
Futurism,” is the quasi-mythological unification of human and machine: racing into the future, Marinetti 
rolls his car into a muddy ditch, and from this symbolic sacrifice, the heroic couple are ritualistically 
reborn from the “good factory muck – plastered with metallic waste, with senseless sweat, with celestial 
soot.”1972 The sonic aspects of Marinetti‟s poetry principally concern this elevation of technology, as is 
clearly manifested in the easily recognizable onomatopoeia of “Aprés La Marne.” Here is “phonic poetry, 
whose onomatopoeia gives voice not to the ecstatic impulses of an organic anatomy but to the electric 
impulses of an operant machine.”1973 
 
Equally interesting, although aside from the question of technology, is “A Landscape Heard,” which 
recognizes the poem as a concrete medium for the association of sound and duration – an accumulation of 
moments which are a materialization of the quantitative logic of being, if not of quantity itself:  
 
The whistle of a blackbird, envious of the crackling of a fire, ends by extinguishing the gossip of water. 
10 seconds of lapping. 
1second of crackling. 
8 seconds of lapping. 
1 second of crackling. 
19 seconds of lapping. 
1 second of crackling.  
25 seconds of lapping. 
1 second of crackling. 
35 seconds of lapping.  
6 seconds of the whistle of a blackbird.
1974
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The Russian concern with origins is more clearly audible in the work of the Dada poets – notably Hugo 
Ball, Raoul Hausmann and Kurt Schwitters – who seek a “pristine Adamic language,”1975 an ur-language 
capable of capturing the most immediate and powerful sense of linguistic expression. Had they been able 
to approximate this ideal, the Dada sound poets would almost certainly have produced some of the most 
significant works of minimalism. In performance, however, austere scores, often little more than a short 
sequences of phonemes, take on a remarkable intensity. Despite their advocacy of “purely abstract 
form,”1976 the search for an ur-language is finally a deeply referential activity and one rooted in a rather 
ill-informed concept of the primitive.   
 
The theurgical element of this work recalls the connection of sound poetry to various elements of 
religious chant – sonically evident in works such as Hausmann‟s passion incantation “K‟Perioum” (Track 
39),
1977
 and at various points of the large-scale Ur-Sonate (Sonata in Primitive Sounds) by Kurt 
Schwitters. Of more immediate interest than the extreme theatricality of this work – its purposeful 
exaggerations, the ritualistic mannerism of its intonation, the self-conscious and often virtuosic patterning 
of its articulation – is its significance in reviving through an overtly textual form the transgenericism so 
successfully exploited by opera. To accomplish this, these poets pursue new ways of notating sound 
poetry, developing optophonic or vocovisual
1978
 scores designed to create a more immediate and accurate 
integration of letter, shape and sound
1979
 – a unified poietic script which works towards a sense of 
interartistic presence. Ordinary musical notation, while very accurate, functions by layering visual 
information: words are generally written below the melodic syntax of time-pitches, installing a certain 
discontinuity between musical and verbal information which can only be overcome by careful rehearsal 
(or genuinely specialist knowledge), and so is neither as immediate, nor as accessible, as one might hope.  
According to Drucker, “the idea that the poetic page can be constructed along the same lines as a musical 
score is an idea that has been rediscovered periodically and made use of by poets in various ways.”1980 
The modern prototype is offered by the Zaum poet, Iliazd, as well as in the simultaneous poetry of Tzara, 
Huelsenbeck and Janco in which three texts in different languages are recited concurrently, represented 
on a single score in which the alternation of space and letter reflects the poets‟ utterance and silence.1981 
More elaborate is the system developed by Kurt Schwitters, whose abiding concern was with “an ever 
                                                          
1975
 Pegrum, Challenging Modernity, 262; Bök, Cyborgs, 131. 
1976
 DSCMA, 116 
1977
 Raoul Hausmann, K’Perioum, 1918. 
1978
 Rothenberg and Joris, Introduction, xvii.  
1979
 Dachy, Dada, 37-8.  
1980
 Drucker, “Visual Performance,” 138.  
1981
 Ibid.; DS, 15; Nicholas Zurbrugg, “Towards the End of the Line: Dada and Experimental Poetry Today,” Dada 
Spectrum, 228.  
   328 
 
greater integration and equivalence of the various facets of his artistic oeuvre.”1982 The Ursonate very 
precisely follows the formal structure of music, most audibly in the recurring theme of the opening rondo, 
and the da capo section of the third movement, a scherzo and trio (Track 40).
1983
 If the “concept of 
orchestrating verbal language through visual means became a mainstay of experimental poetics in the 
twentieth century,”1984 this is nowhere more remarkably exemplified than in John Cage‟s 1968 anthology 
Notations. In a collection emblematic of early postmodernism at its most utopian, Cage gathers an 
unparalleled sample of contemporary scores. These range from traditional calligraphic manuscripts and 
experimental scores which are still recognizably musical, to electronic scores, instructions for 
performance pieces offered by some of the leading members of Fluxus, and works which clearly situate 
themselves within the lineage of concretism. Incorporating photography, cartography, geometry and 
various numerical notations, many of these works implicitly problematize the relationship of three-
dimensional space, visuality, language and sound.  
 
 
d) Losing voice and concrete intensification 
 
By consolidating within a single medium, the visual, sonic, verbal and representational parts of a poetic 
scheme, the score itself becomes a significant genre of avant-gardist poietic pursuit.
1985
 John Cage, 
perhaps the most tireless avant-gardist of all, develops a range of techniques, from the early linear 
patterns of “Lecture on Nothing,”1986 which clearly reflect the influence of Schwitters,1987 to the 
perceptibly entropic logic of “Empty Words,” in which strange verbal attractors and temporary points of 
linguistic stability increasingly disintegrate to dispersed phonemes, and eventually drifting, chaotic letters 
(Figure 97). These contrasting styles are mirrored in various of Cage‟s performances: “Lecture on 
Nothing” follows the spatially determined pace and pauses of its score, while “Empty Words,” drenched 
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in the pathos of its growing vacuity, is replete with groans, sobs and hisses – the haunting stutters of 
words almost conscious of their own disintegration, of phonemes which are no longer able to cohere 
(Track 41).
1988
 There are significant resonances between Cage‟s task of “making language saying nothing 
at all”1989 and Beckett‟s syntax of weakness. Despite notable stylistic differences – style, at least, in the 
sense imparted by Danto‟s understanding of “what remains of a representation when we subtract its 
content”1990 – both writers pursue inarticulacy as a philosophical accomplishment. For Beckett, this 
results from a progressive conviction that language is a concrete phenomenon, the marker of an existential 
persistence. Its failure to fix the externality to which it refers exposes a delicate aperture to the poietic 
force which we wontedly name the imagination. Here the brutality of material finitude – of the body in 
space – comes up against the infinity of thought.  
 
Beckett tirelessly searches for the medium which might convey this impasse, or narrate this lacuna. The 
condensed intensities of his early prose and poetry give way to an austere drama of repetitive action and 
absurd dialogue. Finally, at its most minimal, Beckett‟s work discovers an intermedium. Textual 
technologies – writing, typescript and the page – expand by their imbrication with action, movement and 
performance, and subsequently radio, film and television. Every medium which expresses itself in terms 
of agency, is symmetrically negated by its intermediary participation, so that these are marked instead by 
what they fail fully to signify – a growing voicelessness; sometimes mute, but at others the primal sounds 
of linguistic disintegration. At the heart of the intermedium, therefore, is the recognition of a gap – the 
void – which no conceptualization or practice of nothingness can dissolve or resolve. In Beckett‟s oeuvre 
the void is often marked by self-conscious, even exaggerated, rhetorical gaps: verbal and structural 
ellipses, interruptions and disjunctions; repetitions which both cover and draw attention to narrative 
disunities and sudden shifts of perspective; physical movements, sometimes rapid and predetermined, at 
other times painfully tentative and slight, which mark invisible fields of containment and impassable 
empty spaces. As Abbot adjudges the situation: “[t]o speak of nothing as the place of generation 
(language, the unconscious) or, conversely, as a purity of emptiness (vacancy without end) is to put 
something there in the place of nothing and to that degree to anchor it.”1991 This is indeed the case from 
the perspective of the work as phenomenon, and perhaps what the poem – that is, a predicate of poiesis, or 
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a product of production – is able to teach us: “there is no resolving its uncertainties without disengaging 
from the work itself.”1992  
 
Here it is necessary to reassert that existence is subtracted from, rather than simply coextensive with 
Being. This recognition arises from the fundamental axiom of Badiou‟s ontology – that “the one is not, 
but any structure, even the axiomatic structure of ontology, establishes that there are uniquely ones and 
multiples,”1993or, in other words, that while being qua being is pure multiplicity, from this pure 
multiplicity are nonetheless subtracted beings. In this light, it might seem counterintuitive to assert that 
the void, or nothing, is the most proper part of being.
1994
 Yet this is the case precisely to the extent that the 
void is inconsistent; for inconsistent multiplicity is the fundamental ontological atmosphere of all 
possibility. That which is consistent or presented in existence, is subtracted from, without negating, the 
inconsistent multiplicity of pure being, so that what is void is distributed between Being and existence – 
“scattered all over, nowhere and everywhere;”1995 “the name of unpresentation in presentation.”1996 In this 
light, “nothing is as much that of structure, thus of consistency, as that of the pure multiple, thus of 
inconsistency.”1997  
 
The void names the minimal displacement between Being and existence, “the unperceivable 
gap…between presentation as structure and presentation as structured-presentation.”1998 In this light, the 
gaps in Beckett‟s writing suggest more than omission, expressive incapacity, or even the dialectic 
opposition of finitude and infinitude. Rather, these conceptual cavities – travelling between idea, word, 
inscription and sound – attempt to translate into poietic terms the manner in which the void is the 
prerequisite in order that existence be subtracted from pure Being, acting as a “suture to being.”1999 In two 
of Beckett‟s radio pieces – “Words and Music”2000 and “Cascando”2001 – the poetic intuition of the void 
discovers a significant, if enigmatic, presentation. Exemplifying an intimate negotiation of language, 
sound, performance and technology,
2002
 we encounter here the exploration of an intermedium, the shifting 
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boundaries of which subtly instantiate the principles of the sonic object poem. In both works, the 
association of generation with authorial force, is embodied by two characters who attempt to orchestrate 
the relationship of word to music.
2003
 In “Words and Music,” making obvious reference to the relation of 
the faltering voice to the recognition of finitude compelled by the fading potency of old age, this role is 
taken by Croak. The action of the play takes shape around Croak‟s adjudication of the association 
between words and music – Beckett, with admirable bluntness, names the former Words or Joe, the latter 
Music or Bob.  
 
Beckett aims “to cast words and music on the same footing.”2004 In this sense he draws on a notion of 
music which resonates with the classical Greek model, the primary informant of the operatic tradition, 
despite the fact that, in practice, the literary content of operatic libretti is commonly subordinate to their 
melodic representation.
2005
 As Zilliacus asserts, “Words and Music” is “the closest thing there is in the 
Beckett canon to opera.”2006 The initial attempts of Words to impress Croak with the meaningful verbal 
elaboration of the latter‟s feelings and existential situation, are brought into conflict with Music, which 
responds to Words programmatically, at first matching then exceeding through its immediacy that which 
in verbal representation is only approximate. For Ackerley and Gontarski, Croak is a mediator.
2007
 
However, he is also a poet, whose orchestration of an alternation between words and music is a deliberate 
experiment in interruption, a gesture of self-limitation, a self-imposed lacuna. At the command of Croak – 
“Together. [Pause. Thump.] Together! [Pause. Violent thump.] Together, dogs!”2008 – Words and Music 
begin an awkward interplay, “[t]wice culminating in near-operatic sequences.”2009 Finally, we are left 
with a strong sense of the “shaping power of music in poetic composition,”2010 and that the lyrical 
endeavours of Words alone fail to live up to the immediacy of Music. The vision here is not of linguistic 
impotence, per se, but of a lacuna inhabiting the modern lyrical project which, defeated by its own 
sophistication, misses its radically productive potential.  
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Initially entitled Calando, the musical term for fading away,
2011
 Beckett‟s “Cascando,” is a near “mirror 
image”2012 of “Words and Music.” Opener performs a function structurally identical to that of Croak, 
coordinating the discontinuous narrative of Voice – whose “[l]ow, panting”2013 speech, fragmented by 
ellipses and irregular modular repetition, tries to relate the story of an ill-formed character, Woburn – with 
the unspecified melodies of Music. Attempting to discover a functional medium for the translation of 
reality, Opener self-consciously manipulates the aperture of poietic activity: “I open and close,”2014 he 
tells us. Yet the ideal poietic medium proves evasive, since the greatest gap of all is not between the Real 
and the art which represents it, but in the void which art demands of us – the sheer vacuity of subjective 
knowledge, and the existential vertigo which accompanies the self-awareness which the artist necessarily 
courts, all of which are recurrent concerns of Beckett‟s oeuvre. Opener‟s resignation to self-doubt is 
exemplary in this respect:  
 
What do I open?  
They say, He opens nothing, he has nothing to open, it‟s in his head… 
I don‟t protest any more, I don‟t say any more, 
There is nothing in my head. 
I don‟t answer any more. 
I open and close.
2015
 
 
Opener attempts to overcome the increasing dissolution of subjective stability by repeating, with a 
stubborn futility, his attempts to prescribe the ideal interaction between language and music within which 
the work might take place. At first presented separately, language and music subsequently sound in 
unison, but even when he “open[s] both”2016 the synthesis they find is, at best, uncomfortable2017 – a 
forced simultaneism, perhaps. 
 
“Cascando” instantiates several of minimalism‟s most characteristic aesthetic techniques. Through the 
significant reduction of sound effects,
2018
 it presents an order of sonic containment which demands of 
language and music a radically reciprocal generativity. Simultaneously, it is possible to recognize, in the 
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dotted lines through which Beckett represents Music‟s contribution to “Cascando,” the reduction of 
textual and sonic presentation to a series of repeated blank marks. In the very indiscernibility of the 
referent of this transcription, it is possible to recognize an implicit transumption – the poietic 
displacement of sound into a minimal script of identical, minimal and essentially contentless marks,
2019
 
charged, in turn, by the prospective reformulation of these marks in terms of sound. Properly poietic, yet 
in no sense containing the poietic substance of the work, the atopianism of such transumption reveals, at 
the heart of its sonic object, an existential intensity which we might provisionally term voidal proximity – 
a closeness between two or more aesthetic points of contact with the void.
2020
 
  
In this light, there are considerable implications of the ideal state towards which these intermedia 
experiments of Beckett yearn – the solid sound, or the instantiation of pure poetico-musical coincidence 
and presence. Such solid sound would dispel existential doubt, by locating, by means of such voidal 
proximity, the void itself, upon which not only poiesis, but the very consistency of any situation, is 
forwarded. This is a fantasy central to the modern conception of the poem, as Badiou notes,
2021
 and one 
which is also distinctly minimalist. For when we recognize the void, we recognize the most minimal 
condition of any situation. It is towards this same voidal sonic centre that Cage urges poietic work when, 
in “Empty Words,” he notes that “a text for a song can be a vocalise: just letters. Can be just syllables, 
just words; just a string of phrases; sentences. Or combinations of [these].”2022 Finally, he institutes the 
“equation between letters and silence”2023 which is as much visually reflected in the work‟s score as it is 
in any of its sonic substance. Jackson Mac Low‟s scores are no less eclectic. The influence of Cage is 
often clearly in evidence. At other times, Mac Low‟s work takes on a distinctly expressionistic character: 
a concern with the intimacy of vision and sound, with the singularity of handwritten manuscripts for 
gathas – sacred verses intended for recitation in various of the traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism – 
which perhaps translate into contemporary practice not only these forms, but also that which Khlebnikov 
and Kruchenykh had envisaged when they suggested that “[o]ur handwriting, distinctively altered by our 
mood, conveys that mood…independently of the words.”2024  
                                                          
2019
 Worth, “Words,” 17. 
2020
 By aesthetic points I mean the objects or parts of objects proper to any aesthetic code, practice or discipline. 
Here one of these points is the dotted lines representing music, which is textual-linguistic, while the other is the 
music in its actual sounding, which is implied in the text, but which must be realized in any complete performance 
of Cascando. 
2021
 “[P]oetry propagates the idea of an intuition of the nothing in which being would reside when there is not even 
the site for such intuition” (Badiou, BE, 54). 
2022
 Cage, “Empty Words,” 11. 
2023
 Ibid., 51. 
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 Khlebnikov and Kruchenykh, “The Letter as Such,” 236. 
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Figure 97: John Cage, Empty Words, 1980. 
 
Given that the development of sound poetry is shaped on the one hand by a paradigm established in the 
music of classical Greece, and on the other by an apparently transhistorical yearning for a primal 
language, the discovery of a theurgical preponderance in even the contemporary genre. One need only 
catch a few moments of Ernst Jandl‟s2025 “Ode auf N” to recognize the morphological experiments of the 
futurists, and the ritualistic incantations of the Dadaist are similarly audible in works as diverse as the 
somewhat contrived, quasi-primitivism of British poet Bob Cobbing, and the juxtaposition of European 
and South American musical and poetic elements in the work of Brazilian practitioner of “Intersign 
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 Of this poet of the Viennese school of concrete poetry Bann remarks that, “[i]n fact Jandl is concerned not 
simply with sound but with time,” (Bann, Introduction, 13) although Bann is careful to highlight both the 
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poetry,”2026 Philadelpho Menezes. In Bök‟s estimation, various contemporary genres of performance 
poetry – amongst them the ludic improvisations of groups like the Four Horseman, and the “jazzified 
theatrics that have gone on to characterize „spokenword‟ performers…many of whom vocalize „def rap‟ 
from memory at slams”2027 – derive their momentum from musical metaphor, much as does Schwitters‟ 
Ursonate.
2028
  
 
 
e) The technology of solid sounds 
 
To appreciate the contemporary significance of sound poetry – its pivotal role in the development of 
aesthetic concretism, as well as the radical potential of minimalism it harnesses – we must supplement the 
traditional conviction that within the voice it is possible to discover something authentic and uncorrupted 
from our past. Vocality, beyond the most immediate means of bodily performance, must be 
reconceptualized as a technology – it can be recorded, transmitted, altered and combined without 
undermining its integrity presenting itself as a flexible means of coming to the heart of poiesis. Steven 
Connor‟s2029 conceptual construct, the vocalic body, provides a useful means of clarifying the growing 
technical autonomy of the voice, an autonomy which significantly bolsters its claim to being able to 
constitute sonic objects:  
 
Voices are produced by bodies: but can also themselves produce bodies. The vocalic body is…a projection 
of a new way of having or being a body, formed and sustained out of the autonomous operations of the 
voice…The leading characteristic of the voice-body is to be a body-in-invention, an impossible, imaginary 
body in the course of being found and formed…[It is] also the characteristic ways in which the voice seems 
to precipitate itself as an object, upon which it can then itself give the illusion of acting.
2030
 
 
In Bök‟s estimation, contemporary technology compounds the situation, central to Connor‟s argument, in 
which we are “ever more detached from our voices.”2031 The technologically mediated voice – intensified 
or duplicated by various technologies of amplification, capture or reproduction – confirms the autonomy 
of effect exercised by vocalic bodies. Indeed, the majority of recorded music, radio, and film would 
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sacrifice its potency were it not possible to judge the vocalic body which is instantiated by these 
technologies as being of equal existential status to the embodied voice. This is not to say that a voice 
needs to be a recognizably human one, however. Henri Chopin‟s sound poetry, for example, realizes of its 
most impactful moments by blending the amplified atmospherics of recording with such unvocalized 
vocalic bodies as breath – “Espaces et gestes” (Track 42)2032 is exemplary in this respect.  
 
“Technologies of vocal recording, vocal telephony, and vocal synthesis”2033 find an increasingly 
significant place in contemporary sound poetry. We find ourselves in a situation in which the inherited 
model of anthropocentric recitation, fuelled by its theurgical radix, seems “all but untenable in the face of 
our technological augmentations, which already threaten to overwhelm the organic coherence of any 
unified performer.”2034 Our finest contemporary sound poets are those who separate themselves from the 
stubborn mainstream fetish – “the performative authenticity of a sincere speaker”2035 – focusing instead 
on work generated in relation to sound itself.  
 
The virtuosity of Jaap Blonk‟s “Zamongi Grin” (Track 43),2036 for example, explores a spectrum of vocal 
techniques for generating subtle timbrel shifts within the framework of a steady pulse. The remarkable 
effect of this work derives not from its opposition to the mimetic associations of the voice, as one might 
expect, but by presenting in a number of rapid shifts precisely how vocality transects the simple 
anthropocentric compartmentalization historically imposed upon it. Within the framework of a steady 
pulse – one which strongly recalls the minimalist technique which Reich famously deploys in Music for 
18 Musicians – Blonk experiments with various vocalic permutations much as one might do in trying to 
master elementary software for computer-generated music. At times musical references are unmistakeable 
– rudimentary accented patterns, such as might be practised on a snare-drum, and some combination of 
pinching the nose, contracting the vocal fold and rhythmically tapping the larynx, reproduces the timbre 
of a Jew‟s harp with remarkable accuracy. Other progressions more closely resemble an experiment in 
phonemic morphology, incorporating sounds which are singularly associable with French, Flemish and 
Dutch. What is clarified most by Blonk‟s sound poem, however, is that the sheer immanence of the 
vocalic body in the best sound poetry relegates its mimetic attachments to a position of secondary 
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significance. Here the voice has independent substance – is a self-sustaining “body-in-invention,” to 
recall Connor, which “seems to precipitate itself as an object.”  
 
Insofar as it instantiates the vocalic body as a poietic entity which requires no external confirmation for its 
integrity, or addendum for its justification, this type of sound poem constitutes an important species of 
concretism. Such concretism, in turn, expresses a significant form of minimalism to the extent that its 
autopoietic status can be regarded as actual, and not merely symbolic. More often than not, however, 
sound poetry which remains coupled to the voice is drawn back into an interminable hermeneutic 
interplay, and so quickly is absorbed by the mimetic scale of most criticism – its manner of weighing all 
art in relation to an anthropomorphic vision of the Real, a paradigm which Badiou identifies as the 
dominant one in the West, which views the aesthetic in terms of a “subject for enjoyment and the 
experimentation of the limits of the body.”2037 In this manner, it is all too readily consigned to an 
exponentially expanding dump of interesting but failed poetic experiments.  
 
Technological attempts to overcome this historical barrier are numerous. Yet, as Bök remarks, despite this 
remarkable potential, “only a spartan coterie of sound poets have ever committed themselves to the use of 
such technology.”2038 The investigation of this vastly underexplored poietic field remains an urgent task 
for prospective study. The most obvious and popular set of instruments used at the intersection of sound 
poetry and technology is the vocoder, a class of instruments which are designed to analyze speech,  
 
deconstitute it into electrical information, and then synthesize it as a vocalic body independent of its 
source. These are widely used in almost all genres of contemporary music – Fischerspooner‟s “Emerge” 
(Track 44)
2039
 presents a suitable example of a standard use of the vocoder in popular electronica – and in 
much progressive sound poetry, Paul Lansky‟s “Idle Chatter,” (Track 45),2040 for instance.  
 
There exist near limitless processes of synthesizing sonic material, or “transforming sounds by cutting 
and splicing, retarding, accelerating or reversing,”2041 using means ranging from the “audio-frequency 
oscillators, variable speed turntables...[and] generator whines,”2042 of early electronic experimentation, to 
the rapidly evolving software currently in use and under development. With the provocative proposition 
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that “[w]e are perhaps the first generation of poets who can reasonably expect in our lifetime to write 
poems for a machine audience,”2043 Christian Bök argues that the vanguard of sound poetry manifests in a 
move away from the ritualistic and verbal, towards a “hitherto undreamt poetics of electronica.”2044 The 
Cyborg Opera, a “linguistic soundscape which responds to the ambient chatter of technology,”2045 retains 
the familiar shift in sound poetry from semantic to phonic values, recalling the tradition established by the 
Russian futurists, but more specifically identifies its models more specifically in Marinetti‟s work with its 
celebration of accelerating mechanization,
2046
 Chopin,
2047
 and the experimental beatboxers, Razael and 
Dokaka.
2048
  
 
In his discussion of electronica, Simon Emmerson usefully distinguishes between abstract musical 
substance
2049
 – with no point of reference but its own sounds – and mimetic musical substance. Sonic 
mimesis, in this sense, is either timbrel, in which case it manifests in terms of the “direct imitation of the 
timbre („colour‟) of the natural sound,”2050 or syntactic, determined by the interrelation of sonic events, in 
other words.
2051
 He notes, moreover, that in practice every musical discourse combines the mimetic and 
the abstract. This is exploited in productive ways by electronic composers, who have developed 
technology to capture, generate and fuse different types of sound with relative ease. Consequently, 
resolving the tension between mimesis and abstraction, or between the primal and the technological, is a 
less pressing concern for the contemporary sound poet than is moving beyond the traditional 
understanding that vocality is essential to poetry. 
 
The proliferation of electronic literature, new media interart, and virtual aesthetic communities, presents 
an important step in this process of poietic revolution, the momentum for which derives in no small part 
from the resources made freely available by organizations such as PennSound,
2052
 Ubuweb
2053
 and the 
Electronic Literature Organization.
2054
 Intermedia poets – babel, geniwate, Damian Everett and Stuart 
Moulthrop amongst them – continue to propel their diverse hypermedia experiments forcefully into the 
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cultural fray with a subversive, political awareness which parallels if not exceeds such street artists as 
Banksy and Space Invader. Meanwhile, journals like poemsthatgo
2055
 – founded and edited by Megan 
Sapner and Ingrid Ankerson – continue to provide less archival forums for the aesthetic and polemical 
activities of the hyper-avant-garde.
 2056
 If, from one perspective, the best sound poetry is deeply minimal – 
eschewing the ordinary economy of reference and substituting in its place the immediacy of its taking-
place as sonic object poem – it nonetheless retains a deep connection to its mimetic radix insofar as its 
range remains contingent on vocality or to technologies designed to overcome the problem of vocality. It 
is for this reason that only the most extreme conception of sound poetry, and its most radically minimal 
instantiations, manifest externally to the voice, or, at least, at the point at which the anthropocentric 
anchor of the voice begins to dematerialize.
2057
 At this point, where the sound object is autonomous, 
concrete sound poetry begins.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. CONCRETISM AS AN EXEMPLARY VEHICLE FOR MINIMALISM 
 
a) A concrete continuum 
 
While the venerable lineages of both visual and sonic poetry suggest their transhistorical poetic vocation, 
it is also true that at certain nodal moments of peak generative intensity,
2058
 their capacity for 
transgressing any particular medium is so concrete and so specific as almost to be singular to a particular 
work. We might well recognize such works as concrete theoretical objects:
2059
 aesthetic entities in which 
the taking-place of poiesis is directed in so strong a self-reflexive manner, that ordinary concerns of 
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aesthetic production and mimesis are suppressed to the extent that the work appears genuinely self-
productive. The manner in which such radically autonomous entities reflexively problematize their own 
media and constituent material, the present study delineates in terms of aesthetic concretism.   
 
The term Concrete Art derives from Theo van Doesburg‟s 1930 manifesto, which represents a point of 
confluence between the formalist abstraction of Bauhaus and De Stijl, and the enthusiasm of Futurism and 
Dadaism. At this juncture, occupied by such artists as Arp, Bill and van Doesburg,
2060
 the suggestion 
arises that the universality of art be sought at the intersection of the conceptual and the concrete – another 
provocative formulation of the Real.
2061
 It is worth emphasizing, with Osborne and Alexander, that two 
distinct types of abstraction are evident in most aesthetic media. The first involves a reductive extraction 
of components or essential structures from their imbrication in a complex situation, or the deduction of 
transcendental principles from the interaction of parts. The second conceives of abstraction as original or 
fundamental – a situation which precedes, or is entirely indifferent to, any referential, representation or 
semantic responsibility.
2062
  
 
Concretism opposes the first sense of abstraction entirely, as is evident in Arp‟s manifesto: “[w]e don‟t 
want to copy nature. We don‟t want to reproduce, we want to produce…Since this art doesn‟t have the 
slightest trace of abstraction, we name it: concrete art.”2063 It is opposition to this type of abstraction 
which also informs Bann‟s position that abstraction “is in fact almost the antithesis of concrete, [since] 
the concrete procedure is inductive, while that of the abstract is reductive.”2064 However, considering the 
second understanding of abstraction as the aesthetic pursuit of an original, non-referential, materialism, 
we uncover equally plausible claims to the contrary. For Theo van Doesburg such art is concrete precisely 
to the extent that it is abstract, the former insofar as “[t]he work…must be entirely conceived and formed 
in the mind before its execution,”2065 and the latter in that the work must be “entirely constructed from 
purely plastic elements.”2066 It is to this sense of abstraction the Caws refers in claiming not only that 
“concrete is thus related to abstract art,”2067 but, further, that “[c]oncretism abstracts the object from all 
attachment to reference, seeing it as obliged only by its own rules.”2068 Thus is it that the ideal concrete 
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work “should have its own form, that it should be somehow original,”2069 in Higgins‟ estimation, and to 
this extent related to a tradition of self-executing high modernism. 
 
 
In the visual field, concretism anticipates several key minimalist principles, aiming to be “simple and 
visually controllable…[and] exact…[in an e]ffort for absolute clarity.”2070 Its musical analogue, although 
to some extent anticipated by the Futurists and Dadaists, is discovered in Musique Concrète, principally 
associated with the work of Pierre Schaeffer and Pierre Henry – remarkable collagic works constructed 
from spliced samples of musical and everyday sound. Equally, Steve Reich‟s initial decision to label his 
work musique répétetive rather than minimalism, sounds a terminological echo of Musique Concrète. The 
early tape works, It’s Gonna Rain and Come Out (Track 46),2071 are not only amongst the truly excellent 
minimalist process compositions, but might easily be counted particularly fine examples of concrete 
sound poetry.  
 
Yet, it is in the broad arena of literature that concretism discovers its most fertile, and also contested, 
ground. Considerable disagreement persists regarding the precise extent to which this field might be 
unified by historical, aesthetic or theoretical considerations. Stephen Bann approaches Concrete poetry as 
an international, historical movement. Bann identifies as its progenitors
2072
 the Swiss poet, Eugen 
Gomringer (Figure 98)
2073
 – whose work makes extensive use of repetition and omission to effect a 
process of forming and shaping at the heart of the poem
2074
 – and the Brazilian Noigrandes group. The 
latter‟s Pilot Plan for Concrete Poetry resulted in a particular aesthetic and political cohesion between 
Decio Pignatari, Haroldo de Campos, his brother Augusto de Campos (Figure 99),
2075
 Ronaldo Azeredo 
and Jose Lino Grünewald.
2076
 This association centred on their development of a contemporary 
ideogrammatic language
2077
 – the verbivocovisual, a synaesthetic synergy generated by the “phonemic, 
ideogrammatic, paragrammatic character of the morphemes and words themselves.”2078 The 
verbivocovisual expresses itself in terms of a literary structure-content – a term deployed to indicate the 
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manner in which the structure and content of the poem are at once reflexive and reflective of one another, 
appealing to the immediacy of non-verbal communication
2079
 while pressing beyond any simplistic knot 
of sensation and medium.
2080
  
 
      
Figure 98: Eugen Gomringer, wind, 1954.          Figure 99: Augusto de Campos, terremoto, 1957. 
(ovo = egg; novel – bail of thred; novo = new; sol = sun; estrala = star; 
soletra = (it) spells; so = only; terremoto = earthquake; temor = fear; more 
= death; metro = metre; thermometro = thermometre. 
  
     
Towards the end of the 1950s, groups of concrete poets arose in Darmstadt (Claus Bremer and Emmett 
Williams) and Vienna (Gerhard Rühm and Friedrich Achleitner, who were further affiliated with Ernst 
Jandl – principally a sound poet), affirming some sort of affiliation, either in terms of their publications or 
aesthetic positions, with the enterprises of Gomringer or the Noigrandes group. Bann identifies a second 
generation of concrete poets – in Scotland, Ian Hamilton Finlay and Edwin Morgan; in England Dom 
Sylvester Houédard, Josh Furnival and Bann himself; in France, the spatialists,
2081
 Ilse and Pierre Garnier; 
in the United States, Ronald Johnson, Jonathan Williams, Robert Lax and Emmett Williams (who was 
affiliated with Bremer in Darmstadt).
2082
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Although Bann recognizes that there exists a “difficulty of assigning a precise limit to the field of 
Concrete Poetry once the periphery of small groups and well-defined traditions has been left behind,”2083 
this does not dissuade him from offering a typology which is unapologetic in its identification of 
concretism in terms of a specific movement. Similar claims regarding the inextricability of this poetry 
from the notion of a movement are forwarded by Augusto de Campos,
2084
 Haroldo de Campos,
2085
 Claus 
Clüver
2086
 and Harry Polkinhorn
2087
 regarding the composition of a distinct movement of Concrete poets. 
For Bann, such a movement is related to, at times coextensive with, but finally distinct from, sonic and 
visual poetry. To this view we might contrast that of Dick Higgins, who claims that “Concrete poetry is 
one of the main forms of visual poetry,”2088 yet remains curiously hostile to the notion of concretism as 
the marker of a movement.
2089
 Nonetheless Bann and Higgins seem to agree, superficially at least, that at 
the heart of this poetry is something distinctly literary, although for the former this literariness derives 
from an interartistic dialectic of sorts, whereas for the latter, it is almost subtracted from a rather more 
vague intermedial plenum which stretches across both culture and epoch. 
 
Where Higgins regards concretism as a “fiction invented by analogy,”2090 numerous others are more 
hospitable to the notion that it constitutes a broad aesthetic modality. Luciano Nanni describes it as “a 
way of being of the art work…[which] reduce[s] communication…to its physical matter”2091 in order to 
revivify the sense in which thought transverses the artwork “in a presemiotic way.”2092 McCaffery 
similarly considers concretism “a fundamental force”2093 revealed transgenerically by an “heuristic 
dynamism,” in which, contra Higgins, a strong basis for connection is affirmed – one which recalls the 
claim of the Noigrandes poets that concretism affirms an internal isomorphism, structural self-
identification, or structure-content.
2094
 In this case, the concrete poem is at once “model and 
precedent,”2095 as Clüver suggests: paradigmatic – a theoretical object that acts as a cipher for all 
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concretism – as well as singular – a theoretical object that declares and reflects only upon itself qua poetic 
entity.
2096
 In both cases the work of concretism constitutes, as Finlay suggests, a “model of order.”2097 
     
Concretism, however one understands the term, must certainly involve at least some sort of strong 
tendency towards convergence. In terms of terminological convergence, we might suggest that although 
Concrete Art, Musique Concrete and Concrete Poetry are historically separate and geographically diverse, 
they nonetheless share a common aesthetic pursuit in the idea of concretism. The second convergence 
pertains to the intermediary status of the concrete entity itself, which emphasizes at least one of the visual, 
sonic, verbal or conceptual aspects of the concrete work. Thus, it is no surprise to discover disagreement, 
almost partisanship, as regards the constitution of the concrete. For Perloff, concretism “is just a 
synecdoche for the larger category of visual poetry,”2098 a view endorsed by Caws, who suggests that it 
“rel[ies] on slippages and ambiguities of language and on the spatial configurations of letters,” and Clüver 
who regards it “a distinct genre of visual poetry.”2099 Pagano, on the other hand, champions a concretism 
dominated by the sonic fascination with “words, vowels, consonants, [and] the changing play of sounds.” 
Augusto de Campos maintains that concretism is a “radicalization of…the specificity of poetic language 
itself,”2100 while Bernstein, in a similar, yet clearly linguistic, register maintains that the “radical 
materializing dimension [of concretism]…continues unabated in the poetry…often associated with 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E… restor[ing] poetry to itself, to its medium…[while] incorporat[ing] the social 
and historical registers of words and their combinations.”2101 Others understand the poetics of concretism 
as conceptually coordinated: according to Castro, concretism is a “poetic conception,”2102 for Bohn, its 
“value stems precisely from its conceptual bases,” while Vos claims that the concrete poem 
“intensifies…awareness of the various material and linguistic „properties‟ of the verbal sign (visual, aural, 
tactile, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, kinetic).”2103  
 
The present argument holds that the conceptual and quantitative ground for the emergence of a concrete 
aesthetic are not necessarily in conflict. In this light, the abstraction to which concretism appeals belongs 
neither entirely to an order of active reduction, nor to one of an essential ground. Instead, might we not 
characterize the search for pure concretism as one for an exemplary object which is capable of 
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demonstrating, at the heart of its existence, the instant at which concept and matter are indistinguishable? 
Such would be the wager of a successfully constituted theoretical object, and amongst the many types of 
theoretical objects, concrete poems offer arguably the most contained, succinct – indeed minimal – field 
within which theory and praxis are perceptibly continuous. Indeed, Haroldo de Campos suggests that 
concretism, at least in its geometric phase, “was minimalist poetry avant la lettre, even before the term 
existed.”2104 Polkinhorn recognizes a relationship between the systems of “essentializing order or 
stabilizing control” exercised by concretism and minimalism, while Clüver twice identifies concretism as 
the predicate of minimalist endeavour.
2105
 Bann, too, observes a number of minimalist concerns in the 
concrete poem – a concern with increased simplicity and compression;2106 “repetition to cancel all 
particular impressions;”2107 and a self-reflexive containment and preference for closed forms.2108 
 
An excellent minimalist concrete poem – and moreover one which exemplifies with some force the 
manner in which the Noigrandes group‟s emphasis on the verbivocovisual simultaneously involves a 
strong appeal to the transformatory, conceptual aspect of poiesis – is Ronaldo Azeredo‟s “Velocidade” of 
1957 (Figure 100).
2109
 The velocidade or velocity with which the poem is concerned proves at once self-
productive and self-reflexive. Visually we deduce acceleration both through the swift descent from top to 
bottom on the right of the poem, and in the more measured gathering of momentum from top right corner 
to the bottom left, at which the entirety of its self-prescriptive content – velocidade or speed – is 
presented. Conversely, the poem reflects an entropic loss of momentum if we read it upward from the 
bottom. Transecting the poem is the voiced labiodental fricative v – a rapidly vibrating and penetrating 
sonic ground; a radical sonic quantity, from which is progressively subtracted the concrete sense and 
substance of this work. From top to bottom, this subtraction from the opening “VVVVVVVVVV” marks 
a progressive acceleration towards the word “VELOCIDADE” which concludes the poem; while 
sounding the poem from the bottom to the top effect a significant ritardando, as the v at the left of every 
line grows in length until the poem is encased by “VVVVVVVVVV” – a static existential drone of sorts.  
 
                                                          
2104
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2105
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 Bann, “Introduction,” 8. 
2107
 Ibid.  
2108
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 Figure 100: Ronaldo Azeredo, Velocidade, 1957.                   Figure 101:Seiichi Nīkuni, Ame/Rain, 1966. 
 
That it is possible to regard the poem as a singular, concrete entity in the very midst of the processes of its 
synaesthetic taking-place, owes precisely to its self-reflexive conceptual dimension. The symmetry and 
reversibility of the poem is clarified not only by its physical form, but by the fact that its conceptual 
material is constitutively open: much as velocity can be steady, positive or negative, which encourages 
several approaches to the process and temporality at work in the poem, so, too, the conceptual 
connections between origin, poiesis, time, manifestation and change persist dialectically rather than in a 
settled relationship. As regards minimalism, it is of no small account that this work reflects similar 
formalist and procedural concerns as the early compositions of Philip Glass, or the serial sculpture of Sol 
Le Witt. Its aesthetic method combines systematic exposition with incremental repetition – in this case, 
the increments are symmetrical so that this work is a prime exemplar of the minimalist logic of 
containment, which is not always the aesthetic position adopted by the work of Glass or Le Witt. 
 
A different, but no less significant, form of minimalist concretism is evident in “Ame/Rain” (Figure 
101)
2110
 by the Japanese poet Seeichi Nīkuni. Here we encounter a precise example of how a minimal 
aesthetic gesture potentially effects dramatic poietic transformation. The subtle inscription at the bottom 
centre of the page transforms what would otherwise be a largely undifferentiated and in any case 
uninteresting, grid of dots into a sheet of falling rain, a powerful demonstration of the capacity of 
concretism to bind together mimesis and concept through the intermediation of visuality and language. 
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The abstract becomes eminently concrete very suddenly, through a gesture which endorses the 
recognition that thought is a type of materialism.
2111
 Foster notes much the same of minimalism – in 
particular, of Judd‟s assertion that the abstract presents, rather than represents, the Real.2112 The present 
claim is that concretism and minimalism are confluent not only on the basis of numerous stylistic 
similarities, but to the extent that both are directed towards the clarification of the Real through a strongly 
self-reflexive poietic programme – one which traverses every possible medium, uniting concept and 
matter.   
 
Of comparable significance is the work of the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets, a loosely defined group 
associated with the eponymous journal edited by Charles Bernstein and Bruce Andrews between 1978 
and 1981. The journal was primarily intended for the dissemination of the theoretical and critical 
manifestos of various poets all committed, as Ron Silliman notes, to “placing the issue of language, the 
repressed element, at the center of the program,”2113aiming thus, in Connor‟s terms “to reaffirm the 
historical materiality of words in a culture that consistently ignores and effaces this materiality.”2114 
“[T]he graphically modified noun language was used to name a journal that published about language-
centred writing…rather than examples of it,”2115 according to Watten. Such autonomy, which is 
maintained between theory and practice, even amidst a poetry which quite clearly offers itself as a 
theoretical practice, is strongly reminiscent of the critical situation which emerged with regard to the 
minimalist visual arts. The artifacts of high Minimalism and L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poetry are both 
accompanied by a mass of theoretical literature: the latter, as Watten reminds us, “stood as a name for a 
literature that could be represented but only indirectly presented,”2116 in the sense that “examples of 
language-centered writing itself were not the primary content of the journal…[and that] articles about 
language-centered writing were not identical to their referents.”2117  
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The agenda of the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets is relatively unambiguous, as defined in Silliman‟s 
epochal essay,
2118
 “Disappearance of the Word, Appearance of the World:” exposing the historical nature 
and structure of referentiality; emphasizing the question of language; recognizing the centrality of 
language to the ongoing project of class struggle.
2119
 For Silliman, it is capitalism which empties 
language, claiming from the supposedly “natural laws …of poetry”2120 an empty yet effective fetish by 
which to invent a realism suitable to its ends.
2121
 A principal concern of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poetry is 
therefore the critique of reference
2122
 – the relationship between both word and thing, and word and itself 
– in order to come to terms with the simultaneously political, economic and aesthetic aspects of a meta-
linguistic “gestural poetry.”2123 Indeed, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poetry constitutes a significant field of 
theoretical objects – the coincidence of theory and praxis2124 in a concrete yet also meta-discursive 
writing. It revivifies the Jena romantic project which Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy term a transcendental 
“poetry of poetry.”2125 Indeed, it is not mere coincidence that symcomposition – which aims to 
“reconfigure[…] the politics of authorship in a form of collective practice”2126 – is a technique used in 
both the Athenaeum of the Jena school, and Legend, composed by leading L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets, 
Bruce Andrews, Charles Bernstein, Ray DiPalma, Steve McCaffery and Ron Silliman.  
 
Also of interest is concrete prose, which, despite its impressive range of techniques, has received little 
critical attention. McHale takes note of numerous important experiments in this regard – in the physical 
presentation of the book, the colour, texture, size, orientation and binding of leaves; with regard to 
typography and the significance of space; and conceptually, in the manner of its self-reflexivity and 
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coordination of experience.
2127
 Indeed, it is the re-orientation of margins and visual axes, the use of blank 
space and construction of unusual visual and sonic patterns, which constitute the most significant visual, 
and by analogy, conceptual hallmarks of such prose.
2128
 McHale repeatedly draws attention to Raymond 
Federman‟s 1971 experimental novel, Double or Nothing, – and secondarily to selected works of such 
other writers as William Gass, Michel Butor, Christine Brooke-Rose and Steve Katz.
2129
 Purposeful 
experiments in concrete prose can be traced, however, at least to Sterne‟s Tristram Shandy – most 
famously, its black page – which finds a recent equivalent in Dave Eggers‟ “There Are Some Things He 
Should Keep to Himself” which consists, in its entirety, of five blank pages.2130 Noigrandes concretist, 
Haroldo de Campos, increasingly turns his attention to concrete prose from his Galáxias onward,
2131
 and 
Perloff draws attention to the experimental prose of Cage, Retallack, McCaffery and Waldrop as 
comparable writers, and particularly to the “absurdist cataloguing” of Kenneth Goldsmith‟s immense No. 
111.2.7.93-10.20.96,
2132
 a groundbreaking, concrete revision of the poietic knot within which linguistic 
belonging is existentially charged.  
 
 
b) The parameters of concretism   
 
The suggestion regarding concretism is that the concrete entity presents the persistence of a particular 
existential intensity at which poietic material – whether visual, sonic, linguistic or conceptual, separately 
or together – coheres in a maximally self-referential manner, while presenting a minimal distance 
between theory and praxis, form and content. Such concrete intensities are not restricted to any historical  
epoch – at least not by any necessity – as they are determined by aesthetic rather than historical norms. If 
they manifest with considerable force in the 1950s, it is because at this point the particular intensity of 
concretism becomes self-conscious. Thus, without dismissing the coherence of the international 
movement which emerged in the 1950s and peaked in the 1960s,
2133
 it is no exaggeration to maintain that 
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a certain concrete logic undergirds the numerous historical explorations of aesthetic intermediation. 
Furthermore, given the complexities which adhere to any such project of concrete intermediation, it is not 
surprising that at its most minimal, such concretism is also at its most visible.  
 
The present proposition is not that minimalism and concretism are identical, nor even that they are 
necessarily complementary. Rather, it holds that at times their conceptual and material passages are 
parallel – one clarifying the other – and, at others, that their trajectories intersect, effecting a poietically 
productive perturbation and genuine novelty. The concrete emergence of novelty is seldom unrestrained, 
however. Concretism reflects not only an aesthetic self-productivity, but also a theoretical self-
reflexivity. The concrete object and poem – indeed, the concrete object-poem – constitute meta-
theoretical entities, but entities with minimal content that has a maximal effect. In this sense, concretism 
constitutes an existential orientation rather than a movement, subject to a distributed history, gathering at 
nodal moments but in essence unrestrained by these. That which is concrete of concretism is not its 
medium, but the relation which persists between the medium and its message – a relation which is 
rendered with particular clarity when this message is minimalist or self-reflexive.  
 
 
c) Synaesthetic concrete patterning 
 
We might call to mind the celebrated position of Marshall McLuhan, who views all media as an 
“extension of some human faculty – psychic or physical”2134 and the sense in which the medium is the 
message as emerging from the manner in which it “shapes and controls the scale and form of human 
association and action.”2135 Certainly, this is a deeply concrete vision of intermediation, but it is one 
which is equally anthropocentric. The quantitative ground for a particular medium is handed over almost 
entirely to the qualitative distinctions of sensation and physical process. Thus, turning to Bohn‟s insight, 
that concrete intermediation “is neither a compromise nor an evasion but a synthesis of principles 
underlying each medium,”2136 we come to recognize that at the very moment of affirming that media are 
extensions of the senses, we are drawn back to the recognition that as such a synthesis, these works are 
equally drawn from theory and concept.  
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In this light, the concrete object is a theoretical object precisely in the sense explored above: a singular 
intersection of self-reflective theory and practice. With regard to a minimalist concretism, the McLuhanist 
dogma that the medium is the message is nowhere more provocatively interrogated than in the so-called 
colour poetry of Robert Lax. The experimental temper of this work is well-exhibited in the productive 
tension which emerges from the relation of the various verbal, visual, linguistic and implicitly rhythmic 
manifestations of its constituent media. We might fruitfully compare the verbal “Red & Blue,” which 
appears in Bann‟s epochal anthology, to the predominantly visual “Another Red Red Blue Poem.” Both 
present a remarkable series of synthetic permutations which result from the dialectic between the verbal 
and visual spheres, generating more general questions regarding the relation of concretism and 
intermediation.  
 
Closely considering Lax‟s original typescript for “Red & Blue” (Figure 102),2137 reproduced in miniature 
below, reveals the manner in which the temporal, rhythmic and intervallic material of this poem sets up a 
productive counterpoint between its potential visual, conceptual, linguistic and sonic instantiations. Here 
an oblique approach to quality crosses sheer quantity in a forceful examination of the concrete aesthetic: 
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Figure 102: Robert Lax, Red & Blue, 1967. 
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Only three words are used in this work: red and blue – opposites on the visual spectrum – and white, 
which marks at once the absence of colour, as well as the potential for its taking-place. These are 
“arrange[d as] individual syllables in slender columns”2138 containing eight repetitions each – parallel, 
vertical bands
2139
 which “break[…] up the journey of the reading eye,”2140 but which constitute a rhythmic 
regularity of their own, at once visual and sonic insofar as they encourage a certain pace of processing 
and style of recitation. Lax was deeply concerned with the different types of rhythmic pattern which 
emerged from his work,
2141
 treating sounds and words alike as “means of instantiating the pattern”2142 – 
an “abstract entity”2143 with remarkably concrete properties insofar as these are determined in terms of 
quantitative rather than qualitative intensities.
2144
     
 
Yet for all these assertions, it is difficult to ignore that the poem possesses no directly chromatic qualities 
as such. Colour manifests only to the extent that we are able to equate the concept of colour, the verbal 
markers of colour, and the aesthetic associations these reiterations occasion, with colour in terms of its 
qualitative actuality. Such equation poses significant existential questions: where does the actuality of 
colour reside – in the quantitative dimension, or the physical part of the spectrum which a particular 
colour occupies; in the somatic sequence prompted by the sensory apprehension of its particular 
wavelength; in the idea of a particular colour; in the epistemological normalization of a particular colour 
by a concept and its predicates?
2145
 It is of no small consequence that the interest provoked by this work 
rests on indicators of the minimalist aesthetic: sparsity, austerity, severe reduction, repetition, incremental 
subtraction, sudden inversion, a concern with scale and presence.2146 Nonetheless, its principal concern 
with chromatic specificity cannot be reduced to an aesthetic position.  
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Determining chromatic specificity becomes a question precariously balanced between concept, matter and 
effect, and as such, a rehearsal of ontological fundaments. Lax was content with admitting the primacy of 
abstraction in his work,
2147
 but any such overly rigorous classification threatens to miss the implicit 
distinction of colour as concrete taking-place, from colour as medium, and colour as exemplary ground 
upon which the distinction of primary and secondary qualities rests – reviving the problem, so significant 
to Descartes and Locke, which phenomenology imagined it had dismissed once and for all.
2148
 Implicit in 
Alexander‟s assessment of Lax‟s colour poetry is the ascendency of secondary over primary quality, 
citing as basis Lax‟s own preference for relation over essence – “it doesn‟t matter if red is not red…what 
matter is red is not blue.”2149 Thus, Alexander believes that “it is the contrast between the elements that is 
important. It is not what they represent, nor what [they] are in themselves that is important. Instead it is 
the sheer difference between them that allows the poet to use them to suggest a pattern,”2150 and that it is 
such patterning that ties Lax‟s poetry to the minimalist tradition,2151 reflecting the essence towards which 
Lax‟s brand of concretism aspires.    
  
On account of its verbal constitution, “Red and Blue” presents what we might call an unusual type of 
negative presentation – colour is rendered present by virtue of the persistence of its absence. By contrast, 
“Another Red Red Blue Poem” (Figure 103)2152 effects precisely the species of presence with which 
minimalists are habitually concerned. Here the understanding of poem clearly presses beyond its 
conventional written forms towards a more inclusive understanding of the force of poiesis or production. 
Our ordinary understanding is that “the word, or at least a part of the word, is the minimal unity of 
poetry.…[but here] the poem is reduced to its essence as pattern.”2153 Although a strikingly austere visual 
work, there is little question that familiarity with Lax‟s concerns, methods and presentation enhances our 
comprehension of this work qua poem. 
2154
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Figure 103: Robert Lax, Another Red Red Blue Poem (1971). 
 
Although its principal means of presentation are undoubtedly visual, having been told that this is a poem, 
we are implicitly enjoined to explore the linguistic elements for which these blocks and columns of colour 
are presumably metonyms, substituting for their verbal equivalents – blue and red; equivalents of their 
potential articulation as words, as sounds. Thus we might imagine a verbal poem, most likely constructed 
in vertical columns, from left to right, arranged in three groups – the first of five columns, the second of 
four, the third of four; and alternating between groups of three, four and seven blocks.
2155
 Doubtless these 
groupings are of symbolic as well as quantitative value. As Bann notes, for Lax there exists “an intimate 
relationship between simple devices such as inversion and repetition…and the spiritual or philosophical 
burden of the poem,” 2156and Mark van Doren describes Lax‟s poetry as a patient transcription of “a sort 
of bliss he could do nothing about[, l]east of all…express it,”2157 and there are certainly significances tied 
to the numbers three, four and seven in Judeo-Christian mythology. Nonetheless, it seems wrong to 
overdetermine such molecular content, particularly when this work also clearly instantiates a powerful 
holism. Printed on a single sheet, the work is also a unit, the effect of which derives from the visuo-
conceptual vibration of its parts qua the whole, in addition to the processes by which these might be 
viewed or read as additive or subtractive components.  
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While to read the poem in a conventional sense might suggest that we process these units in terms of 
vertical rows arranged from top to bottom, rows which are then organized into three larger blocks which 
proceed from left to right, the overall lisibility of the work suggests several other strategies. It is possible, 
of course, to reverse or invert the direction in which the units, reading from top to bottom, or right to left 
– indeed, several more complicated patterns might plausibly be woven through this text. The substance of 
such patterning is distributed between the pattern itself and at least three other types of entity which we 
might substitute for the chromatic constituents of the poem: verbal entities, in other words red and blue ; 
numerical entities, in which case “1 2 3/ 1 2 3/ 1 2 3 4/ 1 2 3” acts as the purely quantitative equivalent of 
the left column; and sonic entities, if we understand that the poem as a type of score to be read aloud, 
sounding out the colours in question, and determining their pace and rhythms by their proximity and 
various gaps. The poem presents the verbivocovisual complex of concretism in particularly minimal terms 
– at once unified and immanent, while simultaneously the paradigm for a patterned, rhythmic 
extemporation of poietic taking-place. Concrete minimalism allows us to glimpse the atopia upon which 
poietic generation, effect, reflection and belonging are coincident: it is the example of its own poietic 
exemplarity.  
 
  
d) Quantitative categories and the role of the example 
 
Exemplarity presents the primary vehicle through which the interaction of theory and praxis, the basis for 
any poetics, is comprehended. Since exemplarity is furthermore intimately connected to the Real – the 
principal concern of both minimalism and concretism – it is necessary to examine which of the dominant 
models of exemplarity is best able to account for this remarkable intensification of an entity‟s 
knowability. Recalling that for the present argument it is quantity that lies at the heart of all Being, our 
initial contention is that inasmuch as exemplarity intensifies the knowability of an existent or entity, it 
also coordinates to some degree the quantitative categories by which it is possible to comprehend such 
entities. Extending the binarism of Aristotelian categorical thought,
2158
 which asserts as its proper sphere 
the most elementary structures which organize those things which exist,
2159
 Kant claims that the 
categories are coordinate rather than subordinate to one another.
2160
 Coordination establishes non-
hierarchical relationships between any of the terms of Kant‟s categories of judgment – quantity, quality, 
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relation and modality – allowing for the understanding that these are potentially co-implicit with respect 
to a particular entity or object.  
 
As Ferrara notes, Kant‟s strategy in this respect involves two distinct routes – “„subsuming under a 
concept‟ and „bringing to a concept.‟”2161 Both refer to the coordination of quantity – of particularity, 
singularity and universality
2162
 – the first, the descent from universals to particulars asserts the 
universality of the transcendental a priori aspect of pure concepts which precede as the essential 
conditions for the instantiation of concepts by particulars; the second, the ascent from particulars to 
universals, maintains that by virtue of aesthetic judgment, it is possible from the properties of a 
particularity to determine its position with respect to a pure concept. The Kantian addition of singularity 
as a separate category of quantity is significant in negotiating these two positions. He accepts the position 
from Aristotelian logic that the singular is a type of universal in which “the predicate of a singular 
judgment holds for the subject concept without exception.”2163 Singularity involves universality insofar as 
it constitutes a self-referential unity: it is universal in every instantiation of its singularity, but this 
singularity cannot simply be extended or applied as a concept outside of itself. Simultaneously, as 
Attridge notes, singularity indicates the emergent properties of an entity: while identifying it as a 
“particular manifestation of general rules…[and] a peculiar nexus…perceived as resisting or exceeding all 
pre-existing general determinations,”2164 singularity retains a sense of mutability, of being “eminently 
imitable,”2165 and an “event…which takes place in reception”2166 
 
The apparent incommensurability of these views is easily overstated, for do we not finally discover 
mirrored in the opposition of emergent and self-reflexive singularity, precisely the essential division of 
Kantian reflective judgment between teleological and aesthetic judgment? The former understanding of 
singularity corresponds to the notion that aesthetic experience has a purposiveness, a teleology not always 
pronounced, but which nonetheless may be presupposed. The latter presents the possibility that 
singularity is instantiated by self-prescriptive and auto-teleological entities. Both, finally, appear to 
conform to the Kantian understanding of singularity as the means of mediating between particularity and 
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universality, constituting objects in search of a theory, or, in more properly Kantian terms, an ascent from 
particularity to universality.
2167
 Kant famously identifies at the heart of reflective judgment a free play of 
the imagination and understanding,
2168
 and the sense of this claim is captured well in Ferrara‟s description 
of the “mutual feedback”2169 between the faculty of imagination, which constitutes representations of 
sensory data, and the faculty of understanding, seeking concepts to regulate these representations. Most 
significantly, however, this “mutual feedback…instead of being brought to closure by the intellect 
through the production of a definitive concept, remains unamenable to closure and indefinitely active.”2170 
 
To understand this peculiar power of singularity, apparently instantiated with particular intensity in the 
case of aesthetic objects, it is necessary to recognize its singular energy as nothing other than the force of 
exemplarity. Of central concern in this respect is the manner in which certain aesthetic judgments – of 
taste, for example – adjure “universal assent”2171 and universal communicability “without mediation by a 
concept.”2172 It is such immediacy to which exemplarity attends. For Kant, the example is a species of 
hypotyposis – an exhibition “making [a concept] sensible”2173 or open to sensory intuition. “[I]f concepts 
are empirical, the intuitions are called examples. If they are pure concepts of the understanding, the 
intuitions are called schemata.”2174 Such hypotyposis is evidently vital in connecting objects of intuition to 
concepts, connections which furnish judgment with direction and force. Ferrara cautions as to the over-
conflation of schemata with symbolic hypotyposis, or exemplarity, since “to treat...[examples] as the same 
as schemata means to betray their exemplary nature, to turn the process of „merely‟ reflective judgment 
into one that eventually leads to the closure of determinant judgment.”2175 If “schemata contain 
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direct…exhibitions of the concept,”2176 it is because they subsume entities under a concept, to recall the 
argument above. In contrast, “exemplary validity is best understood in terms of creating an example 
rather than applying an example,”2177 and in this creative action, exemplarity brings its activity to a 
concept. In this light, exemplarity might be described as a special type of validation in which the example, 
as singularity, demands universal assent, effecting a reconciliation between particularity and universality. 
It is this reconciliation which validates the commonplace that a given example is potentially applicable in 
every situation within which it is exemplary.  
 
Unresolved in the Kantian discourse is that the example remains curiously dislocated from the force of 
exemplarity itself, in which case it might be argued that it is really just a particularly convincing 
illustration of a concept, and not itself an instantiating force. From the perspective of aesthetic judgment, 
exemplary force involves mapping the relation between example as entity and those things which the 
example enhances. Typically we encounter “the capacity possessed by the exemplary work of art to 
induce an aesthetic experience beyond the bounds of its context or origin without relying on external 
principles or laws.”2178 Kant identifies this force with “analogy…in which judgment performs a double 
function: it applies the concept to the object of sensible intuition; and then it applies the mere rule by 
which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the former object is only the 
symbol.”2179 Exemplarity, for Kant, is not a force in itself. Rather, it is a type of “indirect exhibition,”2180 a 
shared reference that takes place as an increased resonance with “the rules by which we reflect on the two 
[proximate entities in the operation of an example] and on how they operate.”2181 Such analogical force is 
inextricably linked to the Kantian notion of sensus communis and universal assent. In this light, the 
example can be seen as the embodiment of a process which formulates contingent, non-conceptual rules 
for the perception and connection of specific entities. Implicit here is that the force of the example is 
transitory and impermanent. We might even argue that herein lies the appeal of exemplarity: it produces 
temporary intensifications of experience which remain open and do not require final commitment or 
universalization under a transcendental principle, yet which are universal enough to be agreed upon.  
 
Accepting the Kantian position, it is possible to adopt relatively uncritically Ferrara‟s traditionalist claim, 
that “[e]xamples orient us in our appraisal of the meaning of action not as schemata, but as well-formed 
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works of art do: namely, as outstanding instances of congruence capable of educating our discernment by 
way of exposing us to selective instances of the feeling of the furtherance of our life.”2182 If Ferrara‟s 
proposition retains many merits of the Kantian project, it also fails to recognize that its conception of 
norms is itself disappointingly normative. It has been suggested that exemplarity is threatened when the 
example is handed over entirely to the universal. This is not to miss or subvert the Kantian argument that 
an example presents, through the force of an analogy, the mediation of particular and universal. What 
requires emphasis, however, is that it is nothing other than the Kantian association of exemplarity with 
singularity – that the example is singular rather than particular or universal – which makes it subject to the 
type of coordination which, to my mind, always seems to reinvest the universal, at however subtle a level. 
Similarly, the Kantian identification of exemplary validity with analogy remains equally problematic, for 
it is far from certain that analogical connectivity is sufficiently strong to justify the faith Kant and many 
other thinkers place in it. Analogy doubtless provokes novel connections between entities and plays a 
significant role in facilitating communication. This does not, however, make it equal to the task of 
universal validation which genuine exemplarity claims for itself. Displacing exemplary force from the 
relation between the exemplifying entity and the exemplified entity to the level of a vague analogical 
force of shared principles or rules, is problematic precisely in its vagueness.  
 
 
e) The example is para-ontological rather than para-epistemological 
 
Turning to the work of Agamben, we discover a voice of startling insight on the force of the example.
2183
 
For Agamben, the example and exception constitute a symmetrical system
2184
 in which inclusion or 
exclusion – conditions of belonging which ordinarily reflect a position coordinate to, but not co-extensive 
with, Being – autopoietically constitute their own ontology.2185 Although structurally defined by negation 
– “whereas the exception is included through its exclusion, the example is excluded through exhibition of 
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its inclusion”2186 – the consequences of this system are unambiguously existentially positive: in short, the 
recognition of the situation in which seeming is Being.
2187
  
 
Following Aristotle, Agamben recognizes not only that which is exemplified as being rendered 
increasingly intelligible by the example, but also that the example itself, by its means of relation, is that 
which is more knowable. An idiosyncratic amplification emerges: because it is more knowable, by 
containing in itself an “excess of knowability,”2188 the example renders something else, to which it is 
related, more knowable. The Kantian analogical explanation suggests that such amplified knowability 
occurs as the result of a shared appeal to rules of belonging or genus. Agamben, however, maintains that 
“[t]he important thing is not that the two are homogeneous but precisely that one is more knowable”2189 – 
a question of existential “intensities.”2190 It remains to be explained, however, why and how the example 
– or paradigm2191 – is more knowable. Discovering in Plato an alternative explanation to the categorical 
view which passes from Aristotle to Kant, Agamben suggests that the effective force of the example 
arises from the fact that “the [exemplary…] relationship takes place between the single phenomenon and 
its intelligibility. The [example…] is a singularity considered in the medium of its knowability. What 
makes something intelligible is the paradigmatic exhibition of its own knowability.”2192 Paraphrased 
elsewhere, the example is a “singular case that is isolated from its context, only insofar as, by exhibiting 
its own singularity, it makes intelligible a new ensemble, whose homogeneity it itself constitutes.”2193  
 
The radical move here is the refusal of any a priori universal or substrate.
2194
 Hence Agamben is able to 
claim that the example cannot be comprehended by the manner in which singularity mediates between 
particular and universal, but “entails a movement that goes from singularity to singularity, and, without 
ever leaving singularity, transforms every singular case into an exemplar of a general rule that can never 
be stated a priori.”2195 The exemplary validity of the example does not precede it as knowability, nor does 
it function, as Kant might have it, through some form of judgment, since the latter, no matter how subtle, 
appears always to reaffirm the primacy of the concept. In the medium of its knowability, that the example 
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is self-reflexive affirms not its identity in its normal medium of presentation, but in the medium of its 
knowability. This is a distinctly minimalist proposition, not entirely inhospitable to the scholastic notion 
of haecceity, and would certainly support the intuition that minimalist works as various as La Monte 
Young‟s drone work, Dan Flavin‟s light art and Robert Lax‟s poetry do indeed establish their own 
aesthetic paradigms. Accepting thus that the exemplary entity self-reflexively defines its own singularity 
in its very taking-place,
2196
 it becomes clear that Attridge‟s contention – that aesthetic “[s]ingularity is not 
the same as autonomy, particularity, identity, contingency, or specificity; nor is it to be equated with 
„uniqueness‟”2197 – holds not only from the perspective of judgment, but also from that of the entity or 
artwork itself.    
 
The resultant situation presents a shift from an epistemological view of knowability to an essentially 
ontological one
2198
 – a para-ontology, which “refers not to the cognitive relation between subject and 
object but to being,” constituting “an ontology which is still to be thought”2199 as that which partakes of 
Being but is beside Being. Significant resonances emerge between this para-ontological position and that 
which Meillassoux indicates in the arche-fossil as an absolute, external to the correlation of subject and 
object. Indeed, if in minimalism we discover an exemplary para-ontology, it is because the concrete 
quantities which constitute its aesthetic press so persistently against the boundaries of the absolute. 
Finally, to understand what it means to exemplify the Real – a significant clause of the present thesis – it 
is necessary to distinguish between the para-epistemic and para-ontological models of what it means for 
the example to be more knowable. According to Gasché, “[w]here cognition fails, aesthetic judgment 
ensures a minimal mastery and minimal identification of something for which no determined 
concepts...are at hand.”2200 In this sense, “aesthetic judgment holds its place as equal to cognition. This 
para-epistemic dimension of judgments of taste is the hallmark of Kant‟s aesthetics.”2201 Most models of 
exemplarity constitute such a para-epistemology: a sphere of knowability, initially minimal, which 
radiates between a concept and its intuition by which an example establishes an increase in knowability 
qua knowability – an increase which, through self-reflection, reopens that which otherwise would be 
epistemically closed, and situates itself thus as the knowability beside regular intelligibility.  
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However, the actual existential intensity of the example cannot be contained either in epistemic or para-
epistemic terms, for these leave unattended the properly ontological dimension of exemplarity. In the first 
instance, we might understand para-ontology as the recognition that if the example is to exceed its 
reduction to epistemological terms, it must be shown to be a force independent of judgment. For 
Agamben, the exception and the example – the principal terms of his understanding para-ontology – 
involve both an essential suspension of judgment and a constitutive undecidability: the example is 
“whatever singularity, which wants to appropriate belonging itself…and thus rejects all identity and every 
condition of belonging.”2202 Moving decisively beyond any conception of sensus communis, Agamben 
suggests that the example “come[s] into play every time the very sense of the belonging and commonality 
of...[particularities] is to be defined.”2203 The example “escapes the antinomy of the universal and the 
particular,”2204 constituting instead a “force field traversed by polar tensions”2205 – a threshold upon which 
belonging can be indicated by self-reflexivity alone. Exemplarity emerges as a special function of 
affirmatory auto-exclusion: “[neither particular nor universal, the example is a singular object that 
presents itself as such, that shows its singularity. Hence the pregnancy of the Greek term…para-deigma, 
that which is shown alongside.”2206 In short, “intelligibility does not precede the phenomenon; it stands, 
so to speak „beside‟ it (para).”2207 Agamben is able to assert in this light that “the example steps out of its 
class in the very moment in which it delimits it…The example is thus excluded from the normal case not 
because it does not belong to it but, on the contrary, because it exhibits its own belonging to it.”2208 The 
para-ontological force evades both particular and universal through its being simultaneously an auto-
reflexive, autopoietic and auto-demonstrative operation – the “innermost exteriority”2209 of every 
exemplary entity which assures its singularity. Para-ontology is like a halo
2210
 which “dwells beside the 
thing…so close that it almost merges with it,”2211 a “supplement added to perfection – something like the 
vibration of that which is perfect, the glow at its edges.”2212  
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Agamben‟s is an account as evocative as it is compelling, yet his theory of exemplarity does not articulate 
satisfactorily such exemplary force itself. Certainly Agamben demonstrates an ample awareness that this 
force exists, and that it necessarily emerges from the example itself: he considers it variously a force of 
transformative modelling,
2213
 a force of belonging,
2214
 a force of intelligibility,
2215
 a force of analogy,
2216
 
and a force of differing intensities.
2217
 This, however, is to define a force by what it does, and by that 
which it draws together, which is not the same thing as confronting the force itself. Nor do we approach a 
satisfactory argument be endorsing the para-ontological maxim that seeming is Being,
2218
 which certainly 
rests on the existence of a productive exemplary force, but does not directly describe it. The present 
suggestion is that to understand this force of exemplarity we must progress from the view that the 
example is simply self-reflexive, to one in which this self-reflexivity is directed towards autopoiesis and 
self-demonstration, thus establishing the example as universal insofar as its validity extends to every 
situation in which it is able to establish its own belonging. It is somewhat disappointing in this light that 
Agamben ultimately affirms that the example “is strictly linked to the problem of analogy.”2219 In my 
view, the connective force of analogy remains intrinsically open-ended, allowing numerous and rapid 
superficial connections to be established. In one sense these are its strengths, making analogy the most 
pervasive mode of connectivity.
2220
 However, from the perspective of an autopoietic para-ontology, a 
reliance on analogical examples seems always to invite external intervention – some form of reflective 
judgment – in which case para-ontology cannot guard itself against the possibility that it may revert to a 
para-epistemological understanding of the example. In such a situation, the essential force of the example 
remains unexpressed, and Agamben‟s reliance on analogy culminates in the familiar tactic of substituting 
exhibition for explanation,
2221
 according to which it is unnecessary to describe the force of the example; 
we can simply demonstrate it.
2222
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f) Exemplary force 
 
Although it is now clearer that the force of the example resides in its para-ontological operation, and that 
this force is knowable by the self-reflexive operation of exclusion by virtue of self-inclusion – hence the 
example stands apart qua its exemplarity – the actual force of the example remains to be defined qua 
force. A possible solution is discovered in shifting our attention from analogy to homology, from seeming 
or likeness to structural correspondence. Through homological coherence, the compossibility of 
autopoiesis, auto-reflexivity and auto-demonstration is conceivably actualized. Homology is perhaps best 
understood in terms of isomorphism, the discovery of a shared deep structure or structural forces between 
like or unlike elements.
2223
 Indeed, we do well to recall that the Noigrandes poets insisted upon 
isomorphism as the defining mark of exemplary concretism.  
 
While homology is acknowledged as offering a “valuable model[…of] formal correspondence founded in 
reality,”2224 restricting their operation to an essentially logical character, the present discussion recognizes 
in isomorphism a properly ontological force. Exemplarity is thus intimately related to the structures and 
structuration of the Real. The example functions not because it is isomorphic and homologous to the 
Real, but rather because it reveals that isomorphism is the very force of ontological structuration itself – a 
force which is Real. Exemplarity names an operation of independent structuring of the Real which, 
ordinarily unintelligible except in retrospect, is knowable through a specific structured, exemplary entity. 
As opposed to an analogical model of exemplarity, homology or isomorphism cannot simply be deduced. 
It must realize itself, or rather, expose itself as Real. The Real emerges not by any dramatic gesture of 
affirmation, however, as it is in fact the persistence of the Real which makes epistemic affirmation 
possible in the first place. Although the Real is not a metaphysical ground as such, it functions 
homologously since it remains indifferent to questions of origin and telos, even as it shapes the manner in 
which they are phrased. The Real, finally, is a synonym for ontological naturalism.  
 
If, as Badiou suggests, pure Being qua multiplicity is unstructured, it becomes necessary to suppose that 
some process of contingent structuring takes place beside such multiplicity in order for entities to exist 
concurrently in Being through a process of structuration. Such is the function of metastructure, which 
structures ontological structure itself, insofar as the latter fails with regard to pure multiplicity. Indeed, we 
might say that it is an isomorphic force of structuration which connects all Real entities or existents, and 
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which renders them knowable in terms of the very medium of their knowability, which is to say, structure. 
If isomorphism marks the structuring force of the Real, as well as the force of the example, it follows that 
these are in a significant sense co-extensive. Such force finally speaks of the physicality of metaphysics, 
in which light I find it difficult to imagine that any force exists which is not, finally, identical to the very 
fundamental force which allows existence to cohere and to persist.
2225
 The example is an aperture to the 
Real which operates as, and through, an isomorphic para-ontology. The proximity of this assertion to the 
thesis of the present work – that minimalism exemplifies the facticity of the Real – is clearly discernible. 
Indeed, it draws together the productive knot of exemplarity, persistence, minimalism and the Real in a 
provocative manner. It remains only to identify this knot at its most concrete. 
 
 
g) Concretism as minimalist para-ontology 
 
I am sitting in a room, different from the one you are in now. I am recording the sound of my speaking 
voice, and I am going to play it back into the room again and again until the resonant frequencies of the 
room reinforce themselves, so that any semblance of my speech, with perhaps the exception of rhythm, is 
destroyed. What you will hear, then, are the natural resonant frequencies of the room articulated by speech. 
I regard this activity not so much as a demonstration of a physical fact, but more as a way to smooth out 
any irregularities my speech might have.
2226
 
 
This text constitutes the basic material of Alvin Lucier‟s legendary work of autopoietic concretism, I Am 
Sitting in a Room (Track 47).
2227
 Self-productive, self-reflexive and self-regulatory, the work draws 
together linguistic, sonic, and spatial media in a sound-sculpture which, subjected to a specific process – 
technologically mediated, reproduced, exposed to certain physical laws and properties of spatial limitation 
– is eventually entirely transformed, as are the media from which it takes its form. There may be no finer 
example of the two principal quantitative operators of minimalism, drone or sustenance and repetition.
2228
 
LaBelle summarizes the aesthetic process: “sound sets into relief the properties of a given space, its 
materiality and characteristics, through reverberation and reflection, and, in turn, these characteristics 
affect the given sound and how it is heard.”2229 As in any transformation, the moment we pay sufficient 
attention to the transformative process to slow it down or arrest its strictly processual operation, we are 
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compelled to take note of a deep paradox: that it is considerably more difficult than one might expect to 
distinguish between poiesis and destruction; making and unmaking.
2230
 
 
The work is indubitably autopoietic: the composer literally performs his own dictates. Sitting in a 
resonant room, he records his voice which he plays back into the room, recapturing it with additional 
resonance – a process which is repeated relentlessly over forty-five minutes. Resonance comes to 
dominate to the extent that language gives way to noise, the effects of which are at times quite unsettling. 
That the remnants of pitch and of rhythm remain, despite the significant processual decomposition of 
Lucier‟s work, owes to the clear non-fluency of Lucier‟s speech2231 which adds both pattern and 
irregularity. As the initial repetitions progress, they also effect a sonic deepening, the extended s taking on 
a whistle and the non-fluent r retaining a syncopated irregularity. To the attentive listener the initial 
strengthening instantiated by repetition soon gives way to an increasingly complex interaction of 
resonance and interference as the accentuated treble and bass tones begin to pull further apart, distinctly 
undermining the integrity of the voice. Simultaneously, a deep pitch, the beginnings of a drone, emerges 
from the deep, sustained pitch of the dipthong [a  ]. Yet, as the duration of its disembodiment increases, so 
the voice becomes hard, metallic – an uncanny mechanistic double; a voice increasingly divorced from 
any sense of integrity as self-presence becomes an entirely mediated quality. Bass tones are almost 
completely eroded by the exponentially increasing resonance, replaced by an irregular pitch which lags 
significantly behind its articulation, while the s sounds give way to a constant atmospheric whistle, 
punctuated by shrill, aggressive chirps.  
 
However, what initially appears a purely destructive process begins to effect a significant reconstitution. 
The atmospheric ground becomes more stable and upon it the whistle, itself more substantial now, reveals 
a rhythmic play between two pitches. As the composition moves towards its conclusion, we are not 
submerged in pure noise or chaos, but, rather, exposed to new singularities. Here is a compelling example 
of minimalist transumption: extremely limited material, subjected to characteristically minimalist 
aesthetic processes,
2232
 transposed to an atopian locus – that is, one which cannot be localized in an 
ordinary sense, nor to a specific medium – from which is poietically subtracted a work which nonetheless 
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evidences a singular concretism, an unambiguously poietic quantity. The semantic material of the work 
self-reflexively distributes its poietic substance in a manner which undermines its coherence only to 
transpose and affirm its persistence at another. Between text, voice, architecture, music and sound 
sculpture – a situation literally amplified by its technological mediation – the poietic heart of the work is 
predicated transumptively, within the para-ontological atopia which the autopoietic force of the example 
instantiates in its very taking-place.  
 
I phrase this subtractive autopoiesis in the sense Badiou reserves for the former of the terms, since while 
it contains a negation, this negation does not exhaust or destroy the generative multiplicity that inheres in 
the work: transformation and manifestation are simultaneous – the voice becomes noise, but noise 
becomes a new entity, a new type of rhythm and melody. In the poetic alternation between creativity and 
destruction, the singular importance of subtractive autopoiesis lies in that it transposes the self-regulatory 
subject entirely into process, while still acknowledging the intrinsic excess which inhabits the process of 
subtraction. It is thus weighted, ultimately, towards poiesis or generation.   
 
In certain situations, it appears that the self-reflexive force of the example is so great as to become fully 
autopoietic – in knowing itself as example, it produces itself as example. This autopoiesis subsequently 
manifests a singular internal subtraction, an ontological torsion so that even as the example affirms itself 
qua example,
2233
 it manifests beside itself a para-ontology. Thus, the example is autopoietic in a manner 
which involves negation of its independence and the subtraction through this negation of a new, para-
ontological field which renders it not only knowable as such, but as a force of knowability. This 
autopoietic operation – reflection, negation, extension, concrete novelty – seems to me remarkably close 
to the process identified above in relation to Lucier‟s work as subtractive autopoiesis. In this sense I 
suggest symmetry might be noted: subtractive autopoiesis instantiates an example of exemplarity, and 
exemplarity functions by a logic of subtractive autopoiesis. If exemplarity is, as Agamben suggests, an 
“ontology still to be thought,”2234 I contend that it might well be in this properly minimalist field that such 
thinking potentially takes place.  
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15. A TYPOLOGY OF MINIMALISM 
 
 
a) Transumption and the typology of minimalism 
 
The attempt to grasp and communicate the very essence of poiesis is the abiding concern of minimalism – 
a claim which has been argued repeatedly in the present work, and which is evidenced beyond the 
particularities of medium, aesthetic quality and historical epoch. Minimalism approximates poiesis by 
affirming the essentially quantitative nature of Being. However, pure quantity – multiplicity – proves  
elusive, in light of which the minimalist object is obliged to press its quantitative concerns only obliquely: 
by the essentialization of quality, by the radicalization of the form and so, too, the sense of presence 
conveyed by the work, and by the self-reflexive pursuit of the force by which such presence is knowable. 
We term this last force exemplarity, which, manifesting a para-ontological field to entity, displaces the 
question of a work‟s poietic essence to an atopia. An atopia is a non-space, the formulation of which is 
necessitated by two recognitions. The first is that since the entirety of an entity resists representation 
within the field of knowledge – which assigns epistemic values to ontological properties – it is necessary 
to posit a subsidiary topos to account for those elements which escape the Count. As a field of 
knowability such a topos mediates between Being – with which it is non-identical – and knowledge – to 
which it cannot be reduced – manifesting a para-ontology which radiates from the heart of an entity 
towards its normalization by concepts. At once reflective and productive, we term this force of the 
example poietic, even though its domain is not pure poiesis. Hence our contention that an exemplary 
para-ontology is locatable only in terms of a poietic atopia.  
 
A good example of minimalism exemplifies well the quantitative force of Being by offering para-
ontological testimony to the taking-place of the Real. The minimalist entity is transumed
2235
 – 
“transferred from one part or place to another,”2236 as Bann suggests; the materially2237 marked correlate 
of the paradigmatic movement which Agamben recognizes is one from singularity to singularity, rather 
                                                          
2235
 It is important to distinguish transumption from what Danto intends by transfiguration. Both involve the 
transposition of aesthetic concerns to an atopian locus, and a consequent transformation of the significance of the 
aesthetic object itself. The implications of this atopia are, however, notably different: transfiguration marks the 
transformation of non-art to art, whereas transumption involves the clarification of mediality, place and taking-place 
in art; transfiguration emphasizes a self-reflexive quasi-transcendence, while transumption involves a field of 
immanence from which novelty is drawn by the sheer indifference of the objects to its status as art or non-art. 
2236
 Bann, Transumption, 7.  
2237
 To recall, material has been used in a broader sense throughout the present study.  
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than between universals and particulars
2238
 – from its quantitative location to that of its poietic taking-
place. That this transumption is effected by a force which is unambiguously Real allows us to recognize 
in exemplary entities the reflection of poietic force in the example, and of exemplary force in the poietic 
entity, in both cases affirming the facticity and persistence of the taking-place of quantity. It is in this 
respect that minimalism constitutes a radical field of potentiality with regard to the exemplification of the 
Real. Finally, accepting these theses, which have consistently been argued and exemplified throughout the 
present work, it is possible to offer, in conclusion, a typology of minimalism.  
 
The first part of this work demonstrated that aggregating minimalism to particular properties, and 
organizing these in terms of a stable movement, Minimalism, fails to account for its dynamic taking-
place. Minimalism is neither a spent force, nor one with an orthodox beginning, and to grasp it 
adequately, it is necessary to attend to its existential logic – its manner of existing or taking-place within 
the Real. The existential logic of minimalism – the intuition of “the formal set of relations”2239 by which 
minimalist entities manifest in existence – is transumptive, and such transumption is expressed by three 
principal types or modalities: containment, distension and distribution.  
 
 
b) The minimalist logic of containment 
 
The majority of minimalism, whether by design or not, expresses itself as a species of the aesthetic 
modality here termed containment. In the case of minimalist containment, the parameters of the work are 
defined by various notions of monadism, restriction, unification, containment, poietic action within 
specified limits, or the disintegration of such limits from within a situation which nonetheless appears 
severely limited. In short, the forces of production and perception converge upon a contained work, and it 
is through this very containment, and their temporary impotence with respect to such containment, that 
such minimalist works effect the transumption, or atopian predication, which marks minimalism qua 
force. Key minimalist sculptors offer useful terms in this regard: Judd‟s specific objects, Morris‟ unitary 
forms, and Flavin‟s primary figures2240 all offer monadic conceptions of minimalist containment.    
 
                                                          
2238
 Agamben, Signature, 19, 31. 
2239
 Badiou, SMP, 31. 
2240
 Here we refer to the artist‟s self-assessment regarding his earlier and more austere work, since, as will be argued, 
the majority of Flavin‟s work is, in fact, subject to a distributive logic.  
   372 
 
Containment habitually expresses itself in unitary or monadic forms – self-contained and self-containing, 
eschewing external reference and preoccupied self-reflexively with their objectal status. Progressing from 
the most abstract to the most concrete of media, although numerous singular cases of sonic containment 
have been noted in the present work, we do well to identify three principal techniques through which 
minimalist containment is clarified: sustained drones, repetitive continua, and sparse soundscapes. That 
sonic containment should be particularly evident in drone music is somewhat paradoxical, as such 
composers as La Monte Young, Harold Budd, Pauline Oliveros, Charlemagne Palestine and Rhys 
Chatham habitually create works of considerable duration and with gradually undulating structures, 
resisting any simple unification by perception. However, in a significant sense, the  
 
 
musical material of many drone works is significantly self-contained and self-containing. Rhys 
Chatham‟s A Crimson Grail – a composition for four hundred electric guitars (Track 48)2241 – exemplifies 
the manner in which the force of sheer musical quantity is potentially self-limiting, as elementary music 
substance is unfolded in a manner at once strikingly beautiful and apparently contained. Equally 
significant are the repetitive continua of such composers as Riley and Glass, the miniature forms and 
strict predetermination of material in compositions as distinct as Webern‟s Five Pieces for Orchestra, op. 
10 and Ligeti‟s Musica Ricercata, and the sparsity of much of Feldman‟s composition, Vertical Thoughts 
1 (Track 49)
2242
 for instance, which, recalling Lucretius and Leibniz, presents the lonely fall of sonic 
monads within a severely restricted soundscape.  
 
In prose, the logic of containment is most evident in works which explore the possibility of event- and 
content-free narrative. Not only imaginatively difficult to accomplish, but also requiring technical 
virtuosity to sustain, convincing examples of such work are scarce. Regarding canonical minimalism, it 
might be argued that certain of Raymond Carver‟s most severe narratives approach this condition, but, in 
general, more convincing arguments can be made for containment in the elliptical repetitions of Gertrude 
Stein‟s writing, the relentlessness of Robbe-Grillet‟s descriptivism and its subsequent incorporation of 
self-generative techniques, and, in particular in the later prose of Samuel Beckett, to which the discussion 
will return. Most conspicuous amongst literary approaches to containment, however, are those self-
reflexive and ostensibly autonomous poems in the calligrammatic tradition of Apollinaire, and the 
ideogrammatic mould of the Noigrandes poets and their early Concrete associates. In particular we might 
                                                          
2241
 Rhys Chatham, A Crimson Grail. Table of Elements, 2007. 
2242
 Morton Feldman, Vertical Thoughts 1, 1963. 
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consider two remarkable works – Emmett Williams‟ “like attracts like” (Figure 104),2243 and Frans 
Vanderlinde‟s “Elimination/Incarnation” (Figure 105).2244  
 
 
            
Figure 104: Emmett Williams, like attracts like, 1958.        Figure 105: Frans Vanderlinde,Elimination/Incarnation.  
                                                                                  Date unspecified. 
 
Theses masterpieces of autopoietic concretism at once prescribe and execute their poietic taking-place. In 
Williams‟ work the word attracts is centred in each of thirteen lines, flanked by two identical, equidistant 
words – like – which, following the semantic stipulation of the poem, start fairly far from one another and 
move closer together with each new line, until the three words are completely overlaid, the likes 
occupying the same space as the word attracts. Here self-prescriptive containment – at a concrete level, 
like does attract like, encapsulating the work of the poem – and subtle semantic subversion complement 
one another. For Williams‟ poem presents a reversal of the commonplace opposites attract, a semantic 
                                                          
2243Emmett Williams, “like attracts like,” ACP, 314. 
2244
 Frans Vanderlinde, “Elimination/Incarnation,” CRAC, 77. 
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distortion which owes in part to typographical convenience,
2245
 and in part to the concrete intuition that, 
by subverting conventional meaning, the poem is able better to reinforce its autopoietic substance and to 
contain its productive capacity. 
 
The conceptual precursor to this logic of concrete containment is arguably the fragment as conceived by 
the poet-philosophers of Jena – that experimental form which, “like a miniature work of art, has to be 
entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete in itself.”2246 Yet, despite this strong claim, 
it is apparent that the fragment – existing in a state of “essential incompletion,”2247 “forever...becoming 
and never...perfected,”2248 and fluctuating between creation and destruction, reduction and elaboration, 
contraction and expansion – moves uncomfortably through a referential world upon which, in one sense, 
it is clearly dependent, yet in its compactness and self-sufficiency, it simultaneously eschews. Is this not 
precisely the poietic dynamic at play in Vanderlinde‟s “Elimination/Incarnation”? Here, however, the 
poem‟s semantic element engages explicitly with poietic activity itself. Directly confronting the 
relationship between negation and sublation which grounds the Hegelian dialectic, the poem‟s 
containment within a single system of elimination and incarnation, destruction and creation, appears to 
pivot on the increasing definition and isolation of a quasi-subject – the I – typographically and 
symbolically situated at the heart of the poem. The sole remnant of the progressive disintegration of the 
word elimination, this quasi-subject is also the pivot upon which the poietically reconstitutive incarnation 
is set in motion. A powerful minimalism, the work fixes, through a rapid and markedly tense poietic 
containment, the complicity of form, formation, language and letter. The quasi-subject marks both the 
spectrality of the poet as productive agent and the emergence of a constructive spectator in the manner 
which Foster emphasizes as of minimalism‟s most consistent features.2249  
 
In this sense, minimalist containment rests on the degree to which its impassivity is able to compel the 
beholder to affirm its separateness as object, in which case the spectator is in a significant sense 
displaced, indeed transumed, to the centre of the container, as it were – to the heart of the poietic process 
itself.
2250
 Indeed, such a minimalism of containment is strongly in evidence in the tradition of 
monochromatic painting which simultaneous captivates and resists. In this regard, we do well to compare 
                                                          
2245
 The word like has four letters which, when doubled, equal the number of letters of the word attracts, so that the 
words may be perfectly spatially overlaid by the end of the poem, whereas this would obviously not be the case had 
the Williams used the word opposite.  
2246
 Schlegel, “Athenaeum Fragment 206,” 251. 
2247
 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, Literary Absolute, 42. 
2248
 Friedrich Schlegel, “Athenaeum Fragment 116,” German Aesthetics, 249. 
2249
 Foster, Return, 47, 50. 
2250
 The Michael Fried of “Art and Objecthood” would find this suggestion abhorrent. 
   375 
 
the mesmeric quality of Klein‟s IKB paintings, the unremitting intensity of Reinhardt‟s black canvases, 
the manifest effort contained in the thickness of Ryman‟s white paintings, and the monochromes of Baer, 
framed as they are by thick, black, painted edges (Figure 106).
2251
 
 
 
Figure 106: Jo Baer, Stations of the Spectrum (Primary), 1967-9. 
 
A similar ambivalence is evidenced in much of Brice Marden‟s monochromatic work, in which the artist 
confronts the very radical structure of his materials
2252
 to create “thickly worked, opaque surface[s] of oil 
colour mixed in a medium of wax and turpentine.”2253 By the sense of their “presence,” what initially 
appear to be uniform surfaces reveal an opaque density
2254
 – a “compressed weighty feel”2255 and 
physicality
2256
 which simultaneously draw the spectator towards their apparent depth, yet repel this 
advance by the impenetrability of their waxen “epidermis.”2257 The capacity of paintings such as those 
from Grove Group II (Figure 107)
2258
 to captivate while resisting the viewer is achieved by applying layer 
upon layer of Marden‟s characteristic matte admixture, “as thick as butter”2259 – a process closely linked 
                                                          
2251
 Jo Baer, Stations of the Spectrum, 1967-9. Tate, London. 
2252
 Marden uses principally oil and wax, and charcoal and wax admixtures for his monochromatic work.  
2253
 Stephen Bann, “Brice Marden: From the Material to be Immaterial,” Brice Marden: Paintings and Drawings 
and Prints 1975-80 (London: Whitechapel Art Gallery, 1981), 7. “When applying colour to the canvas, I mix 
standard artist‟s oil colour (paint) with a medium of wax and turpentine” (Brice Marden, “Selected statements, notes 
and interviews,” Paintings, 54.). 
2254
 See Marden, “Selected statements,” 55; Strickland, Minimalism, 27; Colpitt, Minimal Art, 24; Meyer, 
Minimalism, 31; Roberta Smith, “Brice Marden,” Paintings, 46. 
2255
 Ibid.  
2256
 Strickland, Minimalism, 78.  
2257
 Mario Codognato, “A Cut Through the Frieze of Time,” Brice Marden: Works on Paper: 1964-2001, ed. Mario 
Codognato (London: Trolley, 2002), 12; See Smith, “Brice Marden,” 46. 
2258
 Brice Marden, Grove Group II, 1973. Museum of Modern Art, New York.  
2259
 Meyer, Minimalism, 30. 
   376 
 
to the manner in which colour
2260
 acquires a significant materiality of its own, containing rather than 
being contained by the work.
2261
 Marden refers to the manner in which colour holds a visual plane,
2262
 
“„turn[s] back into itself...reveal[s] itself to you while at the same time it evades you.‟”2263 
 
 
Figure 107: Brice Marden, Grove Group II, 1973. 
 
Marden‟s monochrome drawings (Figure 108)2264 offer an interesting clarification of minimalist 
containment. While they share the opacity of his painting, they do not resist so much as reflect the efforts 
of the viewer. This reflection is as literal as it is metaphorical, for the thick application of its wax-infused 
graphite might easily be mistaken for a “primitive mirror...[as] from two feet away you can see a hazy 
image of yourself.”2265 This much is clear from the reflection in the image produced below, demonstrating 
the manner in which perspective does indeed shape our relationship to minimalist objects and the manner 
                                                          
2260
 The subdued hues of Marden‟s early monochromes escape easy chromatic classification. See Colpitt, Minimal 
Art, 29; Smith, “Brice Marden,” 46. 
2261
 On the imbrication of colour and matter, see Bann, “Brice Marden,” 14. 
2262
 Marden, “Selected statements,” 55-6. 
2263
 Colpitt, Minimal Art, 29.  
2264
 Brice Marden, Grove Group (1-5), 1972. Museum of Modern Art, New York. 
2265
 Jean-Claude Lebensztejn, “From,” Brice Marden: Recent Paintings and Drawings (New York: Pace Gallery, 
1978), 6. 
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of their containment
2266
 – the viewer is crucial, certainly, but also evanescent with respect to the 
indifferent persistence of the object. Belonging to a “unique tradition of immanence”2267 – a tradition of 
incarnation, to recall Vanderlinde, which ties together the material and the metaphysical – the uniform 
measure of Marden‟s work is its sense of presence.2268 Yet presence is guaranteed by containment in this 
species of minimalism – and of this we should not lose sight. Marden recognizes the “strict confines”2269 
of his work, the manner of their “holistic self-sufficiency,”2270 which at once succeeds in “locking in the 
painting and locking out the world.” Yet at the centre of this dynamic of containment, Marden retains a 
thoroughly poetic sensibility:
2271
 “[t]he rectangle, the plane, the structure, the picture are but sounding 
boards for the spirit.”2272 
   
  
Figure 108: Brice Marden, Grove Group (1-5), 1972. 
 
                                                          
2266
 Ibid., 5. 
2267
 Bann, “Painting,” 11.  
2268
 Ibid., 8. 
2269
 Marden, “Selected statements,” 54. 
2270
 Strickland, Minimalism, 27. 
2271
 See Bann, “Painting,” 8. 
2272
 Marden, “Selected statements,” 54. 
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Although Beckett never admits such sentimentality into his work without considerable irony, it is possible 
to draw from an image that pervades his later oeuvre,
2273
 the “[s]epulchral skull,”2274 a powerful 
minimalist vision of the stakes of containment
2275
 – the same sense of strain between interiority and 
exteriority, poiesis and negation, persistence and desistence, to which Marden‟s monochromaticism 
attends. Indeed, the skull is a theoretical object par excellence – at once the tomb of fading consciousness 
and a monstrance of the incarnate imagination; a cipher for the closed spaces in which Beckett‟s prose of 
an entire decade
2276
 is claustrophobically located. According to Davies, these works, which Finney 
insightfully identifies as “narrative ideograms,”2277 should be assessed as a cycle,2278 set in motion by “All 
Strange Away,” and continued in “Imagination Dead Imagine,” “Ping,” “Lessness,” “The Lost Ones,” and 
“For to End Yet Again.”2279   
 
Their principal concern is encapsulated in the opening line of “All Strange Away,” – “Imagination dead 
imagine”2280 – a clear paradox upon which the persistence of the imagination is affirmed self-reflexively 
in situations in which its disappearance seems imminent. We discover in “Imagination Dead Imagine” a 
provocative, minimalist revision of its earlier model. This work tests our capacity to “reconstruct[...] 
whole worlds out of minimal fragments.”2281 Here is a prose emaciated and compressed, contained by the 
sparsest spatial and temporal coordinates, and which presents the remnants of a world tentatively mimed, 
then almost eliminated by the intensity of self-reference which marks Beckett‟s work.2282  
 
This granted, the solidity and specificity of the closed spaces or containers within which these works are 
situated is of immense significance. Both “All Strange Away” and “Imagination Dead Imagine” take 
                                                          
2273
 Ackerley and Gontarski, Faber Companion, 530.  
2274
 Beckett, “For to end,” 246. 
2275
 On the explicitly minimalist implications of Beckett‟s short prose, see Barbara Trieloff, “„Babel of Silence‟: 
Beckett‟s Post-Trilogy Prose Articulated,” Rethinking Beckett: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Lance St John 
Butler and Robin J. Davis (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1990), 89; Richard Kearney, “Imagination Wanted: Dead or 
Alive,” Samuel Beckett 100 Years: Centenary Essays, ed. Christopher Murray (New Island: RTE, 2006), 113; Brian 
Finney, “Assumption to Lessness: Beckett‟s shorter fiction,” Beckett the shape changer, ed. Katherine Worth 
(London: Routledge, 1975), 79; Paul Davies, The Ideal Real: Beckett’s Fiction and Imagination (London and 
Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1994), 136. 
2276
 The closed space works were principally composed in the 1960s and early 1970s, although Beckett‟s 
preoccupation with restriction and containment significantly predates this period (see Rubin Rabinovitz, “The Self 
Contained: Beckett‟s Fiction in the 1960s,” Beckett’s Later Fiction and Drama: Texts for Company, ed. James 
Acheson and Kateryna Arthur (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1987), 51. 
2277
 Finney, “Assumption,” 75. 
2278
 Davies, Ideal Real, 132-3, 137. 
2279
 Samuel Beckett, “All Strange Away,” CSP, 169. 
2280
 Ibid. 
2281
 Kenner, 176. 
2282
 See Rabinovitz, “Self Contained,” 50. 
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place in enclosures of severely restricted dimensions. The former is “[f]ive foot square, six high, no way 
in, none out,”2283 “gradually becoming smaller as memory diminishes” 2284 in the failing coherence of its 
narrative. The latter is situated in a miniscule cylinder
2285
 containing two figures, back to back, immobile, 
and imperceptibly alive but for the condensation which would appear were a mirror held to their lips,
2286
 
and the terrifying image of “the left eyes which at incalculable intervals suddenly open wide and gaze in 
unblinking exposure long beyond what is humanly possible.”2287 Both are ciphers for the skull, the dome-
shaped
2288
 setting of “For to end yet again,” the eighth of Beckett‟s short prose residua,2289 and the 
attempts of consciousness to dislocate itself from its encasement in the “dark place”2290of the skull.2291 
Indeed, it is interesting that the blinding white light which pervades “All Strange Away,” “Imagination 
Dead Imagine,” and “Ping” is replaced here. “The Lost Ones” is dimly lit by an eerie, lifeless, yellow 
light – one in which the wandering of two hundred and five bodies in a “flattened cylinder,”2292 “each 
searching for its lost one”2293 in this “entropic abode,”2294 periodically promises points of improbable 
egress
2295
 – and by a dark void in “For to end yet again.”  
 
Where external light sources appear dim, brilliant white light seems to have its source in the closed spaces 
themselves. Taking light as metonym for consciousness, the ultimate concern of these works is then the 
manner in which consciousness is at once limited, and yet rendered substantial, by embodiment. For it is 
the struggle of an apparently immaterial consciousness with its material substrate which lends an 
autopoietic force to its self-reflexivity, a consistency by which the “[f]luidity pointing to chaos” in 
Beckett‟s early work, “is replaced by rigidity enclosing the void.”2296 The embodied imagination tests 
itself against infinity. This much is clear in the post-apocalyptic futurity of “Lessness:” a “[l]ittle body 
                                                          
2283
 Beckett, “All Strange Away,” 169.  
2284
 Ackerley and Gontarski, Faber Companion, 11. 
2285
 Beckett, “Imagination,” 184. 
2286
 Ibid. 
2287
 Ibid.  
2288
 Davies, Ideal Real, 158. 
2289
 On this term see Kearney, “Imagination Wanted,” 113; Finney, “Assumption,” 64. 
2290
 Beckett, “For to end,” 243. 
2291
 As Davies notes, “[c]onsciousness alive and imagination dead make an inhospitable home for man, who is still 
there on the scene whatever atrophies he may have undergone” (Davies, Ideal Real, 141). 
2292
 Samuel Beckett, “The Lost Ones,” CSP, 202. 
2293
 Ibid. 
2294
 Ackerley and Gontarski, Faber Companion, 325. 
2295
 See ibid.; Dermot Moran, “Beckett and Philosophy,” Samuel Beckett 100, 95. 
2296
 J.E. Dearlove, Accommodating the chaos: Samuel Beckett’s nonrelational art (Durham, N.C.: Duke UP, 1982), 
108. 
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little block beating ash grey only upright”2297 – the persistent vertical presence of a person, “face to 
endlessness,”2298 in an infinite landscape which is revealed when the container in which this person 
existed collapses. Yet, apparently free, and indulging in “a wild imagining the blue celeste of poesy,”2299 
it becomes evident that every action is always frustratingly situated in the imminent future, which, 
however close, remains potential only: “[h]e will curse God again,”2300 “[h]e will go on his back face to 
the sky,” and he will die.2301 “Figment light never was,” Beckett tells us, and illumination here evokes 
only the pathos of a tragic hope – the desistence of persistence in the face of actual infinity. 
 
The unavoidability of our encounter with the Real, and its persistence even in the most minimal 
imagining, is the painful price of consciousness in Beckett‟s estimation. As Kearney notes, imagination  
 
has ceased to operate as a human agency, of expression, will and creativity and become instead a 
mechanical pulse of repetition...But this entropic decline of imagination into emptiness [is itself 
unreliable]...For even as we imagine imagination dead, we still find ourselves caught in the reflexive spiral 
of imagining.”
2302
  
 
“[A]n inexorable force in life,”2303 imagination is, as Pilling echoes, “less and less a matter of exercising 
the will and more and more a matter of waiting for the mercies vouchsafed by inspiration.”2304 Yet, 
luminescence in Beckett‟s closed space works is habitually blinding rather than revealing. The quasi-
transcendence promised by the imagination in such minimalist poietic situations rests of the transumption 
of consciousness, the dislocation of consciousness to an atopian exterior
2305
 from which it might be 
possible to view such minimal instantiations of a contained existence objectively. Such externality is also 
the concern of the minimal sound of the ping which punctuates the tiny, isolated cubic structure – its 
“[w]hite walls one yard by two white ceiling one square yard never seen”2306 – of Beckett‟s eponymous 
work.
2307
  
                                                          
2297
 Beckett, “Lessness,” 198. 
2298
 Ibid. 
2299
 Ibid., 199. 
2300
 Ibid., 197. 
2301
 See Ackerley and Gontarski, Faber Companion, 318. 
2302
 Kearney, “Imagination Wanted,” 115-8.  
2303
 Davies, Ideal Real, 153. 
2304
 John Pilling, “Shards of Ends and Odds in Prose: From „Fizzles‟ to „The Lost Ones,‟” On Beckett: Essays and 
Criticism, ed. S. E. Gontarski (New York: Grove, 1986), 175. 
2305
 On the implicit atopianism of these works see Finney, “Assumption,” 77; Rabinovitz, “Self Contained,” 50, 58. 
2306
 Samuel Beckett, “Ping,” CSP, 193. 
2307
 Stylistically, “Ping” offers a fine example of minimalist containment: its words, far from unpatterned, present 
the reader with an austere potentiality, with numerous possible permutations of pattern and significance, revealed 
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Lodge draws attention to the dissenting views on whether ping is a noise external or internal to the 
discourse.
2308
 The present contention is that Beckett‟s view necessitates that we comprehend this sound, 
and by analogy the question of containment itself, as simultaneously internally and externally produced, 
simultaneously autopoietic and the consequence of induction. As a minimalist modality, containment 
reveals the threshold of example and exception upon which inclusion and exclusion are necessarily 
undecidable. Thus, repeatedly flanking the ping which marks this threshold, we discover that the work is 
at once “fixed”2309 and “fixed elsewhere.”2310 The logic is explicitly transumptive and atopian – a 
displacement to a non-space in which the minimal but unambiguously poietic essence of the work is 
predicated. In this sense, containment is neither final nor static, but rather a poietic modality of 
stabilization which discovers its most forceful instantiation through minimalism. Yet, contingent stability 
is also the mark of potential change, and it is the imminence in minimalism of internal torsion and 
transformatory processes which the present work terms distension.  
 
 
c) The minimalist logic of distension 
 
Although in terms of its immediately visible qualities the dominant logic of minimalism, with its 
emphasis on the predication of unified objects, appears to be that of containment, minimalists are in fact 
equally concerned with the exposition and taking-place of process in their work, or, indeed their work qua 
process. It is to such process that the logics of distension and distribution attest. Regarding the first of 
these, we encounter a means of reflecting upon the constitutive heart of the work in its transformatory 
tenor, yet without departing from the work entirely. For such is the wager of poietic distension: a 
transumption of poietic essence, prompted from within, by virtue of the reflexive arrangement of parts 
and the internal torsion, and hence transformation, of these parts implicit to the processual taking-place of 
the work. The transumption is of ordinary spatial location and temporal occurrence, to a processual atopia 
which is at once integral to the work, yet always in the process of reflexive re-integration. In this sense, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
through various techniques of repetition, addition and subtraction, which nonetheless emphasize in its language a 
sense of minimalist objecthood (see Trieloff, “Babel of Silence,” 90). 
2308
 David Lodge, “Some Ping Understood,” Critical Essay on Samuel Beckett, ed. Patrick A. McCarthy (Boston: 
G.K. Hall, 1986), 125. 
2309
 Beckett, “Ping,” 193. 
2310
 Ibid. 
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the logic of distension marks the processual field upon which the introspective logic of containment and 
the extroverted logic of distribution are mediated.  
 
Central to any analysis of distension is the implicitly temporal understanding and elaboration of process. 
Thus, although a distinction is made in what follows between temporal distension and spatial distension, 
it should be understood that temporality – indeed, the temporality of the Real as it has been defined and 
deployed in the preceding discussion – is the implicit substrate of both. Here McTaggart‟s distinction of 
A series, B series and C series in his epochal essay, The Unreality of Time, is instructive.
2311
 The A series 
is marked by relative temporal positions, “from the far past through the near past to the present, and then 
from the present to the near future and the far future.”2312 The B series involves a more fluid progress 
“from earlier to later.”2313 The C series, by contrast, “is not temporal, for it involves no change, but only 
an order.”2314 The present contention is that the ancestral time of Meillassoux offers significant 
endorsement of the validity of the A series.  
 
As Meillassoux demonstrates, a reaffirmation of the Real in an age of correlationist doubt requires that we 
rehabilitate an understanding of time which is independent of perception, cognition and access. The 
strong Absolute figure of the arche-fossil,
2315
 the proposition and formal proof that there exists no 
legitimate refutation of the existence of material prior to its givenness, allows us to situate entities in an 
irrefutably solid past, and to regard with equal realness the present and the future. Our concern then shifts 
from disputing whether or not time is real or unreal, to the task of identifying the proper time of the Real. 
In my view, there exists no impediment to affirming that such a time is identifiable as the temporal A 
series, or Meillassoux‟s ancestral time. This does not, however, entirely resolve the apparent disparity 
between the indifference of temporal passage, and the manner in which temporal fluctuation and 
inconsistency are felt.  
 
The temporal and spatial distension which marks much minimalism, attempts to account for this 
phenomenon in aesthetic terms by prompting a reconsideration of ancestral time from the perspective of 
the processual object. In short, art which attempts to grasp its own processual taking-place defines what 
here is termed distension. More closely still, distension refers to a transumptive, internal torsion – an 
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internal expansion proper to the constitution of the entity in terms of its processual objecthood – which 
occurs when an artwork attempts to grasp itself, either in spatial or temporal terms, in the midst of this 
process. Distension thus refers to operations internal to the object which manifest by a certain 
externalization, but which finally affirm the coherence of the object. In the case of temporal distension, 
the poietic work occurs in its transumption to an atopian point at which the entity emerges qua process; 
for spatial distension, poeisis is located in a quasi-object which offers itself in spatial terms in the very 
midst of its processual taking-place.   
 
Amongst the most significant and radical works of minimalism operate by a logic of distension. Samuel 
Beckett‟s “Quad,” for instance, exemplifies the manner in which distension is at once a turn outward and 
a return inward; an expression of the manner in which disparate media – geometry, text, movement and 
colour – come to be held as one. Equally exemplary is the kinetic weight of effort, still discernible in 
many of Richard Serra‟s lead sculptures, the numerous process-oriented concrete poems examined above, 
and the generative fiction of Alain Robbe-Grillet, the tropes of which express very precisely an 
autopoietic expansion and contraction. However, the most productive unravelling of this processual 
aesthetic emerges, unsurprisingly, in the manner in which it exemplifies itself qua process. With respect 
to temporal distension, we need look no further than Steve Reich‟s epochal composition Piano Phase,2316 
while an especially fascinating model of spatial distension is discovered in the poem machines of Liliane 
Lijn.  
 
The Parisian avant-garde of the 1960s offered an environment at once stimulating and receptive of Lijn‟s 
experimental endeavours with the atomization and deconstitution of language, and the subsequent 
contrapuntal reconstitution of its constituents.
2317
 Sympathetic experiments were being conducted by the 
Beats,
2318
 Lettrists and Spatialists, and it would be no exaggeration to claim that Lijn‟s poem machines 
instantiate a comparably compelling form of kinetic, minimalist concretism, although, curiously, her work 
is seldom examined in this light. Of particular interest are the conical structures of the ABC Cone
2319
 and 
Act as Atom.
2320
 The spinning cone, on account of its tapering surface area, has the unique capacity for 
generating the illusion of different rotational speeds. In fact, the axis of a cone rotates at a consistent 
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speed, but, were a vertical line to be drawn from top to bottom, two points upon this line would recur at 
different times – more regularly at the apex, and more irregularly at the base.  
 
The result, in the case of ABC Cone (Figure 109; Clip 4), is a significant spatial distension, one which 
stresses the integrity of the perceptual and conceptual fields within which the individual integrity of the 
letter and its sequential identity are determined.
2321
 In this work, Lijn has lettered the entire alphabet on 
the cone: towards the top we discover the first few letters, in various repetitive patterns reiterated in three 
separate but aligned horizontal rows, while at the base the remaining letters are arranged in a continuous 
band. As soon as the cone is set in motion, each row takes its own path at a specific pace and intensity, 
but also exposes various dynamic relationships between repeated letters and rows.  
 
 
 
       
Figure 109: Liliane Lijn, ABC Cone, 1965.                 Figure 110: Liliane Lijn, Act as Atom, 1966. 
 
Lijn‟s is a remarkable minimalism: the elementary units of writing, shape and basic motion generate a 
poietic field of considerable force. The transumption effected by the work derives from the interaction of 
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real motion and apparent motion, and acts upon the constituent letters of the work, constituting a 
distensive medium in which the physicality of letters bleed into a non-linguistic poietic continuum. By 
varying the velocity of rotation, letters dematerialize at a typographical level, only to materialize a 
particularly stimulating and concrete flux, altering the direction of flow as well as the consistency of our 
visual perception. This phenomenon is particularly clear in Lijn‟s transparent cones. Act as Atom (Figure 
110; Clip 5), for example, presents from top to bottom in a sucession of carefully angled orbits the words 
or phrases, atomation, automation, instead of, action atom, act as atom, followed by three rows of 
symbols at the top. These are arranged in such a way that when the cone is in motion, they conform to the 
various orbits, ellipses and helixes by which intermolecular forces are usually illustrated . This thoroughly 
autopoietic work effects a symbolic distension from the representational field of language to the 
presentation force of subatomic particles, and a material distension from simple typography upon 
transparent perspex to the dynamic facticity of its poietic taking-place.  
 
The processual experience of distension is amplified further in the temporal paradigm of minimalist 
objecthood instantiated by such works as Reich‟s Piano Phase. Much has been written on the 
considerable technical accomplishment of this composition. By radically minimal means – melodic 
fragments constructed from a consistent flow of eight notes and eighth note rests, and from only a few 
pitches – it presents a complex array of effects when its very simple melody, played simultaneously on 
two pianos in unison, is gradually shifted out of phase. Piano Phase was the composer‟s first purely 
instrumental attempt at phase-shifting or phasing, a process he had discovered in his earlier tape 
compositions.
2322
 Phasing involves the displacement with respect to one another of two or more musical 
fragments, initially sounded together, by a process of relative acceleration and/or deceleration. All 
phasing combines temporal linearity – the composition begins and ends – with temporal cyclicality. The 
latter is clarified in the structural process itself: generally short fragments are played identically by two 
voices; one voice accelerates with respect to the other, moving them progressively apart until, at the point 
of greatest temporal distance,
2323
 they once more begin to converge until they have returned to their 
original relative positions.
2324
 Within this overall process, the alternation of “fuzzy transitions”2325 – in 
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which voices are out of phase with one another – and contingent stabilities – in which voices are in phase 
with one another – produces considerable sonic interest.  
 
Epstein‟s rigorous formal analysis provides significant insight regarding the shift from formal 
arrangement to effect.
2326
 Perceptual ambiguity arises when temporal fluctuation is juxtaposed with 
contingent stability; phase shifts or fuzzy transitions with sections of rhythmic coincidence and melodic 
stability. That such ambiguity
2327
 should dominate our experience of Piano Phase is in fact an indicator 
that its logic is thoroughly distensive, as the maximally ordered system is plunged into disorder with a 
procedural clarity rare even in Reich‟s oeuvre, in which “compositional process and a sounding music 
…are one and the same thing,”2328 Indeed, a restless simultaneity of equally plausible temporal 
trajectories is evident: a condition of temporal multiplicity in which several possible temporal trajectories 
exist with respect to a particular entity or process.  
  
The first of these is the indifferent, ancestral time of the Real which, regardless of the temporal 
complexities of perception, simply takes its course – the absolute becoming that Savitt characterizes in 
terms of a temporal passage or “ordered occurrence of events.”2329 For Savitt, there is no intrinsic 
connection “between this sort of passage and either freedom, spontaneity, and emergence on the one 
hand, or determinism, necessity, and reductionism on the other.”2330 Piano Phase, by “always extend[ing] 
farther than…can [be] hear[d],”2331 testifies to the manner in which such becoming is at once proper and 
indifferent to both entity and perception of the entity: both are merely perturbances upon the 
uninterruptable path of the Real with respect to its absolute becoming.   
 
Second, the composition instantiates numerous individual but parallel temporal trajectories, deduced 
simultaneously from its fuzzy transitions, the contingent unities established on either side of these 
transitions, and the idiosyncratic temporality of every realization or performance of the work, and, 
moreover, of the unique experience of every listener. Stoianova‟s claim, that minimalism “generat[es] the 
present at each moment...without beginning, multi-directional motion without cause or effect,”2332 gains 
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momentum in this light not simply as a response to the inherent multiplicity of the work, but also to 
multiplicity in the experience of the listener – the productive subtraction of numerous temporal lines from 
the inexhaustible becoming of the Real. Thus might we also account for Mertens‟ identification in 
minimalist process music of a conflict between so-called clock time, which he associates with the 
dialectic progression of history, and macro-time, which he claims is a “higher level…beyond 
history…which has been called now or stasis or eternity.”2333 He concludes that minimalism “attempts to 
unite the historical subject with non-historical time”2334 – a provocative analysis, but one which overlooks 
that no necessary conflict exists between absolute becoming and multiple temporal strands, since the 
latter are simply subtractions from, rather than negations of, the former.  
 
The third temporal exposition of Piano Phase suggests that its cyclicality offers us an alternative temporal 
frame to ancestral time. Cyclical time identifies a split between that which is perceived as progressive 
change, and that which is perpetually in a process of recurring. In this it appeals to the proposition of 
eternal recurrence
2335
 which Nietzsche develops from the dominant Greco-Roman understanding of a 
“circular and continuous”2336 time, and the later Stoic kairos, an “infinite time…at once delimited and 
made present.”2337 In this light, the temporal distension of minimalism might be interpreted as a formalist 
aspiration for the eternal – a temporality in one sense transcendental, but in another imbued with an 
immanent transformative energy. Analysis of Piano Phase habitually leads towards such cyclicality.
2338
 
That the same melodic material is phased against itself in the first and third cycles accounts for the 
composition‟s simultaneously symmetrical and cyclical structure. Given a limited amount of melodic 
material and a steady pulse, repetition subject to a continuous minimal displacement in relation to itself, 
does reveal a distinct cyclicality. A singularity can be structured in such a way that a continuous 
displacement of its elements will amount to a return to the original material.  
 
This proposition is significantly close to the remarkable formulation which Derrida offers near the 
conclusion of “Ellipsis:” “[t]hree is the first figure of repetition. The last too, for the abyss of 
representation always remains dominated by its rhythm, infinitely.”2339 Yet, to my mind, it is unclear 
whether or not the self-reference which underpins cyclical progression, either in quantity or quality, 
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constitutes a suitably stable point from which such cyclicality might be deduced outside of the indifferent 
progress of ancestral time.
2340
 Finally, the present wager is that it does not: cyclicality presents a 
particularly seductive illusion of identical recurrence, but its repetitions are in fact similar rather than the 
same, and finally the assertion of the latter over the former lacks ontological force.  
 
Only when these three temporal trajectories – of ancestral, parallel and cyclical time – are traced 
simultaneously does the full significance of temporal distension become apparent – as a principal 
modality of Piano Phase specifically, but also as the temporal distensive logic which moves through 
much process-oriented minimalism as an internal displacement. In brief, for minimalist processual 
objecthood to be knowable as such, the indifferent passage of ancestral time must be shown to exist in an 
intimate dialectic relation to multiple and cyclical times, which measure themselves against the Real, of 
which ancestrality is the guarantor. While such restless simultaneity is certainly sublime from the 
perspective of perception – a play of oppositions prompted aesthetically, between form and formlessness, 
pleasure and pain, control and powerlessness which is quite evident in Piano Phase
2341
 – we understand 
distension best by a late excursus through Agamben‟s analysis of potentiality.  
 
Agamben proceeds, through a close examination of Aristotle,
2342
 to suggest that potentiality (that which 
can be) cannot simply be cancelled by impotentiality (the potential to not-be). Nor is it sufficient to note 
that potentiality always implies impotentiality, and that in moving from what is potential to what is actual, 
impotentiality is spent. Rather, Agamben contends that “what is truly potential is…what has exhausted all 
its impotentiality in bringing it [impotentiality] wholly into the act as such.”2343 In other words, any act 
brings into actuality the potentiality to not-be, which threatens to cancel not only potentiality prior to the 
act, but the act itself. However, to the exact degree that in a situation such a cancellation does not occur, 
impotentiality also carries tremendous promise. If impotentiality is not exhausted (in the process of 
cancellation) it carries anew its constitutive opposite, potentiality.  
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When an act is still potential, when it has not yet taken place, the potentiality to be is balanced 
symmetrically by the potentiality to not-be. However, when potentiality becomes act, the act does not 
exhaust impotentiality. Impotentiality does not just disappear, but is carried fully into the act, as the 
possibility of the act‟s cessation. But inasmuch as impotentiality enters into activity, so does potentiality, 
since as has been noted, they are constitutively bound. That which seemed to have been spent in the act, is 
restored, is recharged once more from within the very same act as, in the midst of the act, impotentiality is 
converted to potentiality. The charge of potentiality, the charge of a future, is tied to the fact that 
impotentiality does not exist merely as the shadow of potentiality, but as a producer of excess potentiality, 
or that which carries excess potentiality into the act. Thus, there exists a certain reserve of potentiality that 
does not have to be spent in the act, but which is always in excess of the act, oriented towards the future, 
and which seems to propel current activity towards future activity. Under conventional conditions, 
potentiality might be described as the charge of the future in the present (the being-able-to-become act 
situated in the present). Agamben suggests that true potentiality is the charge of the future as the present 
(the being-able-to-become act as the present, to the extent that the present is itself an act which 
incorporates fully action and impotentiality). In seeming to be spent in the act, potentiality is actually 
conserved. The shift is from a static model of dynamics, to a dynamic model of dynamics.  
 
This is also the precise formulation of futurity implicit in the notion of taking-place and of the Real, as 
they are offered in the present work. The charge of the future thus resides not in the present but as the 
very presentation of the present – its taking-place qua Real. Here the resonance of Lyotard‟s formulation 
of the sublime in terms of the interrogative is significant: “Is it happening?...[T]he mark of the question is 
„now‟, now like the feeling that nothing might happen: the nothingness now.”2344 Lyotard‟s move from 
the indefinite, sublime, suspension – “nothing might happen now” – to the predicative “the nothingness 
now,” matches closely the manoeuvre required by Agamben in realizing that impotentiality abandons its 
relationship of strict negation to potentiality, and is incorporated into the act. The nothingness now thus 
comes to figure for the presentation of impotentiality in the act.  
 
Lyotard suggests that the mark of the event, particularly as it is felt in aesthetic terms, is its sublime 
uncertainty – will it happen, will it not? As such, it evades any normal presentation, since it precedes 
manifestation. Offered to the senses, taking place as its own uncertainty, there is something of this 
offering that remains unpresentable. Here we have a precise, sublime formulation of poietic atopia. 
Indeed, we come to understand that the stakes of the minimalist logic of distension are not aesthetic so 
                                                          
2344
 Lyotard, Sublime and Avant-Garde, 92. 
   390 
 
much as they are existential. Distension, in both its spatial and temporal expressions, offers itself as a 
positive poietic charge – that things happen and acts take place, but also that “potentiality…survives 
actuality [its being consumed in the passage from potential to act], and in this way, gives itself to 
itself.”2345 This last phrase is of considerable moment, since it comprehends the very heart of the fact that 
what is at stake in the act is, simply put, the very taking place of the future. What Agamben marks in the 
act, Lyotard affirms through the sublime question. If Agamben‟s act ultimately presents the ground upon 
which potentiality gives itself to itself, securing the future, then, for Lyotard, the sublime question is what 
allows the unpresentable (the positivity of the event) to give itself to presentation as negative presentation 
– the future guaranteed by the event now. The positions are close to symmetrical. They also reflect the 
understanding reached in minimalist aesthetics that, precisely because the poietic act offers itself in the 
radical terms it habitually does, that taking-place remains at its centre – a centre which in the truest sense 
is atopian and transumptive, marking in material terms that which has not yet materialized; futurity in the 
immanence of the present.   
 
 
d) The minimalist logic of distribution 
 
Minimalism‟s distributive logic defines the clearest examples of the relation between the transumptive 
displacement of poietic force and the constructive role of the perceiver in defining the parameters of the 
artwork.
2346
 This logic is subtly at work in most minimalist narrative. Minimal, concrete, linguistic terms 
appear to be the telos of a process of progressive reduction, but, in fact, prompt a significant transumptive 
redistribution as they are processed. A dynamic intermediary field is generated – one upon which the 
work is distributed between concept, language and the most austere representational markers of both. The 
distributive dynamic habitually pivots upon the sudden extension or contraction of the linguistic sphere. 
This is nowhere clearer than in concretism – an extended discussion of which precedes – and it is no 
exaggeration to say that intermedial distribution is so central to the work of such poets as Lax, Williams 
and Finlay, that their proper medium can only be described with any accuracy in terms of an 
intermedium.  
 
                                                          
2345
 Agamben, “On Potentiality,” 184. 
2346
 To recall, for many critics this is the most salient mark of minimalism, especially in the visual arts.  
   391 
 
Steve Reich‟s Different Trains (Track 50)2347 presents a particularly compelling example of minimalism‟s 
distributory logic. A composition for tape and string quartet, its melodies are very evidently derived from 
carefully chosen and interwoven narrative samples. As Reich reports,  
 
The idea for the pieces comes from my childhood. When I was one year old my parents separated. My 
mother moved to Los Angeles and my father stayed in New York. Since they arranged divided custody, I 
travelled back and forth by train frequently between New York and Los Angeles from 1939 to 1942 
accompanied by my governess. While these trips were exciting and romantic at the time I now look back 
and think that, if I had been in Europe during this period, as a Jew I would have had to ride very different 
trains.
2348
 
  
The natural melodic qualities of these vocal samples are intensified as they are transmediated – taken up 
by a string quartet, subtly transformed, and woven into the next sample. That the aesthetic substance of 
the work should thus be distributed – between voice and instrument, live performance and recording – 
locates it very precisely upon an intermedial atopos. Without sacrificing the best of minimalism‟s 
attributes, Reich‟s work exhibits the vision of a subtle narrator. At once “documentary and musical 
reality,”2349 the imbrication of musical, verbal and visuo-conceptual elements – what Reich describes as a 
“theater in the mind”2350 – reflect an art which is integrated to the precise extent that its poietic essence is 
also distributed.  
  
However, perhaps the finest example of the minimalist logic of transumption, its manner of exhibiting 
itself qua medium and in the very process of mediation, is discovered in the light art of Dan Flavin. What 
we gain from Flavin‟s work is an acute understanding of the potential migrancy of the artwork: its 
movement between poiesis, creativity, and the possibility or impossibility of creation ex nihilo on the one 
hand; and aesthesis, or art‟s expression and perception through physical sensation, on the other. In short, 
trying to comprehend the objecthood both explicit and implicit in the light-art of Dan Flavin emphasizes 
the atopian location of the minimalist artwork with some force – its migration between the physicality of 
location, the insubstantiality of its medium, and the poietic force which some imagine underpins its 
emergence. Even a cursory encounter with this work reveals, as Jeffrey Weiss suggests, the continuation 
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of a tradition of both abstraction and transcendentalism, of “the transformation of painting and sculpture 
into a third medium that both transgresses and transcends the first two.”2351  
 
This observation regarding transmedial synthesis reveals a radical transgression not only of the 
exhibitionary spaces reserved for the conventional media of the visual arts,
2352
 but also of art‟s 
constitutive media themselves. The proper medium of the work appears to migrate: it is at once the 
physical light fixture; the chemical light-producing reaction within the fixture; the light itself, as it 
irradiates; and complex boundaries this mediation encounters in terms its environment – the architectural 
space, the space of other objects (often including other light-art) and the physicality of the viewer.  
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Figure 111: Dan Flavin, untitled (to Tracy, to celebrate the love of a lifetime), 1992. 
 
Addressing the complex of physical, conceptual and perceptual location implicit in the light art of Dan 
Flavin goes some way to understanding the manner in which certain objects, by virtue of their 
atopianism, draw attention once more to the question of poietic force, now not merely in terms of its 
knowability, but in the fullness of its transumptive potential to dislocate in the act of distributive 
relocation of its material (the artwork). In this work, a minimalist atopia takes on its most material face. 
Far from an instance of pure perception, it is clear in this art that something of formative significance 
occurs prior to perception – to furnish the sense with information, but also to account for the distributed 
objecthood of the work, which is evident regardless of how the work is apprehended. Tiffany Bell ends an 
essay on Flavin‟s art by commenting that “[j]ust as you cannot really delineate the material boundaries of 
a Flavin installation, you cannot pinpoint the precise moment of its making. The lights shine in a 
continuous present.”2353 Examining this statement in relation to one of Flavin‟s iconic corner pieces, 
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untitled (to the real Dan Hill) 1b 1978 (Figure 112),
2354
 we encounter an exemplary case of such 
distributive minimalism. Attempting to grasp the process of transumptive emergence in the very midst of 
its relocation or taking-place qua force, this work allows us to rehearse the fundamental concerns of 
atopian objecthood with particular clarity. 
 
 
Figure 112: Dan Flavin, untitled (to the real Dan Hill) 1b, 1978. 
 
Flavin‟s work clarifies the manner in which in distributive minimalism, the transumptive process through 
which the minimalist object manifests is coherent despite frequent expectation that it ought not to be. A 
similar phenomenon is observable in Walter de Maria‟s Lightning Field, in which no adequate 
anticipation of the sublime effect of energy distributed by repeated lightning strikes can be offered, either 
by concept or by the work‟s physical configuration. Transumption of such work always occurs upon a 
threshold – a sequence of occurrences, conceptual points, or physical configurations, able to present a 
parataxis of quite distinct processes. Considering Flavin‟s light art, for example, we find a homologically 
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compelling example of distributive transumption as a whole. Such art paradoxically is both produced and 
deconstituted by a dissipating energy – the irradiance of light qua medium, the dissipation of which is 
precisely what enables its convergence as an aesthetic-poietic form. Finally, might we not recognize here 
the meeting of the sublime (the putting-into-form of formlessness) and the procedurally poietic (the 
putting-into-form of formation) as defining the work of distributive minimalism.  
  
The distributive immediacy of this work – a position of significant productive paradox – is clarified only 
by a close examination of untitled (to the real Dan Hill) itself. Six clear processual elements are 
distinguishable: the production of the light fittings; the conceptualization of the work; powering the 
situation; the irradiance of the fixtures; the physicality and limitations of the physical environment in 
which irradiances occurs; and the perception of the work.   
 
Regarding production, as was the case with many minimalist, Flavin made exclusive use of 
premanufactured, commercially produced, fluorescent fixtures for all of his proposals.
2355
 Thus, Flavin‟s 
art is in the first instance conditioned upon a situation of production not directly related to either the 
artists or the work: industrial manufacture.
2356
 Adapting the primary palate of blue, green, pink and 
yellow, untitled (to the real Dan Hill) is structurally elementary, consisting of four connected fluorescent 
tubes, two facing forward and two facing backward. These premanufactured objects, which Flavin 
stressed should retain their union labels,
2357
 enter what Meyer describes as the “netherworld of 
dada…non-referential abstraction,”2358 leaning like  forgotten functional light fixtures in the corner of a 
gallery space, allowing the work to retain a sense of externality and autonomy within its subsequent 
artistic situation.  Nonetheless it is clear that some form of conceptual work is underway – a sort of 
intervention of the imagination upon such basic materials, a notion which Flavin confirms by executing 
draughtsman-like plans of all of his work which were issued as certificates, doubling the proposal in an 
important sense,
2359
 but at the same time pointing to the significant problems which persist regarding the 
materiality of the concept, particular as progenitor of rather abstract artwork.  
                                                          
2355
 In characteristic resistance to the critical establishment, Flavin insisted on referring to proposals rather than 
works (Govan, “Irony and Light,” 71), situations rather than installations (Brydon E. Smith, “Recollections and 
Thoughts About Dan Flavin,” Dan Flavin, 138), and expositions rather than exhibitions (Bell, Fluorescent Light, 
116).  
2356
 As noted above, the emphasis on eliminating artistic facture, and on using premanufactured objects, is a 
hallmark of the minimalism visual arts (Meyer, MAP, 186). 
2357
 There are a number of reasons for this instruction, largely legal, or related to the goodwill of workers involved in 
the assemblage of proposals or situations within the exhibitionary space.  
2358
 Ibid., 106. 
2359
 In this way, Flavin‟s certificates formalize a certain split between conception and execution of the work.  
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 Regardless of whether a fluorescent fixture is deployed in the commercial context as a source of 
functional lighting, or, through its conceptualization, formation and (retrospectively) perception, as fine 
art, such operation requires a very real activation in terms of its powering. Of course, this occurs in the 
banal act of switching the fixture on or off, yet this act locates very precisely two sources of power: the 
individual will, at once internal and external to the artwork, and the indifferent source of power, 
genuinely external to the object. A decision having been made, a predetermined distributory process is set 
in motion: sealed tubes of gasses (aragon and mercury) glow when electrified and cause the coated tubing 
of the fixtures to fluoresce and give off light of a particular colour or hue which depends on either the 
phosphors or pigments which coat the tubes.
2360
 Through its irradiance, the proposal extends itself 
considerably and extremely rapidly. Although certain hues are directed – blue and green forward, yellow 
and pink backward – by its very nature radiance exceeds itself, and so these cannot simply be contained.  
 
A principal virtue of light-art is that it takes place at the speed of light, making questions of perception 
immediate, emphasizing a certain understanding of sublime, minimalist presence. At the point of 
perceiving the artwork qua light, it is possible to say that the distributive character, mediatory parataxis, 
and the paradoxically ethereal materialism of the work coincide. However, to validate the transmediation 
of the work – from fixture and concept, to power, act and irradiance – the concrete encounter of light with 
its physical environment must be recognized as the principal means by which Flavin‟s proposals, quite 
literally, take their shape. Flavin‟s work in u-shaped bunkers in Marfa, Texas is exemplary in this respect 
(Figure 113-4):
2361
 what appears at first to be two separate sources of light, have in fact a single source – a 
two sided proposal in a u-shaped tunnel, each light of sufficient strength to instantiate the situation in 
which a single work is distributed in a plural manner in a specific spatial configuration.  
                                                          
2360
 Govan, “Irony and Light,” 59.  
2361
 Dan Flavin, untitled (Marfa Project), 1996. Chinati Foundation, Marfa. 
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Figure 113: untitled (Marfa Project), 1996. 
 
    
Figure 114: Installation views of Dan Flavin, untitled (Marfa project), 1996. These offer views are from opposite sides of 
the same proposal. .  
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The ultimate form of light art is significantly altered not only by the concrete physical aspects of its 
exhibitionary environment – the shape of the gallery, the walls it encounters, the degree to which the 
space is enclosed – but also by the existing light situation of this environment. As Meyer notes, “the 
actual space of the room could be disrupted and played with,”2362 affirming the work‟s ability to 
“transcen[d] the medium upon which it reflects…it does not cover the wall, but exposes it.”2363 The 
distribution which marks Flavin‟s work offers an important and difficult extension of the aesthetic and 
poietic quantity of the work: the latter insofar as the union of production, conception, illumination and 
dissipation encapsulates the distribution of novelty itself; the former to the extent that it is our perception 
of these numerous aesthetic properties, our “direct vision,”2364 which finally draws together the 
distributive logic of the work.   
 
Yet it would be a significant error to suggest that the minimalist logic of distribution – indeed of any of its 
transumptive modalities – necessarily ends with the perceptual or conceptual ordering of space. The 
atopia within which is discovered the predication of the minimalist poetic, extends across and beyond any 
simple separation of nature, technology or art. Its province, to recall, is the Real: the indifferent taking-
place of contingent entities qua their ontological quantity. The exemplarity of minimalism does not, 
however, reside in its capacity to produce, or even influence the Real, but rather as a means of reflecting 
the sheer consistency of the Real in the face of pure multiplicity. The minimalist object persists, and 
through its persistence it clarifies the facticity of the Real. Minimalism offers the aesthetic means with 
which to maintain the crucial if often minimal distinction between Being and Void, existence and 
inexistence, order and chaos: this is its exemplary vocation.  
 
In this spirit, we look to the far corner of Ian Hamilton Finlay‟s Little Sparta, backed by woodland and 
facing the untamed landscape from which its poietic substance has been wrought, to discover Finlay‟s 
most iconic work: The Present Order is the Disorder of the Future – Saint-Just (Figure 115).2365 The 
poietic and prophetic force of these words – each chiselled on a giant slab of rock, powerful fragments of 
a great existential logic, of the conflict of radical and revolutionary logic
2366
 – confirm the sense that one 
has reached both a physical and a poietic threshold. Its medium is massive, brutal, and durable. Yet, these 
words are fragments – broken, partial and rendered coherent only by immense force and effort. Theirs is a 
                                                          
2362
 MAP, 102. 
2363
 Ibid. It should be noted that Meyer is referring to a different work from the one presently under consideration, 
and so my following statements in this regard should be viewed as expansionary and not contradictory.  
2364
 Baker, Minimalism, 19. 
2365
 Ian Hamilton Finlay, The Present Order is the Disorder of the Future, Saint-Just, 1983. Little Sparta, Dunsyre. 
2366
 These are, after all, the words of the French Revolutionary and co-architect of the Terror, Saint-Just.  
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minimalism which expresses itself in contingency, and which takes its tentative shape precisely within the 
indifferent passage of time – within the Real, the facticity and persistence of which it exemplifies with a 
tenacity which strains across every medium, across history, and across thought itself. Minimalism reflects 
a profound sense of vulnerability, but also persistence, which inhabits the entire poietic enterprise.  
 
 
Figure 115: Ian Hamilton Finlay, The Present Order is the Disorder of the Future, Saint-Just, 1983.  
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